Zambezia (2002), XXIX (i).THE DEBATE OVER ELEPHANT CULLING: IS IT EVERMORALLY JUSTIFIED TO CULL ELEPHANTS?PATRICK TOMDepartment of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy, University ofZimbabweAbstractThis article argues that, since elephants do not just live in forests or parksbut in a whole social, economic, political and ecological environment, it isnecessary to look at how surplus elephant populations affect the lives ofhuman beings living in these communities and the environment. It alsoargues that it is not always wrong to cull elephants. However, this ought tobe done under certain circumstances, for example, in cases where it isnecessary to protect their habitats or the habitats of other animals and incases where the elephant population threatens the livelihoods of humanbeings. Culling ought, however, to be done in a way that does not make theelephants suffer unnecessarily.INTRODUCTIONElephant culling is the periodic, planned killing of elephant herds, families,and individuals (Hoyt, 1994, 149). Zimbabwe's elephant population isestimated to be over 66 000. According to the CAMPFIRE News Magazine(Vol. 15, May 1997), the Department of National Parks and WildlifeManagement (DNPWLM) considers 35 000 to be the optimum for theavailable habitat. The Zimbabwean government and conservationistsrealised that this surplus elephant population can be reduced throughculling. However, they have received a lot of criticism from animalwelfarists, especially from the Western countries such as The UnitedStates of America, Britain, and Canada where interest in animal welfare isquite considerable. Animal welfarism is not as strong in Zimbabwe as it isin the above three countries. Nevertheless, elephant culling in Zimbabwehas resulted in tension between animal welfarists and conservationists.This article will first show that conservationists and animal welfaristsdo not have the same theoretical commitments and, because of this, theydisagree on the issue of elephant culling. Some animal welfarists arguethat it is wrong to cull elephants in Zimbabwe. There are, however, otheranimal welfarists who take a moderate point of view and argue thatelephant culling is justified in order to protect their habitat. On the otherhand, conservationists argue that it is justified to cull surplus elephant76P. TOM 77population in cases where they threaten biodiversity. This article arguesthat, since elephants do not just live in forests or parks but in a social,economic, political and ecological environment, it is necessary to examinehow surplus elephant populations affect the lives of human beings livingin this environment. It will argue that, if culling benefits both humanbeings and the environment, then it is morally justified. However, thearticle will also argue that the animal welfarists' point of view should notbe discounted since it is important that elephants should not be made tosuffer unnecessarily in the culling process.ANIMAL WELFARISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL CONSIDERATIONOF INTERESTSAnimal welfarists are primarily concerned with the well-being of all animalsthat are sentient, that is, animals that can suffer or experience enjoyment.Animal welfarists argue that animals, like human beings, want to avoidpain. Therefore, human beings should not act in such a way as to causeunnecessary pain to these sentient non-human beings as this is immoral.Thus, the animal welfarists extend the utilitarian principle of equalconsideration of interests to sentient non-human creatures.According to Singer, the principle of equality states that all humansare equal regardless of race, sex, age, or nationality. In response to theargument that not all human beings are equal because they differ in theirphysical features, intellectual capacity, and moral principles, Singer arguesthat "we should make it clear that the claim to equality does not dependon intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength or similar matters offact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact" (Singer, 1986,220). He views the principle of equal consideration of interests of humanbeings as central to the way in which human beings ought to treat eachother, but more significantly, he maintains that the principle should alsobe extended to non-human animals, which also feel pain as human beingsdo.Similarly, Bentham argued that, if animals have a capacity to feel painand pleasure, then they should be subject to the same moral law of equalconsideration of interests that applies to human beings, for "the questionis not, can they [animals] reason? Nor can they talk? But can they suffer?"(Singer, 1986, 221). From this perspective, animal welfarists argue that, ifinflicting pain on a human being is morally wrong because of the sufferingit causes to that person, then it is also wrong to inflict pain on a sentientnon-human animal because of the suffering this causes to that animal.Thus, for animal welfarists the criterion for moral standing is sentiency,for everything that has a capacity to feel pain and pleasure has moralstanding.78 THE DEBATE OVER ELEPHANT CULLINGThe principle of equal consideration implies that human beings'conduct towards animals should not depend on what they are like, orwhat abilities they have, but on their capacity to suffer. In her article,"Immoral and Moral uses of Animals", Christina Hoff has argued that thecapacity for suffering confers a minimal prima facie moral status to anycreature. Therefore, anyone who is wantonly cruel to a sentient creaturewrongs that creature. Thus, for Hoff and other animal welfarists, objects,which do not have the capacity to feel pain and pleasure, are excludedfrom this moral domain, for objects such as trees, habitats, soils andmountains only matter in so far as they promote the well-being of individualsentient animals. Their preservation is essential, however, because theyprovide a suitable environment for sentient animals and, thus, enhanceanimal welfare.CONSERVATIONISM AND ELEPHANT CULLINGConservationists, on the other hand, are interested in the prevention ofthe destruction of ecosystems, species, and habitats and promotingbiodiversity. They are primarily concerned with ecological collectivesand not with individual sentient animals. This explains whyconservationists spend most of their time, energy, and resources intrying to save habitats or a species threatened with extinction and whythey advocate culling in cases where animal over-population threatenshabitats or other animal species. Conservationists are concerned withindividual sentient animals only in cases where they promote thepreservation of other species. Unlike animal welfarists, therefore,conservationists believe that moral standing should not only be limitedto sentiency, but should extend to ecological collectives.Zimbabwe's surplus elephant population is harmful, not only tonational parks such as Hwange, Victoria Falls and Gona-re-Zhou, but alsoto the rural communities where they destroy crops, human property andeven threaten human life. Because of the damage elephants are causingin the communal areas, development has been retarded and the localcommunities have developed a negative attitude towards them. It is alsoargued, for instance, that elephants have contributed to the decline inthe Zimbabwean rhino population because they are destroying theirhabitat. The surplus elephant population is, thus, disadvantaging bothhuman beings and other animal species and also destroying their ownhabitats.Conservationists in Zimbabwe have, thus, argued that it is necessaryand logical to cull the surplus elephant population in the interests ofconserving both the elephants themselves and other animal species.They maintain that elephant culling promotes human well-being andP. TOM 79development, not only by lessening the damage caused by elephants tothe communal population, but also by generating revenue for thecommunities from the sale of ivory and other elephant products, as wellas providing meat to the local communities. It is further contended that,when local communities are compensated, they are motivated to conservewildlife and desist from poaching, as they realise that the wildlife in theirareas has economic value. Consequently, the conservationists insist thatit is necessary to sacrifice some elephants in order to preserve thespecies.ARGUMENTS AGAINST CULLINGBecause animal welfarists are concerned with individual sentient animals,they strongly oppose elephant culling because it is undue cruelty toelephants. Such animal welfarists like John Hoyt and Cynthia Moss aswell as organisations that advocate animal welfarism, such as the HumaneSociety International and the Humane Society of the United States, arevery vocal critics of elephant culling. Hoyt and Moss argue from a moralpoint of view that elephant culling causes intolerable suffering to thesesentient beings, and since human beings have a moral obligation not tocause pain to these animals, it is wrong to cull elephants. Hoyt arguesthat elephants are animals with complex social relations and killing someof them may disrupt these relations and this is likely to cause a great dealof suffering to the surviving elephants.Some animal welfarists argue that the ecological collectives that theconservationists insist should be protected from destruction by elephants,have no interests and, therefore, do not have any moral standing. Others,however, take a more moderate position and accept that, in cases whereelephants threaten their habitat and that of other sentient creatures, it isnot always wrong to cull some of them. This point of view makes sense,for if elephants are allowed to destroy their habitat, they will starve todeath and, therefore, might experience a great deal of suffering, the verything that welfarists are trying to avoid. Culling is therefore necessaryand morally justified in order to avoid greater suffering of elephants andother creatures. Whilst the claim that we ought to avoid inflicting pain onthe elephants as they are sentient creatures makes sense, the view that itis always wrong to cull elephants is not sustainable, for as already argued,uncontrolled elephant populations inevitably destroy the communalpeople's livelihoods.CONCLUSIONAnimal welfarists who take the extremist position that all culling is immoralover-emphasise sentiency at the expense of other considerations, such80 THE DEBATE OVER ELEPHANT CULLINGas human well-being and the need to conserve other animal species.However, conservationists should not totally ignore animal welfarists'concerns and ensure that elephants do not suffer unnecessarily duringculling exercises. Elephant culling in Zimbabwe is, thus, necessary andjustified provided those who cull the animals take care to spare them anyunncessary suffering.ReferencesADAMS J. S. AND MCSHANE T. O. (1992) The Myth of Wild Africa: ConservationWithout Illusion (New York, W. W. Nortaton).ATTFIELD, R. 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