Zambezia (1991), XVIII (i).INTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONAND THE LAW IN THE FIRST DECADE OFZIMBABWE'S INDEPENDENCEANGELA P. CHEATERDepartment of Sociology, University of ZimbabweNINETEEN EIGHTY-NINE was the year in which the Zimbabwean government, in itseconomic policies, voluntarily turned away from its earlier profession of socialismand embarked on a policy of trade liberalization. In the longer term, therefore, thefirst decade of Zimbabwe's independence may prove to be anomalous Š anephemeral hiccup in its essentially 'capitalist1 history. From another perspective,however, the impact of labour policies during this period may prove to have morelasting effects than even the government dreamed of. The altered legal frameworkduring the first decade of Independence has given both labour and capitalpractice in forms of confrontation and manipulation that are unlikely to beforgotten in a hurry by either side of this production relationship. The politicizationof work and the workplace in Zimbabwe may not easily be eradicated, even by themassive unemployment currently being experienced by youthful school-leavers,which is likely to continue irrespective of what economic policies are adopted inthe future. The replacement of racial discrimination during the colonial era by theproblems of class differentiation among Blacks after Independence has clearlyhad an important (and thus far negative) impact on production output in manyenterprises. These and many other experiences of Zimbabwe's temporary flirtationwith socialism can be expected to influence both her immediate adjustment to'liberal' economic policies, which will tilt the balance once again in favour ofcapital and its management, and any equilibrium which may be established in thelonger term.It is important, therefore, that we understand in some detail exactlywhat did happen during the 1980s in Zimbabwe's industrial sector, ratherthan run the risk that, as political ideologies, together with what counts aslegitimate history, change, these experiences will be expunged from ourcollective memory as being history incompatible with contemporary realityin the future. It is important to record in accessible, published form theshop-floor findings of industrial sociology during the 1980s, so that they willbe available to future generations of researchers and teachers in this field.THE ENTERPRISES STUDIEDAlthough all of the workshop participants' research interests were definedindividually, their choices have, fortunately, enabled this collection to1INTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE LAWcover most of the major forms of enterprise ownership in Zimbabwe.State-owned companies are represented by 'Parastatal', a single enterprisestudied successively by both Shadur and Mutizwa-Mangiza. Within theprivate sector, the local subsidiaries of different transnationals were inves-tigated by Maphosa and Gaidzanwa. 'Zimcor', discussed by Cheater,straddled this divide, with a majority state shareholding and participationby both transnationals and local companies, while 'Zimtex' is an exampleof a wholly local company quoted on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, withsome individual shareholders resident overseas. Our examples thereforecover a wide range of ownership variation, with the exception of thehandful of recently formed co-operatives. These companies, with a mini-mum of 500 employees, also represent the large-firm sector of the Zimba-bwean economy. They have all been made anonymous.Given the diverse nature of the enterprises studied, the congruence ofthe research findings by the different authors is striking, attesting to thesignificance of structural processes in widely differing contexts. Theirinterpretations of their data, however, sometimes differ. In particular,readers may be struck by the divergent interpretations offered by Shadurand Mutizwa-Mangiza of what was happening in the management of thesame enterprise. Perhaps their differences confirm Karl Mannheim's (1936)assertion that there is no 'God's-eye view' of social reality, merely a seriesof different perspectives, even among scientific observers who, like thesocial actors observed, may be differently-placed in respect of their gender,nationality and other social attributes. In this respect, though, one mightnote the shared interpretations of the Zimbabwean industrial scene by thefour Zimbabwean contributors, irrespective of their differences of raceand gender. It is, therefore, especially useful to have this shared insiders'perspective leavened by that of Shadur as an outsider.RESEARCH THEMESThe articles collected here deal with a number of substantial themes, onsome of which we do not have as much hard data as we would like. Forothers, however, more detailed information has already been published:the bibliography on industrial sociology in Zimbabwe at the end of thiscollection is, we hope, comprehensive and will allow interested readers topursue specific issues in more detail should they so wish.Among the many issues raised in these articles, some recur in manydifferent contexts, indicating their structural importance in the system ofindustrial relations in Zimbabwe. These recurrently important themesinclude: the changing legal framework of labour relations; the limitedextent of de facto workers' participation in the different enterprises andthe causes of these limitations; the inverse relationship between democra-ANGELA P.CHEATERtization and bureaucratization in the workplace, which is related to differentialeducation; the importance of the informal structure of social relations in theworkplace; the links of urban workers to the countryside; the growing impactof class differentials among Zimbabwean Blacks and their impact onproduction relations; the impact of its non-productive welfare functions(housing, etc.) on production relations within an enterprise; the impact ofrace on production relations; the role and problems of supervisors on theshop-floor; and the politicization not only of production relations but also ofthe relationships of workers' dependants to employing companies and of therole of the 'workers' representative'.It may be helpful to consider, in the necessary comparative detail, atleast some of these themes as they are reflected in the different articles, andto provide additional background information which the papers often assumein their own arguments.THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF LABOUR RELATIONSClassically, newly established socialist states have begun their transform-ation with new laws governing land tenure and marriage. Zimbabwe, however,gave early attention to legalizing the state control of remuneration (in theMinimum Wages Act, No. 4 of 1980) and of the relations between employerand employee (in the Employment Act, No. 13 of 1980). Contrary to popularbelief, however, as reflected, for example, in Sachikonye (1990, 3-4), theMinimum Wages Act did not establish for the first time the principle of aminimum wage: for certain categories of industrial worker that principle wasestablished by the Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 21 of 1945, section 27(1))and the Native Labour Boards Act (No. 26 of 1947, section 21(2)) and madenon-racial by the Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 29 of 1959), while itsgeneralization to agricultural workers dates from 1979 (S. I. 917 of 1979).The Minimum Wages and Employment Acts were 'holding operations',establishing a measure of central control while the state prepared a morecoherent legal framework to restructure the triangular interface betweenindustrial capital, labour and itself. This exercise took longer than expected:the Labour Relations Act (No. 16 of 1985) was promulgated at the very endof 1985, after extensive criticism of early draft bills by both labour andcapital, and became effective at the beginning of 1986. The Labour RelationsAct incorporated the core provisions of both of the earlier Acts.There is considerable misunderstanding of the intentions of both theIndustrial Conciliation and Labour Relations Acts, perhaps because bothare sufficiently long (89 and 80 pages, respectively) to deter all but themost determined reader. A detailed comparison of their provisions, how-ever, is necessary to cut through misinformed popular and state discourseson the subject of labour relations in Independent Zimbabwe. Even beforeINTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE LAWsuch a comparison, though, one needs to note the background context Što both pieces of legislation Š of the development of a new state (datingfrom 1890) and the strengthening of its powers. The original IndustrialConciliation Act (No. 10 of 1934) was the first attempt by this new state toexert any measure of control over a fledgling, but growing, industrial base.Earlier statutes attempting to control labour, such as the Masters andServants Act (No. 5 of 1901) did not apply to skilled workers. The IndustrialConciliation Act exempted certain categories of employee from its prov-isions: those working in agriculture, domestic service, the civil service,education (including universities) and those working free for charities.The Labour Relations Act extended considerably the theoretical reach ofthe state into employment, exempting only those whose conditions ofemployment are provided for in the Constitution of Zimbabwe.Before comparing the content of the Industrial Conciliation and LabourRelations Acts, one should first note their different intentions. It is clear thatthe Industrial Conciliation Act assumed conflict between capital and labour(or at least between employers and employees) to be endemic, requiring asystem of bureaucratized adjudication to resolve such disputes. Layingdown the rules for entering into and adjudicating such conflicts wasconsidered to be the responsibility of the state, but the ensuing negotiationsand their outcome were the responsibility of the conflicting parties. To thisend, the Act established two two-tier adjudication hierarchies, one concernedwith matters of registration and membership of trade unions and employers'associations (an industrial court to which decisions of industrial boardscould be appealed), and the other concerned with the resolution of industrialconflict through bureaucratic procedures (industrial tribunal(s) plusindustrial councils/conciliation boards, both of the latter composed of bothemployers and employees). The Act thus brought under the bureaucraticcontrol of the state the recognition of both trade unions and employers'organizations as part of the system of regulating industrial conflict and itsresolution. Finally, it dealt with ancillary matters, including the status ofunregistered trade unions and employers' organizations, procedures ofmediation and arbitration, the control of savings and other funds owned bytrade unions and employers' associations, and matters of publication. Theobjectives of the Industrial Conciliation Act were thus very limited andbased on the pattern of labour relations which had emerged in the UnitedKingdom, Europe and North America before the Second World War.With two important exceptions, the colonial state regarded matters ofemployment and dispute resolution connected with employment as strictlyprivate affairs. These exceptions included the state's outlawing after 1959,firstly, of the differentiation or discrimination of work or work conditionson the basis of 'race, colour or religion' (Chapter 267 [1974], sections36(2), 40(l)(e), 57(l)h, 78(2), and, secondly, of victimization of employeesANGELA P. CHEATERgiving information to the state's industrial-conciliation machinery againsttheir employers (section 136). For the rest, the Act specifically stated that'This Act shall not bind the State' (section 3) and severely restricted thecapacity of the Minister of Labour to intervene in industrial matters. Thecolonial bureaucratization of labour relations involved state controlexercised through civil servants, not politicians.The role of the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, as it then was,under this legislation was restricted to: statutorily receiving a copy of allagreements negotiated by industrial councils or conciliation boards (sec-tion 86); declaring Š at the request of the industrial council or concil-iation board concerned Š and publishing such agreements to be bindingon all parties in a particular area or sector of industry, taking into accountalso the interests of consumers and 'the public as a whole' (sections 113,114, 116); having the right to make a final determination to refuse to makean agreement binding if he considered it to be contrary to the interests ofconsumers or the general public, but being subject to the adjudication ofthe industrial tribunal if he refused to make an agreement binding on anyother grounds (with the later provision that the State President could, bynotice in the Government Gazette, declare the Minister's decision to befinal: section 117(4)); being able to prevent the referral, by an industrialcouncil or conciliation board, of a dispute to an industrial tribunal foradjudication if such action would likely result in changes to an industrialagreement during its agreed duration (section 100(1)); being able to takeover and operate, in the event of industrial action which prevented itsnormal operations, any enterprise delivering essential services (definedas the supply of light, power, water, sanitation works, fire extinction andthe mining of coal (section 142)); and consulting employers on mattersaffecting the interests of employers or employees (section 150(3)). Inaddition, only the Minister could authorize, in writing, anyone to holdoffice simultaneously in more than one (registered or unregistered) tradeunion, employers' organization, or both (sections 47(1), 67(1)).The Minister did not constitute the final state authority in anyessentially judicial matters. He could not be appealed to over recognitionor registration or the operation of workers' or employers' organizations,or the termination of membership in unions or employers' bodies. Heappointed members of the Industrial Court (of record) and the chairmenof industrial tribunals (which could also act as courts of inquiry), but hadno statutory right to become involved in the outcome of decisions onconflict resolution made by either of these appeal divisions of theadjudication hierarchies. The essentially apolitical nature of the IndustrialConciliation Act was also reflected in its insistence that no registered orunregistered trade union or employers' organization might affiliate itselfto any political party or organization, use any of its funds to further anyINTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE LAWindividual or collective political interests, allow its property or facilities tobe used for any political purposes, or receive financial or other assistancefrom political organizations of any kind (sections 49, 66). Such pretensionsto apolitical labour relations parallel the separation of legislative, executiveand judicial powers. Both are concerned to develop a legal-rationalbureaucracy, Max Weber's (1947) acme of efficient organization, especiallyin industrialized societies.But in some views, of course, both apolitical labour relations and theseparation of powers are dismissed as mystifications of capital's interests.These views argue that labour relations are, by definition, political,concerned with the power relations linking capital to labour. Any legislationthat does not favour labour, therefore, by definition favours capital, andall ostensibly apolitical legislation falls into this category. Such views wereespoused by Zanu(PF) (cf. ZANU[PF], 1980) and the new Zimbabweangovernment after Independence. Hence it is not at all surprising that thefundamental assumptions as well as the content of the Labour RelationsAct are very different from those of the Industrial Conciliation Act.The Labour Relations Act explicitly takes the part of labour in thecapital-labour relationship, as can be demonstrated by classifying itsobjectives into four divisions. Firstly, this Act declares and defines 'thefundamental rights of employees [and] unfair labour practices', and regulates'conditions of employment and other related matters'. Specifically, workerorganizations are given the right to recommend industrial action (includingstrike action: section 29(4)(g), and the Act indemnifies individual workers aswell as workers' committees and registered (but not unregistered) tradeunions against civil liability for lawful collective industrial action), whileemployers are not given the right to lock-outs or other collective action(sections 120-123, 29(5)). In its second category of objectives, the LabourRelations Act moves on to provide for state control over the economy inways antithetical to the assumptions of the colonial system that employmentis a private matter: 'to regulate and control collective job action [and]employment agencies; to provide for the control of wages and salaries [and]the appointment of workers' committees'. A third set of objectives of this Actincludes taking over, renaming and expanding the institutional base of coloniallabour relations, providing for 'the formation, registration, certification andfunctions of trade unions, employers' organizations, employment councilsand employment boards; the establishment and functions of the LabourRelations Board and the Labour Relations Tribunal'. Finally, the LabourRelations Act reveals a Utopian view of what the future might hold, in seeking'to provide for the prevention of trade disputes, and unfair labour practices'Š a united future, without preventable conflict.In this ideological perspective, then, the law can dissolve the inherentclass antagonism between capital and labour and create industrial harmony.ANGELA P.CHEATERIt is, moreover, the duty of the state and its political functionaries tooversee the dissolution of this class antagonism. Apolitical systems mustbe politicized. One result of this politicization, however, appears to be theconversion of a legal-rational bureaucracy into a patrimonial bureaucracy,as controlling politicians have appropriated the state apparatus in orderto achieve these goals. The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (No. 23of 1981, section 5(6)) outlawed discrimination on the basis of 'tribe, etc'as well as race, and the Labour Relations Act equally prohibits discriminationin employment 'on the grounds of race, tribe, place of origin, politicalopinion, colour, creed or sex' (section 5(1)). But Zimbabweans have cause tobelieve that their state sector now operates on the particularistic principlesof tribalism, nepotism and ministerial directives on appointments. It is nolonger a universalistic system, if it ever was.It is instructive to note the sheer extent to which labour relationswere politicized in the Labour Relations Act by noting what functions werevested in the Minister as final authority in contrast to the colonial situationoutlined above Š and I should note that this list is incomplete! TheMinister currently: defines unfair labour practices (section 10); grantspermission to delay or withhold wage payments (section 13(2)); allowswelfare and fringe benefits to be diminished (section 16(2)(b)); makes'regulations providing for the development, improvement, protection,regulation and control of employment and conditions of employment',which regulations 'prevail over the provisions of any other statutoryinstrument or of any agreement or arrangement whatsoever' (section 17(1)and (2)), including, it would appear from this wording, the law of contract.Specifically in terms of sections 17(3), 19, 20 and 22, the Minister mayregulate, among many others, minimum and maximum wages, bonuses,increments, allowances, benefits, social security, retirement and super-annuation benefits, wage deductions, hours of work (including overtime),rest and meal breaks, the provision of food, leave of all kinds, holidayentitlements, the establishment of and contributions to pension schemes,medical and other insurances, the settlement of disputes, the recruitmentof all types of labour, whether Zimbabwean or foreign, and the reinstate-ment of workers suspended or dismissed without his permission.The Minister also exercises direct and indirect control over employ-ment councils, employers, trade unions and workers' committees. Firstly,the Labour Relations Act sets up a deliberate monopoly system in itsrequirement that 'there should be no more than one certified trade unionor employers' organization for each undertaking or industry' (section45(l)(d)). Secondly, 'if the Minister has reasonable cause to believe thatthe property or funds of any trade union, employers' organization orfederation are being misappropriated or misapplied', or that their affairs'are being conducted in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of itsINTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE LAWmembers as a whole', the Minister may appoint an investigation into theorganization's affairs, and may accept or reject any recommendations towithdraw its recognition by the state and for it to cease operating (section136). For some odd reason, more control (both financial (section 61) andpolitical) is exercised by the Minister over trade unions than overemployers' organizations. 'Where the national interest so demands', theMinister may not only 'cause to be supervised... elections to any office or post ina registered or certified trade union or employers' organization' (section 55(1)).He may also, for reasons of 'national interest', prohibit any candidate fromconducting an election campaign for such office (section 55(2)(d)).The Minister may direct employers, workers and their respectiveorganizations to negotiate or renegotiate a collective-bargaining agreement(section 25), and that parts of such a collective-bargaining agreement(notably concerning wages) be implemented before they are ratified bythe negotiating parties as required in the Act (section 83). He may alsorefuse to allow the registration by the state of such agreements untilamended (section 84). Moreover, the Minister may: 'make such regulationsas he considers necessary for the control of workers' committees' (section26(1)); specify maximum trade union, employers' organization and employ-ment council dues (sections 28(2), 57, 58, 64(d)), levies to support theLabour Relations Board and Tribunal (section 139), and the mode ofpayment of such dues (section 60); direct payment of union dues 'into atrust fund and not to the trade union concerned' (section 60(3)(b)); approveor revoke the authority of a trade union to act on behalf of non-unionmembers, as an 'agent union' (sections 31, 32, 56); and institute accredit-ation enquiries into the (continued) registration of any trade union oremployers' organization (sections 39, 41).The-consent of the Minister is necessary for any employer to 'threaten,recommend or engage in a lock-out' or to take punitive action in respect ofcontinued employment, wages or benefits as a result of a lock-out (section121), even though, as I have already indicated, employers do not in facthave the right to such collective action in the first place! Perhaps section121 is merely making doubly sure . . . Such industrial action may in anycase be terminated or delayed for up to 90 days by a 'show-cause order' or'disposal order' issued by the Minister (sections 122, 123). Any partyaggrieved by the issuance of, or refusal to issue, such an order may appealdirectly to the Labour Relations Tribunal (section 126(1)), but such anappeal does not affect in any way the implementation of such an order,although the Minister may, during the period in which an appeal isconsidered, 'give such directions to, or impose such restrictions on, anyof the parties as he considers fair and reasonable, taking into account therespective rights of the parties and the public interest' (section 126(2)).Employment boards, governing conditions of employment, areANGELA P.CHEATERappointed by and report to the Minister (sections 70-73, 77), who isrequired 'as far as is practicable under the circumstances' (section 72(2)),to ensure 'equality of representation' of the interests of employers andemployees. He must 'pay due regard to' (but not necessarily appoint!) anypersons nominated by any interested party to such an employment board(section 71), and may vary its investigative authority (to another board, orto a trade union) if he considers that the interests of the employees concerned'would be more properly served' by such a transfer (section 78).The Minister also appoints, and may suspend or dismiss, all membersof the Labour Relations Board (sections 88, 91), which is the board ofappeal against determinations made by the state's regional hearing officers.In turn, appeals against the Board's determinations are heard by theLabour Relations Tribunal, members of which are appointed, suspendedand dismissed by the State President (sections 99-104). From the Tribunal,appeals must be made directly to the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. At thefirst level of appeal in this hierarchy, there is explicit scope for politicaldetermination: 'The Minister may give to the Board directions of a generalor specific nature, and the Board shall comply with such directions'(section 93(4)). Interestingly, an appeal may be made to the Board onlywith the consent either of the regional hearing officer, or of a member ofthe Board itself (section 113): thus the right of appeal is not automatic butinstead is controlled by interested gate-keepers who are part of thedetermination system. Moreover, although the Board and Tribunal alikemay co-opt non-voting experts to assist their deliberations (sections 93(5),105(5)), political appointees, not experts, decide. For example, if anaggrieved party alleges unfair labour practices, the Minister may ordereither a labour relations officer of the state or the Labour Relations Boardto investigate such allegations (section 114).The comparison of new and old appeal structures shows quite clearlythe different principles on which the Industrial Conciliation and LabourRelations Acts were constructed (see Table I). Laying out the comparisonsin tabular form allows us to see how much authority in respect of industrial-conflict resolution has been removed from the disputing actors themselvesand vested in politicians controlling the state apparatus. The authority ofsuch politicians now extends to the lower reaches of the expandedbureaucratic hierarchy controlling both capital and labour.As might be expected in such a structure, the Labour Relations Actprovides for direct links between civil servants (notably the labour relationsofficers and hearing officers) and the Minister. Such civil servants mustinform the Minister 'forthwith' when they order compulsory arbitration ofa dispute (section 117(1)), but it is then the Minister's responsibility to referthe matter to the Labour Relations Tribunal or to appoint (at the request ofthe disputing parties) an independent mediator (section 117(2)). Thus a10INTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE LAWTable ICOMPARATIVE STRUCTURES OF THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACTAND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTLevel of appeal Industrial Conciliation ActLabour Relations ActFinal industrial tribunals)(chairman appointed byminister, four membersappointed by chairman)Penultimate industrial councils)/conciliation boards(constituted by employers plustrade unions; registered byIndustrial Registrar)Secondary nilInitial nilSupreme CourtLabour RelationsTribunal(all members appointedby State President)Labour Relations Board(all members appointedby Minister)state hearing officerssenior politician is required to communicate between state functionariesand the political appointees to higher-level decision-making organs. Whereascolonial civil servants, not politicians, had decision-making authority overindustrial relations issues, in Independent Zimbabwe civil servants merelyimplement at the lowest level of the system political decisions taken elsewherein the expanded and fully politicized state system.Of course, one must distinguish among different types of politicization.Zimbabwe's ruling party has been quite happy to politicize the stateapparatus with its own ideology and personnel. But given its orientationto the perspectives of labour, the Labour Relations Act shows one startlingsimilarity to its predecessor: section 35(c) prohibits the use of associationfunds, whether by trade unions or employers' associations, for 'election-eering' or any other unspecified 'political purposes'. Moreover, sections39 and 40 allow for 'any interested party' (including the one concerned) torequest the Registrar of Labour Relations to vary, suspend or rescind theregistration or certification of any trade union or employers' organizationand to supply his reasons for so doing. Legitimate reasons for such actionare not defined in the Act, allowing the Registrar very wide latitude. Oncean employers' organization or union loses its recognition by the state,given the accreditation provisions of the Act (sections 41-44), it could beextremely difficult to restore such recognition. It would seem, from theseANGELA P. CHEATER 11provisions, that an organization could lose such recognition on 'political'grounds Š an irrefutable allegation that it had, indeed, used funds forsome 'political' purpose.Another aspect of politicization also merits specific attention. As Ihave noted earlier, one of the assumptions underlying the Labour RelationsAct is that a directive state can eliminate the class conflict between capitaland labour. Yet whereas the Industrial Conciliation Act had required theMinister to permit an individual to hold office in both a union and anemployers' organization, the Labour Relations Act (section 45(l)(b))requires the Registrar of Labour Relations to 'ensure compliance' with therequirements that 'a trade union shall not represent employers or mana-gerial employees' (the latter defined as enjoying a 'confidential relation-ship' with an employer concerning the rights and interests of otheremployees), and that an employers' organization shall represent onlymanagerial employees. There is a fundamental contradiction in a positionthat, on the one hand, defines the class lines ever more stringently and, onthe other, avers the possibility of harmonious relations between capitaland labour, for such a position explicitly prevents the development ofcross-cutting ties which blur definitional boundaries through thedevelopment of mutual rather than opposing interests.Under such circumstances, it would be naive to expect in the futurethat workers and managers will immediately forget the techniques theyhave learned over the past decade to exert political influence within thispoliticized system. To put it differently, can the system be depoliticized?Certainly at this point there is no indication that government intends todepoliticize the constitution or operation of its own institutions. In itsattempt to cut down the bureaucratic delays that have frustrated retrench-ment since 1985, the independent state has used its 'traditional' operatingprinciples in formulating the Labour Relations (Retrenchment) Regulations(S. 1.404 of 1990), which provide for the Minister to appoint seven members(three civil servants, two employers' representatives and two workers'representatives) to the new Retrenchment Committee. This committeemust decide on applications referred to it within two weeks and makerecommendations to the Minister, which he may accept or reject. If theRetrenchment Committee fails to make such recommendations, the Ministerwill decide anyway! Both Minister and Committee are bound by two basicprinciples: that retrenchment should be avoided and that its consequencesshould be mitigated (section 7).It is true that various researchers (Cheater, 1986; Gaidzanwa. thisvolume) have reported dissatisfaction among workers with the practicalimplementation of these worker-oriented legal provisions, and that bothpoliticians and civil servants (especially those supposed to implement theLabour Relations Act) have tended to develop class interests consonant12 INTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE LAWwith, rather than opposed to, those of capital. Nonetheless, the politicalrhetoric of national unity requires that government be seen to be on theside of the workers (and peasants). It is thus unlikely that the law will alterits form of discourse and highly probable that an even larger gap willdevelop in the era of trade liberalization between the law and its practicalimplementation. In government as in industry, informal social relationsand connections are therefore likely to become increasingly important.FORMAL BUREAUCRATIC AND INFORMAL PRODUCTION RELATIONSLarger enterprises in the Zimbabwean economy are becoming increasinglybureaucratic in their mode of operation, whether these bureaucraticprocedures and relationships grow out of managerial conflict at theshopfloor level or are imposed from above (for example, in standardizedpractices devolved from head office in the case of subsidiaries of trans-national corporations). Perhaps the most obvious index of suchbureaucratization is the current popularity of the Paterson Method of jobclassification, which emphasizes the decision-making content of jobs ingrading them as unskilled, semi-skilled or skilled and has many localvariants in Zimbabwean enterprises. As Shadur (1989, 235) notes: 'Thereare grounds for concluding that the Paterson Method has been adoptedon a major scale in Zimbabwe as a result of the weak labour movementwhich has not had the expertise and strength to resist this method', butpersonnel departments all over Zimbabwe have over the past decadebeen involved in job-regrading on this basis. However, Gaidzanwa indicatesthat standardized practices at 'Gold Mine' were very difficult to enforce,and Cheater deals with the responses of both workers and management toincreasing bureaucratization more generally. Both papers, together withthat of Mutizwa-Mangiza, describe some of the specific difficulties of super-visors in a situation of ongoing bureaucratization.Supervisors have structural difficulties in all systems, of course, especiallywhen they have been promoted from the shop-floor, and most of thesedifficulties centre on the differing informal social relationships betweenworkmates and between unequals. These difficulties may be furthercomplicated when, as Maphosa indicates, the supervisor's promotion hasresulted from his initial election to workers' representative and/or to partypolitical office. But there are particular difficulties for supervisors in nego-tiating informally with their subordinates about regular as well as overtimework when these subordinates have access to other productive resources.Gaidzanwa notes, for example, that locals from the communal land sur-rounding Gold Mine, having their agricultural interests tended by theirwives, were less tractable than 'foreigners' working at the mine to supervisory'discipline' at work. Yet even while they regarded their mine wages asANGELA P. CHEATER 13supplementary to their total productive resources, the local workers werealso particularly threatened by any failure of this wage source, given theinadequacy of agriculture as a sole source of income under local environ-mental conditions. Local workers, therefore, had to confront at closer rangethe trade-offs available to them from (migratory or commuter) wage employ-ment and agriculture in ways that, perhaps, workers without such optionsmay have envied.As what Maphosa calls 'bureaucratic logic' tightens its grip on theorganization of production, and the 'chain of command' lengthens inex-orably (best exemplified in Parastatal), so informal social relations becomemore, not less, important to ordinary workers. As Maphosa and Mutizwa-Mangiza point out, even those workers elected to represent others on theworkers' committees do not have the necessary education or skills tomanipulate the bureaucratic order: they must, therefore, manipulate peoplein order to get what they want. This falling-back by workers on personalrelationships in the work-place exacerbates the politicization of ostensiblybureaucratic relations, diverting them into patrimonial forms and contra-dicting the original intention of state policy-makers to quash especiallyracial discrimination by legal-rational means.RACE AND CLASSThe Industrial Conciliation Act was and is widely and wrongly thought tohave disadvantaged workers mainly on the basis of race. In fact, as Iindicated earlier, this Act explicitly outlawed differentiation or discrim-ination, including in industrial agreements, on the basis of 'race, tribe,colour or creed' in respect of work, though it did permit such discriminationon the basis of age, sex, experience, length of employment and type ofpremises (sections 36(2), 78(2)). The Act did not permit the IndustrialRegistrar to register any trade union or employers' organization formed'for the purpose of furthering the interests of its members on a basis ofrace, colour or religion' (section 40(l)(e) and required him to enquirepublicly, for 'reasonable cause', into unions and organizations believed tobe functioning so as to further the interests of their members on the basisof 'race, colour or religion' and to cancel the registration of offendingbodies 'unless cause [was] shown to the contrary' (section 57(l)(h)). Theonus was thus on such organizations to prove to the state that they werenot operating in a racist manner.But the real problem in colonial Rhodesia was not legalized, structuralracism of the kind characteristic of South Africa: it was de Facto, practicaldiscrimination in everyday life, and that problem has by no means yetbeen resolved, eleven years after Independence. In the early 1980s, suchpractical discrimination was responsible for considerable industrial unrest14 INTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE LAWin individual enterprises (see, for example, Cheater, 1986). Some of thepapers here address this issue in the context of removing the colonialoverlap between race and class. Maphosa broadly indicates the backgroundproblems inherited from colonialism. Shadur deals with these continuingproblems after Independence. Cheater shows how government policyrapidly Africanized enterprise management, while exacerbating the classdivide between workers and executive management. In yet more detail,Gaidzanwa shows how the response of Black managerial staff to perceivedracism in promotions at Gold Mine was politicized in various ways: bycalling in the local Member of Parliament and mobilizing workers' wives ina public demonstration.DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE POLITICIZATION OFPRODUCTION RELATIONSPoliticization may be a strategy of last resort, used by managers andworkers alike. Gaidzanwa, for example, notes that in contexts not involvingaccusations of racism, the ZANU(PF) Women's League at Gold Mine wasmobilized to demonstrate against managerial employees with whomworkers were dissatisfied. Maphosa observes that such politicization,especially by members of workers' committees, was particularly likely tooccur in mining enterprises operating in relatively isolated areas. In anearlier publication, Cheater (1986, 93) described the Zimtex supervisors''takeover' of the local Zanu(PF) apparatus in order to reduce their post-Independence supervisory problems at work, which had been caused byafter-hours political action against them in the workers' village.These examples of the politicization of work relations, whether bysupervisors, managers or workers, are perhaps related to the high butunfulfilled expectations of workplace democratization found by Maphosaimmediately after Independence. These expectations far exceeded thelevel of democratization that the state (never mind management) wasprepared to allow, as both Maphosa and Mutizwa-Mangiza detail in theirarticles. It could be argued that the workers were deliberately misled onthe subject of worker participation by political rhetoric (for example, inthe Zanu(PF) Election Manifestos of 1980 and 1985 (see ZANU[PF], 1980and 1985)), and that their subsequent politicization of work relationsrepresents a backlash against their continuing subordination, now tobureaucratic rather than racial control. Such bureaucratic control isespecially clear in the case of the parastatal enterprises, with their extra-ordinarily long chains of command culminating in the Cabinet as finaldecision-making manager, and in the Labour Relations Act itself.The question for the structurally-adjusted future must then become:how will previously politicized workplaces be controlled, and by whom?