Zambezia (1991), XVIII (i).LABOUR RELATIONS IN AZIMBABWEAN PARASTATALM. SHADURGraduate School of Management, University of QueenslandTHE CASE OF 'Parastatal' Š in which research was carried out from 1984 toearly 1988, before the Parastatals Commission was established Šexemplifies that the advent of Independence and the Mugabe Government'slabour policies had a major impact on labour relations in some enterprisesin Zimbabwe. Before Independence, management practices and attitudeswere typical of colonial enterprises: White managers ruled Black workerswith a mixture of racism and paternalism. Managers did not feel compelledor obliged to react to workers' grievances. After Independence there washostility between workers and management as workers sought to havetheir pent-up grievances resolved. Over time, co-operative relations wereestablished between workers and management. Workers' demands wererecognized as legitimate and management genuinely took workers' viewsinto account. Structures were established to enable workers' representa-tives to negotiate labour relations policies from the shop-floor workers'committees through to the employment board for the industry. Many Whitesrefused to conform to the post-Independence labour relations regime andleft Parastatal, and this gave rise to rapid Black advancement which facilitatedthe shift from racist management practices. In this case, too, the workers'committees did not undermine trade unions; in fact the workers' com-mittees relentlessly endeavoured to strengthen union organization.Parastatal is a statutory authority which was established in 1952. Atthe time this research was undertaken, it was virtually a monopolypurchaser, processor and supplier, controlling over 95 per cent of thedomestic market for its products. Domestic market competition occurredwith respect to some of its minor products, although Parastatal was thesole supplier to its private-sector competitors of the basic ingredients forsuch products. Sales were overwhelmingly to the domestic market, withlimited exports to Southern African countries. In 1984 sales realized $71,5million. The national workforce numbered approximately 3 800 people insix processing enterprises and 48 depots located throughout the country.Thus the organization was quite large and played an important role inZimbabwe's economy.Parastatal operated in deficit, funded by state subsidies. The annualtrading account deficit increased dramatically after Independence, risingfrom 7 per cent of sales in the year to June 1980 to over 50 per cent of sales2526 LABOUR RELATIONS IN A ZIMBABWEAN PARASTATALin each year from 1983. Parastatal managers stated that the company didnot operate at a loss: the deficit was the inevitable result of governmentpricing policy and, in particular, its subsidy to consumers. Governmentset the price paid to producers and the selling price for processed products.A major factor in the deficit, then, was that the average prices paid toproducers increased by 126 per cent from mid-1980 to 1985, while theprice to consumers remained static from 1 July 1979 until a 50 per centincrease in September 1983, and a 20 per cent increase in November 1984.After Independence, the government decided to remove the subsidies toparastatals gradually and began raising consumer prices, though economicdifficulties interrupted this policy and deficits continued. In addition,Parastatal was required to accept everything that registered producersproduced, regardless of market demand. In the mid-1980s, this requirementto accept production which was surplus to market demand contributed toParastatal's deficit. The consequence for labour relations was that fundswere not available to meet workers' demands involving money. Thissituation was largely beyond management's control.DECISION-MAKING AT PARASTATALThere were many decision-making tiers above the six processing plants(see Table I)- Each of the six regional managers of the processing plantsreported to the General Manager through other managers at Head Officein Harare. Head Office in turn reported to the Agricultural MarketingAuthority (AMA), primarily through the industry committee of the AMA.At Independence virtually all managers and senior employees wereWhite. There were two conditions of service: for 'established staff, whichgenerally meant skilled and senior employees, most of whom were White,and for 'non-established staff, who were invariably Black. There was noindustrial relations officer within the enterprise, nor was there any tradeunion of any significance, although some Black Bulawayo workers joined aunion federated to the United Food and Allied Workers' Union (UFAWU).There was no formal disciplinary code or grievance procedure, and record-keeping for Black workers was sketchy at best. Workers' representativesdid exist before Independence, but they were nominated by the personnelofficer, a management representative. Industrial relations between Blackworkers and White managers were probably no worse than in othercompanies; managers ruled with a mixture of paternalism and authori-tarianism. Members of the workers' committee fondly recalled one Whitemanager who disciplined workers 'like a father does'.In the absence of an effective voice for workers through trade unions,and in line with government policy, workers' committees were formed in1980. In the early 1980s, a volatile atmosphere characterized industrialM. SHADUR 27Table IAUTHORITY STRUCTURE AT PARASTATAL PRE-1988Cabinet Committee on Parastatals[Parastatals Commission 1988-1990]Minister of Agriculture, Ministry of AgricultureAgricultural Marketing AuthorityAMA Industry CommitteeGeneral ManagerRegional ManagersProcessing plantsHarare Bulawayo Gweru Kadoma Mutare Chipingerelations at Parastatal and the workers' committees were in the forefrontof these confrontations. A strike took place at the Harare processing plantin April 1980. Many White managers left, but wages and basic conditions ofemployment did not improve as quickly as workers had hoped. The twodifferent conditions of service remained intact, although senior Blacksnow enjoyed the superior benefits in terms of pension, health and leaveentitlements. Tensions built up as workers' calls for increased wages,improved conditions and an end to authoritarian management were notmet. Workers were frustrated and a Black manager was beaten up byworkers at one Harare depot in August 1982. This involved the police anda court case ensued against the workers, including workers' committeerepresentatives. The manager was transferred. The labour relations climatewas fractious, and the workers' committee agitated strongly for demands tobe met. They could not afford to be accused of being vatengesi (sell-outs).LABOUR RELATIONS AT PARASTATALHarare plant managers stated that Parastatal workers remained 'heatedup' and 'Bolshie' until the Harare bus drivers' strike early in 1982. Thecentre of this strike was situated immediately across the road fromParastatal's Harare processing plant, and its workers witnessed policeusing batons to load about 500 workers into police vans. This signal thatthe government would no longer tolerate strikes had a powerful impact indampening workers' demands. It was clear that militant action would notbe tolerated by the government, to whom workers had felt they could turnfor support against management. The prosecution of workers followingthe depot assault confirmed this, and workers' claims became less sweepingand instead focused on more immediate issues, those thought to be more28 LABOUR RELATIONS IN A ZIMBABWEAN PARASTATALachievable. With moderated demands, tension was reduced betweenmanagement and workers and relations slowly became more amicable.Militancy declined, though workers' committees still pushed for reforms,and labour relations procedures were gradually placed on aninstitutionalized basis. These included worker representative bodies,disciplinary and grievance procedures, job grading and remuneration,training and promotion.The Paterson Method of job evaluation was implemented in 1982 aftera government decision that all agricultural parastatals would use thismethod. There were constant appeals from workers for jobs to be regraded.Many workers and their representatives were perplexed by the PatersonMethod but they were unable to formulate persuasive objections to thescheme as a whole. However, Parastatal management agreed to regradingexercises and generally these were carried out by mutual agreement.The disciplinary procedures at Parastatal were handled amicably.There was a strong emphasis on reaching consensus, and generallymanagement administered discipline quite leniently. In many disciplinaryhearings the head of department was extremely loathe to dismiss workerseven where clear grounds existed under the code of conduct. This was inkeeping with management's policy to act as an enlightened employer.Another factor was that the Ministry of Labour had a marked influence onthe outcome of disciplinary cases. Many applications for dismissal wererejected by the Ministry and, as a result of these precedents, hearingcommittees frequently decided not to dismiss employees on the basis thatthe Ministry of Labour would probably reject the application. In the assaultcase mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Labour ordered the reinstatementof the workers' committee chairman even after the General Manager hadargued strongly for his dismissal and had sought support for the dismissalfrom the Ministry of Agriculture.Parastatal's workers' committee representatives strongly defendedaccused workers. In one case, a clerk with six years of unblemishedservice was apprehended in a theft valued at 48 cents. The code of conductstated that theft entailed dismissal but workers' committee membersstaunchly defended the employee for over an hour, and the head ofdepartment was sympathetic to their case. The hearing committee wasunable to reach a decision, and the workers' committee successfullyappealed to the Regional Manager for the employee's retention. Workersfelt that discipline was generally carried out fairly. Senior employees, andnot just workers, were subject to dismissal: in one case a White transportcontroller was dismissed for misusing company property.Training was extensive at Parastatal and Black advancement tookplace rapidly. By 1984 most managerial and senior positions were held byBlacks. Ten of the thirteen senior head office positions were held byM. SHADUR 29Blacks, including that of the General Manager, and three of the six regionalmanagers were Black. At the Harare processing plant, six of the fourteensenior positions were held by Blacks in late 1984, and this increased toeight in mid-1985, including the post of Regional Manager. One majorreason for the departure of Whites was their racial views, and another wasthe much higher pay levels in the private sector. The rate of promotion forBlack managers was exceptional.This high rate of promotion was beneficial for employee morale, andwas a major compensation for low managerial salaries. But there were anumber of problems associated with high staff turnover. Most serious wasthe promotion of inexperienced personnel into important managerialpositions. Parastatal was fortunate in that most of its staff coped wellunder these hectic conditions. There were some cases where staff wereconsidered not to have coped, and this resulted in some demoralizingdemotions. This issue was complicated, since no formal performanceappraisal was in operation at least until mid-1985. Another problem withrapid promotions was that high expectations were raised and senior stafftended to become frustrated as promotions slowed in the later 1980s. Theslowing down of promotions resulted in a decline in morale.Rapid promotion, however, did not apply to low-level workers.Turnover there was very low and many semi-skilled workers viewed therise of the bright young Blacks with a certain degree of wistfulness. Thiswas similarly the case with some of the White senior employees whostayed during the mid-1980s. There were cases where older or moreexperienced Whites felt passed over for promotion in favour of Blacks,though Whites continued to be promoted after Independence and someexperienced rapid promotion. The general view remained, though, thatBlacks were favoured for advancement. This form of affirmative actionwas to be expected given the historical changes in Zimbabwe, governmentpolicy and the fact that the company is a Parastatal.PARASTATAL'S WORKERS' COMMITTEESAt the Harare processing plant, there were 30 members of the centralworkers' committee, one from each department and from nearby depots.They elected six members to negotiate with management on the workscouncil, including the chairman and secretary. Since there was no certifiedtrade union, each of the workers' committees at the six processing plantselected a member to a national committee to represent workers at theemployment board for the industry (see Table II). Training for labournegotiations had been provided to workers' committee representatives atSilveira House, a respected Catholic-funded organization that had longpromoted the development of Black Zimbabweans.30 LABOUR RELATIONS IN A ZIMBABWEAN PARASTATALTable IITHE STRUCTURE OF WORKER REPRESENTATIONAT PARASTATALEmployment BoardDomestic Employment Board MeetingNational Employee Representatives MeetingWorkers' Committee Chairmen + Harare Secretary(Harare Bulawayo Gweru Kadoma Mutare Chipinge)Harare Works Council(4 workers + 4 managers)Central Workers' Committee(30 workers)WorkforceAt the plant level, workers' committees and works councils dealtprimarily with day-to-day labour relations issues, such as work scheduling,job grading and canteen issues. There was also some interest in thefunctioning of the enterprise, such as promoting the company's moreprofitable products, and questioning of appointment procedures followingthe embezzlement of funds by a recently appointed accountant. Executivemembers exhorted workers' committee representatives to encouragehonest work and deprecate absenteeism and laziness. The achievementsthrough these bodies tended to be piecemeal, like setting pay-day a fewdays earlier in the month or having specific jobs regraded. At the nationallevel, workers' committee representatives obtained broader benefits suchas the formulation and review of the job evaluation scheme and code ofconduct, the introduction of shift allowances, increases in vacation leave,bonuses and long-service leave, and the provision of a basic wage forvendors who sell on commission. Workers' committee representatives alsonegotiated general pay increases at employment board level (see below).WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSMany demands of the workers were not met by management: these includedcalls for massive wage increases (30 to 60 per cent) and the unification ofthe conditions of service between established and non-established staff.Established staff enjoyed superior conditions of service (for example, aM. SHADUR 31shorter working week, and longer vacation leave). This division continuedthroughout the period of my research, despite persistent strong calls fromworkers for unification. Management correctly argued that this was agovernment decision and workers had to put their case to the AMA. Thisthey did and the AMA in turn maintained it was a ministerial, indeedCabinet, decision. This buck-passing was largely an accurate reflection ofthe extensive decision-making layers controlling all parastatals. However,it was also a convenient means for higher authorities to avoid a difficultissue. Parastatal's management was committed to maintaining differentialrewards, and resisted moves from workers' committees to challenge this.Furthermore, its large deficits led Parastatal's management and governmentauthorities to minimize wages, allowances and other costs, so workers'requests that involved increased expenditure generally met with strongopposition. At times the atmosphere in meetings was very charged asworkers became frustrated with management's unwillingness to agree totheir proposals.Contrary to the view that workers' committees have underminedtrade unions, Parastatal's workers' committees worked hard to strengthenunion organization. Two rival unions existed in the industry, both ofwhich were unregistered. As mentioned earlier, a few hundred Bulawayoworkers belonged to a union federated to the well-established UnitedFood and Allied Workers' Union based in Bulawayo, and several hundredHarare workers were members of a union operated virtually by one man,the Secretary-General, R. Marufu. On 28 February 1983 Marufu's Unionconsisted of only 461 members. By February 1984 this number had doubled,although the union was poor. It operated from a single room in officesshared by other poor, ZANU(PF)-aligned unions. The Ministry of Labourhad rejected an application for its registration, since government policywas to have only one union in each industry and the union was incompetition with the unregistered Bulawayo-based union; hence neitherunion could represent its members at employment board meetings. TheHarare union did very little for Parastatal's workers. This was under-standable, given the union's lack of financial and other resources. Theworkers' committee continued to support the union, and gave its blessingto check-off payments, even though there was very little return for theworkers' Z$5 dues per year. They argued that it was necessary to supportthe union in the hope it would eventually merge with the Bulawayo unionand become registered.Parastatal's workers' committees were thus not a threat to unionorganization: indeed, for years they pushed the two rival unions to mergeand then be registered, without success. In early 1985 the workers'committees decided to hold the workers' union dues in trust until amerger was achieved. When this did not happen, the workers' committees32LABOUR RELATIONS IN A ZIMBABWEAN PARASTATALformed a new union which was registered in October 1985, and wasaffiliated to the UFAWU. During this long process, the workers1 committeescarried out the functions of trade unions.Workers' committee representatives also fought hard to obtain wageincreases, but government wage policy had greater impact on wage rates.Table HI shows that while the statutory industrial minimum rose slightly inreal terms between 1980 and 1985, the real minimum at Parastatal fellduring this period.Relations between Parastatal's workers and management were strainedon several issues. Workers' committee members at times prejudiced theTable IIINOMINAL AND REAL MINIMUM WAGES FOR PARASTATALCOMPARED TO THE INDUSTRIAL MINIMUM WAGEDate(July)1980198119821983T19841985Parastatal's minimum wages(Z$ per month)Nominal91,21104,90125,00135,00152,25175,09Real*91,2192,7599,8487,6182,2187,15Industrial minimum wage(Z$ per month)Nominal70,0085,00105,00115,00125,00143,75Real*70,0075,1583,8774,6367,4971,55Ł In 1980 prices.t For September 1983.working relationship with management. A prominent case in this regardwas the assault on the depot manager. The Harare workers' committeechairman gave conflicting evidence to the police and the court, andmanagement believed him to be involved in the assault. However, in myview it would be incorrect to argue that at Parastatal the workers' represen-tatives have been co-opted into compliance. The co-optation argumentmight be summarized as follows. Institutionalized procedures like thecode of discipline locked workers into the management system andremoved their militancy; national employee representatives were accom-modated in hotels three times per year to buy them off; and two of themost articulate workers' committees' chairmen were promoted to beindustrial relations officers in order to quieten them. This line of argumentdoes not convince me that workers' representatives were co-opted tocompliance The formal procedures were a substantial improvement onM. SHADUR 33the previous arbitrary and discriminatory practices. The intensity withwhich workers' representatives debated when bargaining with managementalso belies the co-optation thesis. The promotion of the two workers'committee chairmen did not quieten the next vociferous chairman, andthe workers' committee members strongly supported these appointmentsbecause they then had sympathetic officers with whom to deal.Furthermore, the election results, in which a high proportion of the workers'committee incumbents were returned, indicated that the workforce ingeneral did not regard the workers' committee as sell-outs.CONCLUSIONLabour relations at Parastatal were conducted in a basically co-operativemanner. The organization was faced with severe constraints in terms of alack of finance and the extensive decision-making layers through whichgovernment placed controls over Parastatals. This meant that many of theworkers' claims involving funds were opposed, as were their requests forconditions of service that were not in conformity with those in otherParastatals. Despite these constraints, workers and management overcamethe hostilities of the early 1980s and developed a constructive workingrelationship. To an extent, this decline in hostilities was imposed by thegovernment, which acted to prohibit strikes and other industrial action.However, conflicts were not simply repressed: there were many ways inwhich management and workers developed an understanding of the other'sposition. Personnel and labour relations systems such as those for jobevaluation and discipline were introduced and fairly managed, and rapidBlack advancement took place. Employee development and promotionswere an important compensating factor for the low pay levels at Parastatalcompared to private sector companies. Workers' committees played amajor role in improving relations between workers and management andat the same time they vigorously pursued workers' interests. The workers'committees endeavoured to strengthen trade union organization, andeventually formed their own union affiliated to an existing union federation.Management showed trust and reasoned with workers' committeemembers rather than relying on autocratic rule. Fundamental differencesremained between the two parties, and workers were certainly not preparedto forego the pursuit of their interests in favour of organizational goals.Nonetheless, workers and management were able to establish a modusvivendi to balance the interests of the organization and the workers.Government had a substantial impact on the conduct of labour relationsat Parastatal in the years following Independence. Before 1980 managerialpositions were dominated by Whites, and labour relations werecharacterized by a mixture of paternalism and autocratic rule. Workers34 LABOUR RELATIONS IN A ZIMBABWEAN PARASTATALendeavoured to obtain improved terms and conditions of service beforeIndependence, but management retained the prerogative to determinewhich issues could be discussed. After Independence, management's powerover labour relations outcomes was reduced. Government intervened toattenuate management's right to hire and fire. Selection for and promotionto senior positions was no longer the preserve of Whites, and terminationof employment was regulated by the government in important ways.Management felt obliged to bargain in good faith with employees and notmerely pay lip-service to workers' claims. The settler state was no longerthere to buttress a racial and dictatorial approach to management. Mana-gers generally considered that the new government actively championedworkers' interests. Conflicts between workers and management continuedbeneath the surface, and these regularly broke out into the open. But overtime bitter conflicts were avoided, and both sides attempted to reachnegotiated agreements.