Zambezia (1997), XXIV (ii).COMMUNAL TENURE, MOTIVATIONAL DYNAMICSAND SUSTAINABLE WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT INZIMBABWEEUAS MADZUDZOCentre for Applied Social Sciences, University of ZimbabweAbstractThis article analyses the distribution of wildlife revenues in theBulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho Districts' Communal Area ManagementProgramme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) programmes. The issue isimportant for programmes that focus on wildlife as a land use option andsource of income for those communities living with the natural resource.Wildlife in Zimbabwe's communal lands, unlike livestock or agriculturalproduction, is based on ecological units that do not necessarily conform tothe administrative boundaries of ward or district. In these communal areas,livestock and arable-based production and income are privatised to thehousehold even though they are under communal tenure. This control ofbenefits influences the degree of tolerance of transactions and opportunitycosts households are willing to bear in the production process. With suchmotivational dynamics at play, considering communal land tenure and thefugitive nature of wildlife resources, how should a wildlife producer communitybe defined?INTRODUCTIONCOMMUNITY IS A term that suggests several images. There is no consensuson the definition of the term (Hillery, 1955; Cousins, 1993). Communitymay be used as a unitary term for geographical units or sets of units, forexample village, ward or district. In such cases, spatial boundaries areused to determine the extent of the community. In some cases, communityis used as an analytical category, such as a hunting community, Sancommunity or wildlife producer community. Here the characteristics ofthe group define what the community is. With such different meanings,how do we define a wildlife producer community in a communal areasetting? To answer this question, we need to analyse the 'community' interms of wards and villages.Communal areas are divided up into administrative units of villages.Six or seven villages make a ward. These units have clear boundariesdetermined on the basis of land area or household number. The people inthese units may be referred to as communities. This is regardless of other147TSHOLOTSHO NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECTNgamo Forest LandsElectric Fence (traceHne) /DMrictBoundiry f iVMage Boundary f iBULILIMAMANGWE DISTRICTIApproximate Scale1cm represents 5.5km /IE. MADZUDZO 149characteristics like resource endowment among the inhabitants, selfsufficiency or effects of wildlife. In other words the term community asused here to refer to villages and wards, is not analogous to Redfield's(1955) ideal type of the 'little community'. Having noted that community isan administrative definition when one refers to a village or ward, let uslook at wildlife as a natural resource in the communal areas.Wildlife is a fugitive resource. Wildlife can be costly in the communalareas through damage to crops and livestock (Hawkes, 1992; Madzudzo,1994) or lost opportunity to use resources in other ways. In Bulilimamangweand Tsholotsho, elephants and hyaenas are the major problem animals.Hyaenas are nocturnal predators of cattle, donkeys and goats. Elephantsdestroy large quantities of crops in the fields. Costs from wildlife are notborne on award-wide or village-wide basis but as communities which maybe a small group within a village or ward, or perhaps one that crossesward or village boundaries. The cost of living with, or close to, wildlifediffers among households living in a spatially defined community, forexample a ward. In this article, I give examples of two communities identifiedon the basis of the costs they have suffered from wildlife. Opportunitycosts arose where users were forced to forego the use of their range inorder for it to be used by wildlife. This range can be used for, inter alia,houseland, arable land, pastures, hunting or gathering. Those foregoingthe use of such range are communities, but do not necessarily conformwith the spatial boundaries of village or ward.While wildlife can be a cost, it can also be a benefit. In those areaswhere CAMPFIRE is being implemented, benefits from wildlife are largelyin monetary form.1 These include the revenues obtained from touristactivities like safari hunting or photographic safaris. The revenues can bedistributed to households or used to finance community projects. However,which definition of 'community' is considered when these benefits aredistributed, and how effective is the current definition of 'producercommunity' in motivating communities to bear the costs of wildlife?In this article, the problems of defining a wildlife producer communityare discussed. I conclude that there is need for CAMPFIRE to go furtherand differentiate the villages and wards in terms of their relationship towildlife. Although the ward may be a convenient administrative unit forother purposes, it does not seem to be very relevant when one is dealingwith CAMPFIRE and wildlife as a resource. In other words, the term'community' does not imply ward when one is dealing with wildlife issuesin Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho. It is by paying attention to those whoactually pay the costs of living with the wildlife that CAMPFIRE caneffectively establish a link between cost and benefit. By so doing, thoseFor a discussion of other benefits see Nabane et al (1996), 5.150WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWEwho bear the cost appreciate the value of wildlife as a source of incomeequal to or better than arable agriculture or livestock production. A briefdiscussion of the goals of CAMPFIRE and the study area is put forward inthe following section.METHODSData for this article were collected by the author2 in the two districts overa period of five years from 1991 to 1996. Focus was on the communitybased wildlife programme, CAMPFIRE. A combination of methods wasemployed including participant and direct observation, and unstructuredinterviews with key informants. Secondary data on revenues from wildlifesafari hunting was also used.Background to CAMPFIRE and the study areaCAMPFIRE is a community-based, natural resource managementprogramme. It seeks to demonstrate that, with appropriate incentives,wildlife is a viable land-use option in ecologically marginal areas. Incommunal areas, those living with or close to the wildlife, and thus payingthe costs of doing so, will benefit from wildlife use (DNPWLM, 1984,1990).These are the 'relevant populations' that are the target of CAMPFIRE.The 'relevant populations' are those who live within the micro-environments which sustain the natural resources concerned, who paythe price for their sustained maintenance, who must reap the benefits ofthis investment, and who at the smallest viable operational level, havethe capacity to manage the resources. (This) reflects... a recognition ofthe dynamics of economic motivation which necessarily imposethemselves on rural populations under subsistence conditions and seeksto restore a localised custodianship which can give scope to the fusionof ecological responsibility and community interest which characterisestraditional African cultures (Murphree, 1990, 3).Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho districts are in south-westernZimbabwe. Both districts share their western boundaries with the HwangeNational Park. The districts are separated by the Nata River. Elephantsand other wildlife move between the two districts and the Hwange NationalPark (Murphree, 1989, 4). In 1990, at the inception of the CAMPFIREproject in this area, these two districts ran a joint hunting programme andshared the revenues equally. In 1992, Tsholotsho Rural District Councilfelt that sharing revenues equally with Bulilimamangwe District did notreflect its greater endowment of wildlife resources. Tsholotsho arguedthat it had more wildlife resources, a consequence of superior rangeK. Khuphe assisted the author in some of the field work.E. MADZUDZO 151management such as the canal system supplying water to the wildlife areafrom Gariya dam. Therefore, sharing the revenues equally did not reflectthe difference of effort invested. As a result Tsholotsho seceded from thejoint venture to begin its own separate safari operations in the southernpart of the district. Tsholotsho's withdrawal from the joint venture issignificant for the argument of this article. Wildlife production is notuniform across the environments suggested by physical boundaries. Thosewho perceive that they are contributing more to wildlife production expectto be rewarded accordingly. This argument is central when we deal withthe populations within the micro environments.Seven wards have been selected for the CAMPFIRE programme inBulilimamangwe. These are Makhulela, Ndolwane, Huwana, Gala, Bambadzi,Hingwe and Madlambudzi. The wards were selected on the basis of theirclaims to dry season grazing in the area designated for wildlife.3 Thesewards are dominated by the Ndebele and Kalanga ethnic groups, who areagro-pastoralists (Madzudzo and Dzingirai, 1995, 28-35). Conspicuouslyabsent in this selection was the mention of the minority San Bakwa groupas major users of the area.Prior to the introduction of the CAMPFIRE programme inBulilimamangwe in 1990, an ethnic group, the San, led a nomadic life-stylewith hunting and gathering in the proposed wildlife project area. Tofacilitate safari hunting, a major component of CAMPFIRE, the Rural DistrictCouncil requested the San to keep out of the project area. They were toldby council and project officials that the area where they had been livingwas to be a CAMPFIRE area. Also, they were prohibited from huntingwildlife. A San settlement was set up at the fringes of Makhulela ward. TheSan were encouraged to adopt a sedentary life-style based on agriculture.They lacked, however, even the basic pre-requisites for a life based onagriculture, such as draught power, ploughs or seed. A non-governmentalorganisation, Redd Barna, assisted the San to begin a life based onagriculture by providing them with access to a tractor. San fields wereaway from the area where the rest of the village had fields (Madzudzo andDzingirai, 1995, 28-35). Notably San fields were closest to areas of wildlifeincursion.In Tsholotsho, the lowest unit of settlement is a line. A line is made upof a number of households. There is no fixed number of households thatmake a line, neither is there a fixed number of lines to make a village.Availability of resources like grazing, arable land, and water determine thelimit to the number of households belonging to a line. Each line has its3 However, our research on grazing has demonstrated that only a few households owninglarge herds, and in only some of the mentioned wards, normally use the area (See Madzudzoand Hawkes, 1996).152 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWEsabuku (kraalhead). Six villages make up a ward. Each village has a villagedevelopment committee and each ward, a ward development committee(WADCO). The chairman of the WADCO is the councillor. Eight wardswere selected for the CAMPFIRE programme in Tsholotsho on the basis ofperceived wildlife presence and activity. Four of these wards make thenorthern section, namely wards 2, 3, 4 and later 9. The southern sectionincludes wards 1, 7,8, and 10. This southern section was the one previouslyrun as a joint project with Bulilimamangwe.As part of the CAMPFIRE programme in Tsholotsho, an electric fenceis being erected on most sections parallel to the boundary fence of theHwange National Park. The fence will create a buffer zone between thecommunal area and the Hwange National Park to facilitate safari huntingoperations. It is also expected that the fence will protect livestock andarable lands from wildlife predation and crop damage (see map).DISTRIBUTION OF WILDLIFE BENEFITS IN BULILIMAMANGWERevenue from wildlife, mainly from safari hunting, is distributed as follows:15% to council as a levy, 35% to council for project management and 50%to CAMPFIRE wards.4 Each ward receives an equal amount of money fromthe 50% of the revenues allocated to the beneficiary wards. Wardcommittees decide on how the revenues are going to be used. The revenuesfrom wildlife are not large enough to be shared as household dividends.The highest single disbursement each ward received was Z$20 000 in 1991.This was revenue realised from the 1990 and 1991 safari hunting activitiesof Z$63 166 and Z$84 764 respectively. Income received per ward for both1992 and 1993 was $13 928 per year. Household population in the CAMPFIREwards ranges from 713 to 1 022 with an average of 866 households perward. The sums involved are too small to be meaningful as individualhousehold dividends, which would be less than Z$20 per annum. Insteadthe money has been used for 'community' projects. Below a brief accountis given of how Makhulela ward used its revenues in 1993.In Makhulela ward, the councillor bought fences for each village. Aftererection, the fencing in one village was stolen. A wildlife committee memberwas asked why people were destroying a fence that would help themprotect their crops. In reply he said that, 'You know that governmentproperty is always stolen.' He did not see the difference between othergovernment projects and CAMPFIRE. The fact that the revenues from theuse of wildlife are distributed to every ward regardless of cost, hasweakened the link between wildlife management and benefit in this ward.4 This is based on recommendations from the Department of National Parks and Wild LifeManagement. Levies have been reduced in some districts to increase the community'sshare.E. MADZUDZO 153When Makhulela village received its allocation of fencing, this wasused to fence fields of the Kalanga and Ndebele. No fencing was used toprotect the fields of the San. The San, in covert protest, refused toparticipate in the erection of the fence as requested by the councillor.They argued that the fence was not going to benefit them. The councillorfelt that the San were not co-operating in community projects. He said thatthis was a symptom of a dependence syndrome among the San. They wereused to receiving handouts from donors without putting in any effort.Later, the San kraalhead approached the councillor demanding ashare of the ward revenues for his people. They needed the money topurchase some donkeys for draught power. This was opposed by thecouncillor and other Kalanga and Ndebele present at the meeting. Theyargued that the revenues were for the ward that included the San. It wassaid that the San should come to meetings and lobby for projects for theirarea. The San rejected this saying that they were not given opportunitiesto air their views at meetings. They further alleged that when a San stoodup to talk at a meeting, people would oppose any ideas he or she weretrying to put across. Consequently, no projects selected benefited the San.They further complained that there were no San members on the wildlifecommittee because the people did not select them.Although the San had given up their use of the wildlife area for thesake of CAMPFIRE, they were not getting the benefits of the project.Although the area had previously been used by San households for theircontinued subsistence, interests of the village at large were now beingconsidered to their disadvantage. As one respondent commented:(In the past) The San were not serious about ploughing since there wasabundant wildlife for meat. The meat would be exchanged for grain fromthe Kalanga people. The San are not showing signs of changing fromtheir old ways although hunting has been restricted. They are beggarswithout the meat. Some try to carve stools but their lives are now worsethan before.DISTRIBUTION OF WILDLIFE BENEFITS IN TSHOLOTSHOIt is my intention to show that, as in Bulilimamangwe, the distribution ofrevenues from wildlife in Tsholotsho does not adequately consider whopays more for living with wildlife. Unlike in Bulilimamangwe, revenues arenot uniformly distributed to the participating wards in Tsholotsho. Theward where an animal is shot is regarded as the ward that produced theanimal. It therefore gets a larger share of the wildlife revenue (see Table1). However, although Tsholotsho district rewards each ward differentlyŠ on the basis of who has produced the wildlife Š this is not adequate.When the money gets to the ward there is no attempt to share the benefits154 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWEin terms of incurred costs of living with wildlife. This is because thebenefits from wildlife are being consumed collectively at ward level. Ishow this by way of a case study of the relocation of Lubanji line.Table IWILDLIFE REVENUESWard123478910Revenues receivedin 1992 (Z$)91 250 (50)*48 750 (29)85 631 (51)32 500 (20)56 667 (32)16 666 ( 9)5(0)16 666 ( 9)Revenues receivedin 1994 (Z$)42 179 (31)4 375 ( 8)39 375 (75)4 375 ( 8)42 934 (32)24 679 (18)4 375 ( 8)24 679 (18)Revenues receivedin 1996 (Z$)124 750 (47)22 500 (16)70 755 (51)22 500 (16)93 096 (35)24 000 ( 9)22 500 (16)24 000 ( 9)Source: Adapted from Tsholotsho Rural District Council, CAMPFIRE Manager's AnnualReports, 1992, 1994, and 1996.*Numbers in parentheses are percentages of revenues received by the respective ward.The northern or southern wards are considered separately. Percentages do not alwaysadd to 100 because of rounding error.In Tsholotsho it has always been wards 1,3 and 7 that earn the highestrevenues. These wards share a common boundary with Hwange NationalPark (see map). Therefore, there is a greater amount of wildlife movementinto the wards from the national park. Consequently, most of the huntingoperations in the area have taken place in these wards. Ward 2 is aninterior ward in relation to the Hwange National Park boundary. In a desireto have a bigger place where the animals can move freely, and thus attractmore hunting activity, the councillor for the ward requested the diversionof the electric fence trace line to take up more land at the points it passesthrough the ward. This has necessitated relocating the people of Lubanjiline who were now enclosed in the buffer area.To the programme planners, Lubanji line would threaten the CAMPFIREproject because of human and livestock populations which woulddiscourage the wildlife from residing in the area. Therefore, the line had tobe relocated. It is interesting to see how the residents of Lubanji lineviewed this relocation.Ward 9 only became a CAMPFIRE ward in 1993 after a stray elephant was shot in the area.E. MADZUDZO 155INDIVIDUAL COST VERSUS WARD BENEFIT IN THE RELOCATION OFLUBANJI LINEThe inhabitants of Lubanji line in Zamazama village, Ward 2, were asked tomove to Vusani line in the interior of the ward to make way for the wildlifebuffer area in Tsholotsho North area. Officials from the Rural DistrictCouncil, Ward 2 Wildlife Committee, a non-governmental organisation(Zimbabwe Trust) and the ward councillor, approached the people ofLubanji in July, 1993 to inform them that their line had been enclosed inthe proposed wildlife area. The inclusion of the line in the wildlife areameant that the area would be enclosed by the electric fence. At this time,clearing of the trace line for the electric fence was already in progress. Itwas pointed out that the people of Lubanji line were free to continuestaying in the line. It was also pointed out that there would be increasedwildlife presence in the area which would be a threat to the localinhabitants, their livestock and crops. Control of problem animals wouldnot be guaranteed. However, those who wished to be moved had tochoose a place, where a borehole for domestic and livestock water supplieswould be sunk.The residents of Lubanji agreed to move out of the area. They made arequest to the officials to be allowed to remain in Lubanji for the nextcropping season as it was too late to clear new fields in the area of theirrelocation. However, the people later went to the headman of the area,umlisa to question why, after independence, they were asked to vacatetheir area when they were living in a communal area, where forced removalswere not supposed to take place.6 The headman indicated that he had noknowledge of the relocation. Furthermore, he pointed out that headmenwere no longer in control of settling people, as the role had been taken upby the councillors and the village development committees. The headmanthen referred the people from Lubanji to the chief nduna of the area,Muswigana. The chief also pointed out to the people that he was notaware of the relocation and that he had no powers over land and settlementin the area.It is clear that the people of Lubanji did not make a request to moveout of their line to make way for a wildlife area. Of the people interviewed,only one person clearly stated that the relocation was a welcome moveand that she was glad to go to Vusani. Two others did not like the idea ofmoving but saw some advantages in it. However, these persons did notgive CAMPFIRE related advantages for the move. Among the reasons givenwere that children would be travelling a shorter distance to school, and6 Some of the people in this line came to Lubanji before independence, in 1970. having beenevicted from Nyamandlovu because that area was a commercial fanning area.156 WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWEthe line would be close enough for the councillor to come and give detailsof food assistance. Furthermore, some felt that they would be under theirchief Mswigana and not Siposo as was the case at the present moment(apparently, a consequence of administrative aloofness shown by a failureto take into account allegiance to chiefs when marking out the wardboundaries).However, the rest of the respondents expressed negative sentimentsabout relocation, expressed in such common statements as, 'you preferwild animals to people ...' or 'you have moved us to let your wildlife in...' and 'what can we do, who can fight the government...' The option toremain in Lubanji was given by the officials and the use of direct force wasnot overtly mentioned. No advantages of continuing to stay in the wildlifearea were mentioned. However, the disadvantages of a continued stay inLubanji were correctly pointed out, that is, the likelihood of increasingproblems with wildlife. Given the fact that there is no special benefit forliving with or close to wildlife, the people agreed to move out of the area toavoid these dangers.Over the past two years, the people of Ward 2 (where Lubanji line is)had received revenues from wildlife use of $30 and $17 per household. Thepeople of Lubanji were aware that the people of neighbouring Ward 3 hadreceived household revenues of $100 each. When we asked those in Lubanjiline whether they did not feel that their relocation would give their wardgreater potential for realising higher incomes, they contested the idea.One of the points the people raised was that the increased incomes wouldbenefit the ward as a whole not that particular line. 'Even those who havenever seen an elephant will also benefit because they are members of theward . . .', said some of the respondents. This example impinges on theempowerment rhetoric associated with CAMPFIRE, but it is a subjectbeyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that this demonstratedthe unwillingness of the line to sacrifice on behalf of the rest of the wardbecause they were aware that the benefit from such a sacrifice would beequally shared by the whole ward.7CONCLUSIONAt present the producer community in Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho isdefined in terms of wards. Consequently, the benefits deriving from theutilisation of wildlife are shared equally among the villages within theward. However, wards have been criticised as more of an administrativeconvenience than a reflection of social relationships. The above discussion7 One is tempted to read a relationship between this experience and the problems of co-operative production in Zimbabwe's model B resettlement schemes.E. MADZUDZO 157then illustrates the need for CAMPFIRE to go further and differentiatebeneficiaries in terms of the costs they undergo in wildlife management.While the spatial conception of the ward may be convenient for otherpurposes, it does not seem to be entirely useful for identifying CAMPFIRE's'relevant populations' regarding the devolution of revenues. In other words,the term community does not imply ward when one is dealing with wildlifeissues in Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho. It is through differentiationbetween producing and non-producing villages and lines that those livingwith the wildlife might readily understand the concept of CAMPFIRE andwish to protect their natural resource. Such an effort will be successful inestablishing a clear link between producer (defined by cost) andbeneficiary.Having said the foregoing, a caveat needs to be pointed out. One isaware of the problems which might be encountered in an attempt todefine the concept of a producer community appropriately, especially inTsholotsho district. For one thing, this means denying those interiorvillages or households revenues which they are now used to. This mightprovoke resentment and lead to other villages or lines taking retaliatorymeasures to destroy the resource.The article points out that, in Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho districts,the distribution of benefits from wildlife is undertaken on a geographicallydefined, community-wide basis. 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