Zambezia (1996), XXIII (i).THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION: A COLONIALPARASTATAL 1938-1963A. S. MLAMBODepartment of Economic History, University of ZimbabweAbstractThis article traces the history of the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) from itsformation in 1938 to the end of the Central African Federation in 1963 andanalyses its performance in this period. It contends that the CSC succeeded incarrying out the tasks assigned to it when it was established, namely, todevelop the country's beef industry in general and to promote the sectionaleconomic interests of White beef producers in particular. It further arguesthat, the condemnation of parastatals by the IMF and World Bank as ineffectiveand inefficient notwithstanding, the performance of the CSC in the periodunder examination does show that, if well managed, parastatals can play acrucial role in enabling the state to direct development in select sectors of theeconomy in order to produce certain desired political and economic goalscommensurate with its own development strategy. The colonial state's effectiveuse of the CSC to promote the interests of the White farmers demonstratesthat parastatals can be effectively used as instruments for political andeconomic empowerment.INTRODUCTIONIN 1994, the Zimbabwe government began commercialising a number of itspublic enterprises (parastatals) in line with the demands of the WorldBank and the International Monetary Fund, which made the dismantling ofparastatals one of the conditions for their financial support for Zimbabwe'seconomic structural adjustment reform programme introduced in1990/91. Under the tutelage of the two multi-lateral agencies, governmentofficials who had always sworn by parastatals as indispensable andappropriate vehicles for economic development, changed their tune andstarted denouncing them as corrupt, inefficient and ineffective.Commercialisation, privatisation and free market forces became the newbuzz-words in national discussions of economic development strategies.The new economic wisdom of the 1990s was at variance with previousideas and practices within Zimbabwe, for while parastatals had now becomeanathema in official government circles, they had earlier been accorded aspecial place in national economic planning by both the colonial andindependent governments of the country. Indeed, successive governmentssince the 1930s had consistently and vigorously promoted parastatals as5354 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963desirable, necessary and effective instruments for the promotion ofeconomic development particularly in those areas of the economy inwhich private enterprise was either unable or unwilling to invest or wherethe provision of socially and/or politically desirable services could not besafely entrusted to private enterprise.In colonial Zimbabwe, parastatals were specifically used to promotethe settler economy. As I. Mandaza noted:In Southern Rhodesia, the creation of such agricultural parastatals Še.g. the Agricultural Marketing Authority, the Grain Marketing Board ...and the Cotton Marketing Board Š made possible the establishment of awhite agrarian bourgeoisie that will for long remain an envy of itscounterparts all over the world.1Because parastatals were meant to promote particular national orsectional interests, they were not required to make profits but merely toprovide a public service in order to 'facilitate and earn profits for othersectors of the economy'.2Among the earliest parastatals to be established in the country wasthe Cold Storage Commission which was set up in 1938 to promote thecountry's beef industry. The Commission, like several other publicenterprises created in the colonial period,3 was eventually inherited bythe independent government in 1980 and continued to operate throughoutthe first decade of independence. By then, the Commission had grownfrom its very modest beginnings to become an impressively large anddiversified multi-million dollar enterprise. By 1987, the Commission had apermanent staff complement of not less than 4 700 people employed in itslivestock section, its various factories and in the administration and drawingsalaries and wages amounting to $32 million in that year.4This article traces the historical origins of the Commission, analysesthe economic and political factors behind its establishment and evaluatesits policies and their impact on the country's beef industry. Such a studyis appropriate and important, not only because of the central role that theCommission played in the country's beef industry, but also for what itmight contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of parastatals ineconomic development.I. Mandaza, 'Politics and economics of privatisation', in The Sunday Mail (Feb. 11, 1996), 9.Ibid.Other agricultural parastatals set up at this time were the Dairy Marketing Board, the GrainMarketing Board and the Cotton Marketing Board. Several other parastatals operating innon-agricultural areas were also created, one of which was the Electricity Supply Commission(ESC).Zimbabwe, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Parastatals (Justice G. Smith Š Chairman,Dec. 1988), 22.A. S. MLAMBO 55Using archival and other sources, this article examines the history ofthe Commission during its first 25 years of operation from 1938 to thebreak up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963.5 It arguesthat the government's decision to set up the Commission in 1937 wasbased on logical economic and political grounds given the prevailingcircumstances at the time when, as I. Phimister and other scholars haveshown,6 the colonial government was determined to do everything in itspower to promote the interests of the White economy in general and thesettler agricultural sector in particular. It is further contended that, atleast in the period covered by the study, the Commission successfully metthe objectives set for it, namely to promote the interests of the Whitecattle farmers in particular and to develop the country's beef industry ingeneral.BACKGROUND: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORSThe decision by the Rhodesian government to establish the Commissionand other agriculturally-related parastatals was influenced by a number ofconsiderations. Among these was the need to support the country'sagricultural producers who were suffering from the ravages of the GreatDepression. In addition, certain areas of the economy were likely to remainundeveloped without the help of government resources, either because oflack of sufficient local private capital or because local investors were, fora variety of reasons, unwilling to invest in them.7Government was also anxious to maintain control of those areas itconsidered of strategic importance to the national welfare in order toproduce certain political and economic outcomes commensurate with itsown developmental objectives. As the Minister of Agriculture emphasisedwith respect to the country's beef export industry in 1937,I have arrived at the conclusion that the export of our chilled and frozenmeat is an essential service of the state exactly as the postal and telegraphservice or electrical supply, and that it is the duty of the government todevelop it in the interests of the colony as a whole.8The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was set up In 1953. The Federation, whichcomprised Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, broke up in 1963 for avariety of economic and political reasons. This study ends in 1963 mainly because archivalsources at the National Archives of Zimbabwe are closed to researchers after that date.I. Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948: Capital Accumulationand Class Struggle (London, Longman, 1988); 1. Phimister, 'Meat monopolies: Beef cattle inSouthern Rhodesia, 1890-1938' in Journal of African History (1978), XJX, 391-414; R. Palmer,Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (London, Heinemann, 1977).NAZ/S482/134/17/48, Government Policy Towards Assisting the Development of Industriesin Southern Rhodesia.NAZ/S2704/3/1, CSC, Expropriation of the Rhodesian Export and Cold Storage Company,1937-1951.56 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963With regard to the beef industry in particular, the government wasdetermined to promote the interests of its constituency: the small-scalesettler cattle farmers who were hurting from poor cattle prices during theGreat Depression and many of whom were reportedly deserting cattlefarming.9 What was needed, it was argued, was a public utility companythat would stabilise cattle prices, provide a guaranteed market for cattle,develop both the domestic and export beef markets and generally promotethe beef industry in the country. To appreciate why such a utility companywas considered necessary at that particular time, it is necessary briefly totrace the history of the Rhodesian beef industry to that point.The Rhodesian beef industry witnessed a boom in the periodimmediately following World War I, when rising demand for beef in SouthAfrica led to a rise in local cattle prices. The boom proved very short-lived, however, for by 1921, cattle prices had fallen so drastically thatmany ranchers left the industry and either moved into other agriculturalactivities or abandoned their land altogether. The post-war depression inthe Rhodesian cattle industry, which the Director of Agriculture describedas 'critical', resulted partly from unfavourable global economic conditionsproducing a slowdown in international trade, and partly from the primitivenature of the Zimbabwean cattle industry, which made it difficult for thecountry to compete effectively in the dwindling international market.10The local market proved to be too small to absorb all the beef productsproduced within the country. The Rhodesian cattle industry went intodecline, while local producers and their government blamed 'surplusproduction' for the industry's woes. This situation was of great concern tothe government of the day. Even more problematic was the fact that thecountry did not seem capable of reviving either the cattle industry ingeneral or the beef-export industry in particular by itself, since there waspresent in the country neither the necessary capital nor the skills torevamp the industry. In the words of the Director of Agriculture,both the government and local private resources are powerless bythemselves to establish a meat freezing and packing industry or by anydirect means to provide the necessary facilities for exporting meat.Hence the only course is to induce those who are able and have thecapital and skill to come into the country and take up this work."9 For a discussion of the political importance of the small-scale settler cattle farmers to thegovernment of the day, see 1. Phimister, 'Meat and monopolies', 412^113.10 Southern Rhodesia (S. R.), Report of a Commission of Inquiry into the Cold Storage Commissionof Southern Rhodesia (M. Danziger, Chairman Š Salisbury, Rhodesian Printing and PublishingCompany, 1952 Š hereafter Danziger Report); CSC, 7th Annual Report and Accounts (1954);and S. Pilborough, 'The Cold Storage Commission' (Department of Land Management,University of Zimbabwe, Unpubl., 1983).11 NAZ/S1193/M5, Director of Agriculture to Treasurer, 20 Dec. 1921, Cited in I. Phimister,'Meat and monopolies', 407.A. S. MLAMBO 57In a bid to find solutions to the crisis faced by the cattle industry, thegovernment set up a Committee of Enquiry to suggest appropriate measuresto enable the industry to get back on its feet. The Committee reported in1923 and recommended among other things that the country shouldestablish a meat works as a matter of urgency, that facilities to enable thecountry to export frozen and chilled beef overseas be developed and thatthe government should consider the possibility of granting exclusive rightsto a firm with the competence to process and export chilled and frozenbeef. It was hoped that these measures would reduce the cattle surplus inthe country while providing the country with opportunities to profit frommeat exports.12Acting on this advice, the government entered into negotiations withthe South African-based Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Company Ltd,which was interested in setting up a meat works in the colony. Thiscompany agreed to form a subsidiary company within the colony todevelop the proposed chilled and frozen beef industry on the basis of anAgreement which later became Act No. 34 of 1924. The Agreement providedthat the company would have a monopoly to export chilled and frozenmeat for a period of ten years from the date of the erection of the proposedmeat works and also guaranteed it up to S15 000 per annum against lossesresulting from its operations. It also provided that,The government, at any time after this agreement has been in force for aperiod of seven (7) years, may, six months subsequent to written noticegiven to the Company to that effect, expropriate the Company'sundertaking in Southern Rhodesia as a going concern at a price to bemutually agreed upon between the parties hereto, and failing suchagreement at a price to be fixed by arbitration.13The government would not grant any preferential rights to any othercompany or person for as long as the Company continued to operate. Onthese terms, Imperial Cold Storage created a subsidiary company calledthe Rhodesian Export and Cold Storage Company Ltd (hereafter calledRECSCO) in 1927. RECSCO began operating in May 1928.14RECSCO's performance in the ten years of its operation in Rhodesiaproved unsatisfactory to the Rhodesian government and cattle fanners.The farmers alleged that the Company was paying very low prices for theircattle, while, according to the Minister of Agriculture in 1937, theGovernment wasdissatisfied with the arrangement [with RECSCO] because, in spite oflarge sums of money voted by Parliament, there were no signs of12 Danziger Report.13 Ibid., Extract from Act No. 34 of 1924, eontained in NAZ/S2704/3/1, CSC, Expropriation of theRhodesian Export and Cold Storage Company, 1937-1951.14 NAZ/S2704/3/1, Memo from the Minister of Agriculture and Lands.58 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963improvement in the industry and there were indications that the subsidyvoted was finding its way into the Company's pocket and not theproducers as intended.15Apart from the alleged dishonest practices by the Company'smanagement hinted at in this statement, the Rhodesian government wasnot impressed by the Company's export performance. A variety of factorsconspired to frustrate the Company's efforts to export large amounts ofchilled and frozen meat throughout the 1930s. Among these were theunfavourable international economic climate due to the depression of the1930s and the fact that a small and new country like Rhodesia had tocompete in the international market with long-established, sophisticatedand highly developed cattle complexes such as that of Argentina.16According to Phimister, however, the divorce between RECSCO andthe Colonial government was unavoidable because the marriage betweenprivate enterprise and the settler government was based on potentiallyconflicting interests that could not be reconciled. Imperial Cold Storagewas particularly interested in making profits through cost-cutting measuresand purchasing cattle at the lowest prices possible. The government, onthe other hand, was committed to developing the cattle industry byreducing the cattle surpluses within the country in order to raise cattleprices and thus promote the interests of its constituents; the small-scalesettler cattle farmers.Phimister's analysis is corroborated by the Secretary for Agriculturein his report of 1938, which announced that government had decided toexpropriate RECSCO meat works because it was feared thatwhile the works remained in the hands of private enterprise, there couldbe no security for the industry and no assurance that at any timeconvenient to the Company, prices for chiller and freezer cattle mightnot be reduced to so low a level as to be quite uneconomic to Europeancattle producers.17GOVERNMENT TAKEOVERBy the late 1930s, the government had decided to expropriate RECSCOand either throw the industry 'open to other interests' or set up a publicutility company to run the industry. The first option was rejected on thegrounds that RECSCO would continue to enjoy greater advantages than15 NAZ/S2704/1/1340/2, Cold Storage Commission, General, 1948-1950, Minister of Agricultureto Cabinet.16 For assessments of the poor performance of RECSCO see I. Phimister, 'Meat and monopolies'and C. V. Kwashirayi, "The Operations of the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Company inSouthern Rhodesia 1924-1938' (B.A. (Hons) dissertation, University of Zimbabwe, 1990).17 S. R. Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture and Lands for the Year 1938 (Salisbury,Govt. Printers, Presented to the Legislative Assembly in 1939).A. S. MLAMBO 59any other company entering the business since it would remain 'inpossession of the Works' and would, therefore, continue to 'control thefuture of the industry'. In any case, the 1924 Agreement had stated that ifGovernment terminated the agreement 'it would never in future give morefavourable treatment to any other business'. In the view of the Minister ofAgriculture, this would have meant 'virtually confirming the existingCompany in an uncontrolled monopoly'. The Minister recommended thesecond option.18Not everyone agreed with the Minister's view that a public utilitycompany would be in the best interests of the country or that RECSCO hadfailed in its promises. In a memo to the Prime Minister on 11 September1937, B. L. Gardiner, an official of the Bulawayo-based Willoughby'sConsolidated Company, strongly opposed expropriation. He argued thatthere was no expertise in the country to run the business outside RECSCO,and there was also a danger that a public utility company would continuallybe 'subjected to political pressure and wire pulling'.In addition, Gardiner maintained, as the IMF and World Bank werelater to argue in the 1990s, that a public utility company was likely to begrossly inefficient, for 'it is always the case that once a concern is understate control, efficiency goes by the board'. Gardiner further stated:Here we have in Rhodesia an organisation, the Rhodesia Cold StorageCompany associated with a strong organisation in the Union of SouthAfrica. The Rhodesia Cold Storage Company have built up slowly andwith difficulty a business that within the last two or three years has beenwell, efficiently and economically run, which is in a position to securemarkets on the best terms, and with an organisation to transport anddispose of this country's cattle to the best advantage ... At one blow,this can be destroyed.Gardiner concluded by warning that should the government proceedwith its plans to establish the proposed public utility company, theexperiment 'will end in disaster, and its repercussions on the cattle industryof Southern Rhodesia will be most serious'.19Despite Gardiner's spirited defence of RECSCO, governmentexpropriated the undertaking. On 31 August 1937, the Minister of Agricultureinformed the Chairman of RECSCO of the government's intention to18 NAZ/S2704/1/1340/2, Cold Storage Commission, General, 1948-1950, Minister ol Agricultureto Cabinet. The Minister ol Agriculture and Lands was opposed to granting a monopoly toRECSCO particularly because 'giving a monopoly to the Cold Storage Company in thiscolony [was really giving] a monopoly to the parent company in the Union of South Africa'.See, S. R. Legislative Assembly Debates (1st Nov. 1937, 3rd Session, 4th Parliament), XVII,2447.19 NAZ/S2704/3/1, CSC, Expropriation of the Rhodesian Export and Cold Storage Company,1937-1951.60 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963expropriate as a going concern the undertaking in the Colony of theRhodesia Export and Cold Storage Company Ltd, Byo on expiration ofthe Agreement, namely as from the 30th April 1938 (in terms of Clause 12of the Schedule to Act No. 34, Chilled and Frozen Meats Export Act1924).20On 15 October 1937, Cabinet resolved that a bill should be drafted 'forthe establishment of a commission on the lines of the ElectricityCommission to take over this business'.21 The proposed bill subsequentlybecame the Cold Storage Commission Act 37 of 1937 which provided forthe establishment ofa Commission for the purpose of acquiring, establishing and operatingabattoirs and refrigerating works for the purpose of chilling, freezing andstoring beef, mutton, pork, poultry and other meat foods for export orfor consumption within the colony.Comprising six members, the Commission was to have 'the sole andexclusive right' to erect, establish and operate abattoirs and to process,handle, market and otherwise transact in frozen and chilled meat productsfor export. As a public utility company, the Commission was expected toprovide a public service. Clause 13 of the Act stated clearly that 'it shall bea general principle of the Commission that its undertakings shall, as far aspracticable, be carried on neither at a profit nor at a loss'.22RECSCO proved uncooperative during the expropriation exercise andrefused to accept the government's purchase offer of £200 000, claiming asum of S572 000 instead. The matter went to arbitration, resulting in theUmpire awarding RECSCO a total of S286,930 together 'with interest at therate of 5% per annum from the first day of June 1938 until the date ofpayment'. Thus, although the Commission was created on December 1,1937, it did not actually take control of the works until 1 May, 1938. Theassets surrendered by RECSCO following the above agreement includedbuildings, Cold Storage Area grant of 50 morgen, plant and machinery andStrathmore Ranch, on the Gwanda Road south of Balla Balla.23THE EARLY YEARS, 1938-1953From the debates surrounding the decision of the government to establishthe Commission, it is evident that the major objectives of such a move20 Ibid., Minister of Agriculture and Land to Chairman of RECSCO on 31/8/37.21 Ibid., Cabinet Resolution No. 5502 of 15 Oct. 1937.22 The Cold Storage Commission Act No. 37 of 1937.23 NAZ/S2704/3/1, CSC, Expropriation of the Rhodesian Export and Cold Storage Company,1937-1951; CSC, First Annual Report and Accounts for the Period 1st Dec. 1937 to 31st Dec.1938 (Salisbury, Govt. Printers, Presented to the Legislative Assembly. 1939).A. S. MLAMBO 61were to develop and expand the country's beef exports to the internationalmarket, which RECSCO had not been able to do to the government'ssatisfaction, and, secondly, to promote the country's cattle industry ingeneral and the interests of the small-scale settler cattle farmers inparticular.To ensure that it had sufficient capacity to slaughter cattle and processgood quality beef for export, the Commission established a number ofabattoirs and cold stores throughout the country in the first few years ofits existence. First, it expanded and modernised the Bulawayo factory thatit had inherited from RECSCO and then established new abattoirs atSalisbury (1943), Umtali (1946) and Fort Victoria (1951). It also built coldstores in Que Que (1946) and Gwelo (1947).24 From these establishments,the Commission was able to produce sufficient meat for both domesticconsumption and export.The Commission cultivated a number of foreign markets for its beef,the most important of which were Northern Rhodesia, South Africa, Congoand the United Kingdom. These markets, collectively, absorbed most ofthe Commission's beef products, with the balance going to the domesticmarket. Most of the Commission's beef exports in the first three yearswent to the United Kingdom, which had entered into an agreement withthe Commission to supply given quotas of beef to Britain's Ministry ofFood, especially after the outbreak of the Second World War.25 A smallamount of exports went to Northern Rhodesia, Congo and South Africawhile the balance was consumed locally.By the 1940s, however, the picture was changing as exports to theUnited Kingdom dwindled and petered out at the height of the war in 1943and 1944 as a result of the disruption of normal peace-time marinetransportation, which led to shortages of refrigeration space for Rhodesianmeat exports. Thereafter, the Commission's exports to the UK stoppedwith the exception of 1945 and 1946 when minuscule amounts wereexported. The loss of the British market was compensated for by a slightincrease in exports to regional markets between 1941 and 1947.The impact of the loss of the British market was also lessened by thefact that domestic consumption increased at the very time that foreignmarkets were drying up. The domestic market expanded markedly in thisperiod as shown in the Commission's Annual Report of 1946 which noted:Consumption of beef has risen so rapidly ... that. .. deliveries of cattleto the works do not now produce a surplus. In 1936 a seventy-one24 CSC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1938-1947.25 NAZ/S1215/1342/1, Cold Storage Commission: Agreement for Supply of Meat to Britain,Sept. 1939- Nov. 1942.62 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963thousand head of mature cattle were consumed in the colony; in 1946the figure rose to one hundred and sixty thousand, an increase of onehundred and thirty-four per cent in ten years.26The increase in domestic consumption was partly the result of theCommission's determined campaign to promote beef consumption amongthe African population by running a promotional sales campaign to openup butcheries in African areas. The campaign was backed up by assistanceto such outlets in the form of transport and the provision of cold rooms.27In addition, there was a noticeable increase in beef consumptionamong the rapidly growing African urban population, drawn into the citiesby the emerging manufacturing industries. The domestic market was lateraugmented by the influx of White immigrants who came into the countryfollowing the war. By 1950, 53% of the Commission's beef products wasconsumed within the country, while the balance continued to be exportedto the regional markets.28The increase in the domestic demand for beef was so rapid that by thelate 1940s the Commission was having to ration beef supplies to butchersin the country to prevent beef shortages. The problems created by theescalating domestic demand were revealed by G. M. Huggins in February1951 when he wrote:The present position from the point of view of the consumer in SouthernRhodesia is a very difficult one, as beef production in the Colony hasfallen very short of demand and we have experienced great difficulty inspreading our supplies over the seasons to avoid meatless weeks andeven months. In order to achieve this, we introduced a Sales Permitwhich enabled us, with the assistance of the Cold Storage Commission,to control the amount of beef going into consumption ... In the past twomonths, the public has only been receiving 57% of its requirements.29The problem of cattle 'surpluses' which had plagued the countrysince the second decade of the century had been resolved.By the 1950s, the Commission had also succeeded in providing cattlefarmers with a guaranteed market for their product and restoring thefarmers' confidence in the viability of the industry. Commenting on thisrole of the Commission, the Horwood Report noted in 1963 that, becauseof the hardships faced by the country's cattle farmers, the years followingthe Great Depression had seen a considerable fall in cattle numbers (by26 CSC, Ninth Annual Report and Accounts, 1946, 20.27 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the BeefCattle Industry of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia (O. P. F Horwood Chairman1963 Š hereafter Horwood Report).28 Danziger Report.29 NAZ/F226/1321/6, Liebigs Agreement, G. M. Huggins to K. Carlisle, 23 Feb., 1951.A. S. MLAMBO 63200 000 head in African areas and 250 000 head in European areas), andthat the industry only started developing again after the introduction ofthe Commission in 1938 with its 'guaranteed prices and markets'.30In consultation with the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union, theCommission guaranteed producers a minimum cattle price for periods offive years at a time and undertook to buy all cattle offered it at these 'floor'prices, which in 1950 were pegged at 70 shillings per 100 lbs cold-dressedweight. The price was later increased to 97 shillings and 113 shillings in1955 and 1959 respectively.31Meanwhile, the total national herd increased from under 3,6 millionhead in 1948 to about 4,2 million and 4,75 million head in 1955 and 1960respectively. This represented an increase of about 17,7% during the firstseven years and of 13,1% in the subsequent five-year period.32 While thereis no evidence to suggest that the increase was the direct result of theCommission's policies, it is reasonable to conclude that it played a role inencouraging that increase.The Commission also succeeded in rationalising what had hithertobeen a chaotic domestic cattle-marketing system. Until 1942, Rhodesianstock owners sold their cattle in an unrestricted market. They coulddispose of their herds by auction or by out of hand sales. All wholesalemarketing was 'on the hoof usually at public auctions where the auctioneeroften charged the seller a five percent commission, while some producerssold their cattle directly to retailers and butcher shops. There were nofixed grades or prices, and buyers and sellers were left to agree on a pricefor each beast.This method sometimes worked to the disadvantage of the producerssince buyers generally paid 'a price lower than that obtainable at a publicsale' in order to increase 'the spread between the amount the producerreceives for his cattle and the amount the consumer pays for his meat'.33From 1942 onwards, the Commission improved the cattle-marketing systemby insisting that cattle be sold 'cold dressed weight' and on a grade basis.These measures were meant specifically for the White cattle-farmers.Although it was not expected to make profits and was subsidised bygovernment throughout the period, the Commission recorded operationalprofits in most years and used these to supplement government funding.In the period June 1959 to June 1962, for instance, the Commission's30 Horwood Report, 44.31 Ibid.32 NAZ/F2591/1 Cold Storage Commission: Memorandum of Evidence to the Commission ofEnquiry into the Cattle Industry, 1963, M. Janneck and P. Swart, The Place of the ColdStorage Commission in the Rhodesian Meat Industry' (Oct. 1962).33 S. R. Committee to Enquire into the Costs of Distribution of Imported and Local Products inSouthern Rhodesia, Interim Report on Livestock and Meat, with Special Reference to Cattle andBeef, 1936 (A. R. Burnett-Hurst Š Chairman), 14.64 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963operational profits were reported to have been 'equivalent to 0,86 percent of turnover'. Similarly, between 1956 and 1961, the Commissionpurchased approximately 1 000 000 cattle, achieving a turnover in excessof S36 000 000 and realising a gross profit of SI 129 252 or an average of SIper beast.34Meanwhile, the Commission came under Federal control on 1st July1954. It continued, however, to operate under the 1937 Act until thepassage of the Cold Storage Commission Act in 1960, which established acommission consisting of nine members, to which the assets and liabilitiesof the previous Commission were transferred.Previously, the Commission operated only in Southern Rhodesia butin 1960 its activities were extended to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.It now controlled and operated four meat works in Southern Rhodesia (inBulawayo, Salisbury, Umtali and Fort Victoria), three works in NorthernRhodesia (in Livingstone, Lusaka and Kitwe), and one in Nyasaland (inBlantyre). In 1963, the Commission handled some 60% of the total slaughterproduction of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The remaining40% was handled directly by butchers operating in the rural areas andprivate and municipal butcheries in the towns.35AFRICAN CATTLE MARKETINGThe rationalisation of the marketing of African cattle followed a somewhatdifferent pattern from that applied to settler farmers' cattle. Prior to theSecond World War, no efforts were made either by government or by theCommission to develop an organised cattle marketing system for Africancattle in Southern Rhodesia. In those days, cattle were purchased from theAfricans mainly by traders, speculators, individual European farmers andagents of local meat companies such as RECSCO, Liebigs and theCommission. Buyers would move from village to village with large sums ofmoney and negotiate the price of each beast with the sellers. Beasts werebought on the hoof. Because there was then no grading or weighingsystem, prices for beasts varied with the negotiating abilities of theindividual buyers and sellers.36The Commission found this method of acquiring cattle for slaughterunsatisfactory because cattle prices tended to fluctuate from beast to34 Horwood Report, 83, 150.35 NAZ/F259 [ 1131 ]/l-2, Cattle Commission, Evidence 1962-63 and Cattle Inquiry Commission,Evidence Received 1963, Janneck and Swart, 'The Place of the Cold Storage Commission'.36 S. R. Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Marketing of Slaughter Cattle andthe Products Thereof, 1942 (W. E. Thomas Š Chairman); S. R. Report of the Commission ofEnquiry into Certain Sales of Native Cattle in Areas Occupied by Natives, 1939 (R. J. Hudson ŠChairman, hereafter Hudson Report, Presented to the Legislative Assembly, 1939).A. S. MLAMBO 65beast. Moreover, the Commission could never be certain of the numbersof cattle that buyers would be able to obtain on any given trip. In addition,the Commission was not receiving enough slaughter cattle to meet thedemands of the market, especially to supply the armed services duringthe Second World War. By 1941 it had become evident that 'in spite of theexcessive herds of cattle held in the African areas, the Commission andLiebigs were unable to fulfil urgent orders for the supply of tinned meatsfor the fighting forces'.37The apparent reluctance of Africans to part with their large herds ofcattle convinced the government that coercive measures were necessaryin order to 'persuade' them to sell their stock. As early as 1937, theSecretary for Native Affairs had explicitly told the Acting NativeCommissioner for the Victoria District that 'pressure should be brought tobear on the natives ... to sell [their] stock'.38 The decision was made thatAfricans should be allowed to retain only limited numbers of cattleaccording to the following formula:39Category No. of CattleMembers of family with more than one wife 9-13Members of family with one wife 8-10Bachelors of marriageable age 6-10Bachelors just registered 5-8Children 2-4In 1941, Government formalised its de-stocking policy by passingNatural Resources Act No. 9 of 1941, Section 36 of which provided for thelimitation of the numbers of livestock in African areas on the grounds thatoverstocking in those areas was causing environmental degradation.Thereafter, pressure on Africans to sell their 'surplus' stock was intensifiedso that the volume of Commission purchases of African cattle increased(see table below).Meanwhile, in order to rationalise the marketing of African cattle,assure the Commission of cattle supplies, and further its de-stockingobjectives, the government arranged for the Native Department to holdorganised sales at select points in the African areas on a live weight andgrade basis. Furthermore, the Chief Native Commissioner negotiated a37 NAZ/F259 [1131], Cattle Commission, Evidence 1962-63, S. R. Ministry of Internal Affairs,Evidence for Submission to the Commission of Enquiry into the Cattle Industry (June 1963).38 Hudson Report.39 Ibid.THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION'S PURCHASES OF AFRICAN CATTLE1942-1951Year Total Head Purchased1942 27 0001943 39 0001944 48 0001945 * 100 0001946 * 102 0001947 * 148 0001948 87 7611949 90 8021950 71 7081951 91 200* These were the years of maximum de-stocking in the African areas.Source: S. R. Danziger Report, 16.f ive-year buying agreement with the Commission whereby the Commissionwas to act as the residual buyer for any African cattle that were offered forsale. The Commission was to buy such cattle at the prevailing 'floor'prices.40To prevent speculators from hoarding cattle and thus depriving theCommission of adequate supplies, government passed the Cattle SalesPermit Order (Government Notice No. 603) providing for the allocation ofpermits to buy African cattle only to buyers who required the cattle forslaughter or for bona fide farming activities. It also established a quotasystem for buyers. In 1947 came the Native Cattle Marketing Act (Act No.23/1947) which empowered the Minister of Native Affairs to determine themethod of sales, the places where sales could be held and the person orpersons or class of persons who could purchase at such sales.Subsequently, the Minister of Native Affairs ruled that periodicorganised sales be held in various communal areas and that only theCommission, Liebigs and those butchers who were not being supplied bythe Commission should be permitted to purchase at such sales. TheCommission was allocated a quota of 50% of all slaughter cattle sold atsuch sales in Bulawayo, Fort Victoria and Gwelo provinces and 33% in theremaining areas of the country.4140 Slaughter Cattle Prices Order Š Government Notice No. 18 of 1942.41 Danziger Report.A. S. MLAMBO 67The African cattle marketing system was, then and later, criticised forconfining Africans to selling their cattle through statutory channels whenthe European stock producer was free to exercise choice, while the pricespaid for African cattle were said to be below the market price.42There were several complaints from the late 1930s about the mannerin which African sales were conducted by the Native Department and theCommission. Reverend A. C. Jackson of Chibi District, Reverend A. S.Cripps of Charter District and Mrs Comberbach, the wife of the NativeCommissioner for Chibi District, for instance, complained that Africans intheir areas were being forced to sell cattle against their own wishes, thatthe prices paid for the cattle were very low, that cattle belonging toAfricans who were absent at the time of sale were sold without theirknowledge or consent and that those Africans who refused to sell theircattle were punished or were threatened with punishment.43A Commission of Enquiry in 1939, headed by R. J. Hudson, investigatedthese and other complaints. It not only rejected the charges laid by thethree complainants but also asserted that Africans were very happy andgrateful for a chance to de-stock, were satisfied with the prices paid tothem and were subjected to no coercion by the Native Commissioners.This conclusion was arrived at in spite of the Commission's own evidenceto the contrary.For instance, the Commission's own evidence revealed cases of Africansbeing assaulted by Native Commissioners when they refused to sell theircattle. In the Victoria District, for example, the Commission noted that 'anative had been assaulted by Mr. Gifford (the Native Commissioner)because he would not allow the latter to cull his cattle'. It further reportedthatMr. Gifford admitted frankly that he had hit the native a back hand blow,but he stated he did so because the native had actually shouldered himaside and thus by force tried to prevent him from culling the herd inquestion.The Commission then conveniently added that 'the native in questionappears to have been under the influence of Kaffir beer' and concluded,therefore, that 'no blame can be attached to Mr. Gifford for his action'.44Similarly, while the Commission insisted that Africans were not beingcompelled to sell their cattle, it reported, in the same breath, that in GutuDistrict,Mr. Du Plessis admitted frankly that he told the natives who had electedto slaughter cattle in preference to selling them that if those cattle, the42 Ibid.43 Hudson Report.44 Ibid.68 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963brushes of whose tails had been cut, were again seen at the dippingtanks, they would be slaughtered and the owners fined 2s 6d in respectof each such beast.45Regardless of the complaints noted above, the Commission, with thefull support of the government, continued to buy African cattle at suchofficially designated Native Department Sales at controlled prices. Althoughthe Commission and the government justified their practices by arguingthat the African cattle marketing system was designed to protect Africanstock holders from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous 'rings' andspeculators, Phimister has cast doubt on the motives of the Commissionand has argued that it was, in fact, deliberately promoting the interests ofWhite cattle farmers by continuing the campaign began in the 1890s todispossess Africans of their herds.Phimister maintained that the settlers not 'only stole African land inthe 1890s but they also stole up to 200 000 African cattle between 1893 and1896' and that this policy continued well into the 1950s. He wrote that, inthe 1950s, the Commission was buyingAfrican cattle at knockdown prices during the dry season when theowners lacked pasture for the animals. The cattle were passed toEuropean farmers who were paid handsomely for fattening the cattle forslaughter.46Apart from the fact that Africans were compelled to sell their cattle intimes of drought, when the cattle were least likely to command goodprices on the market, other factors also contributed to the poor pricesAfricans received for their cattle at this time. Among these was the factthat, even in good years, African cattle were often purchased at the timeswhen European-owned cattle were glutting the market. Furthermore,because of government pressure to de-stock, Africans were sometimesforced to sell immature cattle that were not yet ready for slaughter andwhich consequently commanded lower prices than mature beasts. Forthese and other reasons, African farmers received less money per beaston average than their White counterparts. For example, in 1945, theCommission offered African farmers 4s 7d as compared to 8s 4d per 100 lbweight to White farmers.47Such immature African cattle and cattle that were otherwise unfit forimmediate slaughter were often entrusted to White farmers under theCommission's grazier system, in which the farmers were paid handsomely45 Ibid.46 I. Phimister, 'Meat and monopolies', 397.47 E. Punt, 'The Development of African Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia with ParticularReference to the Inter-war Years' (M.A. Thesis, University of Natal, 1979), 137, Cited in T.Hove, 'Peasant Agriculture in Mberengwa, 1890-1945: Some Aspects of EconomicDisarticulation' (B.A. Special Honours dissertation, University of Zimbabwe, 1990), 21.A. S. MLAMBO 69to look after them until such time as they were required by the Commission.According to one source, approximately 45 000 cattle per annum, mostly'graziers and females suitable for breeding', were transferred from Africanto White areas under this scheme.48Those cattle that were not farmed out under the grazier scheme werekept on the Commission's own farms. It is reported that by 1951 theCommission owned 282 140 acres and leased 210 582 acres of unoccupiedCrown land. In addition, it had 38 460 acres on private lease for holdingsuch cattle purchased from Africans.49Pressure on Africans to divest themselves of their stocks was increasedin 1951 with the passage of the Native Land Husbandry Act, which providedfor the further limitation of stock owners in the African Reserves, thefixing of the number of stock to be possessed by registered owners, theremoval of the equivalent natural increase of stock from overstockedareas and the culling of worthless or inferior stock in the African areas.These and other measures severely prejudiced African economic interestsand eventually fuelled mass nationalist African protest against colonialrule.The situation improved after April 1956, following the recommendationsof the Turner Commission of Enquiry on the Marketing of Cattle forSlaughter and the Distribution and Sale of Beef in Southern Rhodesia.Among these were the introduction of free competition throughout thecattle and beef industry with government only providing the floor price,the suspension of retail price controls and the introduction of auctionselling for peasant cattle. Free competition meant that buyers were nowfreed from the obligation of being in possession of permits to buy European-owned slaughter stock at any time, and African-owned stock at auctionsales.50DIVERSIFICATION, 1938-1963Although mainly preoccupied with beef production and marketing, theCommission extended its operations to include the production andmarketing of other livestock such as pigs, goats and poultry. TheCommission became involved in the pig industry in 1948, following theestablishment in the previous year of the Rhodesia National Pig Breeders'Co-op Ltd by Matabeleland pig farmers, who requested the Commission toprocess their pigs for marketing. Subsequently, the Commission acquiredNeill's Bacon Factory in Bulawayo as a going concern. In 1943, the48 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report of the Federal Cattle and Beef MarketingCommittee, Oct. 1954 (C. A. Murray Š Chairman); Danziger Report.49 Danziger Report.50 CSC, 19th Annual Report and Accounts, 1956; Pilborough, 'The Cold Storage Commission', 9.70 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963Commission acquired Neill's Bacon Factory's Salisbury branch and alsopurchased the bacon factory of Hodgson & Myburg Ltd in Umtali.The Commission processed and marketed all the Co-op's slaughterpigs at prices fixed by the Rhodesian Pig Industry Board. The net profitfrom slaughter, processing and sale of bacon and pork from the members'pigs was paid back to the Co-op. Over the period of ten years (1941-1950),profits of S347 355 were realised and distributed to the members of theCo-op. In 1957, the Commission withdrew from servicing the pig industryand surrendered the business to Colcom, a privately controlled producers'organisation. According to the Commission, its withdrawal from the pigindustry stemmed from the fact that the arrangement with the Co-operativehad 'served its purpose of establishing the pig industry' which could nowstand on its own.51In 1948, the Commission also started processing and marketing thepoultry products of the recently-established Rhodesian Poultry Co-op.The Commission provided poultry producers with a guaranteed market asit took all eggs offered by members of the Co-op at a fixed price. Thepoultry venture was never a profitable one since the Commission's saleswere often undermined by small part-time producers who flooded themarket in the flush season, while the fixed prices paid for the Co-op'spoultry discouraged many members who found little incentive in marketingtheir products through the Commission when they could get higher pricesby selling independently. These and other problems eventually forced theCommission to withdraw from the poultry industry in 1964.In addition to the above, the Commission also produced for sale alarge variety of by-products such as hides, neats foot oil, ox gall, edibleoffals, bloodmeal, meat and bone meal, tallow and dripping, canned meats,ham, and pork sausages among others.52THE COMMISSION: AN ASSESSMENTBy the time of the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,the Commission had made significant progress in meeting the objectivesset for it at its formation in 1938. It had played a considerable role inending the perennial problem of cattle surpluses, had helped restore thecattle producers' confidence in the viability of the beef industry byproviding a guaranteed market and prices and thus had played a part instemming the growing tide of farmers leaving the cattle industry. It hadalso contributed to the expansion of the domestic market for locallyproduced beef.51 CSC, 20th Annual Report and Accounts, 1958, 6.52 For accounts of the CSC's diversification operations see the following: CSC, Annual Reportand Accounts, 1939-63; Pilborough, "The Cold Storage Commission'; Danziger Report, andJanneck and Swart, 'The Place of the Cold Storage Commission1.A. S. MLAMBO 71In addition, it had established a nation-wide modern infrastructureconsisting of abattoirs, cold stores, canning and other factories, which notonly improved the country's capacity to process quality beef and beefproducts for sale at home and abroad, but which also enabled theCommission to manufacture and market a wide variety of other livestockproducts. The positive contribution of the Commission to the developmentof the country's beef industry was acknowledged by the Rhodesia NationalFarmers' Union which noted in 1961 that 'the production, marketing andpricing policies followed [by the Commission] to date have been beneficialto the industry and to the economy as a whole'.53In sharp contrast to the post-colonial parastatals, which wereconstantly dogged by managerial inefficiency, corruption and governmentinterference and chronic deficits that drained the public coffers,54 availableevidence shows that in the period under study the Commission was arelatively well-run institution that was not unduly 'subjected to politicalpressure and wire pulling' and that it fulfilled the mandate given it at itsformation. It created the required economic climate for the developmentof the country's beef industry in general and successfully promoted thesectional interests of the settler cattle producers in particular.The history of the Commission is particularly pertinent to Zimbabweof the 1990s, which is under pressure from international financial agenciesto dismantle its parastatals, and in which Black Zimbabweans areclamouring for economic empowerment. The Commission shows how thestate can, through its public enterprises, direct development in selectedsectors of the economy to produce certain desired political and economicgoals commensurate with its own developmental strategy. The colonialstate's use of the Commission to promote the beef industry while at thesame time safeguarding the interests of its political constituency, theWhite farmers, is clear testimony to the efficacy of this strategy. TheCommission's performance analysed above suggests that, the IMF andWorld Bank's condemnation of parastatals notwithstanding, if properlymanaged, parastatals can be effectively used as instruments for 'bothpolitical and economic empowerment'.5553 NAZ/F259 [1131]/2, Cattle Inquiry Commission, Evidence Received, Rhodesia NationalFarmers' Union, Evidence to the Commission of Enquiry into the Cattle Industry.54 See Zimbabwe, General Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Administration of Parastatals(Chairman Š Justice L. G. Smith, Presented to Parliament in Jan. 1989); A. S. Mlambo, 'Adecade of civil aviation in Zimbabwe: Towards a history of Air Zimbabwe Corporation, 1980to 1990' in Zambezia: The Journal of the University of Zimbabwe (1995), XXII, (i), 79-100.55 Mandaza, 'Politics and economics of privatisation' 9.72 THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION, 1938-1963