Zambezia (1993), XX (i).CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWEJ. N. MOYODepartment of Political and Administrative Studies,University of ZimbabweAbstract77IK article critically examines the meaning of the concept of civil society withreference to Zimbabwe. This is done against the background of renewed scholarlyinterest in the impact of state-society relations on the process of democratization inthe Third World. Looking at civil society and the state as intertwining parts of the samesocial reality, the article argues that civil society in Zimbabwe, especially in the Blackcommunity, is in a state of chronic underdevelopment as a result of historical factorsrelated to pre- and post-independence politics. These factors include the value premisesof colonial institutions, African tradition and the liberation war, all of which have haddecisive influences in shaping and constraining the development of civil society inZimbabwe.THE SPECTRE OF democracy currently haunting social and political ordersthroughout the world has revived scholarly debate on the concept of civilsociety and its policy implications for a democratic political order.1 Thisrevival has also been influenced by the change in world politics, a changecharacterized by the turbulence of empirical socialism which culminatedin the dramatic collapse of Stalinist regimes in eastern and central Europein 1989, the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in1991, and the end of the cold war. Less dramatic but equally significanthave been developments taking place throughout Africa, where one-party-state regimes with various ideological orientations are, one by one, dis-integrating into various precarious multi-party systems. The re-emergenceof social struggles based on ethnic identities in countries such as theformer Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and in Somalia has also renewedscholarly interest in the concept of civil society. Whether the direction ofthese political struggles is towards sustainable democracies will remain amatter of intellectual debate and conjecture for a long time to come.However, to a great, and perhaps even a decisive, extent the possibility ofsustainable democracy in countries emerging from authoritarian rule orethnic conflict, will depend on whether civil society will reassert its politicalrole. But what is civil society?1 A representative example is contained in J. Keane (ed). Civil Society and the State: NewEuropean Perspectives (London, Verso, 1988).CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWETHE DEFINITION OF CIVIL SOCIETYCivil society is a highly contentious concept with a variety of connotations.Historically, the notion has been used to designate a plurality of socialenclaves which exist in contradistinction to the dominance of a particularmonopolistic social system within the same social realm or territorialunity.2 Typically, the various social systems which have been targeted foropposition by civil society in political history have included savagery,anarchy, the Church, the monarchy, the party, the state and the marketeconomy. More recently in liberal industrialized societies, opposition hastended to generate tension between civil society on the one hand, and, onthe other, the over-arching imperatives of the market economy as aubiquitous social agency for allocating and distributing resources.3 Thishas been in contrast to the situation in countries going through some kindof transition to democracy, such as in the former socialist countries ineastern and central Europe and in Africa where the tension has beenbetween civil society and the party-controlled state.4In the latter case, assuming that all state apparatuses are distinguish-able from the wider societies in which they are to be found, scholars havetended to view civil society as that part of society which is outside thecontrol of the state apparatuses or the part outside the state sphere.There is thus a presumed basic duality between the state and civil societyas separate social entities. This duality is generally seen as somethinggood in industrialized liberal countries which purport to be pluralist,whereas in developing countries the tendency of the ruling authorities «sto seek to eliminate this duality in favour of the party-controlled state.This is achieved by expanding the scope of the state by fusing the political,ideological and productive hierarchies into one single unified organizationalstructure as an affirmation of the supposed virtues of democraticcentralism.5Within the context of such a single organizational structure open andavowed segmentation is prohibited so as to allow the ruling authorities toparade the declared unity of the state under one party and one leaderwhile stifling differences among social groups, and between them and thestate, by marginalizing social conflict and treating it as if It does not exist.As a result, at least in the early stages of such state formation, civil societytends to be oriented toward patron-client networks in the political andCXXIXE495-5To' CiV" S°Ciety'" hlStOriCal contexV-'"'national Social Science Joumo/(1991).' K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (London, Gollancz, 1945).4 A. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two: A Contemporary Criti nfHistorical Materialism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1987), 61-*25 Gellner, 'Civil society in historical context', 495.J. N. MOYOeconomic spheres. This tendency in turn gives the appearance, howevertemporary, of legitimacy to the state's claim of national unity whiledepriving civil society of the necessary public-spiritedness and the capacityto act decisively and autonomously in policy matters.Despite these problems civil society in traditional states does not dienor does it disappear into permanent irrelevance. It usually remains, itspower latent but ever ready to be either freed or endowed with politicalauthority and constitutional legitimacy.6 That is to say, even though civilsociety may suffer serious damage in developing countries, it does nothave to be re-invented or re-created from scratch as an act of momentoussocial engineering. It simply needs to be regenerated by restoring a publicspirit in national politics beyond the state sphere. But, of course, incontemporary traditional states such as those which are in transitioneither from the brutality of Stalinist socialism or from the vagaries of one-party rule to tenuous versions of democracy, the predicament of civilsociety is radically different from that in industrialized liberal societieswhere the major concern is about the rights and prerogatives of citizens inthe policy process. In the former cases, the problem is not one of liberatingand giving legitimacy and vigour to something already in existence but,rather, one of creating social preconditions for something wholly new inpolitical terms. Zimbabwe falls in this category not least because of itscolonial history.CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATEAs already pointed out, it is common to find social science literaturewhich describes civil society as something 'outside' the state. This, Ibelieve, is wrong, as many other scholars have pointed out before.7 As willbe argued in more detail later in this article, the state and civil societyshould be treated as intertwining parts of the same social reality. Thisview is premised on the notion that both the state and civil society belongto one public realm. The dichotomy between the state and civil society isbased on a false dualism which negates the historical fact that 'civilsociety' means the same thing as 'political community'.8With regard to the question of the state in Africa and its implicationsfor civil society, a consensus has developed between liberal and radicalscholars that the state in Africa has failed. While the conclusion is thesame, the reasons are, of course, different. For liberals, the state, whichwas supposed to play a pivotal enabling role in promoting economic6 Ibid., 497.7 See contributions to Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State.8 See C. Taylor, 'Modes of civil society', Public Culture (1990), HI, 95-107.4 CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWEgrowth has not lived up to the expectations of modernization. To theradical left, the state in Africa has not lived up to its expected revolutionarymission of altering and transforming the economic base in favour of theweakest classes in society. The association of the state in Africa withhuman-rights abuses over the first three or so decades of independencehas made its universal condemnation even more forceful.Thus, rather remarkably, we now witness a situation in which liberalsand radicals, disappointed by the performance of the state in Africa, areunited in proclaiming civil society as the most viable alternative to thefailed state. In civil society, it is now claimed, lie not only the prospects ofdemocracy but also the prospects of a regime that will respect humanrights. The prognosis is that the state is bad while everything outside it isgood. This new optimism is understandable but misplaced, not leastbecause it is without sound scholarly justification.Perhaps the optimism has been given impetus by the presentproliferation of local and international non-governmental organizations(NGOs) and other voluntary associations in developing countries. But thisproliferation does not necessarily spell good news for civil society. Farfrom it. Most of the mushrooming NGOs and voluntary associations are infact a danger to the prospects of a viable society which enshrines demo-cracy and human rights because they have shown a tendency towards atype of particularism, fundamentalism and ethno-nationalism based on anintolerance of other social groups.The type of civil society that is currently being formed in developingcountries such as Zimbabwe is characterized by parochial associationssuch as village communities, elite clubs in urban areas, political parties,burial societies, trade unions, industrial confederations, commercial organ-izations, student groups and fundamentalist religious cults, all of which donot encourage an interest in matters beyond their own immediate concernsThese associations typically equate their own narrow aims with those ofthe public realm and thus seek to manipulate the state for their ownselfish purposes. In most cases, these associations are the mirror imagesof the state which they seek to confront. Such social groups, I contenddonot not belong to civil society in the sense of a political communitycapable of accommodating a variety of social Interests in a pluralistframework. Indeed, the whole notion of civil society as a group concept isseriously flawed. In so far as it is a political concept, civil society should beregarded as an individual's social space which shrinks or expandsdepending on the nature of state-society relations. Politics begins withthe individual as the bearer of reason. A political community, that is, civilsociety, emerges when the individual begins to interact with otherindividuals.The implication from the foregoing is that there is not necessarily aJ. N. MOYOconnection between the expansion of voluntary associations, especiallythose which style themselves as interest groups, and the development ofcivil society in political terms. This is particularly so in this era of economicstructural adjustment programmes during which the elite who control thestate are likely to sponsor voluntary associations and other private sectorgroups in a cynical drive to placate those who define civil society as thedevelopment of anything outside the so-called state sphere.How, then, are we to approach the concept of civil society from adefinitional point of view? A useful starting point has been given by CharlesTaylor. He suggests that there are at least three senses of the concept ofcivil society. These are:9(i) A minimal sense in which there are free associations which can beempirically shown to be free from the control of the state.(ii) A second and stronger sense in which civil society exists only andonly where the political community as a whole is able to organizeitself and co-ordinate its activities without the control of the state,(iii) A third and strongest sense in which civil society exists where onlyand only when the political community is composed of an ensembleof free associations which have the political and organizationalcapacity not only to co-ordinate their own activities but also tosignificantly determine or inflect the sequence and development ofstate policy.These conceptual definitions of civil society provide three heuristicscenarios which can be usefully employed to construct empirical tests ofwhether and how civil society exists as a political community in a particularcountry. Given the three possible scenarios and their pluralisticimplications for democratic governance, it is my contention that civilsociety in Zimbabwe has a long way to go. It is struggling to define itselfwithin the confines of the minimalist sense of the concept: that is, it is stillto establish free associations which are not under the tutelage of statepower. The reasons for this circumstance are outlined below.THE MANIFESTATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWEBy and large civil society in Zimbabwe, especially in the Black community,is in a state of chronic underdevelopment which sometimes approximatessocial paralysis. There are two different but related historical factorswhich explain this circumstance but do not justify it. One relates to the9 Ibid., 98.6 CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWEpre-lndependence period and the other to political developments InZimbabwe since Independence.The pre-Independence factor ,The essence of British colonial policies after 1890 and of Ian Smitn»Rhodesia Front government after the UnUateral Declaration of Independ-ence (UDO in 1965 was to criminalize politics in the Black community.Without political activity, the prospecU of civil society are diminished-For Blacks in Rhodesia, political activity became a clandestine affair a*they were forced to organize and coordinate their affairs behind close"doors and usually under life-threatening conditions. Attempts to mono-polize politics, first by the British and later by the Rhodesians, resulted inan underdeveloped civil society in Zimbabwe.10 It is a well-known factthat, during the colonial period, social movements such as trade unions,student groups, community organizations and political parties in the Blackcommunity were trampled upon in an attempt to relegate them to perma""ent political irrelevance.More generally, the colonial authorities frustrated the development °lcivil society in Zimbabwe by seeking to remove Blacks from mainstreampolitics by confining them to the realm of tribal existence where theywould, as 'natives', define themselves in terms of ethnic as opposed tonational identities. In 1901, for example, a Chief Native Commissioner >nMatabeleland boasted about the success of his 'politic' efforts to keepBlacks outside politics when he observed to his superiors thatAt present there is absolutely no cohesion among the natives eachlittiAt tv>i« a*it were, opposed to the other, a certain amount of jealousy has nJturlnZVriamongst the Indunas, this jealousy has been fostered by me as It is thl ?form of governing the Natives.11 ^ S the m°st V°This sentiment, which formed the essence of the colonial beii * »K * thenative was better governed as a tribal entity, dominated mur*. V n-ment thinking during the colonial and UDI periods with th« govefl'that the possibilities of the development civil society .Conse<luenC£community were undermined. * the Bla^*The post-Independence factorZimbabweans expected colonial and UDI attitudes towards n^iBlack community to change with Independence in 1980 Bw?^8 ln10 This has been well documented by countless sources elsewhere. ForBeach, War and Politics in Zimbabwe: 1840-1900 (Gweru, Mambo Press ufip*«, sec D N-during the colonial period, and J. Todd, The Right to Say No: Rhodesia /972 O*2K Ł** DoUtlc*1987) for Rhodesian sentiments towards politics in the Black community. ^*«. UM>gm«n.11 Quoted by T. Ranger in his The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe ruPress, 1985), 6. (Harare, Mamt*'J. N. MOYOdid not happen. Instead the ruling party, ZANU(PF), took maximumadvantage of an under-developed civil society by claiming that ZANU(PF)was the sole legitimate representative of the people. Under the guise ofthis claim, the party declared itself to be the umbrella organization of allsocial movements and went about destroying civil society associations inthe name of 'the revolution'. All 'legitimate' organizations were challengedby ZANU(PF) to join the ruling party as a way of proving their revolutionaryand patriotic commitment.ZANU(PF) declared 1981 as 'the year of the consolidation of the people'spower' which, according to the President of ZANU(PF), Robert Mugabe,impelled the ruling party to 'adopt a more comprehensive and a moregenerous view of Government embracing all these [pre-Independencerevolutionary] forces'.12 The need for such a comprehensive view ofgovernment was interpreted by the ZANU(PF) leadership and supportersto mean the establishment of a one-party state. Mugabe believed that thevarious impediments to a one-party state, especially those entrenched inthe Lancaster House Constitution, could be overcome with the establish-ment of a government of national unity. Thus he told the nation in his NewYear's Eve address: 'As Zimbabweans, our new nation now demanded ofus either as individuals, or as groups or communities, a single loyalty thatis a proper and logical manifestation of our national unity and spirit ofreconciliation.'13By 'a single loyalty' Mugabe meant loyalty not to the nation but to hisruling party. In effect, his plea was for a legislated one-party state because,in his words, 'we [Zimbabweans] are one state with one society and onenation, that is the political concept we cherish'.14Those social groups which tried to resist ZANU(PF)'s tactic of exclusionby inclusion under the guise of 'one state, one society, one nation, oneleader', were branded as sell-outs bent on working for 'the enemy' as theruling party publicly touted its commitment to a legislated one-partystate, especially between 1980 and 1990. As a result, and strictly speaking,political independence in Zimbabwe liberated only one part of the state:the government bureaucracy and political leadership which became Black,actually ZANU(PF), almost overnight inl980.Civil society groups, such as trade unions and student movements,which had operated underground during the days of settler governmentand which had hoped to attain legitimacy after Independence were leftbleeding by the ruling party's tactics, and some organizations bled todeath because they failed to find any political space for independentpolicy action arising from self-management and self-organization without12 The Herald, 1 Jan. 1981. 13 Ibid.14 Ibid., 5 Aug. 1982.CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWEstate tutelage. Other social groups which survived sooner or later foundthemselves forced to toe the ZANU(PF) party line. This is why, up to now,there is no representation for workers and peasants in the ZANU(PF)central committee and politburo Š despite the fact that these groupsmake up the majority in the country. The precarious political position ofworkers and peasants in the ruling party was illustrated in an editorial on5 December 1989 in The Herald, the supposedly 'progressive', government-controlled daily newspaper, which pontificated that:!£ ri -^ T <;"coura8ement of distinctions between the workers and theparty [read leaders ], or the peasants and the party [again, read 'leaders']. ThereS"0 ****** el,ect°rates but on*y a «*ogniUon and sensitivity [presum-Sd^ ? 'fdership] to the unique interests and problems of theL? W?Ch T ta addre^ b h] que interests and problems of theta address^ by the party as a whole. That is,Pan and t**Ž1 ot ^"nasses. They are theTaTd^^tT T Ptly hostile to the Wea ofa^ theth Riu Žcuia- ' "e enect of this view has been toŁ». been tothe ^S^ Sf Si1of Zimbabwe Industriesmerce (ZNCQ, S2Cfdv -" """"llcl«-'«u rarmers Union/"PPirv J .Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ) all TIK and the EmP'°yers'sense of the concept of civil society denned ahŽ- to the minima"stpowerful interest groups in the politically volaOte d^T^ M the mOStZimbabwean politics that there is no RI«M,Ž^.e..f!ature of Present-daybwean pSi^^^S^X^^ i^~organized or which enjoys as much poH^.nSeTaL^ h " We"controlled groups. One group, the Patriotic^From 5^°**^White-People's Union PF-ZAPU, which had all theaJpL^I?1"1"1* Airtcanwell-organized political t'SSIS? promte dunder the cover of «JoJ\aDecember 1989. Many PF-ZAPU sdesperation by some individuals15 The Herald, 5 Dec. 1989.J. N. MOYOeager to share the spoils of national power but whose party had failed towin a majority at the polls after the ruling party's bitter military campaignagainst them.Apart from formal political parties, students at the University ofZimbabwe have failed to articulate a political agenda beyond mere hooli-ganism. In 1990, for example, their activities turned back the clock ofacademic freedom in Zimbabwe as their irresponsible conduct gave thegovernment a pretext to promulgate the controversial University of Zim-babwe Amendment Act (No. 21 of 1990) which severely curtails Universityautonomy and has far-reaching implications for the development of civilsociety in Zimbabwe. The workers have not fared any better. The ZimbabweCongress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which was created by ZANU(PF) shortlyafter Independence, is only now trying to find its niche. Things will getworse before they get better for the beleaguered labour movement, only20 per cent of whose membership comes from the formal-sector labourforce and which lacks the organizational capacity and technical and legalskills necessary to make a policy difference in civil society.If organizations like the CFU, the CZI, the ZNCC and EMCOZ wereBlack-dominated, Zimbabwe would have the makings of an effective civilsociety. But these White-dominated organizations, with the possibleexception of the CFU, prefer doing business with the ZANU(PF) governmentbehind closed doors, claiming that they are apolitical organizations andthat it is better to co-operate with the government in private than tochallenge it in public. The overall impression is that since 1980 politics inZimbabwe has become the preserve of Blacks while commerce and industryhave remained areas of White domination Š permitted by the ruling partyas part of their policy of reconciliation. Zimbabwean civil society has,therefore, been unable to pursue political objectives beyond spontaneousdemonstrations by University of Zimbabwe students or wild-cat strikes byteachers and nurses.PROSPECTS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWEIn view of the foregoing, prospects for civil society in Zimbabwe do notappear promising. The possibility of a vibrant civil society in Zimbabwe,at least in the near future, is further diminished by three sets of deep-seated attitudes held by the country's populace. These are: the continuedexistence of the institutional and legislative prejudices of colonialismwhich have served as institutional precedents;16 the persistent norms and16 The impact of some of these values and norms has been identified but not criticallyexamined by M. Sithole in his chapter, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy', inL. Diamond, J. J. Unz, and S. M. Upset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Volume II:Africa (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1988), 217-57. For an analytical treatment of the impact of10 CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWEbeliefs of traditional society; and the lingering socio-psychology and cultureof the liberation war.Colonial prejudicesThe value assumptions of colonial rule did not receive critical attentionduring the struggle for national independence. Despite the radical rhetoricof nationalism and socialism, the struggle for independence in Zimbabwedegenerated into a fight to remove Whites from power and replace themwith Blacks. As such, the only visible political change at and afterindependence was in the racial composition of the political elite and thecivil service. Consequently, and seemingly without any qualms, Africannationalists readily adopted the political institutions, legal rules and thebureaucracy of colonialism as if no struggle for independence had everoccurred. Since then Black nationalists have been using their politicalpower to maintain, and in some cases to expand, the oppressive legislationused by the colonial regimes to suppress the political activities of BlackAfricans. A case in point is Parliaments abuse of the 1971 Privileges,Immunities and Powers Act (Chapter 10) to silence the press.I he ruling nationalists have failed, whether by design or by default, to!2*; i Ł ,.1OgiC °f colonia"sm was specifically contrived to limit and^°n natC the P0""041 P^icipation of Blacks: that is, to killK*!""8 ^.e colonial Period. Public institutions were notoriouslythC 8Cneral Public'there was Ž due process of lawc^de^coSd TtTŽ* the maiorltv of the Peop'e- Eventually publicStTmac^fnd *1 ^ utalned beCause colonlal institutions lost theirlegitunacy and ponged the colonia, ^ ^ &after md^nde^as^t0!^41 instltutions -d Žies of conductindependence aS on?e a?l I * °' d°Ubt °Ver the meanin« ofand credibility of the noliti i resurrected problems of the legitimacythe possibility^ anS oC£nit7*TCi J" T^ ^ d°°r haS SnUt °"Zimbabwe. pportunity for civil society to grow on its own inAfrican traditional valuesJ. N. MOYO 11African values are used, as they have been by ZANU(PF), to restrict thepolitical space of the individual by giving cultural legitimacy to monopolypolitics under the cover of 'national unity'. One belief, however mistaken,that runs deep in the consciousness of African nationalists is that Africantraditional values demand a system of governance which has one chiefand one clan bound together by consensus politics. Disagreement is to beavoided by all means. In this now classical scenario in the politics ofnationalist folklore, there is no room for multi-party politics politicaldifferences and aspirations are supposed to be argued and ultimatelysettled under the one political umbrella. The former President of Tanzania,whose thinking on this matter has been followed by many African leaders,argued that 'despite all the variations and some exceptions where theinstitutions of domestic slavery existed, African family life was everywherebased on certain practices and attitudes which together mean basicequality, freedom and unity'.17This deep-seated belief has, somewhat surprisingly, also beenembraced by the supposedly revolutionary-minded, militant, would-beMarxist-Leninist politicians such as Robert Mugabe, who, during the firstdecade of Zimbabwe's independence, unsuccessfully defended the notionof a one-party state in Zimbabwe as a democratic political arrangementtrue to African tradition.18 For example, during the 1989 joint congresswhich united the formerly warring leadership of PF-ZAPU and the rulingZANU(PF), the top four posts of president, two co-vice-presidents andnational chairman were allocated to Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, SimonMuzenda and Joseph Msika, respectively. To forestall the question ofaccountability, no election for these posts was allowed. Any challengerwould have been denounced and ostracized as being impolite to elders inthe party and, therefore, a disgrace to African tradition. The same logicwas used in the selection of ZANU(PF) candidates for the 1990 Zimbabwegeneral and presidential elections. An order was given to aspiringcandidates to refrain from running against the top leadership of ZANU(PF)Š notwithstanding the fact that the party's constitution explicitly entitlesits membership to freely seek election to any party position.The result of this conduct has been that respect for the high value ofindividual freedom of choice in the political sphere has been sacrificed.Now not only are those who govern free of accountability and responsibilityto those they govern but the space for political action by the individualhas been shrunk Š resulting in the loss of civil society. Indeed, as hasbecome a truism among Weberian students, traditional behaviour is hardly17 Julius Nyerere, quoted In W. O. Oyugi et al. (eds.), Democratic Theory and Practice inAfrica (London, Currey, 1988), 49.18 Globe and Mail [Ottawa], 23 Mar. 1984.12 CIVIL SOCIETY IN ZIMBABWEcompatible with the processes of a modern democratic state. This isbecause tradition is, by its very nature, authoritarian.Values of the liberation warThere can be hardly any doubt that the armed struggle in Zimbabwe wasan effective means of defeating oppressive and intransigent elements ofcolonialism and racism. However, as is often the case with protractedsocial processes in a conflict situation, the armed struggle in Zimbabwehad a deep socio-psychological impact on its targets and its perpetrators.Although some work on this issue is now beginning to emerge,19 morerigorous research on the socio-pyschological impact of the liberation waron its perpetrators (some of whom are now in power) is yet to be produced,of taSS J aPPT!tHat thC armed Struggle Proved a violent cultureSLSSS *Tln thC FankS °f ^ liberation moments"ug thelr SOCial base of P^ant supporters who5^swas arbitrarily and atSwcZ !^em*ta5training camTK^^SŽ0* by Po«tician«um-militarymuch internal conflict con^^^LTrdesire for political power SUCh " ethnicity and personalbased onlearn hoVt;TirTVrdTtenZthaT demystlfied to enable'recruits tomilitary and refugi c^pT ^TtaST °f dlSSWentS ta "^^liberation war. Young men a^dwomen^ . * Common feature of thefor, lost their lives In the^ueXc2T H*0* «* stiU unaccountedcircumstances. ^ '* Camps ""^ the most appalling ofmoral ethic^nd wS^^us^arenabte^m^18^^'30^3^1111^nationalist politicians and milkarv com manjpulat|on by unscrupulousliberation war for their ownS^dŽT^8 ^ Personalized thedeath, terror and fear in the camps ^dTh? "t*** « environment ofdeath, terror and fear in the CMnpTandlJ? "^ m environment ofguerrilla^ontrolled 'liberated JS?J^S? J1" ^ md later ln thewho also had to contend ith S 7^ of ^ t***Ž**Kucrniia-controlled 'liberated areas' -who also had to contend with equally brutal colon. Ł.Š* "' Š1~ŠŽ-in a culture of fear in which^olence was ^"i!1 forces. This resultednationalism and socialism. Wa" perPetrated in the name ofJ. N. MOYO 13Guerrilla psychology opposed the basic tenets of tolerance of individualvalues and identities in the military training camps and in the operationalareas, especially in the 'liberated zones'; in other words, it opposed theformation of civil society. This psychology continued after Independencewith the same consequence. This is why peasants are conspicuouslyafraid of ZANU(PF), particularly during elections: the campaign tactics ofthe ruling party are based on intimidation and death-threats. Democracycannot exist in an environment where violence and fear dominate thepolitical process. Something needs to be done with Zimbabwe's politicalculture.CONCLUSIONAll these facts, together with ZANU(PF)'s drive for a legislated one-partystate between 1980 and 1990 which diminished the space for oppositionparties, make the prospects of civil society in Zimbabwe appear rathergloomy. The few opposition parties which have managed to exist so farare basically cliques centered on an individual and have no capacity forcollective political action. What is needed for civil society to grow inZimbabwe is the formation of an issue-oriented mass movement whichwill consider the leadership question as less important than the issues tobe addressed. Judging from what is actually happening, it appears thatsuch a movement is already forming at the grassroots level, consisting ofunderpaid factory workers, exploited farm labourers (some of whom arelosing their jobs because of the severe drought), retrenched civil servants,job seekers of all kinds, parents who cannot afford school fees and uniformsfor their children, young people who do not believe absurd stories aboutthe alleged achievements of individual nationalist politicians during theliberation war, homeless people, frustrated industrialists, disappointedbusinessmen, fallen politicians, chiefs dispossessed of their traditionalauthority and, above all, the ordinary person who is no longer able tomake ends meet.This movement, which is likely to be ignited into political action bythe deadly combination of the effects of Zimbabwe's Economic StructuralAdjustment Programme and general bureaucratic incompetence, does notneed a leader with liberation war credentials. When the time is right, andthat does not appear to be far off, the grassroots movement will produceits own leader with post-Independence credentials from among those whohave paid the heavy price of independence exacted by nationalist politiciansclaiming to have achieved great things during the struggle. But all thisonly points to the beginnings of civil society in the minimalist sense asdefined earlier in this article. It is pointless to speculate on the prospectsof civil society in Zimbabwe in the other two, stronger, senses at themoment.