Zambezia (1996), XXIII (ii).ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM,1957-1963T. H. MOTHIBEDepartment of History, National University of LesothoAbstractScholars of Zimbabwean history have argued that organised African labourwas subordinated to petit bourgeois nationalism. This article refutes theseassessments and argues that, in the period between the formation of the firstmass nationalist organisation and the adoption of the armed struggle, organisedlabour and nationalism were intimately connected, a fact that reflected inpart the structural position of the African workers in a colonial society. Thisrelationship was, however, disrupted by the adoption of armed struggle bythe nationalists in 1963.THE YEAR 1957 marked a very important era in the history of Zimbabwe'snationalist struggle. This was manifested in the formation of the SouthernRhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) on September 12 (in defianceof what the settlers celebrated as Occupation Day). This was the firstmass nationalist organisation. It also marked the beginning of a closealliance between organised African labour and African political parties incolonial Zimbabwe, an alliance that snapped with the split in the nationalistmovement in 1963.The conventional assessment, however, has generally been that Africanlabour came to be subordinated to the nationalist struggle with theformation of the SRANC. Warhurst argues that '. . . by mid-1950s thelargest unions were in decline and they were to be overtaken by the massappeal of the ANC re-founded by Nkomo in 1957'.1 He boldly concludes,'The trade union movement was to be subordinated to politics and therelationship of trade unionism to politics remains unresolved.'2In this article, I argue that, contrary to the above assessments,organised labour was not subordinated to petit bourgeois nationalism:rather it was an integral part of the nationalist upsurge, a fact that reflectedin part the structural position of the African workers in a colonial society,and in part the role of African labour leadership. Subsequently, state'sparanoiac decision to crush SRANC's moderate nationalism on the flimsy1 Philip R. Warhurst, 'African Trade Unions in Southern Rhodesia, 1948-56- Prelude to MassNationalism?' (n.d.), 1.2 Ibid.157158 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963grounds that it was subversive resulted in the emergence of politicallymilitant nationalism whose objective was now the overthrow of the statusquo. The 1963 nationalist movement split into Zimbabwe African People'sUnion (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The state'ssubsequent repression led to the decrease in labour militancy, althoughits connection with the nationalist parties remained strong.This article is divided into three main parts. The first part briefly dealswith attempts in the 1950s to unify the African labour movement. Thesecond part refutes the above assessments by showing how African labourwas integrated with the nationalist parties struggles. The third part showshow the fate of labour and that of nationalist parties were as closely linkedin decline as they had been in ascent.AFRICAN LABOUR MOVEMENT: EARLY ATTEMPTS AT UNITYSince the proliferation of trades unions in the post-war period, repeatedattempts were made to bring different unions into one organisation; theseall failed. Nkomo of the Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association(RRAEA), felt that 'all tribal distinctions should be abolished in the interestsof unity', while Burombo argued that 'if there existed complete unity,Africans could collect their registration certificates and burn them'.3 TheCID noted:there is a growing, although as yet only incipient tendency among nativesto realise that from their point of view, the adage 'Ex Unitate Vires' isparticularly applicable.4If this was the feeling of many trade unionists, why did that unityremain so elusive? Many reasons have been advanced ranging from ethnicand geographic differences5 to personality and ideological clashes betweenleaders and organisations.6In the early 1950s, African workers still felt a great need for a nationaltrade union body. This was sensible in terms of the future growth of tradeunionism. It was also sensible to bring about the communication betweenSalisbury (now Harare) and Bulawayo, both of which constituted the mainlabour centres at this time.7 Moreover, the situation had changed. First,3 National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ) S517, 'Report by Officer Commanding CID...'4 ZBZ 1/2/1, Staff Officer to the Commissioner of Police of Native Labour, Oct. 9, 1947.5 S1561/19, Native Disturbances Commission, Evidence of Captain R. G. Borland.6 N. Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo: African Politics in Zimbabwe 1947-1958 (Harare, The CollegePress, 1989).7 Jamela, then a member of RICU, notes that the need for communication was made moreurgent by the fact that the African Artisans and the Railwaymen were already communicating,while there was no communication between other unions. See NAZ AOH/63, 'Interview heldwith Mr. Reuben Thomas Jamela by D. Murenji', Jan. 11 and Feb. 28, 1980, p.20.T.H. MOTHIBE 159the Central African Federation had come into being despite the oppositionof the workers. Second, Burombo and his Voice were now concentratingtheir efforts in the rural areas, leaving the urban areas to the Federation.8In 1953, at a conference held at Gwelo (now Gweru)9, attended by unionsaffiliated to the Reformed Industrial Commercial Union (RICU), theFederation of Bulawayo African Workers Union (FBAWU) and independentsfrom Bulawayo, Gwelo, Salisbury and Umtali (now Mutare), a decision wasmade to launch a national trade union body. This was done (althoughwithout RICU) in January 1954, when the Southern Rhodesia Trade UnionCongress (known as TUC) was launched with J. Nkomo as President, R.Jamela as Vice-President and G. Bango as General Secretary.10 Otherimportant figures in the Federation were A. Mukarakate, Assistant GeneralSecretary, J. Z. Moyo, L. Nkala, E. Gwanzura and T. Chigwida, almost allfrom affiliates of FBAWU. Quite clearly, the TUC came to be dominated bythe Bulawayo unionists, who had a longer history of organisation andwere in many ways more experienced than their counterparts in Salisbury(now Harare).11Since then, there were two centres Š TUC and RICU. The formercovered the whole colony despite initial teething problems which causedsome branches temporarily to lapse, while the latter was confined toSalisbury until its decline in 1956.12 In 1957, the TUC was organisationallyrejuvenated under the presidency of K. T. T. Maripe, also General Secretaryof the Railway African Workers Union (RAWU), with R. ML Bango as Vice-President, also General Secretary of the Transport Workers' Union and aformer RICU man in Bulawayo, and R. Jamela as General Secretary.13 Thisorganisational unity suffered a slight drawback when Bango decided tobreak away to form a stillborn Confederation of African Labour (CAL).148 See Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo.9 Ibid.; The Central African Examiner (Oct., 1961); C. M. Brand, 'Politics and African tradeunionism in Rhodesia since Federation', in Rhodesian History (1971), II, 91, claims that thisconference was held at Que Que.10 Jamela attributes the failure of RICU to endorse the national body to what he calls 'a lot ofmisunderstanding and disagreement which exists even today', while Brand attributes it tothe rivalry between FAWU and RICU in Bulawayo.11 Interview with Messrs. Gray and R. M. Bango in Bulawayo, Oct. 31 and Nov., 1991.12 NAZ AOH/63 'Interview held with Mr. Reuben Thomas Jamela by D. Murenji', 18 and 22.13 Interview held with Dr. K. T. T. Maripe, Francistown, Botswana, Nov. 13,1991. The presencein the executive of the TUC, in particular, of Maripe, supported by the over 20 000-strongRAWU and Bango, whose organisation (RICU) failed to Join the TUC at its launching, markeda very important step in consolidating the labour movement. Maripe attributes this to thedecline and collapse of RICU in 1956, especially the eclipse of its leader, Charles Mzingeli,who was bitterly opposed to FBAWU, a strong initiator and supporter of the TUC.14 Bango claimed the support of the majority of 11 former RICU-affiliated unions, with about900 members or so, but in reality his was not a viable organisation and it virtually did notlast, as he conceded to the author.160 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963Many reasons have been given for this breakaway. These includedissatisfaction over the name of the federation to Bango's dislike of whathe calls Maripe's flamboyant style of leadership.15 Following this breakaway,the TUC emerged much stronger and its executive was reconstituted withMaripe as President, J. Z. Moyo as Vice-President, Jamela as GeneralSecretary and J. T. Maluleke as Assistant General Secretary.16 In 1957, theconservative Department of Labour reported that there were 27 Africantrade unions known to be in existence but it did not know the strength oftheir membership.17 In 1958, this number fell to 17 due to what it called thefederations of trade unions.18 RAWU, for example, showed a remarkablegrowth, its membership increasing by 2 000 within a year.19 Maripeattributes this growth not only to a recruiting campaign by the union butto also a sense of revenge by railway men after the 1956 strike when theywere forced back to work at gun point by the Todd regime.20The organisational rejuvenation was accompanied by a growth inunion activity. The struggles for 'trade union issues' remained the rallyingpoints but were strongly linked to the 'political'. For example, the TUClaunched a campaign to organise a wages strike in 1958,21 and TUCspokespersons began to assert the need to 'change the economic order'.22Behind this upsurge in economic and political action at this time wereeconomic and political crises. On the economic front, there was economicdecline manifested in low wages and unemployment, while on the politicalfront, there was a mixture of 'reform' with repression.Towards the end of the 1950s, the economic prosperity that hadoccurred in the colony since 1953 began to fall. World demand of copper,the main foreign exchange earner for the Federation, declined.Concurrently, the influx of foreign capital, which had been the mainstay ofeconomic growth in the colony especially since the establishment of theCentral African Federation, started to fall. Capital inflows into the colonyfell from £24,7 million in 1953 to £10,7 million in I960.23 Between 1953 and1960, the investment income outflow rose from £15,5 million to £32,515 Brand, 'Politics and African trade unionism in Rhodesia', and interview held with Mr. R. M.Bango, Bulawayo, Oct. 31,1991.16 Interview with Dr. K. T. T. Maripe; Central African Examiner (Sept. 22, 1958).17 NAZ RG 3/LA B2, Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Department of Labour, 1952-1957; 1958-1959 (Salisbury, Govt. Printers).18 Ibid.19 Interview with Dr. Maripe, Francistown, Botswana, Oct. 31,1991.20 Ibid.21 The Bantu Mirror (Aug. 31, 1957).22 Central African Examiner (Dec., 1957).23 Colin Stoneman, 'Economic development with unlimited supplies of capital: The case ofSouthern Rhodesia', in South African Labour Bulletin (Feb., 1976), II, (vil), 14.T.H. MOTHIBE 161million.24 During the same period the foreign share of investment fell from67,7 to 35,8%.25 The reasons for the decline in economic growth wereattributable to the increasing White opposition to 'partnership' and thecollapse of the liberal federalist project, coupled with the increasing burdenof servicing the foreign capital debt, which began to match and evenexceed the capital inflow, as well as the internal market which remainedtiny in absolute terms because of the low level of Black wages (about twothirds of the wages and salaries bill was paid to Whites).26WAGESWages had become the most important source of income for Africanworkers and their families. The economic stagnation manifested itselfparticularly in the deteriorating living standards of the African workers astheir already poor wages got even worse. At the end of 1957, the PrimeMinister and Minister of Labour, Garfield Todd, aware of the deterioratingAfrican standard of living, promulgated a new minimum wage rate of£6.10s a month, an increase of 35 shillings over the old minimum of£4.15s.27 This minimum wage, which took effect in January 1958, evokedan immediate outcry from a substantial section of the White electorate,who charged that it would price Rhodesia out of the market, create massunemployment and force many industries to close.28 Industry somehowsurvived these increases but their author, Todd, did not. His cabinetrebelled and forced him to resign. He was succeeded by Edgar Whitehead.Todd's replacement did not, however, put to rest the problem of lowAfrican wages and African poverty. As a result, the Whitehead regimecommissioned an urban study under the chairmanship of Plewman. Amongits findings was that the lowest income on which an African man couldprovide the basic necessities of life for a wife and two children in thecolony was some £15 per month.29 These findings were corroborated bythe findings of the Bettison Poverty Datum Line (PDL) study conducted inSalisbury in 1958. In 1959, however, African wages (excluding agricultureand domestic service) averaged just over £10 per month, or some twothirds of the PDL.30In a follow-up survey in 1960, Bettison compared wages earned by thehead of a household with the needs of the family of that particular size and24 'National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia'.25 Ibid.26 Colin Stoneman, 'Economic development with unlimited supplies of capital', 5-6.27 It is to be noted that the latter figure was quoted by the Ibbotson Report of 1943/44 as aminimum required for a family of four to survive at that time.28 Central African Examiner (Aug. 13, 1960).29 Southern Rhodesia, Plewman Commission Report (Salisbury, 1959).30 Central African Examiner (Aug. 13,1960).162 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963composition in Blantyre, Lusaka and Salisbury. In Salisbury, his surveywas complicated by the fact that a large number of the working populationwere unattached males. This did not necessarily imply a high percentageof single men amongst the Salisbury workforce, since a large number ofworkers were probably living away from their dependents. A possibleexplanation of this phenomenon is that at that time, the lack of availablefamily-type housing, coupled with the low level of wages, made it difficultfor a worker to support his family in the towns and forced workers to liveseparately. Bettison, however, concluded that:single men . . . can and do earn sufficient to meet requirements at PDLlevels. It is when the wife and children are added to their responsibilitiesthat sources of income, and particularly wages, fall short of requirementsat PDL standards.31What is significant about this survey is the revelation that, in the1950s, wage structures were based on the needs of a single worker, andthere were no adjustment mechanisms within these structures that tookaccount of the increased needs of the family man. The economic systemdid not base itself on the hope that workers would somehow remain singleand childless, but rather wages were historically determined in relation tothe needs of a migrant worker, who could make remittances home inpartial support of his family. There is strong evidence to confirm that thiswas in fact the basis for setting wages.Early in 1960, the Minister of Labour, A. E. Abrahamson surprisedmost people by stating flatly that a married urban African man could notmake ends meet on less than S14 per month, and that this should beregarded as the standard.32 No dissent was heard. What had broughtabout this dramatic change when hardly three years earlier, protests overan annual minimum wage of £78 had been so strong as to cost Todd hisposition? Now in 1960, the annual minimum wage of £168 was accepted, atleast in principle. The answer seems to lie in the interplay of economic,political and social forces. Among these were:(a) the grievances implicit in the events that led to the 1959 emergenciesand their aftermath;(b) growing realisation that, to be an effective consumer as well as producer,the African had to have greater purchasing power; and(c) recognition that the urban African was no longer a migrant, but apermanent settler, whose wages must enable him to bring his wife andchildren from the country and to provide them with a reasonable'home' as opposed to a mere 'accommodation unit' for himself.31 D. G. Bettison, 'The poverty datum line in Central Africa' In Rhodes-Lioinststone Journal(1961), XXX.32 IbidT.H. MOTHIBE 163To what extent was this apparent change of heart by the regime putinto effect? In presenting his 1960/61 budget to the Territorial Assembly,C. J. Hatty made a point noting in his review of the economy thatover the period 1954-59, average European wages have risen by 22% andAfrican wages by 40%. During the same period the (European) cost ofliving Index has moved up by 16%PIn these terms, the advance appears impressive Š even dramatic Šparticularly for the African, indicating as it does that African wages rosealmost twice as fast as those of Europeans. But the picture loses much ofits sparkle when related to the following: even after the advance, averageAfrican earnings were £80 a year Š still only about half the figure given byAbrahamson; the £80 figure applies only to the higher-earning sector ofthe African population Š that is, in the money economy. The two largestfields of employment for Africans Š agriculture, with 232 100 jobs, and theprivate domestic service with 98 900 Š constituting more than half theworkforce, drew average annual wages of only £50 and £60, respectively.The total wages of 629 800 Africans in employment in 1959 still accountedfor only £50 472 000, while the earnings of 82 230 Europeans in employmenttotalled £92 027 000.34Coupled with low wages was the problem of indigenous unemploymentwhich began to appear from 1957 and increased in later years. The 1956census showed that there were 609 953 Africans employed in the colony.Of these 300 178 were indigenous, 42 253 from Northern Rhodesia (nowZambia), 132 643 from Nyasaland (now Malawi), 125 218 from PortugueseTerritories and 9 661 from other territories. The total comprised 512 042adult men, 52 920 juveniles and 44 991 females.35 As a result of growingAfrican unemployment, the Foreign Migratory Labour Act was introducedin mid-1958 to keep Mozambicans and other alien workers out of SouthernRhodesian towns. Even with this measure, indigenous unemployment grew,and the Federal recession led to an economic crisis in which low wagesand unemployment manifested themselves.It was in this context that the SRANC and the TUC joined forces toimprove the lot of Africans. In 1958 the TUC launched a campaign toorganise a strike for increased wages,36 and the Federation spokespersonsbegan to assert the need to 'change the economic order'.37 But what33 Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly Debates, 1960, Col. 3450.34 Southern Rhodesia, Central Statistics Office, I960 (Salisbury, Govt. Printers, 1961).35 Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary of Labour and Social Welfare (Salisbury, Govt.Printers, 1958).36 The Bantu Mirror (Aug. 31,1957).37 Central African Examiner (Dec., 1957).164 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963galvanised the two organisations was the ousting of G. S. Todd as PrimeMinister in February 1958. Despite intense African resentment of theFederation and all that it stood for, and despite the high-handed ways inwhich he had dealt with the 1954 Wankie and 1956 Railway strikes, manyAfricans had confidence in Todd because of his liberal missionarybackground.38 In Todd, they saw their 'leader' and 'believed his governmentwas in some sense theirs'.39 The reasons for these beliefs are given by N.Shamuyarira:When he became premier in 1954, he pressed for a vast increase inschool places for Africans; he wanted to integrate Africans quickly intoan industrial society on an equal basis. Perhaps more than these factors,his popularity among Africans and their faith in him stemmed from theway in which he never lost the contacts with educated Africans which hehad built up as a missionary organising schools around the whole ofShabani district.40Todd was popular not only with educated people like the Shamuyarirasbut also with the workers, who saw him as someone who might persuadethe settlers to grant them considerable reforms and also as someone whohad taken a bold step of promulgating a minimum wage of £6. 10s, eventhough the consequences were momentous as we have seen above.41 Withthe departure of Todd, many Africans felt abandoned and Patrick Fletcher,one time Minister of Native Affairs and Todd's deputy, did not help matterswhen he said of Todd, 'He has stirred up the natives to want more thanthey can be given.'42From this time on, the anger of the Africans against the regime grew.The security reports, though admitting the existence of opposition, choseto misinterpret it: 'There is no reason to suppose that this oppositionnecessarily reflects the opinion of moderate Africans, nor of those Š thevast majority Š who are far more concerned with earning a living.'43The following year the same security report noted:In Southern Rhodesia, the political crisis has been the subject ofconsiderable interest by politically conscious Africans of all shades ofopinion. There is no doubt that moderate Africans regret the removal ofMr Garfield Todd from office of Prime Minister. They regard him as theperson most likely to secure their rapid advancement.4438 L. Vambe, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (London, Heinemann, 1976), 225.39 N. Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia (London, Heinemann, 1965), 22.40 Ibid., 23.41 This view emerged quite strongly during my interviews with Messrs. Zisengwe, Bangos,Marlpe and Nehwati.42 Quoted in Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, 24.43 Fl 63/78/31, Security Intelligence Review, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, No. 19 (Aug. 12, 1957).44 F163/78/31, Security Intelligence Review, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, No. 25 (Jan., 1958).T.H. MOTHIBE 165While it was clear to almost all who had eye* to (see that the economicand political situation in the colony was deteriorating, the settler regimeand its security establishment chose to play down the problems by makingbelieve that it was only a 'politically conscious' minority who understoodwhat was happening and the majority cared less, The regime initiallyattempted to co-opt this 'politically conscious' group- James Johnson, MP,a strong proponent of this cooptation policy wrote under the heading'Change and Ferment in the Federation'.The most terrifying thing to me about Central Africa is the social apartheid,this cultural gap between the two racial sections of phodesian society... I found the usual African poverty and disease in many places, a lack offundamental education and paucity of technical skills; but I would placethe highest of the tasks ahead, the imperative need to convince theeducated black man that he has an acceptable place in this plural society45This condescending thinking was bound to fail because of its arrogance,naivete, and its ignorance of the fundamental native policy in the colonywhich, though wishing to treat the so-called African middle class differently,failed miserably, and as a result drove them into the arms of their'uneducated' brethren, who were ready to confront the regime, as we shallsee shortly.Since its formation and throughout its life, the SRANC was verysuccessful in mobilising African support all over the country as numerousgrievances were less and less attended te fry the settler state. It did this byteaming up with the TUC at grassroots level, and within a year, it hadestablished 39 branches all over the c@yptry and its membership wasreported to have swelled to 6 000 by May 195.8.46 It gradually turned into amass movement encompassing the workers fffld the peasants, both at theleadership and rank-and-file levels. The leadership came to be fearless inits attack on the settler state, reflecting largely a militant membership inthe rural and urban areas. True, as Ranger points out, SRANC remained'by comparison with other African movements elsewhere, a moderate andpainstakingly non-racial organisation'.47 Non-racial yes, but not moderate,as one security intelligence report testified:... at rural meetings, congress speakers, notably George Nyandoro, theGeneral Secretary, have continued their attacks on GovernmentLegislation and Government Departments, particularly the police and45 Central African Examiner (June, 1957).46 N. Bhebe, 'The nationalist struggle, 1957-1962' in C. Banana (ed), Turmoil and Tenacity(Harare, College Press, 1989), 66-7.47 T. O. Ranger, Crisis in Southern Rhodesia: Research Series 217 (Fabian CommonwealthBureau, Sept., 1960).166 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963the Native Department. There has been nothing constructive in theircriticism and the distortions of the truth which have formed the greaterpart of congress propaganda have clearly been designed to cause unrest.The attacks on government Departments have had as their object theundermining of the prestige of the Native Commissioners and the loyaltyof African policemen. The inevitable consequences of this trend will bethe creation of a situation in which African masses will be induced totake unconstitutional action over some imaginary grievance and thepeace and tranquillity of the territory will be unnecessarily disrupted.48On February 29, 1959, the regime felt sufficiently threatened by themass mobilisation of the SRANC that it decided to ban the organisation,under the notorious Unlawful Organisations Act, which had been rushedthrough the settler Parliament. It is reported that the regime confiscatedS15 000 worth of property and arrested and detained almost all of theSRANC leadership on the allegation that it was engaging in subversiveactivities.49 The TUC was also hit hard by the banning of SRANC. Itsleadership was arrested. Maripe, TUC President, Moyo, Vice-President,Jamela, General Secretary and many others were detained.50 The allianceof the two in action meant that the regime could not hit one and leave theother. This marked the turning point in the African struggle forindependence, as we will soon show.It was no coincidence that at the time when the Whitehead regime wasusing a big stick to beat down the nationalist movement, it also used anapparent carrot by promulgating the amended Industrial Conciliation Act0CA) in 1959. This Act for the first time legalised the African trade unionsunder very strict regulations, recognised African workers as employeesbut excluded workers in agriculture and domestic service.51 In piloting theAct through parliament, the Minister of Labour admitted, 'It could beargued that to provide for these associations is nothing more than acontrol measure and, let me be perfectly frank, it is.'52 The control was tobe explicitly in the prohibition of the use of funds and facilities by tradeunions for political purposes. This meant that trade unions were deniedrights:48 FIBS, Security Intelligence Review (May, 1958), XXK.49 Vambe, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, 281.50 Interview held with Maripe, Francistown, Botswana, Oct. 31, 1991. See also the interviewheld with Jamela, Feb. 28, 1980, by Munjeri, where Jamela admits that 'we were arrestedbecause as I safd we played a part in unionism and nationalism. When the politicians werearrested in 1959, we were also arrested', p.22.51 The African workers employed in these sectors numbered 323 000 and accounted for 51,6%of all African wage-earners, and had their employment conditions regulated by the repressiveand archaic Master and Servants Act. See T. E. Mswaka, 'The relationship between wagesand employment in Rhodesia, 1954-1968' in Rhodesia Journal or Economics (Sept., 1972), VI,(Hi).52 Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly Debates, 1959, Col. 1547.T.H. MOTHIBE 167(a) to affiliate with any political party or political organisation;(b) to use any of their monies or funds for the furthering of interests ofany political party or political organisation;(c) to (by any provision in their constitution) require or permit anymember thereof to subscribe to the funds of any political party ororganisation;(d) to use or permit use of any of their services, equipment or facilitiesfor the purpose of furthering the interests of any political party orpolitical organisation;(e) to accept any monies or services from any organisation which ispermitted by their constitution or otherwise to use their monies orfunds for furthering the interests of any political party or politicalorganisation.53These detailed provisions continued the politicisation of the economicissues by the state and they were meant to break the close links thatorganised labour and nationalist parties had developed. In short, theregime put serious limitations on the political role that unions could playin the nationalist struggle. But it was not going to be possible to separateeconomic from political struggles 'and under colonialism the convergencebetween the two was quicker than under normal conditions of capitalismor post-colonial struggles'.54On January 1,1960, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formedto succeed the banned SRANC. It membership was essentially the same asthat of SRANC,55 and for the first time the demand for one-man-one-votebecame policy.56 The interim leadership consisted of M. Mawema,President, M. Malianga, Vice-President, S. Samkange, Secretary-General, T.Samkange, Treasurer, N. Marondera, Publicity Secretary, and J. Nkomo,Director of External Affairs.57 Labour was once again represented at theleadership level by Mawema and Nkomo, but its strength lay in the rankand file.The NDP was formed at the height of enormous African socio-economicand political grievances. The state of emergency and the detention of53 Quoted in L. Sachikonye, 'State, capital and trade unions', in I. Mandaza (ed.), Zimbabwe:The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986 (Dakar, CODESRIA, 1986), 250-1.54 Ibid.53 The Bulawayo Chronicle (July 25 and 27, 1960).56 Interview held with Dr. M. Mawema, Harare, Zimbabwe, Nov. 13, 1991. See also 'NationalDemocratic Party: Statement of appeal by interim President Michael Mawema and Secretary-General Sketchely Samkange, Salisbury, I960', in Nyangoni C. and Nyandoro G. (eds.),Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents (London, Rex Collins, 1979), 21.57 This was an interim leadership because the State of Emergency was still in effect, theSRANC leadership was still in detention and it was also difficult at this time to call membershipto elect its leadership. Nkomo was out of the country at the time of the banning of SRANCand was unable to return and he spent the next two years campaigning against the Whiteheadregime from offices in London. Interview with Mawema, Nov. 13, 1991.168 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963labour and nationalist leaders had radicalised the labour and nationalistrank and file. This was reflected in the one-man-one-vote demand. Withinfour months of its formation, NDP was able to attract as many as 7 130people to its meetings spread over seven days.58 This was spectacular byany standard. The SRANC had never been able to mobilise so many peoplein such short time during its two-year existence.While SRANC's strong support came from the rural areas, NDP's majorstrength came from the urban areas. The main reason for this was rapidurbanisation of the population at this time. The colony was going througha period of economic recession resulting in high levels of unemploymentin both the rural and urban areas. Unemployment which started to showin 1958/59, reached its peak in 1960 when 637 000 Africans were reportedunemployed, a figure which decreased slightly in 1963 to 602 000.5'9 Theregime responded differently than in 1958 by admitting that there? wasindeed a problem and appointed the Southern Rhodesian Labour adviser,G. E. Stint, to examine the problem and make recommendations.60 Later in1961, a Parliamentary Select Committee, under the chairmanship of A. E.Abrahamson, was set up to examine the possibilities of unemploymentbenefits (albeit on a restricted basis) for all workers.61By the end of 1962,80 000 Africans who had previously been employedwere seeking work, but the Rhodesian Front regime rejectedrecommendations made to establish an unemployment insurance fund onthe grounds that it was too expensive. African workers bore the brunt ofthat decision.62Unemployment went hand-in-hand with poor wages. According togovernment statistics, in 1962 the average African wage was S68. 8s perannum while that of the European workers was SI 034 per annum.63 Overhalf of the African labour force of 612 593 earned less than £5 a month andless than one sixteenth of the total earned more than £10 per month.64 In1963, it was estimated that less than five per cent of Africans in the colonyearned a living wage in cash. While the European worker averaged SI 171in annual earnings, the African worker averaged S101 annually.6558 F120/L343/2, Internal Security Weekly Reports, 1960-6, Secret Memo, Jan. 12, 1960.59 Central African Examiner (July, 1964).60 In a statement on March 13, 1958, the regime said that there was no problem of Africanunemployment but one of maldistribution of labour. It went further to say that the surpluslabour in the urban areas could largely be absorbed by employers in the rural areas.According to the regime, genuinely unemployed Africans were estimated not to exceed8 000 at that time. See Rhodesia Institute of African Affairs (March, 1958), II.61 D. G. Clarke, Unemployment Crisis (CIIR, 1978), 6.62 International Labour Organisation, Labour Conditions and Discrimination in Southern Rhodesia(ILO, 1978), 122.63 Southern Rhodesia, Government Statistical Year Book, 1963.64 Ibid.65 Central African Examiner (Sept., 1963).T.H. MOTHIBE 169Life was not tough and rough in the urban areas only, but in the ruralareas as well with the impoverishment of the rural-based households thatwere significantly dependent on wage labour for subsistence. Now, withfewer options in the labour market, or at best uncertain earnings fromvarious forms of petty production, such households and families soughtto survive more from the land than before.66 The land was not onlyinadequate but poor and infertile whenever available. The LandApportionment Act of 1941 and the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 not onlyreduced the amount of land available to each African family, but thenumber of stock permitted per family as well. As a result, the numbers oflandless Africans increased.67 There was also the fact that the Africanshad no access to capital and modern agricultural skills. As a result, thecash incomes of African farmers were reported to be as follows in August1961: Master-farmer made £40 per annum; plot-holder and member of a co-operative, £6; an ordinary farmer £3. 10s and a woman farmer, £1.68In short, the Land Apportionment Act was both too hard and too soft.Too hard because it prevented those Africans who had the ability anddetermination to break out of the vicious circle to enjoy the fruits of theirendeavours; too soft because it provided a prop for an anachronistic semi-rural economy which was clearly doomed to collapse. Worse still, it broughtabout a twilight existence between town and village which enabled workersto exist on sub-economic wages and salved the consciences of theiremployers.The real situation, however, was best described by an African workerliving in Salisbury, who wrote and sounded a warning:In Southern Rhodesia, thousands upon thousands are unemployed andmove with empty stomachs. Thousands of Africans have been left landlessby the Native Land Husbandry Act, the purpose of which was to createcheap labour pools. The landless and those who cannot get enoughcrops to live on from the poor soils allocated to them are forced to tryfor employment in the industries in urban areas, thus fulfilling thegovernment policy of supplying cheap labour. The government forgetsthe warnings of history that when the majority of the people continue tolive without the means they are bound to resort to demanding control ofthe key to existence, the taking over of government.69Old fallacies die hard, and there were still those who argued thatAfricans were paid low wages because they worked badly. It needed nomore than the merest common sense to realise that an undernourished66 Clarke, Unemployment Crisis.67 See Bhebe, Benjamin Bummbo, Chapters 2 and 6, for earlier effects of these two Acts.68 Bhebe, Benjamin Bummbo, 70.69 Central African Examiner (Nov., 1963).170 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963man could not give his best, as was heavily underlined by the voluminousreport 'African Labour Efficiency' published by the British Government aslong ago as 1947. The survey team who compiled the report showed thatin every case where the productivity of African workers was found to besignificantly below standard, the cause could be traced to malnutrition.Low wages meant poor diet and poor output.Feeding on the numerous African grievances, the NDP was fastbecoming a mass movement on an unprecedented scale attractingattendance ranging from 6 000 to 15 000 to its meetings within months ofits formation, according to security reports.70 Alarmed by the NDP'spopularity, the regime felt sufficiently threatened to move against NDPleadership in the early hours of July 19, 1960. Three leaders Š Mawema,Samkange and Takawira Š were arrested. The regime claimed that thesearrests were not directed against any particular party or any particularrace, but the settler press, whilst describing the arrests as routine policeoperation, stressed the NDP functions of those arrested.71 To the remainingleaders and members of the NDP, these arrests were a direct and deliberatechallenge by the regime to the continued existence of the party. In theweeks before the arrests, there had been other manifestations of theregime's hostility towards the NDP: the party office was searched on July8, homes of Asian supporters and sympathisers were searched also onJuly 8, and leaders were constantly trailed by the Criminal InvestigationsDepartment (CID).72 Moreover, on the morning of the arrests, dozens ofparty officials and members of NDP were searched in Salisbury, Bulawayo,Umtali and Gwanda, including one of the European members of the party.Finally, the three arrested leaders were charged under the notoriousUnlawful Organisations Act, which provided penalties of a fine of £1 000 orfive years imprisonment for the offences of continuing to be an officer ormember or assister of an unlawful organisation.7370 F120/L343/2, Internal Security Weekly Reports, 1960-6. For example, for the month of April1960, the NDP attracted 5 990 people to its meetings in and around Bulawayo and Salisbury.In May it attracted 7 130 at meetings covering Gwelo and Umtali. In May, 1961, it wasattracting 14 860 people to its meetings held around the colony. See Secret Memos, May,June, 1960 and June, 1961.71 See The Rhodesia Herald (July 20,1960), and The Bulawayo Chronicle (July 20,1960).72 Interview with Dr. M. Mawema. Mawema told the author how, days before his arrest, he wastrailed by suspicious people wherever he went. He alerted his colleagues who reported thesame stories. Then they knew that people who were trailing them were the CID. When thesearches were conducted at their offices, they knew that it was a question of time beforethe regime moved against them. He and others were not fearful of their lives because theyknew that the regime could not get away with it.73 Central African Examiner (July 20, 1960). It is interesting to note that leaders of the NDPwere charged under the Act that did not affect their organisation as it had not been banned.What the regime was admitting was that the NDP was the resurrected SRANC, and theywere about to ban it too.T.H. MOTHIBE 171The arrest of the NDP leadership provoked a quick and massivereaction from its membership and supporters. The day following thearrest, more than 20 000 people, most of whom were workers, assembledpeacefully at Stodart Hall, Salisbury, to protest and demand the immediaterelease of their leaders.74 When the police tried to disperse them,widespread attacks on public installations ensued, and many werearrested.75 When the settler state marshalled all its forces of 'law andorder' Š the military, the police, the Rhodesian African Rifles and thereservists Š who showed little idea of how to cope with the situation,things rapidly got out of hand and running battles in the streets werefought between the people and the 'security' forces until July 21. The waythe 'security forces' handled the situation brought a lot of criticism. TheAfrican Daily News complained and other observers confirmed, that teargas and batons were used indiscriminately throughout the disturbances.On the morning of July 21, three Africans, including a woman and herbaby, were wounded by gunshot, and in the afternoon, a Europeanconstable was badly beaten in Highfields. Over 200 arrests were made thatday and government announced a ban of meetings. The military and thepolice were reinforced to restore order in Salisbury townships. The finalofficial toll was 11 dead, scores of Africans arrested and thousands ofpounds in damaged property.76A day after order was 'restored' in Salisbury, Bulawayo stood on thebrink of the greatest working class explosion of its history. On July 22 J. Z.Moyo, recently released from his 1959 detention, addressed a publicmeeting at the Stanley Square on the question of the arrests of the NDPleadership.77 On July 24, the NDP called a mass rally at Stanley Square toprotest the arrests of its leaders. The regime panicked when it saw the sizeof the rally and decided to ban it at the last minute. This could not workand the police attempted to disperse the crowd by force. This failed andthe march to the city centre took place but was blocked by approximately500 military police equipped with armoured cars. In the ensuing skirmishesthat lasted the whole day inside the location and on the outskirts of thecity, people threw stones while the police used tear gas and batons. Byevening, a false sense of quiet followed as people retreated to their homesand the police withdrew.7874 Ibid. Shamuyarira quotes a figure of 40 000 on p. 64. He goes further to mention that at leasthalf the Salisbury labour force did not go to work that day.75 F. Nehwati, 'The social and communal background to "Zhii": The African riots in Bulawayo,Southern Rhodesia in I960', in African Affairs (1970), LXTX, 254, 276.76 The African Daily News (July 22,1960); Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, 63.77 This part draws heavily from the most detailed account of the events by a participant,which were published by Nehwati, 'The social and communal background to "Zhii", and theinterview held with this author, Bulawayo, Nov. 1, 1991.78 Dissent (Aug., 1960), XXI.172 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963That evening and the early hours of July 25, the NDP joined withorganised labour in planning and mobilisation.79 On Monday morning,everything appeared normal as workers went out to work. By 10.00 a.m.,however, the whole industrial area came to a standstill as workers stoppedwork and streamed out back to their townships. Commercial workersjoined the strike and commercial enterprises were attacked along the wayas they conveniently lay between the White industrial area and the Africantownships. It was, however, the townships that took the brunt of Africananger. Everything that had anything to do with the regime's nativeadministration was attacked, damaged or destroyed. The exceptions wereschools, churches, social amenities and other African ownedestablishments which remained closed as demanded. Many peopleidentified as 'sell-outs' were attacked and run out of town; pickets roamedthe streets patrolling and enforcing support for the strike. 'By the end ofthe day, the administration had temporarily abdicated and the townshipshad literally fallen to the African masses.'80 The 2 000-strong army andpolice forces had, in the meantime, concentrated their forces in defence ofEuropeans and sealed off the townships, stopping everything from eithercoming in or going out. By Wednesday, July 27, the strike began to collapsebecause of hunger resulting from the food blockade. Coupled with thiswas the police and army's repression of the townships, which they hadentered the previous day. The final toll, according to police, stood at 12dead,81 several hundred injured, and damaged property, estimatedconservatively at between £100 000 and S200 000.82The significance of these July riots lay in the fact that they representeda political general strike, planned and executed by the African workers.83Over 50% of the people arrested in Salisbury and Gwelo, and over 70% inBulawayo, were workers. The strikes were not confined to Bulawayo andSalisbury only but spilled over to Gwelo. In Gwelo, the pattern was similarto that in Salisbury and Bulawayo. True, the strikes were not overtly calledby organised labour but the latter was at the core of their execution andsustenance. These strikes marked a high point of close co-operation79 R. M. Bango, in an Interview with the author, told that, although not taking part in thesemeetings, he was informed in detail by some of his former colleagues of the meetings whichtook almost the whole night planning. He was insistent that organised labour played acrucial role in this planning and execution of the strike. Nehwati, one of the planners,admitted as much to the author.80 Nehwati, 'The social and communal background to "Zhii", 252.81 Central African Examiner (Oct., 1960). Nehwati, "The social and communal background to"Zhii", 253, disputes this on the grounds that the figure of 12 undercounts those people whowere killed and were collected by their relatives to be buried in the rural areas andtherefore escaped the police count.82 The Rhodesia Herald (July 26, 1960).83 In the interviews with R. M. Bango and F. Nehwati, this point was emphatically made bythese two gentlemen. See also J. Hyslop, 'Trade unionism in the rise of African nationalism:Bulawayo, 1943-1963', African Perspective (1986), I, 55.T.H. MOTHIBE 173between labour and nationalism, exposing in the process its weaknessesand strengths. More important, these strikes initiated a sustained periodof worker militancy, closely allied to the political struggles for one-man-one-vote in colonial Zimbabwe. The month of September was marked byrolling strikes which began on September 5 when the Rhodesian Spinners'night shift downed tools because they had not received pay increases inspite of the investigations into their working conditions by the IndustrialBoard.84 As they left the factories, and went back to their townships, theyattacked and destroyed machines at work, and stoned cars along theirway. Police intervened to disperse them with tear gas. On the morning ofSeptember 6, industrial trouble had spread to Gatooma (now Kadoma),where almost all the African labour stayed away from work.85 By evening'... workers set on fire the Native Administration Offices and the beerhallin Rimuka Township'.86 The following day, September 7, the strugglecontinued as the workers and the police fought running battles lasting thewhole day. It was only due to the belated intervention of the Minister ofLabour, who promised another Industrial Board, that the workers decidedto return to work.87The strike wave affected the neighbouring Que Que (now Kwekwe),where on September 5 a strike by workers at the Rhodesia Iron and SteelCompany (RISCO, now ZISCO) works' single quarters began. The maincomplaint here was poor cooking. They were so angry that they beat upthe cooks.During October, the situation got even worse as a wave of strikesspread all over the colony. It began in Harare (now Mbare) Township onOctober 8, when a European ran over an African in what was apparentlyan accident. This sparked a bloody riot, as people started to burn shops,beerhalls and cars. Coupled with the burning was the looting of property,so that at the end of the day, seven Africans lay dead, 24 were admitted tohospital and at least 42 others were treated in hospital and released; 15shops and four cars were burnt; three beerhalls were severely damagedand the total loss in damaged property was estimated at £50 000.88On October 9, the disturbances spread to Gwelo. Behind these wasthe anger resulting from what the Africans in Gwelo regarded as callous,cold-blooded murder of their people in Harare Township. On October 10,on the heels of the Salisbury and Gwelo unrest, came the 'sit-down' strikes84 Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo, 76.85 Ibid.86 Ibid.87 Ibid88 Central African Examiner (Oct. 22, 1960). Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo, put the figure of theinjured at 70 109 arrested and notes that a numlwr of Whites wpr** ininred as their rars wprpstoned.Central African Examiner (Oct. 22, 1960). Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo, put the figure of theinjured at 70 109 arrested and notes that a number of Whites were injured as their cars werestoned.174 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963in Bulawayo's industrial area. These 'sit-down' strikes covered the railways,bus companies,89 Fox and Bookless cartage contractors and many others.90The immediate causes of these strikes, according to one newspaperappeared to bethe chronic but recently aggravated problem of trying to live with andkeep families on present wages, and a genuine misunderstanding overthe industrial machinery used to decide wages and conditions.91The same paper continues to say that 'the strikes were sporadic,confused and certainly did not give the impression of being organised'.92True, the NDP denied organising these, and the settler regime denied anyconnection between the industrial unrest and the general political unrest.93But the strikes were encouraged by, and intertwined with, the rising tideof African nationalism. The settler regime admitted this when it noted thatNDP was the potent factor behind all the disturbances which started inJuly.94 The Bulawayo unrest, unlike others before it in other areas, passedwithout violence. As a result of these colony-wide strikes, substantialwage increases were initiated by the regime in several industries.95Concurrent with these industrial strikes, student unrest andinsubordination was reported in several schools around the colony,including St. Joseph Mission in Umvuma ( now Mvuma), Morgenster Missionin Fort Victoria (now Masvingo) and the Salvation Army School in Mazoe.96The regime accused the NDP of exploiting high unemployment and shortageof money in the colony, in order to make the colony ungovernable.97 TheOctober unrest, manifested in political riots, industrial strikes and studentunrest, had one thing in common: they were linked to the rising strengthof African nationalism. This was admitted by the Department of NativeLabour in its report:The industrial picture was somewhat clouded by the spasmodic politicalstrike that broke out in the major cities. Ostensibly the reason for theunrest was a demand for increased wages but there is no doubtwhatsoever that the real motive was political.9889 Central African Examiner (Oct. 22, 1960).90 Brand, 'Politics and African trade unionism in Rhodesia since Federation', 95.91 Ibid.92 Ibid.93 For the former, it was a tactical move, while for the latter it was politically expedient to denythe connection.94 See, for example, F120/725/L343/2, Internal Security Weekly Reports, Secret Memo, Oct. 26,1960.95 Central African Examiner (Dec., 1960).96 Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo, 77.97 F120/725/L343/2, Internal Security Weekly Reports, Secret Memo, Oct., 1960.98 Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Department of Native Labour and Social Welfare for theCalendar Year 1960 (Salisbury, Govt. Printers, 1961), 23.T.H. MOTHIBE 175Throughout this extended period of unrest there was evidence ofAfrican workers' support for the NDP and vice-versa. Within the labourmovement there was a move away from 'gradualism' and 'partnership',because these had failed. This was reflected in the leadership as youngerand more militant potential leaders tried to win power from older andmore conservative men. It was also reflected in the ideological battle, as towhether or not trade unions should identify themselves with politicalparties." During December 1960, S. J. Moyo, President of RAWU since1959, was overthrown, for being a delegate to the Constitutional ReviewTalks, having been chosen by the settler regime to represent the views ofthe trade unions.100 He was initially suspended but was later expelled for'taking part in the politics' and for neglecting his trade union work.101Leaders like Moyo were being replaced not because of involvement inpolitics as such but because they got involved in wrong politics: Moyo hadrecently used his influence to urge RAWU members to be patient andfollow constitutional procedures.102In 1961, the mood in the colony in general, and in organised labour inparticular, was still one of increasing militancy. Enos Nkala of NDP hadpredicted without obvious exaggeration, 'By 1961, we will be walking overthe ashes of European supremacy and they know it... 1961 is a year ofpositive action; if not you will perish.'103 On the first point, they had towait another 19 years but on the second, he was very right. The first shotwas fired at the third annual conference of TUC held in Gwelo over theweekend of March 25-26. Among the resolutions, almost always unanimous,the conference decided to:Š reject out of hand the 1961 Constitutional Proposals for SouthernRhodesia;104Š raise the TUC demand for a minimum wage from S20 to S25 per month;Š demand the immediate and unconditional release of all politicaldetainees and restrictees; and99 In an interview held with Dr. K. T. T. Maripe, he was emphatic that African workers were nolonger prepared to be led by people like himself, who advised on the use of the industrialmachinery as provided by the ICA, and who cautioned that trade unions should not be tooclosely identified with political parties. The tactic did not mean that they were denouncingAfrican nationalism but that unions should not fall victim to political repression as happenedin 1959. He admitted that such leadership lost because the rank-end-file was way tooradicalised by this time.100 Ibid.101 Central African Examiner (Dec., 1960).102 Central African Examiner (Oct. 22, 1960).103 F120/725/L343/2, Internal Security Weekly Reports, Secret Memo, Sept. 28, 1960.104 These notorious proposals provided for the franchise which only guaranteed the Africans15 seats in a House of 65 members. Nkomo, Sithole, with Chitepo and Silundika as theiradvisers, initially accepted these proposals but later denounced them when the majorityof the NDP rejected them.176 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963Š approve the appointment of a deputation to negotiate with Whiteheadfor their release.In the event df his failure to accede, the TUC was to adopt a policy ofnon-cooperation.The President of TUC* Reuben Jamela, generally conservative andmoderate, seized the filament by accusing the regime of 'playing into thehands' of unemployment and challenged it to scrap the Native Labour ActWhich opened the way for cheap alien labour into the colony, and toabolish the Native Labour Supply Commission. George Gotora, Presidentof the Mashonaland Regional Council, was blunt:We, in the TUC, have no more time for moderates. We are prepared fromnow on to take a tough line. We must remember at all times that we haveno common problem with people whose colour of skin is theirprotection.105On April 29, the TUC held an emergency meeting of councillors whoresolved to strike by September 1 if the demand for a minimum wage of£25 failed.106 They further agreed that no tax be paid until every Africanworker was in receipt of £40 per month. Jamela once again lashed out atwhat he called afarmer Government which... had no sympathy for the Africans as it wascomposed of Boers. He said all Boers in the colony should leave beforethe 1st of June, failing which they would be removed by force to SouthAfrica and their property confiscated.107It was no coincidence that NDP was at the same time deciding not topay tax until they had representation in the legislature. The securitypolicemen agreed that 'it would appear that both the NDP and the TUC areeagerly searching for any excuse to foment trouble ... '108 A month later,they reported that 'Reuben Jamela, President of the SRATUC, was one ofthe speakers at the large NDP meeting at Harare on the 9th April andpromised full TUC support for any action taken by NDP.'109The demand for a minimum wage of £25 per month was based on amoderate budget of an African married man, with four children, andincluded the bare necessities of such a family.This demand for a minimum wage was made against the official averageminimum wage of £7 per month, according to the Central Statistical Office105 F120/725/L343/2, Internal Security Weekly Reports, Secret Memo, Sept. 28, 1960.106 F120/725/L343/2, Internal Security Weekly Reports, Secret Memo, April, 1961.107 Ibid.108 Ibid.109 Ibid.T.H. MOTHIBE 177figures.110 The response of the regime to SRTUC letter was as expectedextremely patronising arguing that S25 '. . . would be economicallydisastrous nationally and would most seriously injure the very section ofthe population it is designed to benefit'.111At its conference in July in Bulawayo, where 80-odd delegates met,two earlier resolutions were unanimously reaffirmed, namely, to supportthe NDP in its stand against the Southern Rhodesia ConstitutionalProposals, and to demand a minimum wage of S25.U2 NDP leaders whowere attending the conference made speeches defending the rights oftrade unions.113 The militancy of the SRTUC was attracting a lot of support,and it was disclosed that its membership had increased from 14 000 to22 000 since the March conference.114 These figures excluded the 12 500members of RAWU, whose relationship with SRTUC was at this timeobscure.115 The Congress also agreed that labour would give support toNkomo's protest initiatives such as his national day of fasting on OccupationDay 1961. As soon as SRTUC ended, Bulawayo was hit by a two-daymunicipal workers' strike in August, led by Nehwati, which resulted inmajor improvements in pay and conditions from the Bulawayo CityCouncil.116 In October and November 1961, another wave of 'wild-cat'strikes erupted in the industrial area, affecting many of Bulawayo's largestemployers including Dunlop Tyres, Rhodesian Timbers and RhodesianWine Industries.117During 1962, however, the close alliance of labour and nationalismwas disrupted by two events. First, came the organisational crisis inlabour resulting from the activities of the President of SRTUC, ReubenJamela.118 In October, 1961, SRTUC was reported to have 30 000 membersand as such was an important player in the colony's affairs.119 This crisisfollowed from its affiliation to the international labour movements. In1960, SRTUC had affiliated to the International Confederation of FreeTrade Unions (ICFTU), and as a result Jamela went abroad for the first110 This was a paltry increase from Todd's January 1958 introduction of a £6. 10s minimumwage, then regarded as outrageously radical by a substantial section of the White electorate.The result, as we now know, was that Todd lost the premiership.111 Confidential Comments by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Sept. 7,1961.112 Central African Examiner (Dec., 1961).113 Drum (Oct., 1961).114 Drum (Aug., 1961).115 Ibid.116 Interview held with F. Nehwati, Bulawayo, Nov. 1, 1991. See also Contact (3 Dec., 1961).117 Central African Examiner (Oct., Nov., 1961).118 It must be underlined, however, that this does not mean we attribute the problems of theentire labour movement to one man but argue that he bore a large responsibility for thoseproblems.119 Central African Examiner (Oct., 1961).178 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963time, on a trip sponsored by the ICFTU of three months to Tunisia andBrussels.120 On that trip he came into contact and under the subsequentinfluence of Irving Brown, the American Federation of Labour-Congress ofIndustrial Organisation's expert on African labour.121 As a result of thesecontacts, Jamela was elected to the Executive Board of International LabourOrganisation with Tom Mboya of Kenya, representing East, Central andSouthern Africa.122 In 1961, Jamela attended America's Labour Day in NewYork, at the invitation of American Federation as one of the mainspeakers.123 From then on he was mostly abroad.These international contacts and trips resulted more in personal thanin organisational gains. For example, ICFTU gave Jamela a grant of £7 000in 1960 to organise SRTUC but this money was banked in his personalaccount and was under his sole control.124 The ICFTU and AmericanFederation decided to ignore this anomaly because in Jamela they foundan ally with whom they would recover what they had lost out in most post-colonial Africa to the communist World Federation of Trade Unions. InJamela, they saw the last hope to keep African trade unions affiliated toICFTU 'non-aligned', divorced from African nationalist parties and 'madesafe for democracy' or, in other words, capitalist development.125The investment in Jamela soon bore fruits when he attended the All-Africa Trade Unions Federation meeting in Casablanca in May 1961. Heclashed sharply with the Federation's chairman, John Tettegah of Ghana,who argued for non-alignment with either West or East. Jamela forcefullyexpressed his anti-communism, in favour of keeping and strengtheningthe ICFTU link. He argued that any country which is a member of theBritish Commonwealth was automatically on the side of the West, andtherefore it was illogical to pretend to be neutral.126 His standing in theWest was greatly enhanced after Casablanca.120 Ibid.121 Ibid; Hyslop, 'Trade unionism in the rise of African nationalism', 56.122 AOH/63 'Interview held with Mr. Reuben Jamela by D. Murenji', Jan. 11 and Feb. 28,1980.123 Central African Examiner (Oct., 1961).124 ORAL/228 'Interview held with Mr. I. T. Chigwendere by Brian Willian', London, Feb., 1978.The rationale for giving Jamela personal control of the SRTUC's funds was justified on thegrounds that, in the event of the ban, SRTUC would escape the disaster that befell SRANC,when its assets and finances were seized by the state. That notwithstanding, it was stillfolly to entrust organisational funds to one man, and ICFTU chose not to listen to complaintsfrom any trade unionists and Jamela felt that he therefore had the mandate to do as hepleased with the money.125 ORAL/228 'Interview held with Mr. I. T. Chigwendere by Brian Willian', London, Feb., 1978.It is no surprise that, according to Gary Busch, the British trade unions in Kenya andMalaya and the French unions in Indo-china were, at the same time, seeking 'to detach thetrade unions from the nationalist struggle, or at least keep out the communist unions whothreatened to take over the movements'. See G. K. Busch, Political Currents in the InternationalTrade Union Movement, Vol. II, The Third World (London, Macmillan, 1983), 9.126 Central African Examiner (Oct., 1961).T.H. M0TH1BE 179The consequences of these influences showed very quickly in theSRTUC. First, Jamela started to hold unauthorised meetings with theMinister of Labour, A. E. Abrahamson, and decided not to brief theexecutive. As a result of these meetings, he unilaterally switched theFederation's policy of non-cooperation with the colony's industriallegislation to one of recommending that unions register under the ICA andwork from within.127 Jamela failed to inform the members of his switch.Second, in August 1961, Jamela again unilaterally withdrew a call for ageneral strike for a minimum wage of S25, apparently after a meetingbetween himself and Abrahamson, at which it is alleged that money changedhands.128 Instead of trying to explain this decision, Jamela left for the USA.Third, Jamela instituted a highly centralised control of the SRTUC, whichdeprived the branches of any authority to make decisions. All decisionswere taken at the central level by Jamela and the branches were expectedto obey. This meant also that all funds were controlled entirely by Jamelaat the central office.129 Fourth, and most important, Jamela showed alukewarm attitude towards the workers and the NDP. He refused to addressstriking workers at Dunlop in Bulawayo, in October, and in November herejected an NDP call for a general strike in protest against the electionsheld under the 1961 constitution. Jamela is reported to have stated, 'Icannot destroy industry when at the same time I want the same industriesto flourish so that my followers may get better and higher wages.'130.Throughout 1961, there was a lot of anger amongst workers at the wayJamela was increasingly divorcing labour from the nationalist struggle.In January 1962, Josiah Maluleke led an inevitable and long overduesplit which saw the formation of the Southern Rhodesia African TradeUnion Congress (SRATUC).131 Within months, SRATUC grew to be sopowerful as to overshadow SRTUC and threaten the state which accused itof being communist.132 Unlike SRTUC, from its inception, SRATUC relied127 Ibid.; Brand, 'Politics and African trade unionism in Rhodesia', 96; Interview held withChigwendere by Willian.128 Hyslop, 'Trade unionism in the rise of African nationalism', 57. It is important to underlinethat the decision to strike for a minimum wage of S25 was taken at a conference as alreadymentioned and it was critical that the conference rescinded it if they so felt.129 Interview held with Chigwendere, p.14; Central African Examiner (Oct., 1961).130 Brand, 'Politics and African trade unionism in Rhodesia', 95. Note that Jamela now wasreferring to his followers and to SRTUC followers. No wonder he did not care as to whethermany unionists felt that their struggle was an integral part of a wider nationalist struggle.131 Central African Examiner (Nov., 1963). Maluleke, founder and Secretary-General of theCommercial and General Workers' Union, later Commercial and Allied Workers' Union, wasdetained when SRANC was banned in 1959 as one of the 'hard-core' nationalists for nearlythree years. On his release, he became Secretary-General of SRTUC. He strongly believedthat unions had a dual role Š to fight for the bread and butter on the one hand and toensure African political advancement on the other.132 ORAL/228, Interview held with Chigwendere.180 ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN WORKING CLASS NATIONALISM, 1957-1963heavily on the support from its members. On the day of its formation, over£500 was collected in one evening from the workers and the money wasused to buy a table, chairs, pay rent, etc.133 Given the level of their wages,this was definitely a vote of confidence by the workers in the SRATUC. OnMay 14, 1962, SRATUC embarked on a successful strike in Salisbury inpursuit of the S25 minimum wage. The strike brought Salisbury to astandstill and caused a lot of publicity abroad because it coincided with avisit to Salisbury by the British Minister of Colonial Affairs, James Butler.134Following the banning of the NDP on December 8, 1962, ZAPU wasformed. The relationship between labour and nationalism continued untilthe Rhodeslan Front (RF) party came into power in 1962 under theleadership of Winston Field. The latter declared an interest to meet withthe ZAPU officials to discuss future plans after their release from detention.The political leadersconsulted with trade unions and other party functionaries on the wisdomof meeting the RF government. At a meeting held at Chinamano's house,they arrived at the conclusion that such a meeting would be ill-advised.An alternative plan to go to Dar-es-Salaam to form a government in exilewas adopted.138CONCLUSIONIt has been argued in this article that throughout the period underdiscussion, workers and nationalist politicians worked closely initially toseek accommodation in the colonial political structures, and following the1959 emergency they fought together to demand independence. However,in 1962 this alliance suffered a major setback on two fronts. First was thelabour organisational crisis which resulted from the activities of thePresident of SRTUC, Reuben Jamela. Second, and perhaps more important,was the decision of the nationalists to embark on armed struggle. Thatdecision basically shifted the terrain of the struggle from the urban to therural areas and as a result labour was marginalised. Finally, in 1963, thealliance collapsed as the nationalist movement split into ZAPU and ZANU.133 Ibid. All property was taken by SRTUC and SRATUC had to start from scratch to buy Its ownfurniture.133 The Rhodesia Herald (May 15, 1962).135 Ibid.