Zambezia (2000), XXVII (ii). ,ESSAY REVIEWAFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS POLITICALINSTRUMENT*KEDMON N. HUNGWE, Faculty of Education, University of ZimbabweCHIPO HUNGWE, HararePatrick Ghabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz have combined to produce a thought-provoking analysis of the problem of development in Africa, a continentwhich they describe as in crisis. Both authors are European basedacademics with experiences in Francophone, Lusophone and AnglophoneAfrica. They acknowledge that the problem of African development has along history and has been particularly topical in the post-Second WorldWar era. While theories and prescriptions abound, progress has beenlimited. Sub-Saharan Africa has now assumed the dubious reputation ofbeing the "the poorest region in the world".1 This is a reversal of progress
that the region appeared to be making in the mid-1970s when per capitaincomes in Africa exceeded those in most of the developing world,including Asia. Many of the countries that appeared to be on course fordevelopment have experienced spectacular reversals, particularly fromthe 1980s onwards.The book comes in the wake of a renewed interest in the developmentof Africa from Western capitals.2 A recent World Bank report3 highlightsa series of 'dire' facts about sub-Saharan Africa as we enter the new
millennium: income levels are lower than in the late 1960s; it is racked bywar, disease and corruption; and its share of global trade has beenshrinking; and it contributes only 2% of the world trade. It is in thiscontext that Chabal and Daloz have re-visited the question of developmentin Africa and have proposed an analytical framework which they believecan help to explain the developmental crisis in Africa better thantraditional theories. As they say in their introduction, the book:is an attempt to make sense of what is happening in Africa today.Simple as this aim may appear to be, it is in fact fiendishly challengingBy Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, The International African Institute and IndianaUniversity Press, 1999, ISBN 0-253-21287-1 (Paper), 0-253-33525-6 (Cloth).World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? (The World Bank, May, 2000).See for example, World Bank, The Hopeless Continent (World Bank, May 13th-19th, 2000).The story is the main focus of the issue; 'World Bank cites itself in study of Africa's bleakperformance' New York Times, June 1, 2000; 'Incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa seen as
backsliding: World Bank report cites failure to diversify economies, foreign aid dependenceand debt burden', Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2000.World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?269270 AFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTfor reasons having to do with both the diversity of the continent andthe complexity of the events currently taking place there.4THE THREE MAIN PREMISESThe book is structured around three main issues and related premises.First, they argue that sub-Saharan Africa has the problem of pervasivecorruption and ineffective institutions that affects all sectors of the society.Second, the African condition can be explained in terms of a uniqueculture and 'mindset' that constrains its peoples to follow a developmentaltrajectory which is distinct from that of other countries that modernisedfirst. Third, while African countries and institutions appear to be in astate of disorder and corruption, this situation is functional, and definesAfrica's unique developmental path. This theoretical position defines anew theoretical paradigm for analysing African development. The authorscall the new paradigm the instrumentalization of disorder. We now examineeach of these claims in turn.THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION AND INEFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONSChabal and Daloz argue that the fundamental problem facing Africa isthat of corrupt and ineffective institutions. They define institutionaleffectiveness in terms of ideal type 'Weberian type' bureaucracies. Underthis assumption, the effectiveness of institutions is obtained by organisingtheir structure, purposes, and resources so as to provide rule-basedgovernance that is fair, rational and predictable. A properly structuredbureaucracy protects institutions from domination by interest groupsand discretionary authority. The primary problem with African institutionsjS "patrimonialism", which is defined as the widespread use of publicassets or resources for private gain by officials who manage them. Thereis an instrumentally profitable lack of distinction between the civic/public and private/personal spheres. In order to be effective, AfricanInstitutions must function on the basis of neutral and rational decisionmaking procedures.The issue of neutrality of institutions raises the question, what does}t mean for a bureaucracy to be neutral? It has been argued thatbureaucratic neutrality is not possible. As Knott and Miller have observed,ŁŁinstitutions shape outcomes by creating incentives that lead to onedecision or another".5 There is empirical evidence that changing4 p. Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (TheInternational African Institute and Indiana University Press, 1999), xv.5 t H. Knott, and G. J. Miller, Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional ChoicetEngIewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1987), 255.K. N. HUNGWE AND C. HUNGWE 271institutional arrangements affect decision making processes Independentlyof the individuals involved. Knott and Miller therefore conclude that, "aslong as different institutional arrangements lead to different outcomes,then those institutional arrangements cannot be regarded as neutral".6They also maintain that "institutional structures are the result of politicalchoices of politicised actors". It is therefore "pointless and perhapsharmful to maintain the myth of administrative neutrality. Rather, theissue is and must be 'who gets what' from the political system."7 Theinterest and value free model of policy formulation that Chabal and Dalozadvocate is therefore problematic. Their rhetoric serves to conceal/maskthe role of hegemonic politics where particular interests are dominant,not only in Africa, but in industrialised countries.8 Beyond this, theanalysis of bureaucratic effectiveness must take into account the powerrelations in the environment in which institutions are situated. Theproblem of recruitment into elite civil service jobs is a case in point. How,for example, are civil servants in key decision making positions recruitedin bureaucracies in Western countries that Chabal and Daloz describe asinterest/value free models? Arguments have been made that recruitmentin these bureaucracies tends to be biased against minority ethnic/racialgroups as well as women. In the British civil service, for example, poweris mostly wielded by white, middle-to-upper class, public school educatedmales. The British Labour party's campaign to reform the civil servicerecognises this problem9 which is due to past discriminatory policiesagainst women and minorities.10 The implication of this in terms of policyis an empirical question. However, there is evidence that, when properlymanaged, diversity has a positive impact on an organisation's effectivenessby "introducing varied perspectives and approaches to work". The failureto diversify concentrates power in the hands of an elite with a particularworld view. As Long has argued, "Power is only one of the considerationsthat must be weighed in administration, but of all it is the most overlookedin theory and the most dangerous to overlook in practice."11 Institutionaleffectiveness should be addressed in terms of the power structures towhich it is accountable. This perspective is missing from the book.6 Ibid., 255.7 Ibid., 274.8 B. Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London, Unwin Hyman, 1975).9 'Modern Government' Cm 4310 (London, The Stationery Office Limited, March 1999).10 See for instance, the 'Royal Commission on the Civil Service 1929-31 Report' (London,HMSO, 1931) and 'The Employment of Women in the Civil Service: The Report of aDepartmental Committee' (London, HMSO, 1971).11 Long, N., 'Power and administration', Public Administration Review (1949), 9, 257-264.272 AFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTChabal and Daloz's conclusion that African institutions face a crisisof effectiveness is a broad generalisation, which, as all generalisationsdo, tends to conceal some consequential differences. Comparative studiesmay assist in this endeavour. Local government in Zambia and Zimbabweis a case in point. At independence, the Zambian government dismantledthe colonial administration system at grassroots level, and unwittinglycreated an institutional vacuum.12 The remaining system, largely co-ordinated by the ruling United National Independence Party, was over-centralised and lacked co-ordination. While there were'many agencieswith responsibilities for rural development, there was no multi-sectoralapproach to development. Beginning with the Local Administration Actof 1980, the state has been working to remedy the deficiencies in thesystem. More recent reforms include the introduction of districtadministration. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, followed a different pathand chose to reform rather than dismantle the colonial local governmentsystem. The reform process, whose goal was to democratise the localgovernment system was "consistent with the ruling party's articulatedideology of the liberation struggle period".13 The local governance systemin Zimbabwe has been relatively more efficient than that in Zambia.However, institutional effectiveness has been undermined by over-centralisation of control from the state.14 Communities are not sufficientlyempowered to raise and manage revenue, allocate resources, and tomake policy decisions. The problem of over-centralisation has beenidentified in Botswana as well15 but there are differences of degree.Botswana has a tradition of multi-party democracy of over 20 years.Consequently, elements of civil society working through the politicalsystem have over time made some progress in forcing the political eliteto restrain a dominant bureaucracy and make it more responsive.16 In thecase of Zimbabwe, some observers have noted a decline, over time, of theruling party's control, as citizens challenge its control over localgovernment and other institutions.17 What these cases illustrate is thatthere are some similarities in how comparable institutions function. Onesuch similarity is the problem of over-centralisation of power. However,12 See M. Bratton, The Local Politics of Rural Development: Peasant and Party State in Zambia(Hanover, New Hampshire, University Press of New England. 1980).13 J. Mw. Makurabe. Democracv and Development in Zimbabwe: Constraints of Decentralization(Harare, SAPES Books, 1998).14 Ibid.15 J. D. Holm and P. Molutsi. 'State-society relations in Botswana: Beginning liberalization',in G. Hyden and M. Bratton (eds.), Governance and the Study of Politics (Boulder. LynneRienner Publishers, 1992).16 Ibid.17 Makumbe, Democracy and Development in ZimbabweK. N. HUNGWE AND C. HUNGWE 273the degree of concentration of power varies. In the cases discussed, ithas been strongest in Zambia, and least concentrated in Botswana.Furthermore, in all the countries, the situation is dynamic. Beyond thecommon elements, there are other country and sector specific factorsthat account for variability. For example, independent Zambia andZimbabwe approached local government reform in radically differentways. These cases indicate that some generalisations are useful, but eachcase must nevertheless be studied in detail to provide insights into theproblem of institution building in Africa. What Chabal and Daloz havedescribed is the average case scenario. They nevertheless admit thatthere are 'significant' differences in bureaucratic norms and effectivenessacross Africa. Countries such as Somalia and Liberia are on one end ofthe spectrum while others such as Zimbabwe are at the other end. Inaddressing the tension between detailed case studies and generalisations,they argue as follows:It serves no purpose to generalise excessively and to reduce all Africanpolitical systems to their lowest common denominator. At the sametime, however, let us avoid the opposite excess, which consists inarguing that no generalisation is possible because there are in Africa,fifty irredeemably different countries. Beyond the existing diversity, itis clear that any serious study of the state in Africa brings to light anumber of analytically significant similarities.18Despite the word of caution about excessive generalisation, it appearsthat Chabal and Daloz have done exactly that. Hoogvelt, Phillips andTaylor warn against this tendency which has come to dominate relationsbetween African states and Western institutions and governments. Theyobserve that,it has become standard practice in the literature, not least that flowingfrom World Bank staff pens, to treat sub-Saharan Africa as one continent:forty-five extremely diverse nations which are nevertheless thought tohave common characteristics, common features, common problemsand common prospects. Increasingly, the entire edifice of internationallysponsored aid programmes, such as, for example, the IMF/WB Jointlysponsored Structural Adjustment Programmes, has been built on thisclassification of commonality.19Chabal and Daloz's failure to address the issue of diversity of countriesand institutions is compounded by an exclusive focus on state institutions.This is an important oversight. Institutions may be divided into state andcivil society institutions. State institutions include national, regional, and18 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 8.19 A. Hoogvelt, D. Phillips, and P. Taylor, 'World Bank in Africa: A case of mistakenidentity', Review of African Political Economy (1992), 19 (54).274 AFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTlocal governments, the judiciary, and the police. Civil society institutionsinclude non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, churches,community based organisations, social associations, kinship networks,and so forth.20 Civil society institutions play an important role in servicedelivery in sub-Saharan Africa. Examples include local farmer organisationsin Zimbabwe,21 and tree planting activities for fuelwood in rural Kenya.22Many of these institutions are controlled by Africans. There is evidencethat many civil society institutions receive more favourable ratings fromcommunities than state institutions.23 Beyond their functions as agenciesfor service delivery, civil society institutions have played an importantrole in the democratisation process, for example trade union movementsin South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe,24 and the Catholic church inMalawi.25 These are important developments in the historical process ofpromoting effective and responsive institutions.The discussion now turns to the problem of corruption and disorder.CORRUPTION AND DISORDERChabal and Daloz argue that corruption in Africa is pervasive and affectsall sectors of the society. They make a distinction between a pervasiveform of corruption in Africa and a more limited form of corruption inWestern societies which they term horizontal corruption. Horizontalcorruption involves the exchange of favours between economic andpolitical elites.In the West, as in other developed countries, such practices generallyoccur at the top, where deals are struck between, on the one hand, themain industrial and financial sectors and, on the other hand, the politicalclasses ... By contrast, corruption in Africa concerns the wholepopulation and operates essentially according to vertical relations ofinequality.2620 D. Narayan et al, Voices From the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us (Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 2000).21 L. Zinyama. 'Local farmer organizations and rural development in Zimbabwe', in D. R.Fraser Taylor and F. Mackenzie (eds.), Development From Within: Survival in Rural Africa(London, Routledge, 1992).22 N. A. Chavangi, 'Household based tree planting activities for fuel wood supply in ruralKenya', in D. R. Fraser Taylor and F. Mackenzie (eds.) Development From Within: Survivalin Rural Africa (London, Routledge, 1992).23 Narayan et al., Voices From the Poor.24 The trade union movements in Zambia and Zimbabwe have, with varying degrees ofsuccess, challenged the political hegemony of the ruling parties in their countries.25 See for instance, K. N. Hungwe, 'Breaking the silence: Fax transmissions and the movementfor multi-party democracy in Malawi', in A. Devaney, S. Gance and Y. iMa (eds.) Technologyand Resistance (New York, Peter Lang, 2000).26 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 102.K. N. HUNGWE AND C. HUNGWE 275, Society-wide corruption is seen as a uniquely African phenomenonand a key cause of Africa's economic woes. The argument that the scaleof corruption in African societies is atypical has been contested by otherobservers, for instance by Bayart, Ellis and Hibou. They argue as follows:It is not that the societies or the political systems of the sub-continentare more corrupt than others, as is often believed. There is no reasonto suppose that Japan, China, India, Russia, Turkey, Italy (or France forthat matter) are any less tainted by this phenomenon. But in Africa, theinteraction between the practice of power, war, economic accumulationand illicit activities of various types forms a particular political trajectorywhich can be fully appreciated only if it is addressed in historicaldepth. One of the characteristics of this trajectory is the exploitationby dominant social groups, or by dominant actors of the moment, or awhole series of rents generated by Africa's insertion in the internationaleconomy in a mode of dependence ... Current examples include rentsderived from diplomatic and military alliances, from the control ofexports of agricultural goods and oil and of imports of all kinds, as wellas from the management of external financing and aid.27The importance of the corruption of the dominant social groups inAfrican economies suggests that a distinction be made between whatmay be called primary level corruption (by the elite), and secondary levelcorruption by the average person in Africa. Primary level corruptionprecedes secondary level corruption and the two are causally related.Secondary level corruption results from the strategies that people developto cope with dysfunctional institutions and service delivery systems. Acase in point is Zimbabwe, which faced a fuel crisis, beginning December1999.28 The crisis was officially attributed to corruption at the state runoil procurement company, the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe(N0CZ1M), and to shortages in foreign currency. Several high rankingexecutives at NOCZIM were charged with corruption, but no convictionshad been effected at the time of this review. At the height of the crisis,when supplies nearly dried up, there were indications that some oilproducts were being sold on the black market. In addition to this, someattendants at petrol service stations took bribes from motorists inexchange for preferential treatment. A situation of shortage thereforeencouraged a new form of corruption that was unknown before the crisis.The corruption at NOCZIM was an example of primary level corruption,27 Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, The Criminalilization of the Slatein Africa (Indianapolis, The International African Institute and Indiana University Press,1999), xvi.28 The crisis has been extensively featured in the local press. See Tiie Herald, Daily News,The Independent, and the Financial Gazette.276 AFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTwhile the corruption at the retail/distribution level was secondary becauseit was causally related to corruption at the national oil procurementcompany. When such practices are rampant, disorder ensues. There isreason to believe that a significant proportion of society-wide corruptionin sub-Saharan countries is primarily driven by primary level corruptionand much of the corruption at the lower levels of society reflects thecoping mechanisms that people use to deal with ineffective institutionsand malfunctioning service delivery systems. This is riot only true inAfrica, but in other parts of the world as well.29 As Narayan et al haveobserved:When formal institutions break down, people employ a variety ofstrategies to meet their needs, including working around the systemthat is perceived to be unjust or exploitative through active sabotageor passive resistance. Especially in case of state breakdown, few peopleexpress hesitation about employing whatever means are necessary tosurvive, including overtly illegal or dangerous ones.30In one typical case, informants said, "The government has ripped usoff, so why shouldn't people steal a bit on the sly? We don't steal but wedon't judge others who do. You have to survive!"31The discussion now turns to the third issue raised by Chabal andDaloz. They argue that the apparent state of disorder and corruption inAfrica is functional and defines Africa's unique developmental path, andthat this theoretical position defines a new paradigm.TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM OF DEVELOPMENT?The paradigm proposed by Chabal and Daloz explains development inAfrica in terms of what they call the "instrumentalization of disorder".The basic claim is this: Africa's institutions appear to be in a state of'disorder' because of apparently ineffective institutions and corruption.However, the state of disorder is functional and is indicative of a uniquelyAfrican developmental path where everyone is a participant, and everyonehas something to gain from corrupt practices.In sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is rarely centralised: everyoneeverywhere tries to benefit. Examples abound: in airports, each official(passport, health, customs, baggage, etc.) wants his or her cut makingprogress to the exit an obstacle course. Driving from Lagos to Cotonou,Narayan et al, Voices From the Poor.30 Ibid., 95.Ibid. See also A. Nkhoma-Wamunza, 'The informal sector: A strategy for survival inTanzania', in D. R. Fraser Taylor and F. Mackenzie (eds.), Development From Within:Survival in Rural Africa (London, Routledge, 1992).K. N. HUNGWE AND C. HUNGWE 377for instance, the traveller is likely to encounter at least a dozen roadblocks, manned by different police forces, various army corps, flyingcustom officers, local authority officials, etc., each duplicating thesame control of papers and documents .. ?2Corruption and disorder are therefore instrumentally profitable.Nevertheless, there are big time losers in the politics of corruption. Arecent emphasis on poverty alleviation strategies by aid agencies, theWorld Bank and the IMF is confirmation of concern about deepeningpoverty in Africa.33 One only has to recall the haunting images of Africa'spoor that regularly feature on international television. The majority arevictims, especially the women and children.34 That there is someinstrumental value in the disorder for some is not surprising. What Ismore important is to identify who the winners and losers are.Given the problems of development in the sub-region, what does thetheory of 'instrumentalization of disorder' mean? Chabal and Daloz arguethat:We have confused development and Westernization, thus making itdifficult to grasp the singularity of what is taking place on the continentin terms of modernisation. Not only have we been prone to explainingcurrent events in Africa as a process of 'backwardness', but we havebeen slow to understand the complex ways in which political change istaking place in Africa.35We are compelled to ask: If Africa is not developing along 'Western'lines, then what is its developmental trajectory? While the authors arguethat Africa may have its own unique path to development which is differentfrom that of the West, they have not clearly defined this alternative path.As they see it:It is difficult to conceive of what a non-Western, particularly 'African'path to modernisation is, both because we live in a Western world andbecause historically, the West modernised first.36Others have argued that what Africa needs is increased foreign aid.37The authors dismiss this argument claiming that, "Africa continues toreceive massive assistance from the major Western donors. Aid fatigue32 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 102.33 See for example, recent policy papers from the World Bank, IMF, and Department forInternational Development, and other donors that focus on poverty reduction strategiesas an integral part of aid.34 See for example Narayan et al, Voices from the Poor.35 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 50.36 Ibid.37 The case for increased foreign aid was a central issue at the Earth Summit in 1992, wheredonors were urged to increase aid.278 AFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENThas not yet set in".38 That is a questionable argument. Concern about aidflows was expressed at the Earth Summit in 1992, where donors committedthemselves to making progress towards the UN target of 0.7 per cent ofGNP allocated to aid. Since then, overall aid has fallen to its lowest-everlevel Š falling to 0.22 per cent of donor GNP in 1997.39 Following the endof the Cold War, the geographical distribution of aid flows has alteredand sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and south Asiahave experienced a reduction in the share of aid. While Africa as a wholeappears to receive comparable levels of aid to other parts of the world,"this picture is heavily influenced by large flows to North Africa (notablyEgypt)".40 Chabal and Daloz do not justify the conclusion that Africa isreceiving adequate aid. In fact they are not consistent in their argumentabout levels of aid because they also contend that:full-scale Westernization would require at the very least a gigantic(financial and cultural) investment on the part of the North, which inthe present international circumstances is hardly realistic. Nor is thereevidence that such an injection of resource would have the desiredeffect.41It is not clear why injection of aid would not have the desired effect.What is interesting to note is the argument for a 'cultural' investment, apoint we will address momentarily. For now we stay with the economicquestion.What is missing from the text is an adequate analysis of the economiccontext in Africa and its relationship to the problem of institutionalinefficiencies and corruption. Historically, one of the reasons for thedevelopment of bureaucracies was as tools for managing economic growthand development. The argument that is made by the authors is thatAfrican countries should create efficient bureaucracies first in order tofoster development. Our view is that the development of institutions andeconomic development have historically occurred in parallel, and notindependently of each other. Putnam's study of southern Italy helps us torefine the observation. He observes as follows:Economic modernity is somehow associated with high-performancepublic institutions Š that much is clear. What our simple analysis sofar can not reveal is whether modernity is a cause of high performance(perhaps one among several), whether performance is perhaps in some38 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 105.39 See for example [online] URL: http://www.oxfaminternational.org/educationnow/tied_hands/aid.htm.40 J. Beynon, Assessing Aid and the Collier/Dollar Poverty Efficient Aid Allocations: A Critique(DF1D, 1999).41 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 136.K. N. HUNGWE AND C. HUNGWE 279way a cause of modernity, whether both are influenced by a thirdfactor (so that the association between the two is on some sensespurious), or whether the link between modernity and performance Iseven more complex.42The relationship is therefore complex and answers must be based onempirical studies, and in particular historical case studies. Cross-sectionalstudies, that focus on a particular point in time are not likely to provideadequate data and insights. This is a major problem with Chabal andDaloz's book. It lacks a historical perspective and fails to clarify causalrelations between institution building and economic development.We now turn to the cultural question which we alluded to earlier.This issue takes up the concluding chapters of the book. Chabal andDaloz use psychological/cultural reasons for arguing that Africa has itsown unique developmental trajectory. The central claim is that tounderstand the problem of African underdevelopment, we need to take acloser look at African culture and 'mentalities'. The primary basis for thatargument is psychological/cultural. There is a "post-colonial culturalorder" which "constitutes a distinct universe"43 and explains thedevelopmental process in Africa. There is a "mindset" that is "shared byall layers of the population".44 Chabal and Daloz approach the cultural/psychological aspect of their study with some caution because the studyof 'mentalities' is a "virtually taboo" question in academic circles. Writingelsewhere, Lassiter has summarised the problems facing this line ofinquiry as follows:Many, in fact, consider such inquiry to be no more than unscientificstereotyping, usually with malevolent intent and effect. Some arguethat group personality studies are an anathema to cultural relativismand the particularistic study of singular populations and topics. Stillothers go as far as to assert that all culture and personality studiesobscure the uniqueness of the individual, and divert attention andresources from more fruitful lines of inquiry such as the dynamics ofclass struggle and the scientific study of particular social structuresand functions. At its worst, critics and social advocates say grouppersonality studies and inquiry into broad patterns of culturaladaptation on the part of social scientists exacerbate racism andbigotry.4542 R. D. Putnam. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press, 1993), 86.43 Chabal and Daloz. Africa Works, 132.44 Ibid.45 J. E. Lassiter, 'African culture and personality: Bad social science, effective social activism,or a call to reinvent ethnology?' African Studies Quarterly, 3 (2); [online] URL: http://web.afrioa.ufl.edu/asq, v3.v3i2al.htm.280 AFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTChabal and Daloz nevertheless argue for the importance of thecultural/psychological perspective as an important variable in explainingAfrica's developmental crisis. They are encouraged by a number of Africanacademics who have, in recent years adopted the same approach. Theyargue that when the psychological factors are taken into account, then itbecomes clear that "Africa is not degenerating, nor is it 'blocked', but...it is forging ahead, following its own path, although assuredly at greatvariance with existing models of development."46 Africa will map out aunique developmental path which is consistent with a specific Africanpsychology (mindset). On the other hand, Chabal and Daloz characterisethat very same mindset as defective. For example, in one place theauthors claim that:. . . African elites, even when they use their own private jets andspeculate in the world's major financial centres, remain prey to'irrational' beliefs long disappeared in the West.47In another place the psychological defects of the Africans aredescribed as "the inability to institutionalise more formal and impersonalrelations".48 These are hardly the characteristics of a people on a rationalpath to development. We therefore see a contradiction between, on onehand, the claim that Africa will find its own unique developmental path,and on the other, the characterisation of the African mindset as defective.If the problems of Africa are to be explained in terms of their psychologicalattributes, then we need a more consistent argument. A broader questionis whether it is legitimate to talk of an African psychology independent ofthe lived conditions in Africa. Other researchers have advanced a differentview, taking the relation between psychological attributes and societaldevelopment to be dialectical.49 The assumption is that societal changeand psychological development are co-determinant. In other words,psychological realities are constructed and sustained through socialactivities. It follows, therefore, that changes in societal arrangementshave consequences for the psychological constitution of individuals andvice versa. From this point of view, it is retrogressive to use models thatexplain poverty in terms of the psychology of the poor, when that verysame mindset can be explained in terms of the conditions under whichthe people live and work. What is called for are comprehensive models46 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 135.47 Ibid., 136.48 Ibid.49 K. N. Hungwe 'Becoming a Machinist in a Changing Industry' (Michigan State University,Ph.D. Dissertation, 1999); L. S. Vygotsky, Mind in Society The Development of HigherPsychological Processes (Cambridge, Harvard University Press. H>78). S, Scribner andM. Cole, The Psychology of Literacy (Cambridge, Mass.. Harvard University Press. 198!).K. N. HUNGWE AND C. HUNGWE 281that take into account the individuals, their knowledge, skills and beliefs,as well as the context in which they live and work.Generally, questions can be raised about Chabal and Daloz's work inthree areas. First, the book ultimately blames the poor and vulnerable fortheir problems and does not pay attention to the national and globalnetwork of dependence in which they are locked. The book would havebeen strengthened by paying attention to the role of conflictual socialrelations in African societies, and in particular the role of unequal powerrelations in African societies. The elites may be a small minority inAfrican societies but they hold disproportionate power and control overresources. Second, the book assumes an African culture that is not onlystatic but resistant to change. It is more plausible to assume that Africansocieties are characterised by an "abundance of distinct and sometimescontradictory cultural repertoires, at the same time stable and subject tochange, which are vehicles of both transformation and continuity".50Third, a gender perspective is missing from the book. There is evidencethat culture has differential effects on males and females. Gender andother social relations are regulated through the practice of culture.Introducing gender brings to focus unequal power relations thatcharacterise the practice of culture in African societies that arepredominantly patriarchal.51 It has been observed that "patriarchy andpoverty combine to limit women's political participation and the inclusionof their concerns in official political agendas".52 Unequal power relationshave consequences for institutional effectiveness. As the literaturedemonstrates, institutions in Africa have been particularly ineffective inresponding to the developmental needs of females.5350 Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, The CriminalUization of the State in Africa, 32-33.51 See for example C. Hungwe, 'Women and Democracy in Zambia' (Unpubl.); Narayan et al,Voices From the Poor.52 Hungwe, 'Women and Democracy in Zambia'.53 See for example Ibid; Narayan et al, Voices From the Poor.