Zambezia (1995), XXII (i).A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINESIN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995MARTIN R. RUPIAHDepartment of History, University of ZimbabweAbstractZimbabwe inherited around 1,5 million land-mines, mainly anti-personnelmines laid by security forces during the liberation war. These are in sevenminefields, covering 766 kms along the Zambian and Mozambican borders.Efforts to clear these mines began in 1980, but so far have covered only 10%of the minefields. They run mostly alongside communal lands, where fencingnrid warning signs have largely been destroyed or removed, with devastatingresults. The paper looks at the history of laying the minefields, and thepresent status of each of the major minefields. Finally, it points to theprohibitive costs of clearing this dangerous legacy now facing independentZimbabwe.THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1994, draws attention to 105 millionunexploded but 'live' mines in 62 countries worldwide and from thesedevices, 800 people die every month.1 These statistics, however, do notinclude mines planted in Zimbabwe's minefields from the secondchimurenga, nor do they take into account local casualties, as most incidentsgo unreported. Further, this authoritative report does not take into accountthose people that are savagely maimed by the mines but survive.Medical opinion is in harmony as to the damage mines cause to theirvictims.Land-mines inflict ravaging wounds, usually resulting in traumatic or surgicalamputation; damage is from blast, driving dirt or metal and plastic fragments intotissue or bone, also causing secondary infection. Damage is rarely confined to oneleg, lesser but still severe damage occurs to the other leg, the genitals, arms, chestand face. Most affected are civilians from which a significant proportion is womenand children.2Locally, the horrendous nature of mines was illustrated in a report byThe Chronicle on 4 February 1984, covering an investiture ceremony duringwhich Mr C. C. Hilderband, a Burma Valley farmer, received a Bronze Crossfor exceptional bravery when 'he lost a leg while saving a land-mine victim1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994(Oxford, OUP, 1994), 56.2 Ibid.; 'Report of Proceedings of the Second Non-Governmental Organizations Conferenceon Land-mines' (Geneva, 9-11 May 1994), 105-6; 'Landmines: A worldwide epidemic',International Committee of the Red Cross [1CRC] (1994), II, 20.6364 A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINES IN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995on 6 December 1981'. At the same ceremony, Captain R. Cox received a SilverCross medal and his citation still evokes sympathy and admiration when,... after being told that a man had detonated a mine and was lying in the mine-fieldon 7 December 1981... it was already getting dusk and Cox, himself already a land-mine victim amputee, having been blown up twice before, decided to assist inextricating the injured man and in the process, detonated yet another mine, receiv-ing injury to the eye and leg, but still managed to get both of them out.The remaining mines are taking a heavy toll on newcomers to themined areas. The Herald on 4 November 1992, quotes Mukachana Muchini,proprietor of Mbiza Store, being the last structure alongside the CrooksCorner minefield, asserting that the mines posed a danger to the localpeople but even more so to unwary travellers, most of whom appearednot to have heard of the existence of the minefield. Colonel Lionel Dyck,head of Mine-Tech (a private company involved in mine clearance), alsoconfirmed that it is primarily newcomers to mined areas, now largelyunfenced and unmarked, who fall prey to these devices after straying onto the minefields.3There are an estimated 1,5 million mines in Zimbabwe, located inseven minefields, stretching for 766 kilometres along the Zambian andMozambican borders. Since independence in March 1980, gaps andcorridors, constituting only 10% of the total minefields, have been cleared.In the remaining 90%, all protective fencing and markings have beenremoved or destroyed resulting in a conservatively estimated 66 peoplekilled while 402 have been maimed by the mines country-wide. Ninethousand and eighty four cattle and an unknown number of smallerdomestic livestock as well as thousands of wild animals have also perishedduring the same period. Some of the larger wounded wild animals, especiallyrogue elephants, have posed a serious threat to local communities beforethey are put down. Furthermore, because mine warfare sought to separatethe local population from the infiltrating guerrillas, 626 kilometres,representing 87% of the minefields, runs alongside communal areas, makingthis group still the most threatened by the continued existence of themines.4MINE WARFARE AS A STRATEGYDespite the universal acknowledgement of the devastating effects of mines,mine warfare still forms an important part of the doctrine of most armies.3 Interview with Col. Dyck, Harare, 23 Dec. 1994.4 Mine-Tech, Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Minefields Survey Report (Harare, Dec. 1994), 5. Thisreport, commissioned by the European Economic Community on behalf of the Zimbabwegovernment to ascertain the type of mines, extent of minefields and suggest best possibleclearance methods, admits its figures could be understated by as much as 40%.MARTIN R. RUPIAH65TYPES OF MINEFIELDS IN ZIMBABWE1. Cordon Sanitaire (Corsan) MinefieldsThe 220 km Victoria Falls to Mlibizi Minefield; the 359 km Musengezi,Nyamapanda to Ruenya Minefield; the 72 km Junction Gate, Jersey Tea Estateto Muzite Mission, have this basic construction.2. Reinforced Plough-share Minefields (RPSF)The Stapleford Forest to Mutare 50 km minefield and the 61 km Malvemia toCrooks Corner Minefield.3. Anti-Personnel (AP) MinefieldThe minefield around Kariba Power Station, measuring ± 1 km.66 A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINES IN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995It is therefore unlikely that this facet is going to disappear from theiroffensive and defensive repertoires. Mines are used primarily to 'mouldterrain' as obstacles, as well as to reduce the need for manpower inretaining control over certain areas, where mines can be supported bycovering fire from a much smaller force.5 The United States has retainedmine warfare in its doctrine which holds:Mine-fields are used to produce a specific effect on the enemy manoeuvre, createvulnerability that can be exploited by friendly forces, disrupting the enemy'scommand and control, inflict damage to personnel and equipment and to protectfriendly forces from enemy manoeuvre both in Defence and Offensive operations.6In the recent Gulf War, both the United States and Iraq used minesextensively. Zimbabwe is one of three countries in Africa producing mines,from an industry which emerged after 1974; the others are Egypt and SouthAfrica.7 Zimbabwe is therefore likely to maintain mine warfare as an option.MINE LAYING IN ZIMBABWE BY GUERRILLASInitially, nationalists from Zimbabwe secured base sanctuaries in Zambiaand Tanzania for training combatants before re-infiltration. In support oftheir overall strategy, guerrillas initiated mine warfare along the borderareas from which they were entering the country. Before 1972 they initiatedmine warfare in the north-eastern Musengezi, Mukumbura, Nyamapandaand Ruenya areas, bordering the Tete Province, in what was thenPortuguese East Africa (now Mozambique).The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), through Herbert Chitepoand others, accepted the offer by the Mozambique Liberation Front(FRELIMO) to use the latter's bases as well as lines of supply to prosecutethe war. The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)strategists then sub-divided the new area into four operational sectors ofRubatsiro, Nehanda, Chaminuka and Takawira, making the zone animportant funnel of men and equipment through the Chiweshe TribalTrust Lands into the rest of the country. The geographical location ofChiweshe, lodged between the rich White farming areas of Centenary,5 Carl Von Clausewltz, On War (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 249; I K.Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (London, Croom-Helrn. 1985), 115:'Report of Proceedingson Land-mines', 6-7.6 'Report of Proceedings on Land-mines', 6.7 United Nations/ICRC Poster, land Mines in Africa. 2/95.MARTIN R. RUPIAH 67Mount Darwin, Umvukwes and Bindura, resulted in these areas immediatelybecoming contested zones during the opening stages of the war.Mines were used during the attack on Altena farm on 21 December1972, an incident now recognized as the specific point when the 'war' inthe east started.8As part of ZANLA's strategy to restrict the mobility of the RhodesianSecurity Forces, roads were liberally mined as were the approaches toestablished base areas.Guerrilla movements secured mines mainly from the Eastern Bloc andChina. A series of TM57, TM46, TMH46 tank mines with an anti-handlingdevice and wooden TMD-B mines as well as POMZ type anti-personnelmines were used. As the war dragged on after 1974, guerrillas also liftedmines from the established Rhodesian minefields and employed theseagainst their owners. The reverse was also true as Rhodesian SecurityForces used captured guerrilla weapons, including mines during theconflict.9As early as 1974, the Rhodesian military authorities were alreadybeginning to express disquiet about the heavy toll guerrilla mine warfarewas exacting on vehicles and lives. This led to the introduction of specialvehicles partially to withstand mine blasts.Guerrillas also used mines in unorthodox ways, such as when theylaid booby traps in shopping centres in Salisbury, containing two TM46mines. A similar device was later found and disarmed at the SalisburyStation 'Left Luggage'.10Finally, guerrillas laid mines around some of the Assembly Pointsfollowing the ceasefire in December 1979 as a precaution against possibleattack by the Rhodesian Security Forces.MINE LAYING BY THE RHODESIAN ARMYThe country's oldest minefield, consisting of 3 000 PMN wooden box anti-personnel mines laid over an area measuring approximately one hectare,covers the approaches to the Kariba Power Station and switch gear. Thiswas established without much debate. The minefield was completed on 11November 1963, a few weeks before the formal distribution of Federalassets at the Victoria Falls Butler Conference in December 1963. The8 A. Verrier, The Road to Zimbabwe 1890-1980 (London, J. Cape, 1986), 175.(Tki "^'9 B. Cole, The Elite: The Rhodesian Special Air Service (Transkei, "^^.Jffcl?!129, 345, quoted in Human Rights Watch, Land-mines in Mozambique (Washington, HumanRights Project, 1994), 33-34. ,..— lnon10 H. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1980(Gweru, Mambo Press, 1989, revised 1993), 75.68 A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINES IN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995minefield was meant to hinder Zambian post-Federal moves towardsasserting physical control of the jointly owned assets, as well as to thwartsabotage attempts by guerrilla units.11In contrast, the decision in 1973/4 to engage in mine warfare againstguerrilla infiltration along the north-eastern border was preceded by muchsoul-searching in efforts co-ordinated by the existing Joint Planning Staff.They first considered planting sisal along the border to restrict the passageof guerrillas. This idea was soon found unworkable. Next, aerial and regularvehicle patrols were assessed but were also found to be expensive andimpracticable. Finally, mines were selected, to be coupled with theestablishment of 'no-go-areas'. Villagers residing in the areas in whichminefields were to be established were to be re-located elsewhere, afterwhich anyone found in the designated zones was to be shot on sight.Following this decision, a Cordon Sanitaire (Corsan) Committee chairedby the Deputy Prime Minister, was appointed to co-ordinate civil andmilitary aspects of mine warfare within the Rhodesian national war strategy.This committee included senior representatives from the Army, Air Force,Police, Treasury, Internal Affairs and the Department of Tse-Tse andTrypanosomiasis Control. These provided specialist support for theconstruction of the minefield expected to start in the west from VictoriaFalls, Mlibizi and Musengezi, through Mukumbura, Nyamapanda, to theRuenya border with Mozambique in the east.The minefields along the Zambezi were placed at fordable and narrowriver points while the vast water expanse was policed by a radar systembased on the home side. Stretches of water from the Mlibizi narrows, pastthe Kariba Dam and Chirundu, terminating just below Kanyemba, had thissystem installed with sub-stations at intervals supported by fast armedboats, equipped to bear upon any water-craft from the Zambian sideattempting to cross.In support of these efforts on the Zambian stretch of the border,Rhodesian efforts were augmented by South African troops deployed asearly as July/August 1967. By the early 1970s, South African DefenceForces had three helicopters and two Cessna aircraft and an unspecifiednumber of troops divided between Victoria Falls and Kariba. Their mainaim was to keep the South African guerrillas of the African National Congressnorth of the Zambezi in response to the latter's attempts to operate withthe Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) at this time.11 Zimbabwe Minefields Survey Report, 54; Human Rights Watch, Land-Mines in Mozambique,17, give a technical explanation of PMNs, i.e. 'a very common mine throughout the world.Although easily detectable, the mine has a large explosive content, 240 grammes oftrinitrotoluene, commonly known as TNT, requiring as little as 0,25 kgs of direct pressure toinitiate an explosion.'MARTIN R. RUPIAH 69The Corsan Committee looked at several types of minefields andvisited South Africa's obstacles in South West Africa. They finally settledfor an Israeli system constituted on the following lines:A 25 metre wide barrier mine-field containing a very high concentration of anti-personnel (blast) mines was the first line of defence. This mine-field was fenced oneither side with a great depth of barbed wire. On the home side a system ofelectronic sensors, divided into sectors and wired into sectorial control boxes,constituted the early warning system. Penetration of the mine-field would either bedetected by detonations of mines, or by electronic indications in the controlcentres. Reaction to these incursions was by vehicle, to any part of the sectorswithin 10 minutes of a signal being received. In addition, artillery, sited well in-depth of the mine-field12, was on call to put down fire on pre-selected and rangedtargets.13Estimated costs of this system were put at Rh$5 million per kilometre.14The Rhodesian economy, already burdened by international sanctionsand manpower shortages to prosecute the war as well as the cost of thatwar, could not afford this intricate version. A downgraded system wasthen planned to be put in place. However, the recent survey has revealedthat in practice, teams inadvertently tended to switch the ropes around oravoid particularly difficult ground.Minefield construction drew on the expertise of each participatingdepartment. The Engineer Corp was responsible for clearing the 25-metreland strip of scrub with bulldozers as well as digging, laying, arming andcovering up the mines while the Signals Corp installed the alarm system.The Tse-Tse and Trypanosomiasis Control department erected game fences,measuring 6-8 metres high and 25 metres apart. Thy were also responsiblefor providing back packs to spray the chemical HYVAR-X. Later, plannerswanted to increase the chemically cleared area to 150 metres on eitherside of the minefield. But because of the expenses, they secured a cheaperchemical, TORDON 225, which was not effective, resulting in Rhodesiainstituting court action against the producers in the South African legalsystem. All these three departments were subsequently responsible formaintaining their elements of the minefield.The Corsan Committee authorized the procurement of Rh$10 millionworth of equipment, including dozers, vehicles and anti-personnel mines.Thousands of Portuguese M969 mines, which were readily available, were12 This means the guns were positioned some distance away from the obstacle but withintheir firing ranges.13 Zimbabwe Minefield Survey Report, 9.14 Interview with Col. Dyck, Harare, 23 Dec. 1994.70A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINES IN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995CORDON SANITAIRE (CORSAN)Double Game Fence 6 to 8m Highf2V2m Safety Lane 1st Row25 m. I2'/2 m Safety LaneAlarm SystemDouble Game Fence 6 to 8m HighDefoliants50m,Rope A' Drag Road - Gravel .' 'Ł. 'Ł50 m HYVAR-XDefoliants150m TORDON 225j Less SuccessfulMine laying was carried out in patterns according to ropes marked with notes.Three ropes, each 50 metres long, were laid parallel to each other. These rowsare ten yards apart within the 25 metre-wide strip. Ropes were designated'rope A, B, and C. Rope 'A' was knotted at 1 metre intervals while 'B' was atevery 2 metres and 'C at every 3 metres.At each knot, three holes would be dug, one at 9 o'clock position, another at 12o'clock and the last at 3 o'clock position. Following those digging would be asecond team placing mines in each hole. A third team would then arm eachmine before slightly covering it up. The operation of the teams was in sequence,as reflected on the rope diagram such that if teams came under attack, as was tofrequently occur when they reached the eastern border areas, they could sim-ply turn to the right and take cover over ground which had not been mined,before returning fire.MARTIN R. RUPIAH 71secured to plant the first 300 kilometres of the Musengezi minefield.15 Later,during maintenance of the minefields, other types of mines were laid. Theseincluded locally produced mines to reduce costs, and mines supplied bySouth Africa throughout the war, in spite of the continuing internationalsanctions. These included the South African Mark I and II series16, the ItalianVS 50, and local versions17, RAP Mark I, II and III also known as the Adamsgrenade. The local products managed to reduce mine procurement costsfrom Rh$7 to Rh$2,60 each, although there were serious problems with thequality. Local mines sometimes exploded while being armed. Whenconstruction teams reached the Gona Re-Zhou area, for example, during aperiod when the army in general was suffering from lack of manpower, theEngineers were forced to employ untrained Territorial forces and NationalService men. A whole field was later found to have been littered with unprimedmines, forcing the regular sappers to re-work the field.MINEFIELD CONSTRUCTIONIn conformity with the strategic calculations on mine warfare, before theteams moved in, 'the entire population of Chiweshe, 50 000 families', wasresettled in Protected Villages to create the required 'no-go area'. ByJuly 1974, 187 villages were packed in 21 hastily established areas atMusengezi Mission, Hoya and Mukumbura. This development soon spreadnation-wide. By late 1977, in the six areas where minefields were to beestablished, 203 villages with a combined population of 580 832 peoplewere in the protected villages.19 This hostage community was under thesupervision of a guard force of 7 000 personnel led by Brigadier W. Godwin.Mines were laid and exploded mines replaced from May 1974 untilNovember 1979.However, as the exercise got off the ground, political developments inthe region deflected the main focus of the original thrust of mine warfareagainst incursions in the north-east. Following a coup by the armed forces13 This type is a Portuguese copy of the Belgian NR409 mine and almost entirely non-metal.16 Human Rights Watch, Land-mines in Mozambique, 23, describes the South African mineas made up of 50 grammes RDX/TNT, requiring 10 kilograms of pressure to detonate.17 Ibid., 26, describe this Rhodesian mine as essentially a crudely modified version of thePortuguese M969 mine which had been initially procured.18 Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record; Rhodesia to Zimbabwe1964-1981 (London, John Murray, 1987), 122.19 Ibid.; H. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, 49,52,265, quoting the Catholic Commission otJustice and Peace notes that 'In 1974, Mukumbura Protected Village expenencea "'^"fdeaths which medical experts believed were caused by eating vegetables tainiea uychemicals used to clear the border minefields which had entered the food chain.20 P. Godwin and I. Hancock, ŁRhodesians Never Die': The Impact of War and FoliticaiChange on White Rhodesia c 1970 -1980 (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), Ł»».72 A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINES IN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995in Lisbon on 25 April 1974, Mozambique was almost immediately deliveredto FRELIMO. ZANLA quickly took advantage of this and expanded itsoperational provinces from Tete to the Limpopo in the south-east. A newProvince, Manica, was established in the eastern border comprising sectorsof Tangwena, Monomotapa, and Musikavanhu. Further to the south, theGaza Province, with Sectors I, II, III and IV, emerged. Following the death ofHerbert Chitepo, a fifth sector, Chitepo, was created in the old TeteProvince. In sum, areas of guerrilla infiltration had expanded well beyondthe planned mine-field areas.MUSENGEZI, MUKUMBURA, AND NYAMAPANDA TO RUENYA MINEFIELDThe next minefield after the Kariba Power Station to be laid was a 359 kmstretch, broken into three separate fields with an 8 km section juttinginside Mozambique. In the political environment of 1974, both colonialpowers in the region had a common enemy in the form of restive 'nationalists, and so they co-operated closely. Consequently, one ofRhodesia's Corsan minefields was laid across the international boundary.A total of 1 796 200 M969 type anti-personnel mines and 35 900 plough-shares were laid.21 HYVAR-X defoliants, normally used by the Railways tokeep lines free of vegetation, were successfully used to destroy vegetationin the immediate vicinity of the minefield.As minefield construction continued, a review of its effectiveness wasundertaken. This revealed that guerrillas, using small spades, were able tobreach the 25-metre wide minefield in only two hours. The reviewrecommended future minefields to be not below 300 metres wide. Secondly,the minefield needed to be strengthened by the addition of trip-wire whichwould detonate anti-personnel mines. As a result of procurement costs ofmines, densities had to be reduced to rely more on the plough-shares witha new low density of 100 plough-shares and 300 anti-personnel mines perkilometre, a far cry from the 5 500 originally envisaged.Soon after the completion of the minefield, there were numerous falsealarms recorded through the early warning system, resulting in rapidresponses which found no sign of the enemy. After expending inordinate21 Human Rights Watch, Land-mines in Mozambique, 23, gives a technical description ofplough-shares as 'A concave shaped dish, approximately 250 mm in diameter, operated bytrip-wire with a fragmentation portion constituting about 350 pieces of 6 mm chopped steelbars which are detonated by 150 grams of Pentolite/TNT manufactured by various companiesin Rhodesia. In maintaining and reinforcing this minefield, US type claymore mines, M18A1were also used. Their technical definition is, 'directional fragmentation mine with 700 steelball bearings projected in a 60 degree arc with a killing zone of 50 metres to a height of sixfeet'. These were produced in South Africa.MARTIN R. RUPIAH 73amounts of ammunition, this rapid reaction had to be curtailed from 1975onwards. The on-going review then recommended the stripping of futureminefields of the alarm system. The present condition of these minefieldshas to be seen against the background of:a) a prolonged lack of maintenance;b) heavy and pounding summer rains exposing, washing away and re-locating some mines; andc) veld fires snapping taut trip-wires thereby triggering off explosions orheating mines underneath the burning grass and detonating them.These reasons combined explain the level of deterioration andreduction of initial mines deployed. Furthermore, both people and animals,unwittingly stepping on mines with tragic consequences, also contributedto the depletion of mines.In the minefield running from Musengezi, Mukumbura to Ruenya, theeffects of defoliants have disappeared as bush growth has recovered. TheZimCord Conference of 23-27 March 1981, envisaged that 'all areas notimmediately cleared of mines would be fenced off to prevent accidents'although sadly this has not come to pass. Fencing along the entire lengthof the minefield has been stolen by locals or almost completely destroyed.Replacement would be futile given the general attitude of the local people.22Since 1980 the areas along this minefield have played host to largepopulation concentrations at Katarira, Mukumbura, Caetano, Musengeziand at Chidodo. Families have been forced to use cattle, driven acrosssections of the minefield, to open these areas for resettlement. Sinceindependence in 1980, the Zimbabwe National Army Corp of Engineers hascleared several gaps on this minefield for commercial and cross-borderactivities. These are at Batoka Gorge for the proposed hydro-electricproject with others at Mukumbura, Nyamapanda and Ruenya,This area easily constitutes the biggest contemporary problem interms of population exposure and lack of urgency by those involved inimplementing mine clearance. There are 1 005 872 anti-personnel minesand 5 385 plough-shares and claymores still in place23 in this minefield Šapproximately two-thirds of the total.22 ZIMCORD Conference Documentation, 23-27March 1981 (Salisbury, Govt. Printer, 1981),31-32. When calling for reconstruction funds for mine clearance, the document envisaged thatmechanical clearance over three years would rid Zimbabwe of the problem of land-mines.The fact that these are still around and are not being talked about anymore merely reflects thelow priority that the problem has now acquired.23 All present minefield statistics and conditions are from the Zimbabwe Minefields SurveyReport, 43, 44.74 A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINES IN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995VICTORIA FALLS TO MLIBIZIA second minefield stretches for 220 kilometres from Victoria Falls toMlibizi with 66 000 anti-personnel mines and 22 000 plough-shares initiallylaid. The minefield closely resembles the one above except that nochemicals are reported to have been used. So far, the Zimbabwe NationalArmy (ZNA) has created seven gaps around Victoria Falls, for both humanand animal access to the Zambezi and to allow for the maintenance ofelectricity pylons in the area. In the larger Mlibizi minefield, running alongcommunal and wildlife zones, ten official gaps have been cleared. Localpeople have added a few unofficial gaps. On this section of the minefield,little fencing remains.BURMA VALLEY JUNCTION GATEA small 4 kilometre minefield was laid in Burma Valley by local Whitefarmers, with the assistance of the Rhodesian Army Corp of Engineers andPolice Reservists. The latter were responsible for booby trapping theminefield. One thousand two hundred anti-personnel mines and 400 plough-shares and claymores are believed to have been deployed. The ZNAEngineer Corp cleared many of these mechanically, and only 60 anti-personnel mines and 20 plough-shares remain in areas suspected to havebeen booby trapped. These small pockets have been fenced off, to becleared later.However, late in 1993, the limitations of the mechanical clearancemethod were exposed in this area. Cattle passing over the soil moundsfrom the cleared minefield detonated mines while veld fires, sweepingover the same mounds later, also initiated explosions.THE MINEFIELD FROM SHEBA/STAPLEFORD FORESTTO JUST SOUTH OF MUTARETeams engaged in minefield construction were deployed to Umtali (nowMutare) as a matter of urgency in early 1976, since the perception thenwas that the north-eastern city was under imminent attack from both thenew Mozambican government and ZANLA cadres from nearby Chimoio. A'Modified Corsan' minefield was constructed along 50 kms of the border.This constituted three rows of plough-shares, reinforced with another rowof anti-personnel mines and plough-shares which were placed between 3to 5 metres forward of the main minefield. The improved minefield densitywas greater than that initially planned with 100 plough-shares and over 5 800anti-personnel mines per kilometre. A total of 290 000 anti-personnel minesand 5 000 plough-shares or claymores were laid.MARTIN R. RUPIAH 75Soon after the establishment of this minefield, the review committeeput forward several recommendations which were to be reflected in thesubsequent minefields. Prominent among concerns raised was the cost ofthe 20-kilometre parallel road, which had cost Rh$600 000, as well as thegame fence. A decision was taken by Combined Operations Headquartershenceforth only to establish minefields parallel to existing roads, whilethe replacement of its game fences by a fence of cattle strand wire,erected on the home side only, was to be the future norm.The Umtali minefield was also to host a number of booby traps inwhich mortar bombs, aircraft bombs, 90 mm anti-tank ammunition andcrude home-made explosives were dug in the minefield. These were housedin 44 gallon drums filled with nails, nuts, concrete blocks and anythinginjurious but which could withstand the initial radio-detonated ignition.The materials in the sunken drums were also expected to precipitate fires.Since the end of the war, little clearance work has been done on thisstretch, except detonation of the radio-controlled drums, forcingcommercial concerns to drive cattle over certain portions in a bid toreclaim land. The army has created six official gaps to allow cross-borderactivities to take place and smugglers have also holed the fence andbreached the minefield in a number of places. To date, while the fencingstill remains intact, largely because it runs through commercial farmingareas, 246 500 anti-personnel mines and 4 250 plough-shares or claymoresstill remain.FROM JUNCTION GATE TO SOUTH OF MUZITE MISSIONA 72 kilometre minefield, running alongside the communal areas, wasinitially planted with 21 600 anti-personnel mines and 7 200 plough-sharesand claymores. This minefield was constructed at a time when the Umtalireview had just been concluded. Because key tasks previously performedby other specialist agencies had fallen away, minefield construction becamean all army affair. The army then formed a special task force, known as SixComposite Battalion so that it could undertake all the construction tasks.To date 12 960 anti-personnel mines and 720 plough-shares remain inthis field. Protective fencing, where it runs through commercial farms, hasbeen maintained. However, in the communal areas, this has been removedfor individual garden and cattle kraal construction. A limited area for alocal Customs and Immigration point has been cleared and re-fenced for adistance of 500 metres on either side of the post. Kavira Forest has alsobeen cleared to allow for grazing, as well as the area running throughTamandayi communal lands. However, as a result of pressure for land inthe area, locals have resorted to using cattle to re-open certain areas forresettlement.76 A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINES IN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995MALVERNIA (SONGO) TO CROOKS CORNER (PAFARU)A 61 km minefield similar to the Mutare/Vumba one was established with353 800 anti-personnel mines and 6 100 plough-shares. To this day, the2,46 metres game fence from the small town of Songo which has beenmaintained by National Parks people, is still in good condition. However,the cattle strand protective barrier running from south of the boundarywith the National Park area has been removed, resulting in tragicconsequences for wildlife. A disturbingly high 247 660, or 80%, of theoriginal anti-personnel mines planted still remain on this particularlyexposed minefield as well as 2 440 plough-shares.DUMMY MINEFIELDSFor students of strategic studies, a dummy minefield serves exactly thesame purpose as an actual 'mined field'. A total of three such fields can beidentified. The first is a portion of ground abutting the Junction Gate toJersey Tea Estate24. This is followed by the Malvernia to Songo sectionwhich is 'laid out with pickets and trip-wires but no mines'. Finally, anotherdummy is also located in the same area over swamp land.25With reference to the Rhodesian mine warfare strategy, although theminefields continued to be built and maintained until November 1979, theperiodic reviews showed that the obstacles were not stemming the flow ofguerrillas in any serious manner as initially envisaged. 1978 was to becomea watershed for mine warfare as part of the national strategy. On March 31978, the Rhodesian government agreed to hand over power to agovernment led by Bishop Muzorewa. A component of their agreementwas the opening up of protected villages. As a result, the links betweenmine warfare and the 'villagisation' programme were severed. BySeptember, the inmates of 70 protected villages were allowed to leave, andmore villages were opened up by the end of the year.26 From this point on,mine warfare was to continue as a disjointed army operational initiative.In August of 1978, a major review by the Engineer Corp privatelyadmitted that minefields had failed to halt guerrilla infiltration.27 As if toconfirm this view, in September of that year, ZANU's publication, TheZimbabwe News, published an account of their troops breaching minefieldsof the Rhodesian Security Forces.2824 Zimbabwe Minefields Survey Report, 29.25 Ibid., 32.26 Godwin and Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die', 365.27 Cilliers, Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia, 113; Flower, Serving Secretly, 175; Interview withJ. K. Cilliers, Johannesburg, 2 March 1995, citing the August 1978 Engineers Report.28 Zimbabwe News (Sept-Oct 1978), X, (v), 15, 17.MARTIN R. RUPIAH 77Some casualties were also experienced by the Rhodesian Security Forces,which may have had a bearing on the reluctance of the present forces toclear the minefield by hand. By November 1979 the Rhodesian army, throughthe Engineer Corp, had suffered a combined loss of 25 men killed and 91injured while constructing the minefields. The majority of these casualtieswere incurred from handling of the locally produced mines.In total, over 2 528 800 anti-personnel mines and 76 600 plough-sharesor claymores, as well as those amongst the booby traps,29 were laid inZimbabwe's seven existing minefields. The Mine-Tech Survey teams haveascertained that 1 535 852 anti-personnel mines and 9 915 plough-sharesor claymores remain in an area measuring 8 566 square kilometres.30 Thegaps and corridors created since independence by the ZNA with thesupport of the 1981 marshalled ZimCord Funds, make up less than 80kilometres which have been cleared, presenting the nation with amonumental task of providing the initiative and commitment to removecompletely the remaining land-mines.DISSIDENT ACTIVITY AND MINE WARFARE, 1983-87The last conflict to result in mines being brought into Zimbabwe was the'dissident problem' as it evolved in late 1982 and early 1983. South Africa,anxious to exploit the cleavages which had appeared in the Zimbabweanbody politic, supplied 'Super-ZAPU dissidents', between April to November1983, with a total of 46 TM57 Russian type land-mines. Only one of thesewas planted, and it was later lifted by the army following indications frommembers of 'Super-ZAPU' in custody after they were handed over byBotswana authorities from their Dukwe Refugee Camp. Fortunately forZimbabwe, the Unity Accord signed between ZANU and ZAPU on 22December 1987 appears to have addressed the areas of discontent,resolving the political differences that had emerged.CONCLUSIONS AND OPTIONS FOR MINE CLEARANCESeveral sectors of Zimbabwean society continue to be seriously affectedby the existence of land-mines. These include communal areas, tourism,parts of commercial farming areas as well as forestry harvesting concerns.The department of Tse-Tse and Trypanosomiasis control is also havingrestricted access to Tse-Tse breeding areas in Mozambique as a result of29 Interview with Col. Dyck, 23 Dec. 1994. In the Mutare minefield, an average 100 explosivedevices per day, made up of air-craft, mortar bombs and anti-tank vehicle 90 mm ammunition,were being laid at the height of the conflict.30 Zimbabwe Minefields Survey Report, 43, 44.78 A HISTORICAL STUDY OF LAND-MINES IN ZIMBABWE, 1963-1995land-mines. In the continuing debate on the selection of the best mineclearance course in Zimbabwe, any method selected must be measuredagainst the urgency of alleviating the suffering being experienced byresidents in the communal areas. In terms of casualties, this community isbearing the brunt of the land-mines problem in this country.Several methods exist for clearing mines which are dependent on theenvironment, the geography of the area, available skills and existing back-up infrastructure as well as a host of other minor considerations, not leastof which is the safety factor for operators.The ZNA has publicly advocated for a mechanical method, which theyargue, would clear all the remaining mines in a period of 10 years, givenZ$30 million. However, a private contractor has argued that the task couldbe done in 18 months using combined methods of mechanical and hand-held methods at an estimated cost of about US$40 million or Z$324,lmillion at prevailing exchange rates.31 Considering the United Nationsestimate of the average cost of removing each mine to be between US$300to $1 000, for Zimbabwe's 1,5 million mines, the contractor's estimate32appears cheap but perhaps more research needs to be done. For purposesof this study, the question is not necessarily who is right but what effectiveoption is available to rid the nation of the scourge of land-mines in theshortest possible time at minimum cost.31 The Herald, 7 Oct. 1994.32 This estimate was made against the background of the contractor having won UnitedNations international tenders in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa.