

ESSAY REVIEW

**TURMOIL AND TENACITY:
THE ROAD TO THE UNITY ACCORD**

IN 1989 A fairly thick volume entitled *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890–1990*, edited by the former State President of Zimbabwe, was published.¹ This book is unique in many ways. Besides the fact that it was edited by a former State President now turned academic,² the contributions are written by an assortment of people from many professions — historians, lawyers, bureaucrats, political scientists, civil-rights activists — and some of Zimbabwe's high-ranking politicians such as ZANU(PF) Politburo members Nathan Shamuyarira, Didymus Mutasa and Emmerson Mnangagwa. Even one of Zimbabwe's Vice-Presidents, Joshua Nkomo, and President Robert Mugabe himself contributed to it. This adds to the curiosity value of the book, if not to its academic weight. In all, fifteen contributors were involved. They were chosen for their familiarity with their subject — through their intimate involvement in Zimbabwean politics, or because of the research they had carried out in their respective areas of interest, or both.

The chapters in this book are uneven in size and quality, adding to variety but also to annoyance. Four chapters are very short, ranging from 3 to 7 pages; eight are slightly longer, ranging from 12 to 17 pages; another four chapters have between 25 and 35 pages; one chapter has 46 pages, and the longest has 66 pages. Five chapters do not have footnotes, twelve have endnotes, while two cite references within the text. The editor of this volume should have given the authors guidance on both these issues of length and preferred referencing system. My suspicion is that he did in fact do so, but, as is often the case when an assortment of people with varied backgrounds are involved in an assignment, there are bound to be some oversights and misreading of instructions. This confusion spoils an otherwise worthwhile effort, several chapters of which, particularly those by academics, could be developed into book-length manuscripts.

Turmoil and Tenacity is both an academic and political study. It could not have been otherwise given its inspiration and the occupations of its contributors. The project was inspired by the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU on 22 December 1987, which ended the second part of a 'two-fold' struggle which, in Banana's words, was firstly 'a struggle against a common enemy', and secondly, an 'internal struggle for national unity' (p. 1).

In his contribution, 'An overview of the struggle for unity and independence' (pp. 13–24), Nathan Shamuyarira reports on various efforts to achieve unity in the nationalist movement when it faced a common enemy.

¹ C. S. Banana (ed.), *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe, 1890–1990* (Harare, College Press, 1989), 376 pp., ISBN 0-86925-992-X, Z\$35.95.

² Revd Banana was President of Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1987. He is currently Honorary Professor of Religion and Philosophy at the University of Zimbabwe.

He claims that the 'first united front achieved was in 1896, during the first Chimurenga War' against White settlers (p. 13). Having made this point Shamuyarira then catalogues successive, unsuccessful efforts for unity, most of them during the liberation struggle in the 1970s. These efforts culminated in the December 1987 Unity Accord which he describes as 'the final and successful effort' to unite ZANU and ZAPU after ZANU(PF) had been 'finally confirmed as the dominant political party' (p. 23). Shamuyarira does not offer any explanation as to why the unity efforts succeeded only in 1987. He implies that unity was finally achieved because the performance of ZANU(PF) in successive elections left no doubt of its dominance. This, as we shall see later, is a false impression.

Misheck Sibanda contributes a study on 'Early foundations of African nationalism' (pp. 25-49). It offers an analysis of 'pre-colonial social formations', mentioning the strong state systems of the Munhumutapa and Changamire which, by the middle of the nineteenth century, had 'disintegrated due to natural internecine conflicts and external interferences' (p. 25). His interpretation of early Zimbabwean history avoids the trap of idolizing pre-colonial history as a classless, and, therefore, conflict-free society. Although he does not elaborate the point, he concedes that the Munhumutapa and Changamire states decayed because of these 'natural internecine conflicts'. The 'external interference' referred to is not the advent of the colonial powers but the arrival of the Nguni groups that invaded Shona societies in the early nineteenth century and resulted in the dominance of the class-structured Ndebele system over the Shona (pp. 28-9). The Ndebele and Shangaan groups 'exacted tributes and raided the Shona for food and cattle' — in many ways the same items that the White settlers 'exacted' and 'raided for' later in the century. Sibanda goes on to chronicle the establishment of the capitalist political economy in 1890 up to the outbreak of the Second World War and shows the dramatic and tragic, if gradual, 'proletarianization' and 'marginalization' of the African people during this period. Sibanda's contribution ends with an appraisal of the early African struggles against unjust colonial rule during the period 1890 to 1957, beginning with the 'well-documented' Ndebele and Shona uprising of 1896-7, which 'Zimbabweans have come to regard as the first war of liberation or Chimurenga' (p. 35).

Sibanda, like many others in this book (Banana, Shamuyarira and Mugabe, for example), notes that this first Chimurenga was 'countrywide' and involved the participation of both 'the Ndebele and Shona groups'. However, also like the others, he avoids mentioning that in the 1890s the Ndebele and the Shona 'armies' fought separately — as indeed, ZIPRA and ZANLA forces would fight separately in the second Chimurenga of the 1970s. There was no Ndebele-Shona joint military command in the first Chimurenga. Even if it had existed, I doubt if it could have escaped the fate of the short-lived Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) of the late 1970s.³ I would argue that, had the first Chimurenga succeeded, the Ndebele and the Shona armies would have fought each other afterwards to settle an earlier, pre-colonial, score — as indeed they did between 1982 and 1987 in

³ See E. Mhangagwa, 'The formation of the Zimbabwe People's Army: ZIPA', pp. 143-6.

Matabeleland after the success of the second Chimurenga. No matter how thoroughly we search, the Unity Accord of 1987 has no precedent. It stands on its own, itself setting a precedent.

The chapter entitled 'The nationalist struggle, 1957–1962' by Ngwabi Bhebe (pp. 50–115) is the longest chapter in the book, being 66 pages long. At first glance its length is threatening but I found Bhebe's contribution the most engaging, enjoyable and refreshing of all. Bhebe relates the story of this period in a lively and lucid manner which recreates the past for those Zimbabweans who, like myself, remember that time.

Bhebe begins with a well-defined thesis, to show how the nationalist movement 'by exploiting African rural and urban grievances, grew rapidly until within five years it had engulfed the whole country'. The groundwork achieved during this early period, argues Bhebe, 'did facilitate the launching of the armed struggle' (p. 50). He proves this claim in 65 pages of well-documented research, citing archival sources and key informant interviews, with 134 footnotes.

Judith Todd disposes of the 90 years of 'White policy and politics: 1890–1980' in 7 pages with 2 footnotes (pp. 116–22). She swiftly makes the point that White politics evolved through 'four distinct stages' before African majority rule: British South Africa Company rule; responsible government; federation; and the pariah state and the civil war which finally destroyed White political power (p. 117). She makes the point that it was because the 'only possible umpire between white power and black realities' — Britain — 'never desired to become directly involved', and, in fact, wanted to 'extricate itself from colonial involvement', that the civil war occurred (p. 120). Thus Todd seems to be saying that, had the 'only possible umpire' wanted to become directly involved, the civil war might have been averted. She might have lengthened her chapter by elaborating on this thesis and explaining why such a scenario did not occur. Some would argue, however, that, to the contrary, the 'only possible umpire' was inextricably involved, but on the side of the Whites.¹ Moreover, as Bhebe's contribution shows, the nationalist's swords were being sharpened as far back as the 1950s, independent of the British umpire.

Anthony Chennells's chapter, 'White Rhodesian nationalism: The mistaken years' (pp. 123–39), compensates for Todd's piece on the same subject; his chapter is one of the better-written ones. His argument is that there was a 'nascent nationalism' in White Rhodesia which developed into the 'assertion of the unilateral declaration of independence' in 1965 (p. 123–4). The Rhodesians 'proclaimed that they had a separate identity to that of other white Southern Africans', and on this claim rested White Rhodesian nationalism (pp. 128).² He documents this self-perception convincingly. As to what became of this 'nascent nationalism' after Black majority rule in 1980, Chennells ends on a happy note stating that White Rhodesians 'became part' of the Zimbabwe nation. White nationalism, he says, 'has been transformed into a Zimbabwean patriotism' (p. 128).

¹ This is part of the 'Kith-and-kin' thesis.

² L. Bowman's *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in a Black State* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1973) also argues along these lines.

I would be cautious in asserting that White Rhodesian nationalism, which took more than three-quarters of a century to develop, could be transformed into a Zimbabwean patriotism in only seven years of Black rule. In fact, by 1985 it had not been transformed at all — given the White vote for Ian Smith's CAZ Party (formerly the Rhodesia Front). Mugabe thus lambasted the Whites in 1985 saying that their vote had 'proven that they have not repented in any way'.⁶ Maybe it is more true to say most Whites exhibit the usual civility to political authority. On the patriotism scale, we do not know how many Whites volunteered to fight 'RENAMO bandits'. But this is a question we could also ask about civilian Black Zimbabweans.

Emmerson Mnangagwa wrote the two shortest chapters, one on the short-lived Frolizi, 'The formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe: Frolizi' (pp. 140–2), and the other on the equally short-lived ZIPA, 'The formation of the Zimbabwe People's Army: ZIPA' (pp. 143–6). He compensates for this brevity by a third, longer contribution of 17 pages in which he gives a descriptive analysis of 'Post-independence Zimbabwe: 1980–1987' (pp. 225–41). In the three pieces, Mnangagwa principally chronicles events. One cannot fault him on accuracy, nor on interpretation on the rare occasions when he offers one. For instance, in explaining why ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU contested the 1980 elections separately, he has this to say:

Whatever explanations may be offered, the true and plausible explanation should be found in the history of the struggle itself. One of the most burning and outstanding issues . . . was that of leadership and relative popularity of each party. It was the earnest feeling of many . . . that the question of party leadership could only be decided upon and resolved by the masses of Zimbabwe . . . at home (p. 227).

Yet it was the 'earnest' feeling of many others (Nkomo and the late ZANLA commander, Josiah Tongogara, for instance) that ZANU and ZAPU should have contested the Independence election together so as to avoid future civil strife. In his book, *Nkomo: The Story of my Life*,⁷ Nkomo puts forward the argument that he wanted the parties to run jointly as the Patriotic Front, precisely because he foresaw a possible civil war in Zimbabwe (whether started by ZIPRA or by ZANLA). As it turned out, there was civil war in Matabeleland. This conflict occupies a large portion of Mnangagwa's contribution to this book.

It is also true that some ZANU(PF) strategists may have had a real fear of eventually losing the leadership if they had campaigned jointly with ZAPU. They therefore risked the worst scenario — the conflict that came as Nkomo had predicted and as they had anticipated. Those intimately involved with the 'goings on' in the liberation struggle would have known the saying '*Sinjonjo tamba wakachenjera*' [if you wish to participate in a seductive dance you must be very careful]. This, in the politics of the time, meant: 'Don't trust your partner's [the other political party's] intentions!' The question of unity, therefore, as Mnangagwa explains, hinged on the

⁶ Quoted by M. Sithole, 'The general elections 1979–85', in I. Mandaza (ed.), *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980–1986* (Dakar, CODESRIA, 1986), 92.

⁷ J. M. Nkomo, *Nkomo: The Story of my Life* (London, Methuen, 1984).

leadership question. This is confirmed in subsequent chapters of this book, particularly those by Chiwewe, Mutasa and Mugabe. It would seem that, in the pursuit of power, principles take a back seat.

A former political scientist, now a corporate executive, Ariston Chambati, uses his earlier background and experience to analyse Bishop Muzorewa's African National Council (ANC). He covers the period 1971 to 1979, describing the formation of the ANC in 1971 to oppose the Pearce Commission and the circumstances that led to Muzorewa being asked to be the ANC leader. He describes most lucidly the conflicts within the ANC over the negotiations with Ian Smith between 1972 and 1974, as well as the conflicts between the ANC and ZAPU in 1975 and 1976, and between the parties involved in the internal settlement and the Patriotic Front from 1976 to 1979.

Chambati suggests that Muzorewa was a 'caretaker' leader who performed rather well during the time that he himself believed he was that. But Muzorewa began making mistakes when he started acting politician. 'Apparently', writes Chambati, 'Abel Muzorewa lost sight of the fact that he was merely a caretaker leader' (p. 156). While it could be argued that Muzorewa played a positive role only during the early stages of his political career, I believe that, by and large, he played a positive role throughout. For example, when ZANU and ZAPU leaders could not agree on a leader of the umbrella ANC in December 1974, they decided on Muzorewa. And, as some observers have suggested, the Lancaster House settlement would not have occurred or succeeded without a weak, albeit naïve man leading the Salisbury delegation.⁸ It was necessary, therefore, to have a transitional man between Smith and Mugabe. In a way, and in that sense, the Bishop was God-sent.

The contribution by Shephard Nzombe traces 'Negotiations with the British' from the 1961 Southern Rhodesia constitutional conference (chaired by Duncan Sandys) to the 1979 Southern Rhodesia 'Lancaster House' constitutional conference (chaired by Lord Carrington) (pp. 162-96). The minor conferences in between are outlined and their failure explained. Greater detail is naturally reserved for the negotiations at Lancaster House. Nzombe's emphasis is on the constitutional developments towards democracy. In fact, an alternative title for his chapter could be 'Zimbabwe in search of a democratic constitutional order'. He concludes with some thoughts on 'post-Independence constitutional changes'. One of the changes he anticipated was that the Senate would be abolished to make way for an enlarged unicameral Parliament. He welcomed this impending development (which has since taken place) stating 'not much tears will be shed when it is finally done away with' (p. 195).

However, I shed tears because a case can now be made for a Senate. An upper house will be needed in the future even more than it was in the past. There are many elderly politicians in Zimbabwe and there will definitely be more of them in the future. What does a nation do with its

⁸ S. Stedman, in his *Peacemaking in Civil War. International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1991), 239, suggests that the Lancaster House settlement would have been different had Smith led the Salisbury delegation.

'old Bolsheviks' when their spirits are willing but their bodies and minds are not? Their dignity and experience is quite useful in nation building but they should not remain in demanding and exacting executive cabinet posts. Their collective wisdom could be utilized more wisely and usefully in other areas. The Senate could be one such arena.

Canaan Banana's own chapter on 'The role of the church in the struggle for liberation in Zimbabwe' (pp. 197–210), attempts to situate the contribution of the various Christian personalities and denominations in the liberation effort from the very beginning of Zimbabwe's colonization to its very end. He also suggests the role that the church can play in the post-Independence period. He shows how the Christian church was divided on the question of UDI in the mid-1960s and how the use of violence as an instrument for liberation remained a contentious issue in the church throughout the war in the 1970s. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace is correctly singled out for praise for their 'critique of the Rhodesia minority regime' — a critique which was 'radical and founded on a policy of non-cooperation' (p. 205).

The Church's role in education and health care throughout the colonial era is similarly recognized. For the future role of the Church, Banana singles out the 'land question' which he acknowledges as still 'a hot potato — 10 years after independence'. 'The Church cannot afford to keep aloof from the land question, says Banana, as it is itself a 'big land owner' (p. 209).

One striking omission in Banana's contribution is that nowhere does he mention the Church's contribution to the spiritual and ethical values of the liberation movement. Where mention is made, it is indirect and peripheral. The Church is viewed and treated as a purely socio-political entity and its spiritual role is down-played, if it is mentioned at all. Yet this is the *raison d'être* of the Christian Church as a religious entity. What ethical values did the Church inculcate in the 'comrades' during the war of liberation? Banana should comment on this, even if the Church had no influence in this way. And if it did not, this should be explained. I suspect that the Church, in its pursuit of 'liberation theology' (relevant as this may be), did in fact fail to instil its own moral code in the guerrillas. With the current ethical and value crisis in Zimbabwe's social and cultural milieu, one is tempted to say to the Church: 'Don't forget religion!'

The issue of 'Education with production before and after independence' is dealt with by Fay Chung (pp. 211–24). She starts her contribution by stating that 'Land and education were key issues during the liberation struggle'. Certainly, land had been taken away from the African, but had education been? She argues that it was, *inter alia*, because 'access to education was extremely limited for blacks' that Africans took up arms against the colonial settler regime (p. 211). ZANU evolved the 'theory and policy of education with production' during the liberation struggle. The war situation necessitated a system of self-reliance. It is this experience and philosophy that became the foundation of the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production (ZIMFEP) established shortly after Independence. 'Education with production is a key concept both in terms of the class struggle and in terms of the practical solution of the main problem which faces Zimbabwe today', says Chung (p. 223).

Chung does not mention the contribution made by ZAPU/ZIPRA comrades to the philosophy and practice of 'education with production'. Most of the experiences she recounts relate to ZANLA. What was the philosophy and practice of their partner in the struggle? For a contribution to a volume inspired by and dedicated to the unity of ZANU(PF) and ZAPU, this oversight is unfortunate.

The negotiations that led to the Unity Accord are the subject of Willard Chiwewe's contribution, 'Unity negotiations' (pp. 242-87). Chiwewe attended most of the 'unity meetings' that took place between 1985 and 1987. His 46-page contribution is mainly a reproduction of the minutes of those meetings. Although he gives an interpretation here and there, he is basically reporting what happened at every one of these meetings over two years. Chiwewe's chapter is, therefore, a unique contribution in that it is not an analysis of issues raised in the minutes, but is a presentation of those minutes in a readable and sequential form for those who care to analyse the issues contained therein. With this caveat, Chiwewe's chapter is excellently written with useful insights here and there.⁹

After reading Chiwewe's excellent minutes and the text of the Unity Accord that concludes the chapter, the painful question in the reader's mind is: Was the agreement not possible in 1980? Joshua Nkomo would probably answer 'Yes, if ZANU and ZAPU had contested the elections jointly'. But Mugabe would probably argue that in fact he had offered ZAPU essentially similar terms in 1980 when he formed a government of national unity, but ZAPU turned them down and accepted them in 1987 only after an armed conflict. In a contribution elsewhere on this issue I made the following observation:

However, with an arsenal of arms buried in various places in Matabeleland, and a cadre of young men aching to fight, ZAPU had not only the will, but also the capacity to test both Mugabe's will to rule and ZANU's capacity to survive. Post-independence dissident activity then must be seen in terms of this decisive test. It is a test that those intimately connected with the development of the liberation struggle could see coming, and that must fade away as Mugabe's will and ZANU's capacity are effectively demonstrated.¹⁰

The contribution by Didymus Mutasa, 'The signing of the unity accord: A step forward in Zimbabwe's national political development' (pp. 288-304), is useful in that it emphasizes the policy direction of the country with regard to the one-party state and socialist ideology after the Unity Accord. Mutasa celebrates the fact that the new party is 'dedicated to creating a socialist society' that is guided by Marxist-Leninist principles (p. 289). He is less inhibited than others in explaining why the ruling party desired unity. 'The ruling party', Mutasa writes, 'desired national unity so as to finally establish a one-party state' (p. 290). As if to emphasize the

⁹ See p. 269 for Chiwewe's insightful interpretation of misperceptions.

¹⁰ M. Sithole, 'Zimbabwe: In search of a stable democracy', in L. Diamond *et al.*, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1988), 240. This is a test that Mugabe and ZANU have already passed.

same point he repeats 'Unity was necessary for ZANU(PF) to achieve the long cherished goal of a one-party state' (p. 293). One would have thought that the one-party state was desirable for national unity, but unity, for Mutasa, was necessary for the establishment of the one-party state.

Mutasa ends his contribution with an incorrect and rather unfortunate observation. 'But what must always be borne in mind', he says, 'is that unity was . . . a compromise between the two parties . . . and not the defeat or victory of one party over the other' (p. 298). It is an 'incorrect observation' because, as is clear from Chiweve's minutes, no compromise was either implied or suggested by ZANU(PF) negotiators, it is an 'unfortunate observation' because it was not necessary for Mutasa to make this obviously incorrect statement. Even a cursory look at the terms of the Unity Accord (let alone the Chiweve minutes) gives one the impression that the document spells out terms of surrender and not compromise. Nowhere in the eleven-point agreement does Nkomo's name appear, but Mugabe's appears three times. (Nkomo's name only appears as a signatory to the document.) Nkomo should be praised for the bitter pill he swallowed because his humility brought peace to Matabeleland. Eight of the eleven points are pregnant with victorious Mugabe's ideas. Where mention is made of PF-ZAPU it is either to indicate that henceforth it shall be called ZANU(PF) or that its leadership shall take 'immediate vigorous steps to help eliminate and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland' (p. 285-6).

The contribution by Nkomo himself in this volume is, to say the least, symbolic. His 5-page offering, 'The significance of national unity and the future' (p. 300-4) is mainly a restatement of the positions on unity that PF-ZAPU adopted at its 1984 Congress and in subsequent Central Committee statements. Like many others, he praises the 'united efforts' to resist 'colonial intrusion' in the 1890s. He does, however, make an interesting and significant observation about the 1963 split:

The formation of . . . ZANU in 1963 by Ndabaningi Sithole and some former ZAPU leaders should not be viewed as a breakaway. ZANU could have marginally differed with ZAPU, not with regard to the armed struggle but perhaps in the style of achieving the same objective (p. 301).

How else can we view this split, if not as a 'breakaway'? Are we to view the above in terms of a Maoist conception of 'antagonistic' and 'non-antagonistic' contradictions? Mao would call 'marginal differences' non-antagonistic and, therefore, would agree with Nkomo's description of ZANU as 'not a breakaway' if the differences between ZAPU and ZANU were marginal.

But the substantive issue was that of commitment to the armed struggle. The argument is often made that the split occurred on the issue of the armed struggle. Ngwabi Bhebe's contribution in this book is persuasive in making the point which Nkomo tries to make. ZAPU was preparing for war when the split occurred. This point is also most articulately argued by Cain Mathema.¹¹ It all boils down to being 'more' or 'less' committed — the

¹¹ N. C. G. Mathema, 'The Long and Painful Road to ZANU(PF)-PF-ZAPU Unity' (Harare, unpubl., 1988).

question of non-antagonistic contradictions. But, do non-antagonistic contradictions matter? They do, otherwise the conflict in Matabeleland does not make sense.

Welshman Ncube's contribution, 'The post-unity period: Developments, benefits and problems' (pp. 305–35), analyses 'developments, benefits and problems' experienced since the Unity Accord. These developments are: the elimination of banditry in Matabeleland; the role of students and the press in exposing the Willowgate scandal; the reactions of the masses to the political system after Willowgate and other scandals; the quality of parliamentary debates after the Unity Accord; problems that were experienced during the new ZANU(PF)'s integration exercise; the formation, impact of and reactions to the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989; and the closure of the University in October 1989. These 'post-unity' developments, says Ncube, 'have all, in one way or another, provided a barometer with which to measure the practice of "democracy" in Zimbabwe' (p. 329).

The major thesis in Ncube's contribution is that unity provided space for democratic expression in Zimbabwe: 'In this context, unity has provided the basis for the democratic expression of views'. Thus he laments the formation of ZUM in 1989 which, he writes, 'appears to have laid the basis for a return to pre-unity politics of division and animosity which hindered the emergence and development of critical democratic values' (ibid.). What an eloquent justification for a one-party state! The fact is that Ncube is looking at politicians who, like their followers, are still learning to walk in the democratic way. Ncube coins an instructive phrase about this phenomenon, calling it 'the politics of over-reaction' (p. 324). I believe that both the leader and the follower must move away and not towards the politics of over-reaction. That another political party is formed should not limit democratic expression but, rather, should be viewed as an expression of democracy.

Robert Mugabe's contribution, 'The Unity Accord: Its promise for the future' (pp. 336–59), concludes the book. With a Marxist flair the author explains the 'tribal character' of both ZANU and ZAPU in terms of feudal 'social formations' and 'loyalties' which he claims to be a thing of the past (p. 337–8). The ZANU(PF) unity is presumably based on the new 'class character' of both ZANU and ZAPU in terms of contemporary 'non-feudal' social formations and loyalties. However, while Marxist explanations are useful tools for analysis, they must not be used to explain away enduring social problems. The reason why politicized ethnicity continues in contemporary society is as old as politics itself. Ethnicity or tribalism is a political resource at the disposal of contemporary political gladiators in power contests.¹²

Mugabe shares Mnangagwa's perception of why unity was a problem for such a long time. He says that the 'leadership issue was the problem' (p. 339). As a result the two parties contested the 1980 elections separately. When ZANU(PF) won in 1980 the leadership problem was resolved. This explanation is as logical as it is simple. The ultimate issue in politics is that

¹² See M. Sithole, 'The salience of ethnicity in African politics: The case of Zimbabwe', *Journal of Asian and African Studies* (1985), XX, 187–90.

of leadership: who tells whom what to do and when to do it. Ndabaningi Sithole, himself a victim of the power struggles of the 1970s, succinctly defined the relationship between power and politics thus: 'Politics and the pursuit of power are inseparable.'¹³

Mugabe's contribution also attempts a class analysis of ZANU(PF) in which he sees three categories of interest groups according to their occupation. But he does not tell us which category controls and directs ZANU(PF), though he tasks 'intellectuals and students' with providing the 'urban and farm workers' and 'the subsistence farmers and entrepreneurs' with a 'revolutionary consciousness of themselves as a class' (p. 345).¹⁴ Mugabe prefers a socialist economy and a one-party political system. He sees Zimbabwe as having embarked on the road to socialism at Independence and he forecasts that Zimbabwe will have reached the millennium in thirty years after Independence, at the very latest. 'The process of transition to socialism began in the period soon after Independence', he says, 'and may take several years to complete, even a whole generation' (p. 347). Apropos the one-party state, Mugabe shares the enthusiasm and optimism of Didymus Mutasa, although with more graphic expression. 'We believe', he writes, 'Zimbabwe's future is better guaranteed under one, single, monolithic and gigantic political party' (p. 355).¹⁵

Finally, it should be remembered that *Turmoil and Tenacity* was an inspiration of the moment. It could not have been otherwise, inspired as it was by the momentous signing of the Unity Accord that Zimbabwe had strived and waited for since the 1890s. Nothing comparable has been written so far. Victor de Waal's *The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe's First Decade*,¹⁶ comes closest, but it is only one man's view, though he confirms a great deal of what is written in *Turmoil and Tenacity*. Moreover, de Waal is an outsider looking in, a source of both strength and weakness. The two books should be read jointly.

There are many insights as well as oversights in *Turmoil and Tenacity*. Many of the oversights were, however, probably due more to the excitement of the moment than to the authors' lack of ability or insight. Therefore, this book must be recommended both for the insight and oversight that it reveals. But in the future, the oversights might result in more turmoil than tenacity.

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¹³ Quoted in W. Walker, *The Bear Next Door: The Soviet Threat to the West's Lifeline in Africa* (London, Foreign Affairs Publishing Company, 1978), 38.

¹⁴ The irony is that students and intellectuals at the University of Zimbabwe and elsewhere have maintained less than cordial relations with the ruling party since 1989 and relations have worsened since the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No. 9 of 1991) restricted 'academic freedom'.

¹⁵ The idea of the one-party state in Zimbabwe seemed to be very unpopular. See essays in I. Mandaza and L. Sachikonye (eds.), *The One-party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate* (Harare, SAPES, 1991).

¹⁶ V. de Waal, *The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe's First Decade* (London, Hurst and Company, 1990).