Zambezia (1995), XXII (ii).ENGINEERING OR DOMINEERING? THE POLITICS OFWATER CONTROL IN MUTAMBARA IRRIGATIONSCHEME, ZIMBABWE1EMMANUEL MANZUNGUDepartment of Soil Science and Agricultural EngineeringUniversity of ZimbabweAbstractThis article examines the role of local and non-local actors in water control inMutambara Irrigation Scheme since the beginning of the scheme in 1912. Itshows that deep-seated divisions within the community, which were ignoredby outsiders coming to 'help', have resurfaced. Colonial state intervention,showing high-handedness and ignorance of the social reality, under the guiseof bringing 'technical improvements' to this missionary-assisted local initiative,laid the foundation for a crisis in water management. The technicalinfrastructure has been poor throughout and has played its part in the crisis.The crisis became more apparent once the post-colonial state, in a spirit ofdemocracy, withdrew from the scheme. A monetary donation intended toimprove the physical infrastructure, provided the final push towards a hill-blown crisis. The article argues that improvement in the performance ofsmallholder irrigation schemes lies not only in the technico-physical domain,but also in the socio-political one.MUTAMBARA IRRIGATION SCHEME in Chimanimani District, a gravity-fed schemewhich started in 1912, is widely taken to be the oldest smallholder irrigationscheme in Zimbabwe. The scheme lies 75 kilometres south of Mutare, theprovincial capital of Manicaland Province (see Figure I).2 With a size of145 hectares and irrigated by 220 plotholders, it is the largest operationalcommunity scheme3 in the country. Since its start, a number of changes1 I wish to thank my colleagues Mr Jens Andersson, Dr Pieter van der Zaag, and MrDumisani Magadlela lor making very useful comments on this paper.2 The names of the subdivisions or blocks of the scheme i.e. Guta, Gonzoni, Zomba andMaunzani are the names used by plotholders. This is in contrast to official reports that giveconflicting block numbers. For example, Mutambara Irrigation map [Mutambara Irrigation(Melsetter District), Ministry of Agriculture (1963), Map Ref. No. M/10] and the feasibilitystudy [Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development(1985) 'Feasibility Study: Mutambara Irrigation Scheme, Final Report'] referred to six blockswhile Danby wrote that there were nine blocks. Individual blocks are designated letters of thealphabet [Agritex, Mutare, Danby, E. P. (nd) 'Mutambara Irrigation Scheme Š MelsetterDistrict'].3 Community scheme in this case refers to a scheme where the government is not in chargeof management duties such as water distribution. The concept of 'community scheme',however, needs to be used with caution as it does not necessarily mean that the community asa unit manages the scheme. It may be that only a few members of the community monopolisewater use and other aspects in the scheme as is the case in Mutambara. Although thegovernment does not manage such a scheme, it nevertheless offers extension advice. Normallythere is an extension worker (a certificate holder) at the scheme.115Figure 1LOCATION AND SUBDIVISIONS OF MUTAMBARA IRRIGATION SCHEMEMUTAMBARA IRRIGATION SCHEMEmsoen1oo33OEMMANUEL MANZUNGU 117regarding water control4 have taken place. These changes resulted fromphysical and social factors in the scheme and its immediate surroundings,as well as from factors emanating from beyond the boundaries of thescheme. Non-local influences came from the state in the colonial era, whiledonors played a significant role in changing the course of events in thescheme in the post-colonial phase.This article examines the role of both local and non-local actors inwater control from the beginning of the scheme in 1912 to the present. Itattempts to show that the story of Mutambara has been one of intermittentstruggles waged by various stakeholders in their bid to have a greater sayin the way this important resource is used. It shows that deep-seateddivisions within the community, which were ignored by outsiders comingto 'help', have resurfaced to haunt the scheme. The colonial state, displayingignorance of the social reality and a high degree of high-handedness,appropriated a missionary-assisted local initiative under the guise of'technical improvements' such as 'improving' the layout of canals and'better' construction of furrows. Significantly, the technical infrastructurehas been reported to be notoriously poor throughout and has played itspart in the crisis. The colonial state intervention laid a foundation for acrisis in water management. The crisis is shown today by severe inequalitiesin water distribution and continued physical deterioration of the schemethrough a lack of maintenance, which became more apparent once thepost-colonial state, in the spirit of promoting democracy in smallholderirrigation, withdrew from the scheme.Using the case of Mutambara Irrigation Scheme, I argue that improvedperformance5 of existing and future smallholder irrigation schemes inZimbabwe lies not only in the technico-physical but also in the socio-political domain. I conclude that engineers, whose role in irrigation schemescannot be over-emphasized, and who normally are beholden to 'technical'issues in their irrigation discourse, should also pay attention to the socio-political dimension of smallholder irrigation if well-performing andsustainable schemes are to be realised.4 Water control in traditional irrigation engineering refers to the physical control of waterin the water channels mediated through a variety of water regulating structures [see PlusquellecHerve, Charles Burt, and Hans W. Wolter (1994) 'Modem Water Control: Concepts, Issues andApplications' (Washington, D. C, World Bank Technical Paper Number 246, Irrigation andDrainage Series), among others]. In this article, water control refers to struggles that arewaged in order to have power over how water is distributed [see Bolding, Alex, Peter, P.Mollinga, and Kees van Straaten (1995) 'Modules for modernisation: Colonial irrigation in Indiaand the technological dimension of agrarian change' Journal of Development Studies, XXXI,(vi), 805-844].5 P. S. Rao notes that performance in irrigated agriculture is a very complex subject andthat common indicators of performance deal with the water delivery system, agriculturalproduction and economic benefits. Performance Indicators normally take a quantitativedimension. In this article performance relates to water delivery and agricultural production.However, no quantitative data are used; rather performance refers to qualitative criteria usedby farmers in the scheme, such as 'not enough water' [Rao, P. S. (1993) Review of IrrigationPerformance (Colombo, International Irrigation Management Institute), 1].THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLCOLONIAL STATE INTERVENTION IN A LOCAL INITIATIVEFarmers take the initiative in constructing the schemeAn account of the circumstances surrounding the opening up of MutambaraIrrigation Scheme is given by Roder:... This was a year (1912) of severe famine... The people near Mutambara Missiontook inspiration and encouragement from the example before them and built newditches to irrigate new gardens. The missionaries aided the efforts of the people by-supplying wheat seed and sweet potato vines.6Roder further notes that from 1912 to 1927 farmers enjoyedconsiderable autonomy in the scheme, without much interference fromcentral government. Involvement of central government came in 1927when Emery Alvord was appointed as an Agriculturalist for the Instructionof Natives. Alvord's priority from 1927 to 1935 was to provide schemeswith technical assistance, with emphasis on 'improving' layout of sitesand 'better' construction of furrows.7 Alvord sought the cooperation oflocal people to realise his ambition of 'intellectualizing their agriculturalpractices, so filled with superstition, ignorance, witchcraft and worship ofthe unknown'.8 As a result of his intervention, the main furrow that channelswater from the Umvumvumvu River was resited. Because Alvord saw theschemes as a form of famine relief, farmers were allowed to continue rain-fed farming.9Farmers lose control of the schemeThe fortunes of the farmers vis-a-vis control of the scheme changed as aresult of Alvord's visit to irrigation and soil conservation projects onIndian reservations in the United States in 1935. (At this point Alvord wasconsidering giving up his job because he was being given a lower salarythan his British counterparts on account of his being an American citizen).The visit to an irrigation project had a profound influence on him as heexplains,By the time we reached Flagstaff, Arizona, I had definitely decided to resign my jobwith the Rhodesian Government... Then Destiny took a hand. Next day officials ofthe Indian Service took me to see one of their control of flood waters for irrigationprojects . . . When we arrived at the spot, the area was swarming with naked6 Roder, Wolf (1965) The Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects (Chicago, Department of Geography,Research Paper No. 99, University of Chicago), 95.7Rukunt, M. (1988) 'The evolution of smallholder irrigation policy in Zimbabwe: 1928-1986'Irrigation and Drainage Systems, II, 202.8 Alvord, E. D. (1950) 'The Gospel of the Plough or a Guided Destiny?' (Harare, NationalArchives of Zimbabwe, unpubl), 25.9 Roder, The Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects, 104-110.EMMANUEL MANZUNGU 119Indians, stripped to their loin clothes, fishing driftwood out of the mud, while somewere levelling off the high spots which the water had missed. Their tanned, bronzeskins were exactly the same colour as the Bantu people of Rhodesia. I was struckby nostalgia and vividly reminded of my black people in Africa. If those Indians hadwool on their heads instead of spright black hair I could have sworn that I was backin the arid Sabi Valley. As soon as we got back to Flagstaff I told Benice [his wife]and the children that I had changed my mind. We were going back.10This attitude shaped the development of smallholder irrigationschemes in the colonial era by virtue of Alvord's influential position. Inthis era a development mentality prevailed according to which 'inferior'farmers (then they were called natives) were patronisingly told what wasgood for them. In fact coercion was part of the equation. Roder11convincingly shows that the development of irrigation projects, such asMutambara, which Alvord championed, were a means of implementing theLand Apportionment Act which divided the land between Whites andBlacks. However, the political motives were couched in technical terms:... there is no properly constructed weir at the Umvumvumvu river and there is nohead-gate at the out-take. This furrow was dug privately by a group of Natives withlittle or no outside help and survey methods used in the establishment of the lineof furrow were very crude. In fact, no instruments were used. They told me thatthey did it with their eyes and head... In connection with any survey made I wouldsuggest that the main furrow be put right; that lands for irrigation be properly laidout with lateral furrows on gradient; that 'plots' for irrigation be assigned toNatives and that irrigation be prohibited on lands outside the area laid off intoirrigation plots. If this policy is decided on I could arrange to do this job during thecoming dry season in connection with supervision of work on projects in the SabiValley. The development of the proposed irrigation scheme on the Umvumvumvuriver in the Sabi valley will probably relieve the congestion in this area to someextent.12The policy was apparently 'decided on' because Alvord, using hisofficial title of Agriculturalist, Department of Natives, about a year laterwrote a letter dated 16 February 1937 to the Chief Native Commissionerinforming him that work on the project was begun by the Soil ConservationOfficer, Mr Mackenzie, under his direction. He also revealed that it wasfinanced by a Native Reserves Trust Fund given for the purpose of 'takingover this furrow from private owners, putting it right and redistributingplots to people under Chief Mutambara'.10 Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plough or a Guided Destiny?', 40.11 Roder, The Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects, 104-117.12 National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), SP160/IP, Agriculturalist, Department of Natives,to the Chief Native Commissioner, 25 Jan. 1936.120 TH E POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLA number of 'improvements' were made. The main furrow was re-constructed, a headgate was installed, 'proper' lateral furrows were dugand division gates made for 'proper' distribution of the water, 'complete'works, consisting of contour ridges and storm water drains, were placedto contain erosion and the land was divided into plots.13 This was madepossible by a grant in aid from Native Reserve Trust funds to cover thecost of the materials and by natives who 'worked without pay' accordingto Alvord.14 In the same letter, Alvord indicated that all was not well in theproject as he denied responsibility for the erosion that was apparentlybad by stating that 'my Department has had nothing to do with this furrowsince 1936'.In fact the furrow was never 'put right', contrary to Alvord's assertion.From 1936 to 1974 when the scheme closed down, a year which alsomarked the end of the role of the colonial state, the technical infrastructurewas a subject of concern. In fact the poor infrastructure contributed to theclose-down of the scheme. Two reports made in the post-colonial era bothfound the technical infrastructure to be poor.15 One of these gave viewsabout the origin of the technical infrastructure which was critical ofAlvord.The Scheme was one of the original irrigation schemes started by Mr E. D. Alvord.His criteria for the need for, and the siting of, irrigation schemes was very differentfrom the criteria used today . . . The efficient use of water and the degree of the'need' for the schemes were of minor importance in those days, there being anabundance of water that was not being put to good use ... The layout of the oldirrigation scheme was appalling when judged by modern standards ... Due to theantiquated layouts and inefficient earth furrows that still exist on seven of ourschemes, it is only possible to achieve irrigation of 18 to 31 days. This would beunacceptable to any commercial irrigation farmer, or irrigation officer.16But Alvord did not only rely on the 'technical infrastructure fix'. Healso introduced and enforced new regulations in those irrigation schemeshe worked in. Between 1931 and 1947, these included Mutema, Nyanyadzi,Mutambara, Mvumvumvu, Chibuwe, Maranke and Devuli (now Devure).The regulations discouraged farmers from involvement in rain-fedagriculture and urged them to depend solely on irrigation. Off-farmactivities, such as migrant work, were discouraged.17 In practice, farmers13 Sparrow gives details of construction of technical infrastructure. The (main) canal wascompleted in 1945; in 1947 two night storage dams were completed; between 1957 and 1963,the inverted syphon on the Ruvaka River and the lining of the new canal was completed[Agritex, Mutare, Sparrow, M. R. (nd) 'Mutambara Irrigation Scheme'].14 NAZ, SP160/IP, Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 7 Aug. 1939.15 Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development,'Feasibility Study: Mutambara Irrigation Scheme'; Agritex, Mutare, Danby, "Mutambara IrrigationScheme'.16 Agritex, Mutare, Danby, 'Mutambara Irrigation Scheme1."Rukuni, 'The evolution of smallholder irrigation policy in Zimbabwe', 202-203.EMMANUEL MANZUNGU 121became tenants in the scheme. Their tenancy was confirmed by a waterrent which was fixed at 10 shillings per acre in 1942, a two-fold increasesince its introduction in 1932. 'Commercial' crops such as wheat andbeans were required to be grown.Protests and closure of the schemeOne of the earliest signs of protest came from people who declined theirlabour and personal enterprise being taken as a gift to the community. Asa result Alvord was forced to write on 7 December 1942 to the Chief NativeCommissioner about 'the question of paying out all plotholders who workedwithout pay when we took over this furrow over in 1936'.18 He asked forpermission to use money from the National Reserves Trust Fund to payout a total of S26 5s Od to be shared between the group (of 50) of these'original plotholders'. Two days before, Alvord had also written to theChief Native Commissioner in connection with a similar complaint by fivemen whose canal from Ruvaka river had been taken over by the government.Instead of SI 09 17s 9d that the men demanded, Alvord recommended apayment of S40 on the basis of estimates by the Irrigation Department.19There are no records of the actual payments.The claims seemed to have unleashed further protests until the schemewas closed in 1974. In 1947, the problem was reported to be that thepeople did not want to cooperate with the officials. One official came tothe conclusion that punitive action was doing very little.I today sentenced 7 plotholders for contravening section 11 S/S (b) chapter 176 asread with GN 42/38, but doubt whether this disciplinary measure will do muchgood. After court was over the natives in question complained to me that theNative supervisor Sibiya was as much an offender as they were.20A small consolation, according to one government official, was thatChief Mutambara had shown greater interest in this project during thisyear (1947).The uneasy relationship between government officials and plotholderscontinued until the early 1970s. Then things worsened considerably.Government desired to issue permits of occupation, which were obligatoryin terms of Section 9 (1) of G.N. 69/70.21 The permits were to be renewedannually subject to a display of good 'discipline' on the part of theplotholders. Plotholders were expected to follow an approved cropping18NAZ, SP160/IP, E. D. Alvord to Chief Native Commissioner, 7 Dec. 1942.19 NAZ, SP160/IP, E. D. Alvord to Chief Native Commissioner, 5 Dec. 1942.^NAZ, S160/M1, Anonymous to Department of Native Agriculture, 21 Jan. 1947.21 Agritex, Mutare, Hunt, Noel, A. to the Provincial Commissioner (Manicaland), 4 May1972.122 THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLprogramme including the use of specified types and amounts of seed andfertilizers. They were also to subject themselves to the orders of theDistrict Commissioner and the Irrigation Manager.22 There was widespreadopposition to this requirement. Plotholders argued that it was their landin the first place; how could they be required to apply to use their land? Awheat variety, Devuli, introduced in the same year, was rejected by farmers.Meyer, the Assistant District Commissioner, Melsetter (now Chimanimani),found it difficult to establish why there was opposition to Devuli seed.23He was not the only one. Many officials were baffled as they could notconnect the Devuli debacle to the permits. To them it was necessary tointroduce the variety so as to prevent an outbreak of rust, a disease ofwheat which can only be effectively controlled by changing varieties thatare grown. It was Young, the Irrigation Manager, who discovered theconnection as he wrote that 'all they wanted was to get the permitsremoved'.24The stance of the plotholders exasperated government officials at thenational, provincial, district, and scheme levels. From the office of theSecretary of Internal Affairs came the advice that all irrigators could beremoved if necessary.25 At the provincial level 'drastic action' wasconsidered even in respect of Chief Mutambara.26 Higgs wrote about the'prospect of action to be taken towards eviction of recalcitrant or non-cooperative plotholders'.27Before that could be done, however, there was a need to find outwhether there were grounds of nullification of the eviction orders on thebasis of prescriptive rights.28 The services of the government attorneywere sought. The government attorney replied that prescriptive rights,which could be claimed by a person who had cultivated the plot over along time or had been given use of the plot by someone, did not applysince that was only possible if that person had never acknowledged theauthority of the government. Recognition of the government authoritywas defined to mean the payment of any money in connection with theplot.Once this was clarified, the coast was clear for government officials todo their best to maintain discipline. The Irrigation Manager, Young, summed22 Agritex, Mutare, Barlow, G. A. to District Commissioner (Melsetter), 10 May 1972; Hunt,Noel, A. to the Provincial Commissioner (Manicaland), 4 May 1972.23 Agritex, Mutare, Meyer, J. J. to the District Commissioner (Melsetter), 15 April 1972.24 Agritex, Mutare, Young, I. M. (nd) 'Mutambara'.25 Agritex, Mutare, de Bruijin, L. J. to Provincial Commissioner (Manicaland), 26 April 1972;Hunt, Noel, A. to the Provincial Commissioner (Manicaland), 4 May 1972.26 Agritex, Mutare, Barlow, G. A. to Secretary of Internal Affairs, 28 June 1972.27 Agritex, Mutare, Higgs, B. R. to the Secretary of Internal Affairs, 18 July 1972.28 Agritex, Mutare, Barlow, G. A. to District Commissioner (Melsetter), 24 July 1972.EMMANUEL MANZUNGU 123up the prevailing mood when he said that since fines did not seem to deterthe plotholders the only option left was to 'boot the blighters off thescheme'.29 However, by this time every plotholder was a 'blighter'.Government officials could no longer rely on the incumbent ChiefMutambara who was described by one official, Peter, as 'playing a doublegame of pretending to co-operate with the authorities, but behind ourbacks encouraging civil disobedience'.30It was left to Peters, the District Commissioner of Melsetter, to wrestlewith the intricacies of the evictions. The option of eviction was not pursuedat all as it was unworkable. It was much simpler to close down the scheme,as he suggested in his letter to the Provincial Commissioner of Manicalandon 17 April. In the same letter he identified the cause of the problem:the problem, as stated in this minute, is not the shortage of water or the conditionof the soil but rather a social problem resulting directly from the attitudes of thepeople.31Other technically minded people would not have agreed with him thatthere were only social problems at play.The closure of the scheme in 1974The simmering discontent among farmers caused by losing their schemeto the government eventually led to the closure of the scheme. J. R. Peters,in a letter to the Provincial Commissioner of Manicaland in 1974, gave anaccount of the main events leading to the closure of the scheme.The suggested increased water charges from $2,50 per acre to $14 peracre met with disapproval from farmers. Although the officials had given aprior warning of the issue two years before, this did not help matters. Alast meeting called by the District Commissioner to resolve the issue wasreported as 'unruly' and 'obvious hostility made it impossible to reasonwith them'. At that meeting the District Commissioner, the IrrigationManager, and the Agricultural Officer were present while farmers wererepresented by the 'Acting Chief and leading irrigation personnel from thescheme'.According to Peters, farmers opposed the proposed increases onthese grounds:a) The irrigation scheme had been built by the people and not by the Government.Under the direction of Mr. Alvord, they had dug the main canal in 1934 andopened up the area for irrigation.29 Agritex, Mutare, Young, I. M. (nd) 'Mutambara'.30 Agritex, Mutare, Peter, D. A. to J. R. Peters, 26 April 1972.31 Agritex, Mutare, Peters, J. R. to the Provincial Commissioner (Manicaland), 17 April 1972.124 THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLb) Government had not developed the scheme by introducing an improved layoutwith lined canals as was the case with other irrigation schemes.c) They did not see how the Government could charge them for water which camefrom God, not the Government.d) During the last summer season they had received so much rain that it spoilttheir crops Š so why irrigate?32The view of the government is given in the next paragraph of the sameletter.After listening to their arguments it was obvious that the majority of those presentwere unable to see the real advantages of irrigation as there was 'no apparentneed' for irrigation in a highveld area where drought years were the exceptionrather than the rule. Our own Ministry's history of weakness on this issue and anassurance by a previous Minister in 1969 or 1970 that no increases in water rateswould occur until the scheme was re-developed, are factors which are not easilyforgotten and encourage opposition to new policies or changes in existing poli-cies.33A three-point ultimatum was given to farmers. The three points were:a) Acceptance of the increase in water rates to $14 per acre.b) Modification of the scheme to allow those who wished to accept the increasethe opportunity to continue irrigation farming whilst either the remaindercould leave the irrigation scheme or that part of the scheme be turned intodryland farming area.c) Conversion of the entire scheme into a dryland farming area without water, inwhich case the main canal would be closed and no private or individualirrigation permitted.34Farmers refused to budge on the issue of water fees and at a meeting'with the tribal leaders at Acting Chief Mutambara's kraal' this was conveyedto the District Commissioner. The scheme was officially closed on 1 October1974. Farmers chose point (c) and embarked on rain-fed farming withinthe scheme boundary. Farmers are quick to point out that in that particularyear, without the benefit of irrigation, they got a very good harvest betterthan when they used to irrigate!The ill-feeling towards the scheme by government officials spilled intothe post-colonial era. E. P. Danby who was the Principal AgriculturalOfficer (Irrigation) for Manicaland Province somewhere between 1974 andearly 1980s commented that32 Agrltex, Mutare, Peters to the District Commissioner, 11 Sept. 1974.33 Ibid.MIbid.EMMANUEL MANZUNGU 125... Another most important consideration at the present time is that ground visitswill be necessary for the re-design exercise, escorts and protection will have to beprovided . . . But before any decision is arrived at as to the re-construction ofMutambara Irrigation Scheme, an overall appraisal of the scheme must be made, aswell as an indepth enquiry as to whether the people who are farming the land nowas dry land are willing to pay the full water rates. They would of course want freewater to use or waste as they think fit... I consider that far better use could bemade of any money that is contemplated to spend on the re-development ofMutambara ... MTHE PERIOD OF DEMOCRACYThe re-opening of the schemeThe scheme remained closed until the war of liberation was over in 1980.For the farmers the fruit of the struggle was immediate Š they regainedtheir irrigation scheme. Farmers talk about the District Administrator fromChimanimani, who in 1980, came and handed over the scheme to farmers.The Chief talks about a document which was signed by the DistrictAdministrator in which the hand-over of the scheme was made legal. Thedocument however, cannot be traced. This 'legal' ceremony was precededby opening up the canal through the efforts of farmers who pooled theirlabour and cleaned it. To promote democracy in the scheme it was decidedat the same meeting that an Irrigation Management Committee would beelected to run the scheme. Woodworth, the Acting Provincial AgriculturalOfficer of Manicaland, wrote that the scheme was reopened in August1980.36A decade of popularly-elected committees37The first Irrigation Management Committee was elected in 1980. Subsequentcommittees were elected in 1982,1984 and 1987. The main offices were thechairperson, vice chairperson, a secretary, a treasurer and vice treasurer.The committee employed two water bailiffs who were directly answerableto the committee. According to Mangudya, who served as ManagementCommittee member from 1982 to 1990 and was the last chairman of thepopularly-elected committee, the committee met weekly to review progress.He recounted other activities of the committee. It supervised the waterbailiffs and worked closely with staff of the national extension department,Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex).The committee had a plan to build a dam across the Ruvaka River. It was35 Agritex Mutare, Danby, 'Mutambara Irrigation Scheme'.36 Agritex, Mutare, Woodworth, S. G. to the Director, DEVAG, 1981.37 In this context, 'popularly-elected' means that all plotholders could participate in electingthe office bearers.126THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLalso constructing or in the process of constructing fly-overs to preventsiltation of the canal at those points, four in all, where natural waterwayscrossed the main canal. There was also a plan to open a bank account forthe scheme. The Irrigation Management Committee instituted a set of bye-laws.The way the bye-laws came into existence was markedly differentfrom the common practice whereby Agritex is heavily involved. For eightyears the popularly-elected committees operated without written bye-laws. After being subjected to the difficulties of working with people, aneed arose to have bye-laws, according to Mangudya. In his capacity aschairman of the Irrigation Management Committee, he was obliged towork towards drafting of the bye-laws. He put in a lot of personal effortshuttling to and from Chimanimani district and police offices. The bye-laws were eventually drafted and agreed upon in 1988, and are containedin the document Mutambara Irrigation Scheme Policy. Signatories were theChairman and Secretary of the Irrigation Management Committee, theChief, the councillor, Member in charge of Zimbabwe Republic Police,Agritex and the District Administrator.The bye-laws stipulated the fines that would be levied against farmerswho breached any one of them. These related to stock-keeping, properwater use, maintenance fee payment, cultural practices concerning crops,canal maintenance and a good working relationship with Agritex. Duringthe tenure of the four popularly-elected committees there was no apparentclash with the Chief. The Chief acted as a patron of the scheme while theIrrigation Management Committee oversaw the daily running of the scheme.Popularly-elected Irrigation Management Committees lose controlPopularly-elected Irrigation Management Committees were composed ofpeople from all blocks. This seemed to have riled a section of the 'royalfamily', particularly the 'Chief's sons' (who are not necessarily his sonsbut could be sons of the Chief's full and half brothers).One close associate of the Chief, Vhashi Munjoma,38 who also happensto be one of the two water bailiffs as already mentioned, does not hide thefact that he found popularly-elected Irrigation Management Committeesuntenable as 'squatters were in control'. It seems that in the latter half ofthe 1980s, certainly after 1987, a 'royal committee' was secretly foundedwhich waited for an opportune time to take-over the scheme. The role ofthe Chief in the clandestine arrangements is not clear.38 This and other names that follow are not the true names of the people. Vhashi Munjomaregards himself as royal family although he has no legitimate claim to the Chieftainship [seeDeyo, M. (1955) 'The history of the Mutambara tribe' NADA, XXXII, 55]. His royal claim seemsa strategy to safeguard his personal interests in relation to access to irrigation water.EMMANUEL MANZUNGU 127At present there is no popularly-elected Irrigation ManagementCommittee. Popularly-elected Irrigation Management Committees losteffective control of the scheme in 1990. The present Irrigation ManagementCommittee, whose composition is virtually unknown to many of the farmers,was appointed by the Chief. Every farmer knows at least that the Chief isnow the Chairman of the Management Committee. The Chief himself readilystates that he is the chairman. From time to time, some of the members ofthe appointed Irrigation Management Committee come to light throughhearsay. These include one of the 'sons' of the Chief, Mashoko, andrecently the Treasurer and Secretary. These latter two complain that theyare being used by the Chief and his 'sons'. They point out that they weretold clearly by the royal family that they were not part of the Committeebut were just entrusted with some responsibilities for now. To stress theirplight they said, 'We are just caterpillars (bulldozers) sent to prepare theroad for the real people.'Disappointment among the generality of farmers with the way thescheme is currently run is rife. Many farmers accuse the Chief, not openlythough,39 of bringing the scheme into chaos. Some farmers say thatdevelopment is being hindered. They refer to cases of some donors whowere turned away simply because the Chief and his close associates wereafraid to lose control of the scheme.The Chief appointed two of his close associates as water bailiffs whooversee water distribution in the scheme. The first, Lovemore, who servicesblocks A and B or Guta and Gonzoni,40 is a 'son' of the Chief. The secondwater bailiff, Vhashi Munjoma, services Zomba and Maunzani. Popularityof the water bailiffs among the farmers is low. They are accused offavouritism in water allocation. It is alleged that they take money in bribesas well as giving water to close friends and associates.41 Those who belongto the Chieftainship are said to benefit most.But what were the circumstances that led to the take-over of thescheme after a decade of popularly-elected committees?39 Of late there has been open criticism, at least once, in which the Chief was challenged onthe point that he had no bye-laws by which to administer the scheme. He (the Chief) could notjust use the bye-laws that were drafted by the popularly-elected Irrigation ManagementCommittee. This was, of course, a clever way of challenging the legitimacy of the Chief, whoappointed himself the Chairman of the Irrigation Management Committee.40 In December 1994 the Chief swopped the areas served by the two water bailiffs becauseof complaints by farmers. Afterwards farmers still complained that the water supply situationhad not improved.41 This could well be a fact as the water bailiffs receive a low salary of $150 as of December1994. Moreover, by the same date the salaries were six months in arrears. This is a reflectionof the poor collection rates as well as the fact that water fees are quite low being $30 perhectare per year. The water fees are also meant for maintenance although since 1990 nomaintenance involving money has been undertaken.128THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLHOW AND WHY DEMOCRACY COLLAPSED AND THE CONSEQUENCESThe $50 000 donationThe opportunity to take-over the scheme by the royal family seemed tohave presented itself in the late 1980s. In 1988 the District Commissionerin Chimanimani sent to the scheme a donor, the Lutheran World Federation,which was interested in funding some development projects. After someconsultations with the potential donor, a public meeting was organised bythe popularly-elected Irrigation Management Committee to brief farmersof the proposed development. The cost of the rehabilitation of the schemewas estimated to be in excess of Z$100 000.42 Chiwanza listed the maintasks to be undertaken as fencing, canal repairs, desilting the night storagedam, constructing a grid as well as catchment conservation. In the end asum of $50 000 was given by another donor, ANCPD (full name could notbe found) under the auspices of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches. It isnot clear why the Lutheran World Federation did not finally provide thefinance.The Deputy Projects Coordinator of the Zimbabwe Council of Churchesgave some details of the $50 000 donation. The Heal the WoundsOrganisation sourced the money and placed the Council in charge ofdisbursing the money. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches, as a religiousorganisation, insisted that the money be handled by an affiliate organisation,so the nearby Mutambara Methodist Mission was drawn into the picture.The Chief was included as a representative of the people. These conditionswere conveyed to farmers and the Irrigation Management Committee.This account by the Zimbabwe Council of Churches is disputed byMangudya. According to him, the Irrigation Management Committee, ofwhich he was chairman, was asked to hand-over the control of the schemeto the Standing Committee whose origin and status was not clear. TheStanding Committee was primarily made up of members of the 'royalfamily' or people with royal connections. The main actor was a 'son' of theChief, who at one time was the superintendent at Mutambara Mission, MrX. There were two other people with royal connections; the local councillorwho is also a local businessman (Mr Z) and a primary school teacher, MrY, who belonged to the Munjoma house.Mangudya said that the popularly-elected Irrigation ManagementCommittee was told by Mr X that it would only be allowed to resume itsfunctions once the Standing Committee had finished 'the business athand', presumably of rehabilitating the scheme. There was also an Audit42 Chiwanza, P. (1989) 'Rehabilitation of Mutambara Irrigation Scheme' (Mutambara IrrigationScheme, Working Document).EMMANUEL MANZUNGU 129Committee which was set up to inspect books of the Irrigation ManagementCommittee so that the Standing Committee could start on a clean slate.Messrs X, Y and Z constituted the Audit Committee.The last Mangudya heard of the money was in 1990 when the ZimbabweCouncil of Churches wrote a letter to him addressed to The IrrigationChairman, Mutambara Community Irrigation Project, c/o Chief Mutambara.The letter read in part:As you know, Zimbabwe Council of Churches paid out to you a cheque of $50 000.The accompanying letter dated 4/07/90 specifically requested you to submit to usprogress and financial reports within 6 months of the receipt of the money. Thereports are crucial since they testify the manner in which the funds will have beenused. In respect of the above, may I therefore, inform you that the reports are nowdue/over-due.43This letter lay idle at the local school for a month as there wasconfusion as to who the owner of the letter was. Eventually the letter wasgiven to Mangudya. After receiving the letter Mangudya took the letter toMr X who told Mangudya to 'keep quiet since he did not know anything'.Mangudya complied.The way the money was used remains a question not only to theZimbabwe Council of Churches but to farmers themselves. A flow chart(not presented), that showed who would do what in the disbursement ofthe donor money, was prepared by the self-appointed Project Coordinator,Mr X and the Community Researcher, Mr Y. Four structures were created:the community leadership, administrative body, the correspondence andfinancial committees.The community leaders, as the rest of the people in the otherstructures, appear to have been appointed by Mr X. A number of'representatives' were appointed from each of the four communities, Guta,Gonzoni, Zomba and Maunzani. There were peculiarities in theappointments. The first was the inclusion of a non-irrigator, as arepresentative in the Guta Community. The surprise inclusion happenedto be one of the Chief's 'sons'. Vhashi Munjoma, the water bailiff, wasappointed a 'representative' for Maunzani Community although he did nothold a plot in that block. Overall there was a dominance of names withroyal connections.The second structure, the Administrative body, had three arms. Thefirst arm, called the Guhune Ward: Political and Development, consisted ofthe Chief, two councillors, the local Agritex official, other royal familymembers and other less obvious names. Then there was the Church andCommunity Coordinators arm. Three reverends were present as was Vhashi43 Mutambara, Munonyara, P. to Irrigation Chairman, Mutambara Community IrrigationProject, 1991.130THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLMunjoma, some members of the royal family and the community researcher,Mr Y. One of the reverends is currently one of the Chief's new committeemembers. The third arm was the Irrigation and Project Committee. Thisincluded the chairman, vice chairman and secretary of the popularly-elected Irrigation Management Committee, the Standing Committee, somemembers of the royal family and other less obvious names.The names of the people with the power to sign financial requisitionswere indicated with an asterisk. These included the Chief, the Chairman ofthe Irrigation Management Committee, the project coordinator, Mr X andone other reverend who was not resident on the scheme but neverthelesssatisfied the bureaucratic requirements as he was part of the hierarchy ofthe Zimbabwe Council of Churches.Noticeable in this arrangement is the fact that Mangudya, the chairman,was virtually in the dark about the whole episode although he was supposedto be a signatory. In fact it was common knowledge that the real peoplebehind the whole exercise were the project coordinator, Mr X, and to alesser extent the community researcher, Mr Y.In the end the project was run by Mr X, who had consolidated hisposition by relying on three power bases. Firstly as a member of the royalfamily he could be part of those structures where traditional leadershipwas required. Because he was also educated as a qualified graduatesecondary school teacher, he could manage to by-pass other members ofthe royal family who were better placed than him in the Chieftainshiphierarchy but were handicapped by a lack of education. Another powerbase he used was his religious training. He was once a reverend atMutambara Mission and had trained in the United States. This gave himaccess to the religious fraternity. All the three power bases were used toadvantage. He enlisted the help of various people to his cause.Meanwhile the Zimbabwe Council of Churches has not managed to getan account of the way the money was used. The Deputy Director (Projects)was openly antagonistic to enquiries about the issue, treating suchenquiries as an 'agitation by these University people'. There was nobodyprepared to discuss the issue at the offices of the Zimbabwe Council ofChurches. Two officials claimed ignorance on the issue, each referring tothe other as the 'real' people involved in the project. However, the signatoryof the letter cited above, Mrs Munonyara, admitted that 'the whole thinghad been confused from the start'. The issue is unlikely to be cleared upsince Mr X has since died.Thus a monetary donation, intended to improve the technicalinfrastructure, in practice provided the final push towards a full-blownpolitical crisis in the community.A case of history refusing to lie lowPerhaps the most important factor which has contributed to the problemsEMMANUEL MANZUNGU 131of water distribution today in the scheme relates to socio-political problemsamong farmers. It seems that these had been dormant during the colonialyears as the immediate problem was to get back their scheme from thecolonial authorities. A long-standing feud between certain members of theirrigation community is responsible. The most significant name in thisregard is Maunzani. Maunzani is not only a tail-end block which suffers thetypical downstream water shortage syndrome, but is also historically aseparate community, which was lumped together by the technical designwith the other three: Guta, Gonzoni, and Zomba. The story as related byan old man, Matemera, who has been in the scheme for over 30 years,sounds like a classic kingship struggle tale. Its credibility seems to beborne out by water distribution problems that occur today. 'Long time ago the wife of the chief bore twin boys who were born three days apart.News of the birth of the younger baby boy was announced first to the chief and theyounger boy assumed the throne. To secure his position the younger later in lifekilled the rightful heir. In time spirits of the grieved party are said to have hauntedthe descendants of the usurper. As a gesture of appeasing the spirits, a portion ofthe land, that today is called Maunzani, was given to the deprived party. Eventoday it is widely understood that the Chieftainship of the incumbent Chief ends assoon as one crosses the Chipakonye River (which marks the beginning of Maunzaniwhich also comprises some rain-fed land) and resumes thereafter.44Marguerite Deyo gives a different version:Chief Fuha (an ancestor of Chief Mutambara's eldest son) was Chikomo, the suc-cessor to the Chieftainship. His other sons were: Maunza, who lives at Maunzanibetween Ruwaka and Makoko Rivers ... Chikomo, and his brother, Maunza, bothdesired chieftainship. Chikomo who feared for his life, hid himself away. One daywhen his daughter, Wanyamwanambo was taking food to him, Maunza followedher. Upon seeing Chikomo he let fly an arrow which instead of killing Chikomo,killed his daughter .. .45Although the versions of the story are different, what is clear is thatMaunzani is inhabited by a people who have a long-standing argumentwith the descendants of Chikomo, Chief Mutambara's people. Thelegitimacy of the Chief Mutambara in Maunzani is disputed. This pasthistory has present day implications.In 1990 irrigators from Maunzani wrote a letter to the DistrictAdministrator requesting the scheme to revert to government control.When the letter reached the District Administrator and Agritex, theyassumed that it was the Irrigation Management Committee that had44 Field notes, 15 Sept. 1993.45 Deyo, 'The history of the Mutambara tribe', 55-64.132THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLrequested government involvement. Enquiries revealed otherwise but thematter was not pursued. The significance of 1990 as the date in whichgovernment take-over was requested appears to be based on one mainreason. Before independence the government officials operated as aneutralising force between these two feuding communities. For the firstten years after independence the popularly-elected Management Committeeplayed a similar role since the committee members came from all over thescheme. The take-over by the Chief apparently opened up old wounds.Even today the Maunzani community does not hide its displeasure withthe present situation with the Chief in control. The supply of water toMaunzani is so desperate that on my very first visit there in October 1993,I was asked to 'help out' by one old man. One woman, after I had beenintroduced to her as a researcher, thought it fit to express her desperatewater situation of having to dry plant in an irrigation scheme, 'Never mind,God is not jealous like those people up there, for it is going to rain.' In thesame afternoon it rained!In November 1994, as I moved in the fields I received similarentreatments for help. Some of the people had irrigated their wheat onlyonce. This was in stark contrast with some people north of ChipakonyeRiver, which marks the boundary between Maunzani and the rest of thescheme: these had flourishing wheat and tomato crops. One royal-connected farmer told me that he had just earned $10 000 from a tomatocrop. He had another tomato crop at the point of bearing as well as youngseedlings to be planted out later. Life in the irrigation scheme wasapparently good for him. He was not the only one prospering. About aquarter of the farmers are distributed among 10 marketing clubs andthese farmers sell produce, mainly tomatoes, to a canning factory at agood profit. The majority of these farmers are connected to theChieftainship while others have managed to establish relationships withthe former group. It is not just the geographical top and tail-end scenariothat is present. Some farmers whose fields are not located in the topsections of the scheme get more water than their non-connectedcounterparts in the same locality. These water networks are apparently moreimportant than ever because the last three years have been relatively dry years.The roots of the problem lie in the lack of correspondence betweenthe technical design and the social units which the colonial state failed torecognise. As Shanan advises, social factors should be considered in thedesign stage:A crucial factor ... is matching-up the network subdivisions with the existingsociological or administrative subdivisions ... A lateral or minor (canal) that isdesigned to serve two rival villages,... is asking for trouble.4646Shanan, L. (1992) 'Planning and management of irrigation systems in developing countries'Agricultural Water Management, XXII, (i and ii), 67.EMMANUEL MANZUNGU 133The scheme was not given a chance to develop as the people wantedit. Perhaps the scheme could have taken a different and may be bettercourse altogether.Winners and losers and their reactionAlthough the Chief's committee was established in 1990, it has failed totake authoritative control over the scheme. Stray cattle are no longerimpounded. Some farmers have, as a last resort, fenced their plots formingfences within fences. There is illegal extension of fields, cultivation ofnatural waterways and maintenance of infrastructure is in shambles.Development plans are badly coordinated; indeed they only seem to existin the mind of the octogenarian Chief, who has good ideas and yet thosearound him seem to have a different agenda. For example, Agritex madecontact with the Chief so as to facilitate the rehabilitation of the schemeand emphasized that Agritex did not harbour any ambitions of taking overthe scheme.47 All the same nothing has been forthcoming from the Chiefwho indicated, after more than 12 months, that he was still studying thedocument. It would appear that those close to the Chief exert considerableinfluence on him to further their own interests. For example VhashiMunjoma, the outspoken character, thought that Agritex's offer was simplya ploy to get government control through the back-door, using the followinganalogy: 'When I made a marriage proposal to my wife I never told her thatone day I would beat her up.'He is suspicious of all the 'help' that is offered be it from the governmentor donors. On being questioned how the scheme would progress since thefarmers had very little money to undertake the costly rehabilitation work,he answered, 'A tortoise, in the end, will reach its destination.'Mashoko, one of the powerful 'sons' is also antagonistic to any changesin water distribution: Those that suffer now had their chance to eat(benefit) long time ago. Now it is our turn.'By this statement he was referring to the fact that the Chieftainshippeople were slow to embrace cash cropping and as a result vatorwa(strangers) made money in the past. He also says that there was no pointin making the water go around to everybody when there was not enoughwater for everybody.The majority of the people are dissatisfied with the present situationand are trying to do something about it. Most, if not all, development planssuggested by the Chief are passively opposed by the people. At one timehe called upon the farmers manually to desilt a night storage dam nearGonzoni. This failed completely due to half-hearted involvement or a total47 Agritex, Mutare, Madondo, C. (13 May 1993) 'Minutes of the Meeting Held by Agritex atChief Mutambara'.134THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLlack of it. Then the Chief tried to make the farmers contribute money sothat a contractor could be hired for the purpose, but the farmers simplydid not do anything. Privately farmers point out that they had contributedsome money before but the money had disappeared. They also questionhow the $50 000 was used. They say Mr X built a house for himself usingthe money. In December 1993, a call for farmers to clean the main canalwent unheeded. For farmers in Maunzani community, who are the mostdisadvantaged and were dry planting in December 1993 while the otherblocks had water for planting, the call to clean the canal was 'ridiculous'.DISCUSSION: THE SOCIO-POLITICAL DIMENSION OF IRRIGATIONThe question that can be posed is whether the empirical evidence presentedcan be used to gain a better theoretical understanding of water controlproblems in smallholder irrigation schemes, or whether it is so localisedthat it remains unique to the area? It is my belief that some insights with awider validity can be obtained. Below is an attempt to tease out sometheoretical issues from the empirical evidence presented.The political dynamic in irrigationA general observation is that irrigation is not free of politics. The politicaldynamic in an irrigation context deals with the control of importantresources, chiefly land and water, and the relationships between a varietyof actors that develop around these over time. These relationships are noteasy to predict, a fact that goes against the disposition to predict inbiological and physical academic disciplines, which have dominated thesmallholder irrigation scene. It is also clear that intervenors tend tooverlook 'small' things that nevertheless are very important to the peopleinvolved. For example the colonial state failed to realise the importance ofprivate property in the community. Thus the two furrows which had beenstarted through private enterprise were 'communized' in that the labour,time and money invested therein were not considered as privateinvestment. It was only after claims were filed that this point was made.These informal48 dimensions of irrigation often bring problems. The lackof relationship between the formal and informal control and ownershipadds to the problems. For example, land ownership in the scheme seemsuncomplicated as it is based on informal arrangements, while formalarrangements of water use imposed by the colonial state did not last andhave been marked by persistent problems. In this case engineers whodesigned the scheme, and by so doing formalised a particular form ofwater distribution, did not take account of the differences between thevarious communities.48 Here informal refers to that which is not under the government.EMMANUEL MANZUNGU 135An interesting question arising from the above is how individuals orgroups manage to control resources. How do individuals and groupsconstruct power over resources and how do they maintain or lose thispower? It is important not always to focus on technical or engineeringaspects that tend to be dominant in irrigation, because sometimes thepolitical issue of power is more relevant.Power relationships in irrigationPower relationships shape the outcome of irrigation projects. As theMutambara case has shown, power does not reside in any particularindividual because the same people had power in some domains and lostit in others. In the case of Mutambara, the domains of the state, thetradition, the plot and the expert49 empowered some people anddisempowered others.When focus is on intervention, it can be seen that power was wieldedby the colonial state via technocracy or eliticism50 as exemplified byAlvord's work and thoughts. Using this philosophy, the government soughtto re-order the Mutambara populace through a set of interventions, thebasis of which was underpinned by a belief in technocratic superiority.51The 'expert' role functioned as it did because of its reliance on a certainpower relationship. When the colonial state failed to control the situationand in consequence closed the scheme in 1974, the 'expertise' of the'expert' diminished.52 Paradoxically however, even the post-colonial statestill shares the ignorance of the reality of irrigators, for example throughenforcement of block irrigation where farmers are forced to grow certaincrops in certain sections of the scheme.53We also see different people relying on certain resources or capital togain leverage over water control. The Chief, for example, gained controlthrough cultural capital since his authority derived from traditional culture.Ownership of plots also derives from traditional culture: traditional land49 W. M. Adams explains the role of experts in Africa. He says that 'experts wield greatpower to transform the lives of other people. Despite professional skills and good intentions,this power does not always work for the universal good.' He goes on to quote Adrian Adams(1979),' What matters is the halo of impartial prestige his skills leave him, allowing him toneutralize conflict-ridden encounters ... and disguise political issues, for a time as technicalissues' [W. M. Adams (1992) Wasting the Rain: Rivers, People and Planning in Africa (London,Earthscan Publications), 36].50 The Collins Concise Dictionary Plus (London and Glasgow, Collins, 1989) definestechnocracy as government by scientists, engineers and other such experts, and eliticism asthe belief that society should be governed by an elite (the most powerful, rich or giftedmembers of society of a community e.t.c).51 Roder, The Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects.52 Agritex Mutare, Danby, 'Mutambara Irrigation Scheme'.53Manzungu Emmanuel, (10-12 Jan. 1995) 'Design and Practice: From the Drawing Board tothe Farmer's Field: The Case of Fuve Panganai Irrigation Scheme', Paper presented at theworkshop, New Perspectives on Agricultural Innovation (Harare, Mandel Training Centre).136THE POLITICS OF WATER CONTROLownership is still much respected in the scheme and even those farmerswho have poor relations with the Chief still manage to hold on to theirplots. The monetary or economic resource or capital as a means to achievedomination in water control was demonstrated by Mr X, who used his gripon donor money to gain control over water. He also used formal knowledgeor education as a resource to control water and to gain political power.We also see religion as capital in that Mr X's religious affiliation put him atan advantage.This notion of capital, here used in the broad sense of seeing howpeople construct power in irrigation, explains why weak, poor oruneducated people still have power to influence significantly what happensin irrigation. In other words, we need to redefine the meaning of resourceif we are to have a good grasp of what is happening in smallholderirrigation schemes. It is no longer useful to think such things as money,technical expertise and administrative leverage are the only determinantsof power in irrigation. It may be useful for engineers, who play an importantrole in irrigation because of their profession, to acknowledge that thevariety of actors in irrigation schemes have access to capital in variousforms: money, knowledge (both local and non-local), administrative,cultural and social. Engineers and policy makers may benefit from arealisation that these various guises of capital should be used in concertrather than in isolation from each other.Clearly, improvement in the performance of Mutambara IrrigationScheme does not only lie in the technico-physical domain but also in thesocio-political one. This should apply to other smallholder irrigationschemes in Zimbabwe. In other words the ignorance of social reality insmallholder irrigation is an impediment to the performance of theseschemes in the long run.