

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EXAMINER, 1957-1965¹

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Abstract

The Central African Examiner is a well known source for the study of Zimbabwean history in the seminal period 1957-1965, although the story of its foundation and the backroom manoeuvrings which dogged its short life are relatively unknown. Its inception was the result of industry attempting to push the Federal Government into implementing partnership in a practical way. Up to 1960, the Examiner's internal politics mirrored this conflict, and it was during this time that the Examiner's position as a critical supporter of Government policy was at its most ambiguous. After 1960, the Examiner became a more forthright Government critic — indeed by 1964, it was the only medium left for the expression of nationalist opinion.

INTRODUCTION

IN THE WAKE of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia on 11 November 1965, censorship was imposed on the press. Most newspapers and magazines appeared with a number of blank spaces which would have been filled with articles had they not fallen foul of the censors. One magazine had so much of its content for the December 1965 issue banned that it resorted to making it a 'Do-It-Yourself' edition, urging readers to fill in the blanks themselves. That magazine was *The Central African Examiner*. The December 1965 issue turned out to be the last. The *Examiner* challenged the imposition of censorship in court, thus by implication challenging the legality of the rebel Government itself; it lost the case, and could not continue printing outside the law as no printer in the country would touch it.³

The *Examiner* had not always been such a prominent thorn in the Government's side. It had been founded in 1957 as a liberal journal aimed at the political and economic elite, and the intelligentsia. Its express aim was the furthering of the cause of partnership, one of the foundations on which the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was created.

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³ Interview, Eileen Haddon, Harare, 11 Oct., 1994; Theo Bull (ed.), *Rhodesian Perspective* (London, Michael Joseph, 1967), 7.

This article is a critical analysis of the *Examiner's* existence and influence, and seeks to place the *Examiner* in the debate on liberal thought and the policy of partnership in Rhodesia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is important to remember that the *Examiner* was not a newspaper — one would not turn to it for the factual reporting of events. It was a fortnightly (later monthly) magazine of comment and opinion. When it closed down, the *Examiner* was the last surviving medium for the expression of African nationalist views. The *Daily News* had been banned in 1964, and a host of other publications — *Chapupu*, *Dissent*, *The Zimbabwe Sun*, *The Gonakudzingwa News*, and the *African Home News* — had also been proscribed.⁴ It provides an important source for the study of political discourse in Rhodesia in the early 1960s. While the *Examiner* was an interesting entity in itself, its foundation, continuation under official pressure and eventual forcible closure illustrate the inside story of this significant primary source. The politics which dogged the *Examiner's* short life are an extremely important indicator of the state of liberal debate in Rhodesia, and have uncomfortable resonances with covert government efforts in present-day Zimbabwe to stifle press criticism.⁵ After 1960, when it was bought by Theo Bull, and especially after acquiring more African contributors, it moved closer to the nationalists, reflecting views that were more opposed to government policy, and which were becoming harder to express openly.

Newspaper and periodical sources are extremely important for investigating and analysing the history of colonial Zimbabwe, and the literature on them in general is extensive. However, all too often they are treated as repositories of factual accounts, and little work is done on the politics behind the scenes, or on what we are *not* being told, both of which can enhance the value of a given source. Graham Kinloch's analysis⁶ of some 2 500 editorials from the *Rhodesia Herald*, the *Chronicle* and the *Umtali Post* is an interesting investigation of the way attitudes were defined by and in the Press, but tries to cover too many topics, and the analysis is perhaps too superficial. W. D. Gale's history of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company⁷ is an authoritative monograph, but runs only to

⁴ Judith Todd, *Rhodesia* (London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1966), 99.

⁵ There is little by way of an independent print media in Zimbabwe. The daily press, in particular, displays little independence of opinion. The *Daily Gazette* and *Sunday Gazette* both closed down in 1994 and 1995 respectively, ostensibly because of the difficulty in attracting advertising. The weekly *Financial Gazette* has succumbed to pressure to avoid political coverage and commentary, and is now simply a financial newspaper. A new paper, the *Zimbabwe Independent*, was launched in March 1996, but it is yet to be seen how viable it will be. There are a few independent monthly journals, such as *Parade*, *Horizon* and *Moto*. All other newspapers in Zimbabwe are at least part-owned by the Mass Media Trust.

⁶ *Flame or Lily? Rhodesian Values as Defined by the Press* (Durban, Alpha Graphic, 1970).

⁷ *The Rhodesian Press. The History of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company Ltd.* (Salisbury, Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Co., 1962).

1960, and is only a history of the Company, being weaker on the wider picture of journalism in Rhodesia. Eugene Wason's *Banned*⁸ is a fascinating study of the *Daily News*, the most important African newspaper in Rhodesia, and although it lacks the incisiveness of scholarly analysis, it is an excellent account of how the *Daily News* developed into a mass-circulation, critical newspaper. John Parker's *Rhodesia: Little White Island*⁹ focuses on White Rhodesian society in the late 1950s-1960s. Parker was a controversial journalist, who was eventually deported, and his analysis of the politics of journalism is exceptionally incisive. Peter Niesewand's *In Camera*¹⁰ is a more personal account of the author's harassment by the Rhodesian authorities than is Parker's, and while it has less to say about the wider picture, it is important as a personal testimony. Clyde Sanger's *Central African Emergency*¹¹ is the only work which draws on the *Examiner* as a significant source. Sanger had been deputy editor and editor of the *Examiner* before 1960, and is in a good position to comment on it, but the story of the *Examiner* plays a small part in his narrative, although Sanger is strong on the politics of journalism in the late 1950s. Julie Frederikse's *None but Ourselves*¹² serves as a collation of primary source material — press cuttings, interviews, etc. — and Frederikse generally eschews commentary, preferring the sources to speak for themselves. Elaine Windrich's *The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe*¹³ is probably the best short analysis of Rhodesian press censorship and harassment, and illustrates the conditions under which the *Examiner* laboured when it was forced to close. There is a considerable body of work on the post-independence Zimbabwean media, notably Richard Saunders' admirable doctoral thesis,¹⁴ but work on the behind-the-scenes politics of the press in Zimbabwe is, perhaps understandably, lacking.

THE EXAMINER AND THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP

The term 'partnership' was never satisfactorily defined, but in essence it was an attempt to present to a sceptical world a picture of racial partnership, of Black and White striving together to create a multi-racial state — a halfway house between apartheid and White supremacy, as

⁸ *Banned: The Story of the African Daily News, Southern Rhodesia, 1964* (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1976).

⁹ *Rhodesia: Little White Island* (London, Pitman, 1972).

¹⁰ *In Camera: Secret Justice in Rhodesia* (London, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1973).

¹¹ *Central African Emergency* (London, Heinemann, 1960).

¹² *None but Ourselves. Masses vs. Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe* (Harare, ZPH, 1983).

¹³ *The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe* (Gwelo, Mambo, 1981).

¹⁴ Richard Saunders, 'Information in the Interregnum: The Press, State and Civil Society in Struggles for Hegemony in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990' (Ph.D Thesis, Carleton University, 1992).

practised in South Africa, and African nationalism.¹⁵ It was presented as a way of improving the lot of Africans while granting them a 'real' stake in society, a way of consolidating British rule and parliamentary traditions in Central Africa — and a way of ensuring that government remained in 'civilised' hands while keeping the African middle class happy.

Partnership turned out to be fragile and inadequate in reality. African participation in the affairs of the country would still be heavily restricted for the foreseeable future. Openings in the political, economic and social arenas were offered grudgingly, and with a warning that their continuance depended on the Africans' 'good behaviour' and demonstrations that they were learning to be 'responsible'. The clear inference is that European liberalism sometimes gave the Africans more than they deserved. Sir Godfrey Huggins, the Federal Prime Minister, wrote:

His [the African's] place will be very largely determined by his own behaviour as he advances in knowledge on civilised lines. Under the Federal Constitution, he has been given a place in the Central Government machine. For a people as backward as most of the Abantu [sic], they have been given a very large share.¹⁶

Nevertheless, many people on both sides of the colour line enthusiastically embraced what seemed to be a new way of defining race relations. The rhetoric was heady for its day, and caught on among certain circles in the Federation, and, through the Capricorn Africa Society, in Britain. Some people thought that the apparent liberalism of partnership firmly distanced the Federation from the naked racism of South African apartheid. One former school teacher commented that upon returning to Southern Rhodesia in 1954 after four years in South Africa, an enormous change in attitude had palpably occurred, and Southern Rhodesia now felt like a completely different country from the one she had left.¹⁷ Other observers were less charitable, calling partnership an exercise in collective hypocrisy on the part of the Whites.¹⁸ All the same, multi-racial societies,

¹⁵ Useful literature on partnership includes Patrick Keatley, *The Politics of Partnership. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963); Ian Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia 1953-1960* (London, Croom Helm, 1984), and 'The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Rhodesia', *Rhodesian History* (1976), VII, 41-62; Hardwicke Holderness, *Lost Chance. Southern Rhodesia 1945-58* (Harare, ZPH, 1985); Michael Gelfand, *A Non-Racial Island of Learning. A History of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from its Inception to 1966* (Gwelo, Mambo, 1978). For European attitudes to partnership, see C. A. Rogers and C. Frantz, *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: the Attitudes and Behaviour of the White Population* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962); John Parker, *Rhodesia — Little White Island* (London, Pitman, 1972); P. J. M. McEwan, 'The Assimilation of European Immigrants in Southern Rhodesia' (Ph.D Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1963).

¹⁶ Sir Godfrey Huggins, 'The African's place in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland', *Optima* (1954), IV, (11), 1-5.

¹⁷ Conversation with Diana Mitchell, Feb., 1995. Harare.

¹⁸ See, for example, Doris Lessing, *Going Home* (London, Methuen, 1963).

like the Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia,¹⁹ were formed as meeting places where all races could participate in political discussion. Many people, both White and Black were attracted by the novelty of meeting on an equal footing (perhaps a superficial perception) and being able to debate public issues seriously.

However, partnership was not intended to be the preserve of the intelligentsia. It was supposed to encompass all sections of society, raising the living standards of Africans, and enabling them to participate progressively in the political, social and economic life of the Federation. Among the Africans whose lot could be improved most readily were those who worked for the large mining concerns: they were employed by companies who provided for their 'improvement' as well as making a profit from their labour. Partnership seemed fine as an ideal at the time, but in reality it needed champions to push along those reluctant to embrace it.

This is where *The Central African Examiner* comes in. It was a child of its time, founded as a journal of liberal thought in 1957, by which time partnership was supposed to be in full swing. It was financed for the first three years of its life by Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST), and is an example of the role which RST and its chairman, Sir Ronald Prain, wanted to play. RST had been founded by Chester Beatty in the 1920s, and by 1953 was owned by American Metal Climax. It was one of the two big mining companies (the other was Anglo American) on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, and had a vested interest in supporting partnership. Enhanced opportunities for Africans meant a happier Black workforce, and more consumers to drive the economy of the Federation along, not to mention less scope for unrest. In addition, even if African wages rose three- or four-fold, they would still be cheaper than European wages. In the tradition of the industrial philanthropists like the Cadburys and Leverhulmes in Britain, RST saw great advantage, both moral and practical, in providing for its employees.²⁰ It built decent accommodation, provided social and sporting

¹⁹ The Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia (IASR) was founded in 1954 to take advantage of the new spirit of partnership by providing a forum for multi-racial mixing and dialogue. Its membership largely reflected another discussion group, The National Affairs Association (NAA), which was founded in 1946 as a platform for the discussion of problems facing Southern Rhodesia. For the IASR, see Hardwicke Holderness, *Lost Chance. Southern Rhodesia 1945-1958* (Harare, ZPH, 1985). For the NAA, see Hardwicke Holderness, 'The Rhodesian National Affairs Association', *The Labour Front* (Sept., 1948), V, (ix). Both references explain the rationale behind such groups more fully. For African support for partnership, see Enoch Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy* (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1975); Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London, Heinemann, 1964); and Terence Ranger, *Are We Not Also Men? The Samkanga Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-1964* (London, James Currey, 1995).

²⁰ Anthony Verrier wrote that the trust founder, Chester Beatty was 'a quintessential American magnate of genuinely liberal beliefs', and RST 'was to benefit from a management team whose members decided to treat their . . . black employees like men'. See Anthony Verrier, *The Road to Zimbabwe 1890-1980* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1986), 38.

amenities, and was keen to be seen to be improving the lot of its African employees, even if the government was dragging its feet. It could see by 1956 that partnership was not being implemented with any enthusiasm by the Federal and Territorial governments, and funding a journal of liberal bent was a way of gently pushing the politicians along. In this way, a large mining company found itself championing social and political liberalism in the face of a reluctant government.²¹

The *Examiner* was, however, more than just a pawn in the partnership game between RST and government. Its position up to 1960 generally reflected the political climate, following the government line on partnership and increased opportunity for Africans. After 1960, when it was taken over by Theo Bull, one of the lesser heirs of Alfred Beit's fortune and an enthusiastic liberal, it became an ever more forceful critic of the Federal and Southern Rhodesian governments, and the Rhodesian government after the dissolution of the Federation, until it was forced to close by the imposition of censorship in November 1965 in the wake of UDI. The *Examiner* was a medium for the voicing of opinions from across the entire political spectrum, from extreme right-wing to nationalist — although there is no doubt that it tried to occupy the middle ground. A close look at the *Examiner*, therefore, is very instructive in revealing the way political discourse was developing in the Federation during the turbulent years between 1957 and 1965.

FOUNDING THE *EXAMINER*: OWNERSHIP BY RHODESIAN SELECTION TRUST, 1957-60

If there was any suspicion as to the seriousness with which the Federal and Southern Rhodesian governments took partnership, it was soon confirmed by the wrangle over the franchise in 1956-57, an attempt by both governments to open up the franchise a little while keeping power firmly in 'civilised hands'.²² This stalling did not do the cause of partnership

²¹ See Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals*, Chapter 5, for examples of how businessmen were often at the forefront of pressure to improve conditions for Africans in Southern Rhodesia. This point is also made by Doris Lessing in *Going Home*, 85. However, as with many propaganda exercises, a mining company advertising its good treatment of its employees might arouse suspicion. For examples of African working conditions in the Northern Rhodesia mining industry, see Guy Mhone, *The Political Economy of a Dual Labour Market in Africa: The Copper Industry and Dependence in Zambia, 1929-1969* (Rutherford, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982); for the Southern Rhodesia mining industry, see Ian Phimister, *Wangi Kolia. Coal, Capital and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1894-1953* (Harare, Baobab, 1994).

²² The franchise debate lasted two years. The Federal Government did its best to allow as few Africans on the roll as it could get away with. It destroyed the principle of the common roll by creating a two-roll franchise, with the B Roll having lower qualifications, but also a severely circumscribed influence on the outcome of an election. The Southern Rhodesian Government opted for a 'door' of lower qualifications for people who could otherwise not

much good in the eyes of many Europeans and Africans, so the *Examiner's* launch in June 1957 to push the debate along was most timely. Prain justified the interest of RST in the wider implications of the political developments taking place in the Federation. In the atmosphere of co-operation, and the attempts to extend citizenship in all its forms to the African majority, RST believed it could play a leading role. Prain himself was an 'establishment liberal',²³ and 'fused an element of romanticism into his acute business mind', liking the ideal of inter-racial harmony.²⁴ He was a supporter of Federation, as evidenced by his donation on behalf of RST to the Capricorn Africa Society's pro-Federation campaign in the early 1950s.²⁵ Support for Federation in itself was not unusual. A majority of businessmen and industrialists supported the Federation's promise of a larger market, and stable and equitable political progress, so they financially supported the ruling United Party's campaign accordingly. But Prain chose to give money to Capricorn, which was more concerned with ideas and ideals of multi-racial citizenship, and which did not have the ear of the government to the extent it would have liked.²⁶ He wrote in *Horizon*, the RST magazine, that 'RST's stake in the mining interests of Central Africa is not exclusively a financial one. It has a political and social responsibility towards the territories in which it operates', mentioning the 'social imbalance' caused by the movement of people from the rural to the urban areas and the decline in food production. He continued:

RST is acutely aware of this, and it is a measure of its acceptance of a share of the responsibility that, in 1956, it made loans, interest free until 1960, totalling £2,000,000 to the Northern Rhodesia Government, to be devoted to the capital cost of African development. Because the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia, by attracting Africans away, have created similar problems in its territory, loans totalling £1,000,000 were made at the same time to the Nyasaland Government.²⁷

quality for the common roll, but stipulated that that door would be permanently shut once those who entered through the special qualifications formed one sixth of the total electorate. Neither system could have enfranchised more than a few thousand Africans, hardly an attempt to create a real 'partnership'. However, the Southern Rhodesia franchise kept the principle of the common roll and some people considered it a significant advance for the time. It was embraced by many White liberals and Africans as an example of partnership, however imperfect, in action. See Hardwicke Holderness, *Lost Chance. Southern Rhodesia 1945-58* (Harare, ZPH, 1985).

²³ Conversation with Theo Bull, 19 Jan., 1996. This term was used by Bull to describe the kind of people who epitomised the *Examiner's* 'mood'.

²⁴ Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals*, 44.

²⁵ Ian Hancock, 'The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Rhodesia', *Rhodesian History* (1976), VII, 46.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 52. Hancock writes that in the early days of Federation, Capricorn's founder, Colonel David Stirling, often met with Huggins and Sir Roy Welensky, 'sustaining an illusion of political significance'.

²⁷ Sir Ronald Prain, 'RST's stake in Central Africa', *Horizon* (Jan., 1959), I, (1), 5-14.

Prain explained the rationale in a speech at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (UCRN):

the more responsible manager . . . goes on to accept still further responsibilities with respect to the goals and methods of our society as a whole. Here, of course, the businessman blends with the citizen. But, since business is central in our society, it seems to me that the businessman has a special and central responsibility as a citizen . . . The plain and simple fact is the truly effective business manager in our society makes a major contribution to the welfare of both individuals and of society as a whole.²⁸

Quoting Sir Alexander Fleck, chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), Prain said:

Three characteristics are necessary if a business is to survive . . . First, it must contribute to the well-being of the community and its social evolution. Secondly, it must have the capacity to change its methods and, if necessary, its objectives. Finally, if it is to be self-perpetuating through growth or modernisation it must dispose of its services at a profit.²⁹

RST thus believed it could marry a social conscience with the pursuit of profit. Prain was able to put this into practice in 1953 when the White Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union threatened to strike at the prospect of the lowering of the industrial colour bar and the advancement of Africans in the mining industry.³⁰ This episode is interesting because it illustrates the difference in approach between British/American-owned RST and South African-owned Anglo American, both of whom had the same vested interests.³¹ The threat affected both RST and Anglo, and the different styles of the two companies and aims are made apparent by Anglo's chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, writing to Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Transport Minister, and future Prime Minister, about the possible trouble:

As you know, Selection Trust have been very anxious for some time to bring this matter to the fore, and only held their hand in order to not prejudice the Southern Rhodesia Referendum [on Federation] . . . [but] they have returned to the charge . . . They [Prain and other RST directors] said they were determined to approach the Union at once and to give the

²⁸ Sir Ronald Prain, 'The social responsibility of industry: Address to the management course at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland' in *Selected Papers, Volume II, 1958-1960* (London, B. T. Batsford, 1961), 41-56.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ See Michael Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines. From African Advancement to Zambianization* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1972), 13-19.

³¹ Prain himself was also aware of this. See Sir Ronald Prain, *Reflections on an Era. Fifty Years of Mining in Changing Africa* (Letchworth, Metal Bulletin Books, 1981), 86. See also Verrier, *The Road to Zimbabwe*, 38.

matter the greatest publicity. They said quite clearly that their object was to do away with the Colour Bar in principle.³²

RST was proposing to eliminate Clause 42 of the companies' agreement with the union, the clause governing the 'rate for the job' which guaranteed that cheaper African labour could not be substituted for European labour without prior agreement. Prain was prepared to 'terminate the agreement and face up to whatever action the Union might take' if the union refused to co-operate. Oppenheimer continued:

We find ourselves quite unable to agree to this procedure. In our opinion an attempt to coerce the Union into abolishing the colour bar would offend the deepest convictions and sentiments of Europeans throughout Southern Africa . . . We shall inform them [RST] that while we think it may be desirable that Africans should be allowed to do certain jobs not now done by them, we have no intention whatsoever of attacking the industrial colour bar in principle.³³

The wrangle with the Mine Workers' Union continued until July 1955 with Anglo American, and October with RST. Giving lip-service to the supposed spirit of the day when Anglo settled its dispute with the Mine Worker's Union, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer said:

To appreciate the full significance of this event it is necessary to view it in the light of prevailing opinion and custom in Southern Africa. Here is a case of the European workers in a large and important industry voluntarily and formally handing over certain of the jobs they have been doing to African workers in order that the latter can progress within the industry. It is difficult to think of a precedent for an action as generous and enlightened as this. In effect, it is a practical example of the spirit on which the new Central African Federation has been founded — the spirit of partnership.³⁴

Whether Anglo American gave much thought to what partnership really meant is open to debate.³⁵ The important matter in this dispute is that RST seemed to take the wider view that the colour bar in its present form was unsustainable, and this tallied well with the new spirit of partnership. Of the two mining giants, it appeared that if anyone took the notion of partnership seriously, it was RST. But its reactions to the dispute also demonstrate how the word 'partnership' had permeated the discourse

³² Welensky Papers [WP] 251/5, ff. 1-4, Harry Oppenheimer to Welensky, 28 April, 1953. Oppenheimer later joined RST in pressing the government to open up more opportunities for Africans, and in 1959 withdrew Anglo American funding for the United Front Party (UFP). See Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals*, 87.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ WP 251/6 ff. 20-22, Statement by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, 31 July, 1955.

³⁵ On the other hand, Prain thought that Sir Ernest Oppenheimer represented a liberal and far-sighted strand of thought in South Africa. See Prain, *Reflections on an Era*, 86.

of the day, and how tidily it encapsulated what mining companies wanted to be seen to be doing for their African employees. In the spirit of peaceful co-operation and co-dependence, RST thought it worthwhile to promote the welfare of its African employees. It is easy to be cynical about RST's motives behind supporting the liberalisation of the political and economic scenes (the bottom line for any company is profit) but there is much evidence that RST took its philanthropic and liberal bent seriously, especially since Prain believed RST should contribute heavily to helping the people whose labour RST employed.³⁶ Therefore, RST funded scholarships,³⁷ and Garfield Todd considered an approach to RST worthwhile when he needed to raise money for his 'ultra-liberal' Central Africa Party.³⁸ Given the fiasco of the franchise debate which demonstrated how much the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments were stalling, it was fortunate for the concept of partnership that Prain and RST willingly assumed the liberal mantle.

One way to help create an atmosphere conducive to partnership and political progress was to create a political and economic magazine which would sit on the liberal side of the fence.³⁹ The *Examiner* was deliberately aimed at business and the intelligentsia, the policy-makers and others who were in a position to influence current affairs. It was also aimed at a similar constituency in Britain, since it was supposed to be a sort of African *Economist*.⁴⁰ RST 'thought that through an appeal to the business section of White Rhodesians, they might persuade them [Whites as a whole] to open up to Blacks'.⁴¹ The *Examiner's* Board of Directors reflected this. Sir Geoffrey Crowther, former editor of the *Economist*, was chairman. The connection with the *Economist* was to enhance the *Examiner's* standing among the business community, establish its competence as a serious journal in both the Federation and Britain, and also provide a source for overseas news. One African, Herbert Chitepo, the first African to practise in Salisbury as an Advocate, was also on the Board. There were also three Trustees whose brief was to safeguard the editor's independence from pressure groups, political parties and accusations that RST was influencing

³⁶ It should be noted that the 1950s were extremely profitable for RST, since the Korean War and Cold War both boosted the demand for copper.

³⁷ *Daily News* (6 Sept., 1961). RST was offering scholarships for people who wished to study mining-related disciplines, although there was no obligation to work for RST, and no guarantee of a job with RST at the end. There were also scholarships for arts subjects.

³⁸ National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), Harare, MS 390/2/1 [Todd Papers] Telegram, Todd to Prain, April, 1958. Susan Paul, who is currently writing a biography of Garfield Todd, does not think that Prain gave Todd's Central African Party any financial assistance.

³⁹ Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

⁴⁰ Conversation with Theo Bull, 19 Jan., 1996. Bull remembers his Junior Common Room at Cambridge University subscribing to the *Examiner* in the late 1950s.

⁴¹ Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

editorial policy: Sir Robert Tredgold, later Federal Chief Justice, Walter Adams, Principal of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Oliver Greene-Wilkinson, the Archbishop of Central Africa, comprising 'the most eminent board of trustees imaginable'.⁴² The first editor, Francis Baughan (who had spent ten years with *The Times* in Britain), was sent over from the UK by the *Economist*, and so the link was forged. The Federal news service called the new magazine 'an experiment in journalism in a new and growing country', and added:

its declared aim is 'to provide a comprehensive background to the news of the day for thoughtful people in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and to help create an informed and critical approach to current problems'.⁴³

It was stressed that Crowther had advised RST to provide the financial support for the *Examiner* 'while agreeing to safeguard the integrity of the journal and the complete independence of the editor'.⁴⁴ RST was sometimes accused of influencing editorial policy: 'the impression had grown in the minds of a section of the public that the Trustees were responsible for policies followed by the *Examiner* and for the opinions expressed from time to time in the journal'.⁴⁵ And so the *Examiner* was keen to stress it had total editorial independence:

As it has also been indicated that other sections of the public have assumed that because of the financial support for the journal afforded by the Rhodesian Selection Trust Group, as stated when *The Examiner* was established, the views of the journal are necessarily those of the RST Group, the Central African Examiner Limited wishes to take this opportunity to state that *The Examiner* has always been published as a journal of independent editorial opinion and will continue to be published as such'.⁴⁶

RST's 'hands off' stance helps to explain how the *Examiner* came to be influenced by the Federal Government.

The optimism with which the *Examiner* was established soon ran into problems. Baughan was editor for under a year, from June 1957 to April 1958, and resigned just before the Southern Rhodesia general election in protest against the continuing encroachment on his editorial freedom by the Managing Director, David Cole. Baughan's assistant, Clyde Sanger, wrote that during that time 'I . . . did more than my fair share of writing

⁴² Sanger, *Central African Emergency*, 334.

⁴³ NAZ, MS 1082/1/7 [Todd Papers], Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation, 'Publication of the Central African Examiner', 14-21 Sept., 1957.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Examiner* (20 June, 1959), 7.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

while Francis argued with David, defending his editorial integrity'.⁴⁷ Cole was to prove a problematic figure for much of the *Examiner's* early life. Unlike the 'establishment liberals' who figured so prominently in the *Examiner's* set-up, he was a post-war working class immigrant from Britain, and whereas the 'establishment liberals had serious elements of principle ... Cole had none'.⁴⁸ He had been 'a lively editor'⁴⁹ of the *Northern News* in Lusaka, and by 1957 was running a public relations firm in Salisbury. His presence on the *Examiner's* board was a way of liaising directly with the government. He has been described as 'a Welensky man first and last',⁵⁰ 'an *eminence grise* behind Welensky' who advised him to get rid of Garfield Todd in 1958,⁵¹ and, more unkindly, 'Welensky's doormat'.⁵²

There is little doubt that Cole's relationship with Welensky was a close one, possibly a shared affinity because of their similar lowly origins, and that through Cole the Federal Government was able to exert covert political pressure on the *Examiner's* editorial policy. Cole's public relations firm handled the account for 'Voice and Vision', the Federal Government's propaganda machine. Cole often consulted Welensky on matters of policy regarding the *Examiner*, such as the time when Cole was going to resign from the board after the magazine was bought by Theo Bull. After Baughan's resignation, Sanger, who had moved to *Drum* some months previously, was offered the editor's job by Cole who would adopt the role of overseer.⁵³ It was clear that the job would entail a certain amount of 'constraints',⁵⁴ but Sanger accepted it anyway. Between Baughan's departure and Sanger's arrival, Cole had appointed Ian Hess assistant editor. Sanger wrote 'Ian was a sad figure. I always reckoned David had some hold over him, and I always believed Ian was working for David, not for me'.⁵⁵ Sanger resigned in March 1959 'when David didn't want me to go to Nyasaland [to cover the Emergency] and said one could assess the situation better from Salisbury'.⁵⁶ Sanger's analysis of the political pressure on the *Examiner* is borne out by evidence of the Federal Government's covert manoeuvring regarding advertising in the *Examiner*, and by Welensky's moves to deny the *Examiner* income when he disagreed with its stance.

⁴⁷ Clyde Sanger to Eileen Haddon, 11 Dec., 1987. I am grateful to Eileen Haddon for letting me have a copy of this letter.

⁴⁸ Conversation with Theo Bull, 19 Jan., 1996.

⁴⁹ Sanger, *Central African Emergency*, 328.

⁵⁰ Sanger to Haddon, 11 Dec., 1987.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

⁵³ Sanger to Haddon, 11 Dec., 1987.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

No magazine survives without advertising or a heavy subsidy, and Welensky was able to use his position to persuade many would-be advertisers to withhold their custom if he did not agree with the magazine's tone. Baughan's insistence on editorial independence had not endeared the *Examiner* to the Federal or Territorial governments, and advertising was initially hard to attract,⁵⁷ although a brief look at the editorial tone suggests that the magazine was hardly radical. I shall return to this point.

Once Baughan and later Sanger had left, Cole took over as editor. The *Examiner* was considered to be in more reliable hands, there was a marked change in the attitude of Welensky and the Federal Government. More advertising from the Federal and Territorial governments began to appear. The rationale behind this was expressed by Donald Macintyre, the Federal Finance Minister, when he wrote to Welensky:

To my mind we have a definite interest in seeing the *Examiner* continue, provided it remains the type of paper it has been in the past . . . the significant fact . . . is that a paper of this type is an indicator to people overseas of a degree of economic, social and — dare I say it — mental development. The *Examiner* has therefore a definite prestige value.⁵⁸

Macintyre thus summarised one of the political establishment's prime concerns, and one of partnership's main purposes: the need to present a good face to the world. Bad publicity was a constant source of worry for the Federal and Territorial governments, and what better proof of growing liberalism and widening horizons than a magazine of critical enquiry? But Macintyre was also keenly aware that the *Examiner* had to remain nominally independent: 'It is quite obvious that a subsidy would kill the paper for the simple reason that nobody would then believe it had independent views.'⁵⁹ He concluded, 'I, for one, would be prepared to see Government advertising in the *Examiner*.' The Federal Government's role in supporting the *Examiner* was greatly appreciated by Cole and Hess. Hess wrote to Stewart Parker, Welensky's Private Secretary, thanking him 'for your offer to help us attain more advertising'.⁶⁰

More advertising began to appear, both from the governments themselves and from firms which had been reluctant to advertise in a magazine critical of the government, but which now got a semi-official nod that it would not prejudice their standing with the governments if they decided to advertise in the *Examiner* after all. It is indicative of the close relationship between Cole and Welensky that Cole felt able to complain in August 1959 that the Standard Bank had refused to advertise in the *Examiner*

⁵⁷ Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

⁵⁸ WP 279/4 f.9 Macintyre to Welensky, 5 Aug., 1959.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, ff. 1-3 Hess to Parker, 30 July, 1959.

because 'they did not agree with its policy (this was in the heyday of the Baughan/Sanger period)',⁶¹ with the implicit suggestion that Welensky might be able to do something about it now that there had been 'a change in policy'. Welensky was now willing to actively lobby for advertising on the *Examiner's* behalf. In a letter to Keith Acutt of Anglo American, he said:

I believe that given half a chance with Cole and Hess in command, the thing could be put on an economic footing. Can you help? You may have noticed that they have begun to give some Federal Government advertisements, and you may be able to do something in that direction . . . I think you may have noticed that there has been quite a change in policy in this paper recently, and it is now more balanced.⁶²

Acutt replied, 'I will certainly arrange for the *Examiner* to have our support if we have not already done something.'⁶³

What sort of advertising would the *Examiner* carry? It had to be in keeping with its status as a serious magazine of political and economic commentary. In selling the idea of advertising in the *Examiner*, Ian Hess said that the magazine was the best medium in the Federation for 'prestige advertising', adding that:

When it is considered . . . that The *Examiner* genuinely goes to the 'top people' in Government, commerce, industry, and all other spheres of activity, we can claim to be just about the best selling medium there is here . . . for capital goods such as mining machinery, the more expensive types of car, tractors and the like.⁶⁴

Hess continued, saying that while it may be inappropriate for breweries to advertise Castle Beer or Lion Lager, as such, with us, there is no better place for them to say what a fine organisation they are, what they are doing for their African employees, and so on.⁶⁵

In short, the *Examiner* was the sort of magazine that major companies, RST included, would want to advertise in. There was a profusion of advertising from companies which carried out work for the Federal and Territorial governments. One such company was Costain, the building firm, which was often employed by the various governments, especially the Federal Government. The *Examiner* carried double-page spreads from Costain in most issues in 1959 and 1960. The tone of Costain's advertisements is interesting. They stressed the service the company was providing to the country in the shape of building for the governments: a

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, f. 13 Cole to Welensky, 31 Aug., 1959.

⁶² *Ibid.*, f. 14 Welensky to Acutt, 7 Sept., 1959.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, f. 15 Acutt to Welensky, 9 Sept., 1959.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, ff. 1-3 Hess to Parker, 30 July, 1959.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

reliable government is housed in buildings built by a reliable builder. Even the types of building were important. Costain built police buildings, and those advertisements showed an African constable on patrol. So Costain was supporting partnership and greater opportunities for Africans by building for the British South Africa Police (BSAP), which prided itself in its supposed good relations with Africans and in its policy of recruiting Africans and Europeans on the same criteria.⁶⁶ Towards the middle of 1960, when it was apparent that the Southern Rhodesian Government was preparing to embark on a series of reforms, and the spirit of 'nation-building' was spreading in liberal circles, Costain added the sentence 'Building a Nation' to its advertisements.⁶⁷ Other firms, such as the British South Africa Company, advertised their long association with Southern Rhodesia and the Federation.

This follows a certain tone in advertising spreading through the Rhodesian press. Elsewhere, the Courtesy Campaign⁶⁸ was running advertisements picturing people of all races, proclaiming 'It takes all sorts to build a nation' and 'Rhodesians are proud of it.' This dove-tailed later with the UFP's 'Build a Nation' campaign, whose express purposes were to register on the voters' rolls all those Africans who qualified under the new rules,⁶⁹ and to encourage a sense of a Rhodesian 'nation' where 'every man living in this country no matter what his origin . . . regards himself first and foremost as a Rhodesian and accepts all other citizens — whatever their racial origin — as Rhodesians'.⁷⁰ The political establishment was trying to build a momentum of public support in all spheres to bolster its programme of liberalisation. So, papers like the *African Daily News* which was aimed at the 'thinking' African public, the *Rhodesia Herald* at the European public, and the *Examiner* at the intelligentsia and the business

⁶⁶ It was not mentioned that Africans could not rise as high as Europeans in the BSAP.

⁶⁷ See, for example, Costain's advertisement in the *Examiner* on 23 April, 1960.

⁶⁸ The Courtesy Campaign was run predominantly by White women, and its purpose was to encourage people of all races to be nice to each other. Although it claimed 50 000 members, this is an unlikely figure, and it slipped into oblivion after the Rhodesian Front's election victory in December, 1962. It is interesting that the Courtesy Campaign advertised in the African press about every two days, at least as much as it did in the European press. For a typical advertisement, see *African Daily News* (2 Sept., 1961).

⁶⁹ The 1961 Southern Rhodesia Constitution provided for a B roll, with lower qualifications than the ordinary (or 'A') roll, but also with a heavily curtailed influence on the outcome of an election. The purpose was to enfranchise those deemed 'responsible' who would not qualify for the A roll. The urgency to enrol voters was so that the new franchise would not appear a 'hollow victory' for a liberalising government in Southern Rhodesia. See my 'The Build a Nation Campaign, Nationhood and the United Federal Party in Southern Rhodesia 1961-62' (St. Antony's College, Unpubl., 1994). Also, Charles Kenny, 'The Southern Rhodesian Election of 1962' (BA thesis, Oxford University, 1993).

⁷⁰ Rhodes House (Oxford), Edgar Whitehead Papers, File 1c, Memorandum, UFP Southern Rhodesia Division, Oct., 1961. See my 'The Build a Nation Campaign, Nationhood and the United Federal Party in Southern Rhodesia'.

and political elite of the country in general, all carried similar advertisements from various companies and pressure groups, all of whom supported government attempts to foster a Rhodesian 'nationhood'. Therefore, the *Examiner's* advertising fitted into a loose campaign of the various governments to encourage people to think of the Federation as a single 'nation'. This, perhaps more than anything else, is indicative of how 'responsible' the political establishment in 1959 and 1960 considered the *Examiner* to be.

Under Baughan, the *Examiner's* editorial tone was not hostile, despite the fact that Welensky and the Federal and Territorial governments thought it unreliable, and it was Baughan's insistence on editorial independence more than anything else which turned Welensky against it. As often as not though, the *Examiner* glossed over, or gave the benefit of the doubt, to failures to implement 'partnership', and could have been little more than an irritant to Welensky rather than a threat. The paper highlighted examples of how partnership was creating opportunities for Africans, and one of its occasional contributors was Jasper Savanhu, the first African minister in the Federal Government.⁷¹ It ran articles from prominent African intellectuals like Enoch Dumbutshena and Stanlake Samkange, who supported partnership and regularly warned of the appeal that the burgeoning Southern Rhodesia African National Congress had among the Africans.⁷² The *Examiner* also ran articles which confirmed some settler prejudices, such as the idea that Africans generally welcomed the Land Apportionment Act, and disagreed perhaps only with its actual implementation. A piece by Leopold Takawira, at the time an employee of Capricorn, said that 'no African quarrels with the Land Apportionment Act as such, the principle is sensible and fair'.⁷³ It even ran the kind of articles which epitomised Rhodesian paternalism:

certainly few of them [Africans] are 'ready' to take their place as equals of Europeans in a complicated modern state. Many, if not most, Africans

⁷¹ See a piece by Savanhu entitled 'What my appointment really means' in the *Examiner* (25 April, 1959). See also Savanhu's chapter 'An African Middle Class' in F. S. Joelson (ed.), *Rhodesia and East Africa* (London, East Africa and Rhodesia, 1958), 169-173.

⁷² *Examiner* (20 July, 1957). Dumbutshena was encouraging established political parties of all hues to set up African branches and actively court African support because 'African opinion has been excited by the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC)'.

For more on Samkange, see Terence Ranger, *Are We Not Also Men? The Samkange Family and African politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-1964* (London, James Currey, 1995).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 28 Sept., 1957. Contrary to Rhodesian myth, there had been real and sustained African opposition to the Land Apportionment Act from its inception. See, for instance, T. O. Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia* (London, Heinemann, 1970). Other useful reading is Malcolm Rifkind, 'Land apportionment in perspective', *Rhodesian History* (1972), III, 53-62; Robin Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (London, Oxford University Press, 1977).

are by our standards ignorant and superstitious, and, although they are remarkably good-natured people, brutality lies pretty near the surface.⁷⁴

Between 1957 and 1960, the *Examiner* followed the classic Rhodesian liberal line that while discrimination had been necessary in the past, times had changed, so barriers could be judiciously lowered, and although universal adult suffrage was still not 'practical', it should be the ultimate goal. In addition, the insensitive use of the colour bar against 'advanced' Africans was both crude and losing to the Federation friends abroad.⁷⁵

The editorial tone did not change dramatically when Baughan left in 1958. However, in Cole the government now had a figure in control of the *Examiner* on whom they could rely to support them in difficult times, even though Sanger was formally editor. Such a time was the Emergency in 1959. In February, a plot to cause widespread violence in Nyasaland was supposedly unmasked, and an emergency was proclaimed there. In March, Southern Rhodesia followed suit, banning the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress. The *Examiner's* editorial of 14 March 1959 compared Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, to Abraham Lincoln, in that they had both acted firmly against secession and sedition. A profile of Whitehead in the same issue defended the Emergency on the grounds that Whitehead had little relish personally for the detention of 500 people, and had acted 'only because he is utterly dedicated to building a genuinely multi-racial state in Southern Rhodesia' which those 500 were 'determined to frustrate'.⁷⁶

Because of Sanger's presence, editorial opinion was not as fully under Cole's control as he or Welensky might have wished. During this time, White liberal and 'moderate' African opinion was split between the UFP and Todd's reformed United Rhodesia Party, which in July of 1958 became the Central Africa Party (CAP). The two parties represented different strands of liberalism: the UFP was more gradualist, and the CAP more radical. Cole and Sanger exemplified this split on the *Examiner*, with Cole voicing the official UFP line, and Sanger leaning more towards Todd's 'radical' liberalism. Sanger made sure that the *Examiner* continued to reflect, at least in part, the CAP's brand of liberalism, and despite the political pressure exerted by the Federal and Territorial governments, Todd and his supporters felt that with Sanger on board the *Examiner* was on their side: 'We have the intelligentsia on our side. The C.A. Examiner under Sanger . . . can be relied upon . . . to assist our cause or at least do it no harm.'⁷⁷

⁷⁴ *Examiner*, 21 Dec., 1957.

⁷⁵ For an example of this, see the *Examiner's* editorial of 15 March, 1958.

⁷⁶ Sanger, who had just left the *Examiner*, thought this profile 'the most embarrassing sycophancy'. See Sanger, *Central African Emergency*, 335.

⁷⁷ NAZ, MS 390/2/1 [Todd Papers] United Rhodesia Party, 'Suggestions for the Future', July, 1958.

The conflicting stances of Cole and Sanger at the helm were reflected in the often contradictory opinions the *Examiner's* editorials voiced from one issue to the next. The best example came during the campaign within the United Federal Party in late 1957 and early 1958 to oust Garfield Todd as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.⁷⁸ Over the course of three months or so, it became common to find one editorial calling for Todd's removal, and the next praising him. This was because Cole and Sanger shared the responsibility of writing editorials, and took advantage of one another's absence to run pieces from their own particular standpoints.⁷⁹ This discrepancy was also apparent just a few weeks after the issue of 14 March, 1959, which praised the Southern Rhodesian government's handling of the Emergency, when an editorial lauding the appearance of *Dissent* was printed.⁸⁰ *Dissent* was a broadsheet of irregular frequency whose speciality was articulate and persistent exposures of, and strident attacks on, the government. It was put together by a Methodist minister, Whitfield Foy, and two lecturers in the UCRN, Terence Ranger and John Reed. None of these were remotely supportive of either the Federal or Territorial governments, and therefore no friends of Cole's or Welensky's.

But in general, the *Examiner* reflected the way the political establishment wanted to be seen: a champion of multi-racial progress. It incorporated the opinions of the political establishment for its first three years and generally followed the government line, despite RST's wish that it be leading rather than be led. It was an accurate indicator of the direction in which the Federal and Territorial governments wanted to be seen to be moving, and its existence was an example of how the large business concerns were trying to push them along. In one sense, the conflict between Cole and Sanger was a reflection of the wider conflict of RST trying to prod the government into implementing partnership meaningfully. The *Examiner* also revealed the way in which the political establishment thought the Federation could progress towards a more inclusive nationhood by stressing the advantages that partnership brought to Africans, and occasionally criticising its lapses.⁸¹ Despite Eileen Haddon's opinion that the *Examiner* before 1960 was a medium for reaction,⁸² and despite the influence that the political establishment exercised over it

⁷⁸ Eileen Haddon cites an article in the 4 Jan., 1958 issue entitled 'Is this the beginning of the end for Todd' as the start of this Cole-inspired campaign. Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

⁷⁹ Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

⁸⁰ *Examiner* (11 April, 1959). The piece was written by Clyde Sanger, although he had resigned by the time it was printed.

⁸¹ For example, the *Examiner* criticised the Civil Service Club's refusal to go multi-racial at a time when the Federal Government was encouraging the civil service, business and commerce in Salisbury to cater for non-Europeans as well. See the *Examiner* (27 Feb., 1960).

⁸² Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

between 1957 and 1960, it was still a relatively liberal magazine in a country where the concept of partnership was a bone of contention between the governments, the mining and business concerns, and public opinion of all colours. And although the Federal Government was exerting undue pressure on the *Examiner*, the editorial tone was still liberal. Since RST was a 'hands off' proprietor, and since the *Examiner* was reflecting the policies for which it had been established, there was little need for RST to intervene.

CHANGING COURSE: THE *EXAMINER* UNDER THEO BULL, 1960-65

The good relationship between the *Examiner* and the Federal and Territorial governments came to an end in June 1960 when the *Examiner* was taken over by Theo Bull. Bull had been a postgraduate student at UCRN, where he had started a student paper, the *Unicorn*,⁸³ and where he had been a 'close associate' of the Principal (and *Examiner* Trustee), Walter Adams, and of Terence Ranger.⁸⁴ In the opinion of the political establishment, such contacts made Bull a subversive. In addition, Bull believes that his otherwise impeccable establishment credentials marked him out as a traitor as well as a radical in the eyes of the political establishment.⁸⁵ The official reason behind RST's withdrawal of funding was that the *Examiner* was now a mature magazine able to stand on its own two feet. In Eileen Haddon's opinion, RST had seen by late 1959 that partnership was being implemented too little too late, and too reluctantly, and that Federation would not survive the ructions caused by the 1959 Emergency and the resurgence of African nationalism. In addition, the removal of Garfield Todd from power in 1958 had effectively put paid to any prospect of African opinion trusting a European Prime Minister.⁸⁶ Added to this, the *Examiner* had become an embarrassment, since Cole's editorship had ended any pretence of editorial independence. As a result, the three Trustees resigned in June 1959 when Cole became effective editor — their function was to stop the Managing Director encroaching on the editor, a function which was now redundant since the Managing Director and editor were the same person.⁸⁷

⁸³ Gelfand, *A Non-Racial Island of Learning*, 223.

⁸⁴ WP 279/4 f. 25, Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB) report on Bull, 1 Dec., 1959.

⁸⁵ 'Establishments are always more bitter at radicals from within the establishment (whom they see as traitors) than at those from the outside. I was on visiting terms with the Governor-General through my uncle and aunt Beit, and indeed my Beit origins should have wrapped me into the establishment.' Conversation with Theo Bull, 19 Jan., 1996.

⁸⁶ Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

⁸⁷ This is alluded to in the 20 June, 1959 issue. While stressing the *Examiner's* editorial independence, the Trustees 'suggested that the arrangement under which they were appointed should be brought to an end' — a veiled reference to their powerless position.

As part of the deal whereby Bull took over the *Examiner*, RST left £12 000 in reserve to cover running costs for the first 12 to 18 months, and that money lasted until the end of 1961.⁸⁸ Even if there was little hope left for partnership and Federation, it was important to Prain that a liberal magazine should stand a chance of survival to fight for reforms. There was a certain amount of continuity with the new board. Crowther stayed, as did Chitepo. Additional members came from Bull's acquaintances among the 'establishment liberals', such as Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and Sir Stephen Courtauld. Another new board member was Anthony Marshall, an American, who had founded the African Research and Development Company based in New York. Cole believed that Marshall's share of the money was provided by American Metal Climax, RST's parent company.⁸⁹ Cole also believed that RST had sold all its 100 shares to Crowther for £1 each, and then given Crowther £20 000 to keep the *Examiner* going. When Crowther put up £8 000 as his share towards buying the magazine from RST, Cole believed that it was the change from the original £20 000.⁹⁰ If this was the case, RST and American Metal Climax provided much of the money which bought out their own interests in the *Examiner*. Since the £12 000 RST left for Bull and Crowther's £8 000 come to the £20 000 Cole thought RST had given Crowther, this is probably true.

The change in the *Examiner's* editorial stance was immediately apparent under Bull and his new team. The *Examiner* became more intellectual in content, and as the Federation began to collapse, it concentrated more on Southern Rhodesia. Bull drastically cut staff to economise and employed a new editor from South Africa, Jack Halpern. Halpern was 'of a different mould from most of those who got involved with the *Examiner*,'⁹¹ in that he was not an establishment liberal. He had been a childhood refugee from Nazi Germany, and was 'a rather theoretical, but quite genuine, 'leftist'.⁹² Halpern was also suspect in the governments' eyes, having worked for the Institute of Race Relations in South Africa. Welensky wrote to his friend Ellis Robins, president of the British South Africa Company, 'I can tell you between ourselves that we seriously considered refusing him a permit into the country . . . but I decided it was better to take the chance.'⁹³ In the tone of a weary uncle, Welensky

⁸⁸ Conversation with Theo Bull, 19 Jan., 1996; also, Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994. Haddon believed that RST left money in reserve for Bull to run the *Examiner* after the umbilical cord had officially been cut: 'Halpern was on a good salary, we kept the offices in Manica Road, the money had to be coming from somewhere.'

⁸⁹ WP 279/4 f. 66, Cole to Stewart Parker, 11 June, 1960.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Conversation with Theo Bull, 19 Jan., 1996.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ WP 662/5 f. 43, Welensky to Robins, 6 July, 1960.

concluded his letter: 'I don't know what's coming over us as a people, Ellis. Are we determined to destroy the way of life we have built by playing into the hands of these Leftist elements all the way?'

Halpern was joined by Eileen Haddon as editorial assistant. Haddon was a vociferous liberal who had been active on the liberal wing of Southern Rhodesian politics since the early 1950s. New contributors included Terence Ranger and John Reed, both active supporters of the African nationalist National Democratic Party, and both of whom were later forced to leave the country because of their political activities. Patrick Keatley of *The Observer* wrote the reports from Westminster 'for virtually nothing'. The main difference, thought Eileen Haddon, was that now people contributed 'because they *believed* in what we were trying to do',⁹⁴ a refreshing change in her view from the underhand politics that had characterised David Cole's involvement with the *Examiner*.

A look at Welensky's correspondence shows how little he approved of the new regime. He wrote to Robins,

The 'Central African Examiner' has now turned completely round and is going to be a very anti paper. I personally intend to deal with it as such and I hope my friends will do the same.⁹⁵

Welensky's friends followed his advice. Advertising from most prestige firms dried up virtually overnight, and despite Bull's sizeable inheritance and the vestiges of RST funding, the *Examiner* was run on an almost impossible shoestring. Halpern left at the end of 1961, Bull being unable to meet his salary,⁹⁶ and staff were reduced to Bull as editor, Haddon as assistant editor,⁹⁷ Liz Clements,⁹⁸ and a despatch man. Haddon worked out a budget for the magazine of £5 000 a year, which was never enough.⁹⁹ In an attempt to raise more money, Bull went to the United States in early 1962 to see the Hochschild brothers, owners of American Metal Climax (and thereby bypassing RST), but the trip proved largely fruitless.¹⁰⁰

Welensky's reaction to the new owner and staff illustrates how fundamental the shift in the *Examiner's* politics was. The new line was that Southern Rhodesia and the Federation did not have 'good government, in

⁹⁴ Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

⁹⁵ WP 662/5 f. 38, Welensky to Robins, 21 June, 1960.

⁹⁶ *Examiner* (Dec., 1961), 4. The same issue illustrates how little advertising the *Examiner* now attracted: there was only a single page, from Bookers whose Chairman, Sir Jock Campbell, was another 'establishment liberal'.

⁹⁷ When Bull left for Lusaka in Nov., 1963, Haddon took over as Editor, a post she held until the *Examiner's* closure.

⁹⁸ Liz Clements was another 'establishment liberal', and wife of Frank Clements, who had been mayor of Salisbury and a contributor to the *Examiner*.

⁹⁹ Interview, Eileen Haddon, 11 Oct., 1994.

¹⁰⁰ Conversation with Theo Bull, 19 Jan., 1996.

terms of enlightened self-interest and the realities of Africa in the 1960s', and that no progress would be made unless 'the underprivileged cease to be underprivileged and unless those who rightfully demand their share in government obtain it'.¹⁰¹ Within weeks of changing hands, the *Examiner* was having to defend itself in its own leader column against charges that it was advocating the 'surrender' and 'betrayal' of European interests.¹⁰² The new editorial policy was clearly one of independent, informed criticism of the government. The *Examiner* no longer followed the government line as it had under Cole. Its audience was changing too. In 1961, the *Examiner* began to be sold on street corners to a predominantly African readership, a clear shift away from the White establishment, and an illustration of how its content now appealed to a different audience.¹⁰³ The hostile reaction of the political establishment shows how the discourse of partnership, although progressing,¹⁰⁴ had not advanced as quickly as either the mining and commercial interests had wanted, nor as fast as the European intelligentsia and African middle class opinion had advocated. In this way, the shift in the *Examiner's* position demonstrates that in view of the imminent collapse of the Federation, the winds of change sweeping across Africa, and the growing restiveness of the Federation's African population, the policy of partnership was too little, too late. After three years of relative subservience to government policy, the *Examiner* was seizing the discursive bull by the horns.

But the *Examiner* battled on until December 1965, in an increasingly hostile political atmosphere which culminated with UDI. It became an increasingly outspoken critic of the Federal and Southern Rhodesian governments in their failure to support real political progress towards partnership. It also moved from a liberal establishment position to one openly supporting a certain *rapprochement* with the African nationalist parties. This was especially pronounced after the reactionary Rhodesian Front won the Southern Rhodesian election in December 1962. It also championed the cause of Terence Ranger, who was declared a prohibited immigrant in February 1963 on account of his membership of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and his prominent activities on its behalf. It was forced to close by Ian Smith's post-UDI censorship in December 1965. Theo Bull defended the *Examiner*.

¹⁰¹ *Examiner* (30 July, 1960).

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Conversation with Theo Bull, 19 Jan., 1996.

¹⁰⁴ In 1959, Welensky established the Cabinet Partnership Implementation Committee, whose brief was to identify failures in the implementation of partnership and advise on ways to rectify them. It was presented as proof of the Federal Government's sincerity, but its purely advisory capacity militated against its effectiveness. See files NAZ, F120/L272A, F120/L273 and F120/L276 (Federal Ministry of Home Affairs).

The *Examiner* has always attempted to provide a voice for intelligent and enlightened opinion. As the deep racial divisions in Rhodesian politics have become more clearly exposed, and as individual freedoms have been increasingly whittled away, we have tried to hold a steady line of common-sense realism based on the simple principles of justice and human rights.¹⁰⁵

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the *Examiner* represents an important mirror on the state of political discourse in Southern Rhodesia and the Federation between 1957 and 1965, and as such it is a valuable primary source. In its early years it largely reflected the official viewpoint, and it is instructive in showing us how the political establishment conceived of the Federal 'nation', and of the policy of partnership — interacting with the powers that be, so to speak. Its very existence is a significant illustration of how industry and commerce wished to prod a somewhat reluctant government down the line of political, social and economic reform. The new ownership of Theo Bull and its increasing support for African nationalism illustrates how the *Examiner* was now interacting with 'the people', and how it reflected the growing polarisation of the political arena in the early 1960s. Perhaps it was a fitting comment on the lunacy of UDI that the *Examiner* went out on a humorous note, urging readers to fill in the blanks themselves because liberal discourse was now all but dead in the Rhodesian press. In a farewell to the *Examiner*, Bull wrote:

I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my own gratitude, and I believe that of many past and present Rhodesians of all races, to those who have contributed to the *Examiner* over the years . . . It is fair to say, as one looks at the history of Central Africa over the last decade, that theirs was a remarkable enterprise.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Theo Bull (ed.), *Rhodesian Perspective*, 7.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.