Zambezia (2002), XXIX (ii)The Theory and Practice of Governance ofWater Resources in Zimbabwe1EMMANUEL MANZUNGU AND KRASPOSY KUIINGADepartment of Soil Science and Agricultural Engineering, Uniivrsity ofZimbabweAbstractSince independence in 1980, agricultural land reform in Zimbalnve has been andcontinues to receive extensive discussion, although tlie question of how thedistributed land ivill be governed has not been spelt out adequately. This articleexamines the issue of governance of water resources in Zimbabuv since water andland are complementary in agricultural production. The question being addressedis whether the theory of governance of water resources, as laid out in the new waterlegislation, is leading to a betterment of the management of water resources in thecountry. The analysis is based on recorded meetings of the Save Catchment Counciland two of its subcatchments, the Odzi and Upper Save, representing the ueioinstitutions created to ensure local participation in the management of ivaterresources. The analysis focuses on the functions and responsibilities assigned tothe institutions, the power and authority that they are allowed to wield and then-capacity in relation to information, knowledge, and skill base. The article shozusthat the issue of governance of water resources in Zimbabwe is imbued or endoivedwith a lot of theory, which is difficult tofollozv in practice. For example, it has notguaranteed the empowerment of all stakeholders. There is a need to revisit some ofthe regulations to make them facilitate good governance of water resources throughstrong local participation.IntroductionSince independence in 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe has taken stepsto ensure that the formerly disadvantaged Black majority population,constituting about 99 percent of the country's 13 million people (CSO1992), access productive resources such as land and water. In this regard,land reform has been and continues to be a very prominent public issue,and has, deservedly, received extensive discussion, albeit from differenttheoretical perspectives (see for example Moyo 1986, Bakare 1993, Rukuni1994, Moyo 1995, Tshuma 1997, Mararike 2001). The question of how thedistributed resources will be governed has, however, not been spelt out1- The study was undertaken with funds made available by the Water Research Fundfor Southern Africa (WAFSA) to which the authors are most grateful.191192 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water Resourcesadequately. For example, the government-appointed Commission of Inquiryinto Appropriate Agricultural Land Tenure Systems (Rukuni 1994) did notresult in a change of governance2 of land. Today, provisions for thegovernance of land are scattered in several pieces of legislation such as theCommunal Land Act (Zimbabwe 1982), Traditional Leaders Act (Zimbabwe1998a), and Rural District Councils Act (Zimbabwe 1988). Until such a timethat the dust over the current land reform programme has settled, there islittle point in attempting to analyze the issue of how land is governed. Thisarticle, therefore, examines the issue of governance of water resources sincewater and land are complementary in agricultural production.An examination of the governance of water resources is worthwhile, asthere is a water governance crisis in the world (Global Water Partnership2000). Literature on governance of natural resources that fall into the categoryof multiple use common pool resources, such as water, has highlighted thecriticalness of putting in place clear governance structures and mechanismsin relation to the utilization of the resource. A direct relationship betweengood governance and the sustainability with which that resource is utilisedhas been suggested (see for example Ostrom 1992, Edmunds and Wollenberg2000). Good governance has also been seen as delivering political dividendsat the societal level. When people participate in decision-making over issuesaffecting them, participatory democracy is achieved (Rowlands 1996). Inturn this nurtures self-reliance and self-esteem as people feel that they areengaged in their own projects, which may lead to financial and materialrewards accruing to the participants (Hartwig 1999).The question being addressed in this article is whether the theory ofgovernance of water resources, as laid out in the Water Act (Zimbabwe1998b) and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act (Zimbabwe 1998c),has resulted in betterment of the management and use of the country'swater resources. A unique feature of the new water legislation was theprovision for involving users of water in the decision-making process,through catchment and subcatchment councils, which represented a markedimprovement from the 1976 Water Act (Zimbabwe 1976).Catchment Councils are statutory bodies created as platforms for differentstakeholders to consult and collectively manage water resources in acatchment area. Catchment boundaries straddle provincial and districtboundaries, as they are based more on the major river systems than onpolitical administrative boundaries. The country was divided into sevenThe concept of governance refers to the task or process of running a government orany other appropriate entity. Implicit if not explicit in this perspective is a call forliberalization and democratization (Hyden 1992).E. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA193catchment areas, namely Save, Sanyati, Mazowe, Runde, Mzingwane, Gwayiand Manyame (Figure 1). Each catchment area is under the management ofa catchment council that consists of the chairpersons and vice-chairpersonsof all the subcatchment councilors in the subcatchment area. This articlefocuses on how catchment and subcatchment councils, established in 1999,conduct their business.Figure 1: Save Catchment Area and its SubdivisionSAVE CATCHMENT11(0 It hiŁ TownSubcatctimant BoundaryAnalytical Framework and Methodology of the StudyAxes of the StudyGovernance of water resources is analysed in this article by juxtaposing theresponsibilities of catchment and subcatchment councils, as contained inthe legal framework, and the realities these new institutions face on the194 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water Resourcesground. This means looking at the degree of decentralization/ devolvement3of authority and responsibility to stakeholders, meant to empowercommunities to manage the resources that they use. According to Friedmann(1992) and Farrington et al (1993) an empowering approach emphasizesdecision-making autonomy, self-reliance and participatory democracy.Decision-making autonomy refers to a state where all stakeholders are ableto make crucial choices concerning their affairs or resources, which canassist them in local development (Rowlands 1996: 87). Self-reliance refers toa situation where stakeholders are able to function or direct their ownaffairs without depending financially and materially on the help of outsiders(Hartwig 1999:58). Viera (1991:17) defines direct (participatory) democracyas a process based on the stakeholder's real participation in managing,shaping and benefiting from local development.The discussion in this article revolves around two axes. First, therelationship between the state and the user community is examined, payingattention to how much space was provided for the community to pursueand protect their interests as far as water resources are concerned. Second,the intra-relationships between and among the user community arescrutinized to see how the interests of different stakeholders are reconciled.The new institutions are evaluated with respect to a) the scope of functionsand responsibilities assigned to them, b) the power and authority that theyare allowed to wield (which touches on the degree of autonomy), and c)information and knowledge (Manzungu 2002).The Study AreaThe evidence for the study was gathered from Save Catchment Council.The Save catchment area is characterised by a diversity of water uses andusers (van der Zaag, Bolding and Manzungu 2001). The Catchment CouncilThere are four forms of decentralization namely devolution, deconcentration,delegation and privatization. Devolution, which has been adopted by the Zimbabwegovernment in the management of natural resources including water, involves thecreation of subnational units of government whose activities are outside the directcontrol of central government. These local units are largely autonomous and theyconstitute distinct legal entities from the central government. Deconcentration entailsthe spreading of facilities or functions from central government to sub-units in aneffort to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of a delivery system. Delegationinvolves central government transferring specific duties and functions to subordinateadministrative units in the form of public corporations, regional developmentagencies and various parastatal agencies. Privatization comes about when centralgovernment or local government divest itself of responsibility for certain functionsand transfers them to public or private institutions which then perform functionsthat were previously performed by or regulated by central or local government(Manyurureni 1995).E. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA 195area covers some parts of the three provinces of Manicaland, MashonalandEast and Masvingo. There are seven Subcatchments that fall under the SaveCatchment Area, namely the Odzi, Upper Save, Lower Save, Macheke,Pungwe, Devure and Budzi (see Figure 2). Specifically the material for thestudy was gathered from the Odzi and Upper Save, which as describedbelpw, have a number of contrasting characteristics.' The Odzi Subcatchment area spans over five rural districts in Manicalandprovince, namely Nyanga, Makoni, Mutasa, Mutare and C^himanimani(Kujinga 2001). The population of the Odzi Subcatchment area varies slightlyfrom the one shown in Table 1. This is because the national census, uponwhjch the figures are based, was taken on the basis of administrativedistricts, which as already said, do not coincide with subcatchmentboundaries. For example, some parts of districts such as Chimanimani andNyanga are in Lower Save and Mazowe respectively. The Upper SaveSutycatchment area covers the rural districts of Buhera (in Manicaland),Chikomba and Hwedza (both in Mashonaland East). The population of therural districts that fall under the Upper Save and Odzi Subcatchment area isshown in Table 1.There are some 1 365 water permits with a combined volume of 660 715megalitres (ML) in the Odzi Subcatchment. The Upper Save area, on theother hand, has 232 water permits. The combined volume is 41439, which is16 times less than that of the Odzi Subcatchment.4 Figure 2 shows that thereis more commercial farming in the Odzi area.Table 1: Population Distribution in the Odzi and Upper SaveSubcatchment AreasSubcatchmentODZIUPPER SAVESource: CSO (1992)DistrictNyangaMakoniMutasaMutareChimanimaniTotalBuheraChikombaHwedzaTotalPopulation128 439242 611163 812131808110 836777506203 909124 74569 981398 6354. This information was obtained from ZINVVA headquarters.196Theory and Practice of Governance of Water ResourcesMethods ;The analysis was' based on a record of minutes of the Save CatchmentCouncil as well as the Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchment Council meetings,held'between July 1999 and November 2001. !n analysing the minutes,attention was paid to attendance at meetings by various stakeholders,content of the debates, contribution by various stakeholders and adherenceto laid down procedures. Before a presentation of the summary of therrifnutes, the next section looks at the framework of governance of waterresources in Zimbabwe as defined in the law.Figure 2; the Study Areas: Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchment AreasUPPER SAVE s odziSUBCATCHMENTS :Government Structures and Mechanisms of Water Resources inZimbabweCatchment CouncilsCatchment Councils are established by the Minister of Rural Resources andWater Development, in consultation with the Zimbabwe National WaterAuthority (ZINWA), a parastatal formed after the passing of the ZINWAE. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA 197Act [Chapter 20:25] in 1998.5 According to the Water Act [Chapter 20:24], itis the responsibility of the minister to:Ł Fix the number of members representing water users in the river systemwho shall constitute the Catchment Council and the manner in whichthey are elected or appointed,Ł Assign a name to the Catchment Council,Ł Prescribe the procedure at the meetings by the Catchment Council indischarge of its functions, andŁ Fix the remuneration and allowances payable to members of a CatchmentCouncil from funds allocated from the Water Fund.Catchment Councils are supposed to:Ł Prepare an outline plan for its river systems,Ł Determine applications and to grant permits for water use,Ł Regulate and supervise the use of water,Ł Supervise the performance of Subcatchment Councils, andŁ Resolve conflicts among water users (Zimbabwe 2000a).Statutory instruments 33 and 47 of 2000 define a stakeholder as anyperson under the jurisdiction of the Catchment/Subcatchment Councilwho has an interest in water. In practice, the main stakeholder groupsconstituting membership of Catchment and Subcatchment Councils includeRural District Councils (RDCs), communal farmers, Zimbabwe FarmersUnion (ZFU), resettlement farmers, Small-scale Commercial Farmers (SSCF),Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union(ICFU), urban authorities, large-scale mines, small-scale mines, industryand any other stakeholder group the Subcatchment Council may identify.Subcatchment CouncilsSubcatchment Councils have jurisdiction over subcatchment areas. Thecomposition of subcatchment councils does not differ from that of catchmentcouncils. Subcatchment Councils consist of elected representatives from allthe stakeholder groups. The maximum number of the representatives percatchment or subcatchment council is 15. Stakeholder representatives onthe subcatchment councils elect their own chairperson and vice-chairpersonwho then represent them on the catchment council. The functions ofSubcatchment Councils are given as follows:Ł Regulate and supervise the exercise of permit allocation includinggroundwater use,The functions of ZINWA are to advise the Minister on the formulation of nationalpolicies and standards on water resources planning, management and development,water quality and pollution control and environmental protection, hydrology andhydrogeology, dam safety and borehole drilling and water pricing (see Zimbabwe1998b).198 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water ResourcesŁ Monitor water flows and use in a catchment council in accordance withthe respective allocations,Ł Promote catchment protection,Ł Monitor waste discharge,Ł Assist in data collection and participate in catchment planning,Ł Collect rates and fees, andŁ Collect levies (Zimbabwe 2000b).The Minister of Rural Resources and Water Development has powers toabolish a catchment council or subcatchment council, alter the area forwhich it was established and to change the membership or the name of theSubcatchment Council (Zimbabwe 1998b).Catchment Outline PlansAccording to the law, catchment outline plans should:Ł Indicate major water uses,Ł Proportion of the potential yield allocated to different water uses,Ł Indicate maximum permissible levels of exploitation of water andrelevant quality standards,Ł Phasing of any development and priority of that proposed development,Ł State the relationship of the development proposals with neighboringriver systems,Ł Identify reserved areas for dams and water for future use and benefit forthe environment,Ł Indicate priorities in utilization and allocation of water taking into aCatchment Councilor policy guidelines provided by the minister, andŁ Provide for changes in priorities of use due to the availability of wateror social or economical priorities (Zimbabwe 1998b).The Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development approvescatchment outline plans.Operational Rules of Catchment and Smbcatchment CouncilsThe operational guidelines of catchment and subcatchment councils arecontained in the Water Act and in some statutory instruments. This sectionoutlines some of these operational rules.Stakeholder representatives of the catchment and subcatchment councilsare supposed to hold office for a term of three years. Statutory instruments33 and 47 of 2000 further state that among those chosen at the inauguralgeneral meeting, one third of them have to vacate office at the first annualgeneral meeting (AGM). The other one third will vacate office at the secondAGM with the remainder vacating office at the third AGM (Zimbabwe2000a, Zimbabwe 2000b).E. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA 199If a stakeholder representative wants to resign from the catchment orsubcatchment council, he or she has to write a letter of resignation to thechairperson. A representative who absents himself from three consecutivemeetings without previously obtaining leave of the catchment orsubcatchment council, will have his/her position declared vacant.A catchment or subcatchment council is required to give notice of everymeeting to each representative, giving date, time and place of the meeting,together with the agenda, at least 14 days before the date of the meeting.Catchment and subcatchment councils are not supposed to discuss anymatter that is not on the agenda unless at least two thirds of the memberspresent agree to the matter being discussed. Two thirds of the members ofa.catchment council or subcatchment council constitute a quorum (Zimbabwe2000a, Zimbabwe 2000b).Between the 1st and 31st of October of each year, catchment councils andsubcatchment councils have to convene their AGMs. The main purpose ofeach of them to hold AGMs is to receive and consider the chairperson'sreport, consider the adoption of the financial statement of a (sub)catchmentcouncil, elect members to fill any vacancies and to transact any businessthat may be appropriate (Zimbabwe 2000a, Zimbabwe 2000b).Applications for water permits are forwarded to the catchment councilfor consideration. Applicants pay a fee of Z$2000 to ZINWA in order fortheir application forms to be processed. The various monetary paymentsare set by the Minister, in consultation with the catchment council.Statutory instrument 47 of 2000, section 14, sub-sections 1 and 2, stipulatestwo requirements which have to be fulfilled before a water permit isapproved by the catchment council. The stipulations are that:The Catchment Council shall notify... any other persons whose interestsare likely to be affected by such application and shall be given a period bywhich objections and comments may be lodged.An applicant shall be allowed time to make representations before acatchment council at a place and time and date set by the Council.The next section examines how the new water institutions have conductedtheir business.The Conduct of Catchment and Subcatchment Council BusinessAttendance at MeetingsTable 2 shows that attendance at meetings by stakeholder representativesbetween July 1999 and November 2001 was generally low. A number ofstakeholder representatives failed to attend meetings without excusingthemselves. Although some of the representatives were reprimanded forabsenteeism, none were ever dismissed for being absent for three consecutivemeetings.200 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water ResourcesTable 2: Attendance of Save Catchment Council MeetingsSubcatchment Council Percentage of Meetings AttendedOdzi 61Devure 68Budzi 42Pungwe 25Upper Save 32Lower Save 26Macheke 55Ex-officio members 38Source: Save Catchment Council RecordsOut of the seven subcatchment councils in the Save Catchment area,only three representatives attended about 50% of the scheduled meetings.None of the subcatchments had an attendance above 70%. Beyond theseaggregate figures, it is important to find out the attendance patterns of thedifferent stakeholder groups. This can be obtained by examining theattendance records of the Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchment Councilmeetings. Table 3 shows that the Odzi and Upper Save SubcatchmentCouncils meetings were generally poorly attended by all the stakeholdergroups.Table 3: Percentage Attendance of Odzi and Upper Save SubcatchmentCouncils MeetingsPercentage of Meetings AttendedSector Odzi Upper Save702129680904657N/ASource: Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchment Council RecordsBoth Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchments had only three stakeholderrepresentatives who managed to attend more than 50% of the scheduledCFUSubcatchment CouncilICFUTraditional leadershipSmall-scale irrigatorsForestryRDCsMiningZFUCity of Mutare68256035283310155315E. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA . . Ł 201meetings. In Odzi, the Commercial Farmers Union. (CFU) attended thegreatest number of meetings. The sector representatives who attendedmeetings regularly were also the same people who dominated theproceedings in both catchment and subcatchment council meetings .{seeTable 4 and 5). . , ŁŁ . . . ŁŁ..... ŁŁ.-,ŁŁThe Commercial Farmers Union recorded a low percentage of attendancein the Upper Save Subcatehment Council. The individual,representing theCFU also sits on the ZINWA Board* Which raises the, possibility of theindividual being over committed. The low number of commercial farmersin the area may also explain the low attendance.Rural District Councils in Upper Save had the highest attendance. Thiscould be attributed to the fact that both the chairperson and the vice-chairperson were stakeholder representatives from RDCs and sawthemselves as being obliged to attend most of the meetings. The attendanceof the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU), which represent Commiinalfarmersin both subcatchment councils, was average.The IssuesOverview of Contributions .; . ...;Ł:Table 4 and 5 show the pattern of contributions in the Save CatchmentCouncil and in the Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchment Councils meetings.Table 4: Stakeholder Participation in Save Catchment CouncilIssue, ',' 'Catchment finances Ł Ł Ł' 'ŁTravel and subsistenceallowancesLeviesWater PermitsOutline Plan .., . .Subcatchment reports ,TOTALSpurce: Save Catehiji^n,tFrequency of ContributionOdziiiŁ:;.;Ł. .542., 5....?. tDeviire' .0-:20.. ,00"; 13 :, Council .RecordsMacheke. o Ł21. .3 Ł ,113 : . .(%)Budzi:.o ;002,0'9,'Ł'11Pungwe0 .... ,Ł1Ł0 -1 ,02 :! Ł ;'3 ŁŁ! ŁŁ ŁLower'Save:.;Ł.(!::,,ŁŁ:'. :'Ł ' : Ł Ł00 : —.,00 \ '"T3": ŁŁ )Ł;", . Ł ' i i-'13- ŁŁ<Ł''<-:.'Ł: ,' ŁUpperSave; :0. I-'.".Ł , Ł ŁŁ i , : .0o,. ,Ł0 ,0 '"14Table 4 shows"that Odzi representatives tended to contribute in almostall the above issues. Incidentally/the chairman of the;Odzi SubcatchmentCouncil was also the'chairman of the Save Catchment Coancil..;- ,-'Ł802 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water ResourcesA number of subcatchment council representatives mainly contributedwhen it came to giving subcatchment reports as each subcatchment wasrequired to give a report at the full Save Catchment Council meeting.However, as can be seen from Table 4, not all Subcafchments were able togive reports on each and every meeting of the Catchment Council.Table 5: Number of Contributions per Stakeholder Group in the Odzi andUpper Save Subcatchment Council MeetingsIssueSubcatchment Council financesTravel and subsistence allowanceWater leviesMeeting attendanceWater permitsSectorCFUZFURDCCFURDCCFUZFUCFURDCCFUSmall-scale irrigatorsZFUOdzi13105D7330410Upper Save0011603001Source: Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchment Council RecordsMost contributions in the Odzi meetings were made by the CFUrepresentative(s). There was very little debate in the Upper SaveSubcatchment Council. It can safely be concluded that there was not muchdebate on different issues that took place in both Subcatchments.Travel and Subsistence AllowanceThe issue of travel and subsistence allowances was raised or 'debated' on anumber of occasions in the meetings of the Save Catchment Council a's wellas the Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchment Council meetings. All the threeinstitutions faced problems with paying stakeholder representative traveland subsistence allowances between July 1999 and October 2000. In facf, allfailed to hold their monthly meetings due to the unavailability of travel andsubsistence allowances. For example, the Save Catchment Council managedto hold only one meeting in 1999, after the inaugural meeting. In one of themeetings the chairperson of the Catchment Council appealed torepresentatives to use their money to come for monthly meetings. He toldE. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA 203them that their money would be reimbursed when the Catchment Councilfinds a donor.6 In time, the Swedish International Development CooperationAgency (SIDA) provided financial assistance amounting to Z$12 390 345 tothe Save Catchment Council and its affiliate Subcatchment Councils.When the Save Catchment Council and the Odzi Subcatchment Councilstarted paying travel and subsistence allowances, minimum amounts werepaid so that some of the available money could be used for other things. Atthe beginning of 2000, the Save Catchment Council paid Z$4.00/kmregardless of the mode of transport used. In February 2001, the allowancewas raised to Z$6.00/km and to Z$15.00/km for those using their ownvehicles and Z$7.50 for those who used public transport. In June 2001, theCatchment Council started paying subsistence allowances of Z$300 permeeting.7 Subsistence allowances were not paid to representatives beforebecause the Catchment Council was said not to have enough money for thepurpose. Some of the representatives of the Subcatchment Council who saton the Catchment Council complained that the allowances being paid werenot enough especially for those who used their vehicles. The chairpersonreminded them that the Catchment Council was not yet self-financing and,as such, could not afford to pay high travel and subsistence amounts.8Stakeholder representatives on the Odzi Subcatchment Council startedby receiving Z$2.00/km for transport and a sitting allowance of Z$l50.00for every meeting attended. The transport allowance was raised to Z$6.50in September 2001.9 Recorded meetings of the subcatchment revealed thatonly the chairperson raised the issue of travel and subsistence allowances.The chairperson announced the travel and subsistence allowances ratespaid to stakeholder representatives without input from the other members.There is no information about when the Upper Save Subcatchment startedpaying travel and subsistence allowances and how much each stakeholderrepresentative was paid. There was only evidence of concerns expressed byunidentified stakeholder representatives that most stakeholderrepresentatives were failing to attend meetings due to the lack of travel andsubsistence allowances. Some of the representatives said that if theseallowances could be made available, more representatives would attendmeetings.106. Minutes of the Save Catchment Council meeting held on 28 January 2000.7. See the minutes of the Save Catchment Council of February 2000, February 2001 .indJune 2001.8. Minutes of the Save Catchment Council meeting held on 23 January 2001.9. See the minutes of the Odzi Subcatchment Council meetings held on 14 March 2000and 14 September 2001.10. See the minutes of the Upper Save Subcatchment Council held on 8 August 2000 and17 August 2001.204 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water ResourcesWater PermitsThe Save Catchment Council and ZINWA agreed on the process to befollowed when applying for water permits. All subcatchment councils wouldcollect water permit application forms from ZINWA offices. People wantingto apply for water permits were required to go through the SubcatchmentCouncils. It was decided that, in order to discourage frivolous applications,prospective applicants would be required to pay a ZS2000 application fee.Subcatchment Councils were to collect the application fees and hand overthe money and the completed forms to ZINWA.11 If the application wasapproved by ZINWA, it would be passed on to the Save Catchment Councilfor possible final approval.If the catchment manager presented an application for approval, theCatchment Council chairperson simply asked the other representatives,especially those from the subcatchment area the application originated, ifthey had any objections. If there were no objections, the chairperson wouldask any two people to support the applications for approval and then aprovisional water permit would be issued to the applicant.12Water LeviesOne of the primary aims of the reform process was to make watermanagement self-financing. Commercial users are supposed to pay for thewater they use or store as well as pay a levy for the general management ofthe water sector (Dube and Swatuk 2001). The levies collected bysubcatchment councils are supposed to help them to finance their operations.ZINWA asked all subcatchment councils to collect water levies on its behalfat the rate of ZS40/ML per quarter for directly abstracted water and Z$270/ML for providing raw water from its water sources. Out of the amount eachsubcatchment council collected, it would get a commission of 7.5%.13The issue of levies and rates does not feature much in the meetings of theSave Catchment Council. Some of the representatives on the CatchmentCouncil were concerned about why subcatchment council rates weredifferent. One of the representatives suggested that, since ZINWA had auniform levy of Z$40/ML for abstraction and Z$270/ML for agreement11. See minutes of the Save Catchment Council meetings held on 29 June and 28September 2001.12. Minutes of the Save Catchment Council meeting held on 29 June 2001 show howwater permits are approved by the Save Catchment Council. At this meeting theCatchment manager presented eight water permit applications for approval fromPungwe Subcatchment Council. There were no objections from the PungweSubcatchment Council chairperson. Two representatives from different SubcatchmentCouncils supported the applications and they were approved.13. Minutes of the Save Catchment Council meeting held on 31 August 2001.E. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA 205water (water secured by a long-term contract between farmers andgovenment), subcatchment councils should also have uniform rates. TheCatchment Council chairperson rejected this suggestion.14The issue of water levies was raised a number of times in the OdziSubcatchment Council meetings. However, the chairperson mainly spokeabout this issue. Some sector representatives argued that it was importantfor the Subcatchment to educate communal stakeholders on water levies, assome were resisting paying the levies. It was agreed that the SubcatchmentCouncil should employ a training officer who would educate communalfarmers on various water issues, including the payment of levies and rates.15Some sector representatives on the Odzi Subcatchment Council said thatthey wanted to know the course of action which would be taken withrespect to water users who failed to pay ZINWA but paid the SubcatchmentCouncil. The chairperson said that it was important for the SubcatchmentCouncil to help ZINWA make all the water users pay its levies and rates, asthis money would in the end help the Subcatchment Councils when donorfunds from SIDA were terminated.16The chairperson not only dominated the discussion but also preparedthe budget, which touched on how much each water user should pay. Inthe budget presented to the subcatchment council by the chairperson, thewater rates were pegged at Z$5.00/ML for water abstraction and Z$2.00/ML for storage.17 For the year 2001, the Odzi Subcatchment Council managedto collect Z$85 989.33 as water rates.18Another issue concerning water levies raised in Odzi SubcatchmentCouncil meetings was that most of the commercial farmers with farmsinvaded by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front(ZANU PF) party supporters and those with farms designated forresettlement were no longer paying water rates. The Subcatchmentstakeholder representatives said that it would not force the commercialfarmers to pay the levies neither was it going to appeal to the invaders toacquire water permits so that they would pay levies.19The Upper Save Subcatchment Council has not been able to collect muchin levies since its area does not have many commercial water users. It didnot have measuring devices that could be used to gauge the amount ofwater used. On this issue it was decided that estimates were to be used to14. Save Catchment Council minutes of 26 January 2001, 27 April 2001 and 12 October2001.15. See minutes of the Odzi Subcatchment Council meeting held on 14 March 2000.16. See minutes of the Odzi Subcatchment Council meeting held on 9 March 2001.17. Odzi Subcatchment Council minutes for the meeting held on 13 October 2000.18. This is contained in the Odzi SCC 2001 income and expenditure statement presentedby the chairperson in the meeting of 11 January 2001.19. Odzi Subcatchment Council minutes for the meeting held in September 2001.206 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water Resourcescharge water users.20 There were no records that showed how much theSubcatchment Council was able to collect from rates in 2000 or 2001.It is important to highlight the fact that the subcatchments could havesuffered financial prejudice as the regulations outlining the level of ratesthat could be levied were only available in mid-2001. The rates that wereused, it would appear, were from the old river boards.Changing RepresentativesThis section looks at the extent to which the Catchment Council and the twoSubcatchment Councils adhered to laid down procedures such as those ofholding general meetings.The first AGMs were held in late 2001. The Upper Save held its AGM inSeptember 2001 instead of October as stipulated. The Save and Upper Save,unlike Odzi, went to great lengths in trying to follow the procedure ofholding an AGM. The outgoing chairpersons presented their reports andtabled financial statements before handing the position of chairperson tothe respective returning officers.The chairperson and vice-chairperson of Save Catchment Council wereinvited to the Upper Save AGM. The elections for the positions of chairpersonand vice-chairperson were supervised by the Save Catchment Councilchairman and his deputy.21 All the same members were allowed to stand,contrary to the provisions. A letter had been obtained from the relevantMinistry to waive the regulations for some of the members stepping down.It was curious that none of the members provided evidence that they hadbeen nominated by their constituency to stand for election.The Odzi Subcatchment Council held its AGM on the 12th of October2001. The procedure followed at this meeting was not recorded. There wasno evidence from the recorded minutes that the chairperson presented hisannual report and the financial statement of the Subcatchment Council. Thenominations for stakeholder representatives and elections for the positionsof chairperson and vice-chairperson were not recorded in the minutes.How the allocations were done is not known. In all the three cases theincumbent chairpersons retained in their positions.DiscussionTo better understand the nature of governance of water resources inZimbabwe, as represented by what is going on in the Save Catchment20. Minutes of the Upper Save Subcatchment Council meeting held on 15 September2000.21. See the minutes of the Upper Save Subcatchment Council AGM held on 19 September2001 and Save Catchment Council AGM held on 30 October 2001.E. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA 207Council and the Odzi and Upper Save Subcatchment Councils, we need torecall the analytical points given earlier on in the article as representing aframework within which to determine the effectiveness of these newinstitutions. It was argued that it was important that the new institutions beevaluated with respect to a) the scope of functions and responsibilitiesassigned to them, b) the power and authority that they were allowed towield (which touches on the degree of autonomy), and c) the information,knowledge and skill base.The discussion below centres around the issues of autonomy of theinstitutions, the capacity and competence of the different stakeholders, thedifferences between the stakeholders and the role played by contemporarypolitics in the water reform process.AutonomyGood governance of any natural resources depends on the stakeholderinstitutions, such as the catchment council and subcatchment councils inthis discussion, to act independently and to make independent decisions(Burkey 1998). The question that can be posed is to what extent were thenew institutions given space to exercise their responsibilities?Lack of financial resources by the Save Catchment Council as well as theOdzi and Upper Save Subcatchment Councils, for example, to pay traveland subsistence allowances, a reflection that the institutions were notgenerating enough income from water levies and rates, undermined theautonomy of the institutions. Consequently, they had to rely on outsidersfor financial help, which showed the lack of financial autonomy (Hartwig1999). In fact, the two subcatchment councils and the Catchment Councilitself were not in a position to discharge their responsibilities because offinancial problems. In the case of the Save Catchment Council, the problemwas that it did not receive a budgetary allocation as provided in the Act.However, it is doubtful that the Upper Save Subcatchment, even if itcollected all its dues, could finance its operations on account of the littlecommercial water use in the subcatchment, which had to do with theboundaries that had been set up. (In other words, there was not muchcommercial water use under the jurisdiction of the subcatchment). Thedetermination of boundaries, it is obvious, had financial implications.The point needs to be stressed that government officials determined theboundaries of the subcatchment in ways that compromised the autonomyof the subcatchment. The question then becomes why were the local peoplenot involved in demarcating the boundaries. It would appear that this wasconsidered to be a technical exercise in which stakeholders could notparticipate. This shows the tension between the economic-technical andsocial objectives of the reforms and how these contributed to the erosion ofthe autonomy of the new institutions (Manzungu 2001). There is also the208 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water Resourcesfact that all decisions of the Save Catchment Council and the Odzi andUpper Save Subcatchment Councils had to be sanctioned by ZINWA. Forexample, rates collection was hampered by the fact that ZINWA had notput in place the necessary regulations. In fact they were only instituted inJuly 2001, 12 months after the establishment of the institutions. The sameadministrative bottlenecks also hindered permit processing as ZINWA hadto make up its mind on the various issues.It can, therefore, be concluded that the autonomy of catchment councilsand subcatchment councils in Zimbabwe is undermined by the fact that thestate allocated to itself disproportionately huge powers, in contradistinctionto the democratic ideals of the reforms (Manzungu 2001).Capacity of StakeholdersAs noted above, the capacity of catchment and subcatchment councils tofunction effectively was negatively affected by the lack of financial resources.There are, however, other dimensions that compromised the capacity of thenew institutions, including lack of sufficient knowledge and information ofthe stakeholders concerning the various aspects.There was also the inability to adhere to laid down procedures. Forexample, none of the stakeholder representatives were replaced after missingthree meetings as stipulated in the regulations.One other area that was a problem was the number of stakeholders. Thenumber of stakeholder representatives on the catchment and subcatchmentcouncils was fixed at not more than 15. In the case of Upper Save, it wasdifficult to accommodate all the stakeholder groups. Where there washeterogeneity among the stakeholder groups this had the potential of leavingsome stakeholders without any representation (see Manzungu 2001).Stakeholder DifferencesSo far the discussion has largely focused on what was said to be the firstaxis of the discussion, that is the relationship between the state and the usercommunity. We now turn to the second axis, that of differences betweenthe user community.We notice that the socio-economic background of stakeholders determinedto a large extent their participation and contribution in the debates. Thisexplains why representatives of rural communities did not participate inthe discussions in any meaningful way. In the early stages when individualshad to pay their way to meetings, representatives could not attend meetings.They just did not have the financial resources.The problem of attendance of meetings continued even when money fortransportation was available. This suggests that something was the matterthan transportation. We suggest that the problem was that theseE. MANZUNGU and K. KUJINGA 209representatives were not really representatives - they were representingpeople who had no stake in water because of the low usage of commercialwater. There was another problem. Some of the representatives are in manycases handpicked. They therefore do not represent a constituency.Contributions in the catchment council and subcatchment councils weredominated by a few stakeholder representatives. This basically means thatthough most stakeholder representatives from different subcatchmentcouncils and different sectors attended meetings, their presence did notmake much impact. If some stakeholder representatives attend meetingsbut do not participate in the debate, that cannot be termed participation(Dube and Swatuk 2001). It is not surprising that in Odzi SubcatchmentCouncil, the CFU, which was represented by white commercial farmers,dominated in the meetings. This sector has been involved in watermanagement under the 1976 Act. The experience of the CFU stakeholderrepresentatives in water management made other representativesuncomfortable.The use of English in the meetings and the presence of White commercialfarmers with experience in water management did not provide an evenplatform for the participation of the formerly disadvantaged stakeholderssuch as communal farmers (Sithole 2001). This has hindered otherstakeholder representatives who were not fluent in English fromcontributing. This was quite unfortunate. Full participation by all stakeholderrepresentatives would have helped the water institutions get different ideason how water resources in the catchment and subcatchment areas could bemanaged efficiently and effectively. Finsterbusch and Warren (1978) callthis beneficiary participation.The above raises questions about the effectiveness of heterogeneousstakeholder representatives governing/managing natural resourcescollectively (Sithole 2001, Dube and Swatuk 2001). It would be useful ifstrategic representation was explored to ensure that the groups areempowered before they are brought together in circumstances that do notpromote their interests (Manzungu 2001). ' 'Contemporary PoliticsThe governance of water resources by catchment councils and subcatchmentcouncils has also been hampered by contemporary Zimbabwean politics.The on-going commercial farm invasions by ruling party supporters andthe controversial acquisition of farms by the government for resettlementpurposes impacted negatively on the governance of water resources bycatchment and subcatchment councils. It was difficult for catchment andsubcatchment councils to plan how to manage water resources located onsuch land. Besides, the invaders were not willing to apply for water permits.210 Theory and Practice of Governance of Water ResourcesFarmers whose farms were earmarked for acquisition also stopped payinglevies since they were unsure about what would happen next. These eventsdemonstrate clearly that water resources cannot be separated from thecontemporary body politic.ConclusionThis article has attempted to critically analyse how the latest decentralisationdrive in the water sector in Zimbabwe is promoting efficient and effectivegovernance of water resources by the catchment and subcatchment councils.It was shown that the process has not yet led to the full participation of allthe stakeholders in water resources management. Based on the evidence ofproceedings in the Save Catchment Council and the Odzi and Upper SaveSubcatchment Councils, we can say that governance of water resources inZimbabwe is yet to be clarified although it was better than the case of land.This article has shown that placing governance of natural resources inthe hands of devolved institutions does not guarantee that the differentstakeholders will all be empowered. Legislation can be put in place, whichcan theoretically state how the institutions should function, but practicealways proves otherwise. Thus, the issue of governance of water resourcesin Zimbabwe, is imbued with a lot of theory, which is difficult to follow inpractice. We therefore conclude that, though water institutions have beenin existence for over two years now, their future regarding the governanceof water resources by all stakeholder water institutions does not seem to bebright. There is a need to re-look at the legislation so that good governanceof water resources that practically empower all the stakeholders is achieved.ReferencesBAKARE, S. 1993, My Right to Land - in the Bible and in Zimbabwe: A Theology ofLand in Zimbabwe, Harare: Zimbabwe Council of Churches.CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, 1992, National Census Report, Harare: CSO.DUBE, D. 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