The Multiracial MythA. J. DixonINTRODUCTIONThere are no truly non-racial states today,if by that we mean consisting only of personsof a separate physical type with a distinctlanguage and culture. All states have somemixture of races, though in some the degreeof common identity in belonging to one raceis so widespread as to deserve the appellation ofrelatively homogeneous: among such are Japan,China, Iran, Bulgaria, Spain, Swaziland,Morocco, the Scandinavian Countries, theUnited Kingdom and Australia. This homo-geneity has usually arisen from the heterogene-ity of the past (often the distant past), from thegradual welding of peoples of different ethnicorigin into a unified society; but also, as in thevery recent case of Australia, from the migra-tion of members of an established homogeneousstate into the new land, accompanied by thesubjugation or extermination of the existingpeoples Š as in the example of Tasmania fromthe same area.My justification for describing such statesas 'non-racial' is firstly, that the citizens them-selves see their society as mono-racial ŠNordic, Arab, or Polynesian; or even (despitethe race-consciousness that has spread acrossthe world) in terms of a nationality that trans-cends obvious ethnic difference Š Chinamen,Spaniards, Canadians. And secondly that theforms of government peculiar to these statestake no account of racial difference in lawor in political structures. These governmentforms, it may be noted, run the whole gamut,from left to right, from totalitarianism toliberalism, from feudal monarchy to industrialdemocracy. And thirdly, the paradox of racialexclusiveness that all display in marked de-gree; the fact that whatever the form of govern-ment or the dominant political ideology, it isalmost as hard for people of other races toenter into full membership of these societiesas it is for the proverbial camel to pass throughthe eye of a needle. What European can beaccepted as Japanese? What African Negrocan become an Icelander? What prospectsexist for Indians in Hungary or Poland? Per-haps the best example of this exclusiveness isto be found in the modern state of Israelcreated by those same people Š the Jews Šwho have suffered most from its effects inEuropean countries.Israel, as we know, has a problem of Arabminorities, now exacerbated as a result of the1967 war, fought to maintain her own nationalidentity. The United Kingdom, too, is facingracial strains, the legacy of her Imperial pastŠ itself an assertion of national consciousness.And even Australia, almost exclusively white(if we ignore the Aborigines as Australianshave) and overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon inorigin, has an external race problem likely tobecome more critical by the end of the century.Despite these qualifications, such societies re-main mono-racial in type; the minorities area matter for political accommodation withinthe established order, not a determinant of thepolitical system.THE PLURAL SOCIETYClearly our main concern is with those othersocieties of the world where government isdivided between ethnic groups in some scale61of authority, so that political activity becomespreoccupied with racial interests.It was a now rather neglected writer, J. S.Furnivall, who first called serious attention towhat has become known as the 'Plural Society':the situation where different peoples, dividedby religion, culture, language, ethnicity, or acombination of all four, live side by side butseparately, within the same political unit.1 Inthe colonial societies of Burma and Java,Furnivall found a medley of different peopleswho mixed but never combined, who all, as hewrote, 'met in the economic sphere, the marketplace, but they lived apart and continuallytended to fall apart unless held together bythe British Government'.2 Furnivall was arguingthat under colonial rule Š British, French andDutch Š economic forces had been set freeto determine the new social order; becausehe believed such a society to be inefficient, andunmindful of social welfare, he called for achange of colonial policy to promote a com-mon social will as a prerequisite for independ-ence. Furnivall's influence on official thinkingcould have been considerable, but circumst-ances, in the shape of the Second World Warand the consequent impetus for decolonisationof most of South East Asia, overtook his hopefor a controlled experiment by the Colonialpowers. The concept of the Plural Societyremains, and the model has been held to beapplicable in other areas of the developingworld besides South East Asia, particularlyour own continent. The words 'plural' and'racial' are deemed interchangeable, though thediversity found in Asian societies was notexclusively ethnic by any means. But Furnivall'sanalysis called attention to the absence of acommon social will in these societies and otherslike them. If that was the case, how was thissort of society governed? How was it heldtogether as a political entity?The short answer is that in colonial Burmaand Indonesia, the political decisions weretaken by the European administrators inaccordance with the objectives of Britain orHolland. So the pluralistic nature of thesesocieties was not politically significant until theymoved towards the goal of independence byone means or another. Then the other groupscame to constitute a threat to each group'sinterest Š hence the search for some constitu-tional arrangement whereby a common socialwill could develop without destroying eachgroup's solidarity and their continued co-existence with the others.- In. every case thesearrangements were cast within the mould ofrepresentative government as developed in theWest.The people were not granted an opportunityto frame their own institutions; instead politicalpower became the monopoly of the largestgroup, set upon transforming society in its ownracial and cultural image.Is this then the Multiracial State? Notnecessarily. As I have said, many of the divi-sions found in plural societies arc not racialat all, but cultural or religious. India, Pakistan,and Ceylon, arc such examples. Conversely,there are plural societies where persons ofdifferent or mixed race live together withoutpolitical power becoming the monopoly of onegroup; for example, Brazil, the Soviet Union,Mexico and perhaps New Zealand.MUI.TIRACIALISM DEFINEDSo we may use 'multiracial' as a ratherinexact method of emphasising the ethniccomposition of certain plural societies. But itcan also be used to describe a certain kind ofhope, at once a constitutional programme andan ideological ambition. In that sense it cantake two forms; the first depends upon the viewthat racial difference is fundamental; thereforethe institutions of Government must allow forsome kind of 'partnership'. Relationshipsbetween members of different races arctherefore a matter for government regulation.The second, while also recognising race differ-ences, holds that these may be sublimatedwhere other conditions (for example a commit-ment to the dominant culture) are met; there-fore, there is no partnership, instead there ispromotion of a particular set of social valuesas being valid for all groups. In both formsthere are perceptions and assumptions aboutthe present condition of society, and its futureorganisation; hence in both there is a beliefabout a certain kind of State Š in short, apolitical myth.All this may seem a bit abstruse. We needto come down to earth and look at Africa itself,for it is here that we find societies committedto the 'multiracial myth'. This is not trueof all plural societies found in the continent,however. Although the Sudan is racially andculturally divided the division can be madepermanent by way of partition if all else62fails. Likewise Nigeria, where the Biafranswent some way towards achieving such a parti-tion; and also the case of the Somalis living inKenya or Ethiopia. Theoretically, at least, inthese countries government is drawn from thewhole of society; there is, in fact, MajorityRule, even though it may be the rule of theracial or tribal majority group, and even ruleby a relatively unrepresentative selection ofthat majority group. Whereas, in countriessettled by Europeans (South Africa, Rhodesiaand the Portuguese Territories) and alsoin the special case of Liberia, it is a racialminority which, under different constitu-tional forms, governs the country. To this listwe should add Kenya and Northern Rhodesia,as they were before Independence. The pointabout the racial minority, and this is whatdistinguishes it from aristocracies or oligarchiesthat have existed in many other countries ofthe world, is its physical, cultural and linguisticdistinctiveness; rather than class distinctive-ness or the relative benevolence or harshnessof its record. In these countries we have orhave had government through European institu-tions, on behalf of Europeans, in support ofEuropean values and interests; for if that werenot so, there would have been no point inestablishing those forms of government in thefirst place. The case of other immigrant races,such as the Indians in Durban or Nairobi, isdifferent Š these came, and have lived untilnow, on the premise of accepting (willingly ornot) the forms of government then existing, orwhich developed subsequently.It really is a question of Black and White,then; in Southern Africa the 'multi' in multi-racial means 'two', rather than 'many'. Afellow lecturer has reminded me that had therebeen no indigenous population of any size inwhat is now Rhodesia, this country and itssocial, political and economic situation wouldtoday be much like that of New Zealand, withits Welfare State, Labour Parly and all. Instead,here as in South Africa, the racial minorityrules in a plural society, and thereby lies thecrux of our contemporary problems. Theminority (or the greater part of it) will bepleased to continue this political arrangement,but social forces in the modern world havealready destroyed such a prospect in othercountries, and are making it increasingly un-tenable in our own.Indeed, the conflict of interests betweenrulers and ruled is now so fundamental andextensive that the description of 'two nations'is far more apposite to our own condition thanit was for nineteenth century England. Unlesstheir interests can be protected, the minorityhas no reason for existence in the SouthernAfrican environment; they will lose their indivi-dual and collective identities. In seeking topreserve these identities, the minority sustainsitself by the potent myth of multiracialism.VARIETIES OF MULTIRACIALISMMyths are not the same as dreams: thetime is long gone when genocide, the exter-mination of another nation or race as a separateentity, could be contemplated as a practicalsolution to the clash of racial interest. Butit is as well to remember in passing, that welive in a world where the vaporisation of wholecities and continental populations is an acceptedforeign policy option; and this in our existingstate of scientific and technological achieve-ment.As multiracialism as a form of governmentloses support, even the threat of genocide mightprove a powerful deterrent to alternative pro-positions; international indifference to thehaphazard massacres of thousands of unfortun-ate Hutu tribcspeople in Burundi Š the resultof a conflict of interests at least partially racialŠ is a blood-stained signpost in that direction.But to return to our main argument, thesearch for some multiracial accommodation inSouthern Africa takes a number of differentforms. The present Rhodesian constitution en-shrines the notion of Parity, sooner or Š inthis case Š later, and the thinking behind itcan be found in the Whaley Report. Because'perpetual or ultimate domination by one raceor ethnic group over another' is rejected,a country's constitution has the purpose ofensuring harmony between the differentgroups, by means of racial parity of politicalrepresentation.3 Political competition betweenthe races is potentially destructive; there-fore it must be avoided; this can be doneby giving equal weighting to the political powerof each race. This is Parity and when it isachieved mistrust and fears will be removedand racial co-operation becomes possible. Cen-tral to this reasoning is the rejection of repre-sentation on anything close to a proportionatebasis; the equal right of individuals of differ-ent race to co-exist in the same political unit, is63translated into an equal share of the politicalcake for each racial group. Whatever the logicof this deduction, it is arguable that Jhere issome very rough and ready 'balance' betweenthe preponderance of numbers on the onehand and the near monopoly of skills andexperience on the other. The problem withParity is that if it is to be expected to createracial co-operation and harmony then it mustextend far beyond a division of seats in theNational Assembly; at the very least into theCabinet, the judiciary and the wholeof the central government administration in-cluding the Armed Forces; otherwise theseinstitutions will continue to be the preserveof the dominant minority. There must alsobe at least an equal cut of the economic andfinancial cake, and the meaning of 'equal' hereis fraught with difficulties. How equal is $20million to each race for education serviceswhen the same amount of money has to bespent on ten times as many people? How equalis 45,000,000 acres of land each in terms ofpopulation pressure and economic potential?Consider these points in the context of SouthAfrica rather than Rhodesia and you can ap-preciate that to give any substance to the Parityconcept amounts to nothing less than a socialand economic revolution.Whatever the extent of Parity, at whateverpace it is to be attained, it rests upon yetanother belief, that social behaviour can bedifferentiated in terms of one's own racialgroup; that all people of the same race havea full identity of political interests. Althoughthis is patently untrue (otherwise, why imposebanning orders, expulsions, restrictions onmembers of the dominant racial minority?) itserves as the basis of another form of multi-racial government: Apartheid or SeparateDevelopment, the partition of the State betweenthe various racial groups in order that all canlive apart from each other, in a peace con-trolled by the dominant group. In such a state,there is, in contrast with the design for racialParity, no overlapping membership between thegroups, and so no federation of separate orequal political units. Of course, it may be poli-tically expedient, as in South Africa and SouthWest Africa today, to encourage the same unitsto become fully independent, but that is com-plete partition, a likely but not inevitabledevelopment of multiracialism.What is it then, that cements the Apartheidsociety together with any permanency? It canonly be the continued rule of the dominant,white minority, purged of its more extremeracist ideology, perhaps willing even to absorba minority smaller than itself, such as the CapeColoureds, but always keeping the power offinal decision-making in its own, civilised,hands. As Sir de Villiers Graaff said in 1969:The real interests of South Africa as awhole, as well as of the races constitut-ing South Africa can best be served andadvanced by the leadership of the Whitegroup. Why should we deny that leader-ship to the people of South Africa?4So the racial homelands are the continuingexpressions of that leadership role; howevereconomically viable they may become, they area white, and not a black, creation. Even withthe financial and technological means to realisetheir highest potential, their existence is seenas constituting a denial of the black man'sidentity.It is Portugal's claim that in her Africanterritories social discrimination based on racialdifferences is not allowed. Since Angola andMozambique appear to be launched, howeverhesitantly, on the road to full autonomy, canthese be the truly multiracial states of thefuture? Certainly individual race relations arenot regulated by the State, and there does notappear to be any deliberate physical or econo-mic segregation. But Portuguese colonial policyhas never imagined any alternative to whiterule; the validity of traditional African societyhas been rejected in favour of assimilationto Portuguese institutions; miscegenation de-rives not from colour blindness but colourconsciousness, from the belief in lighter skincolour as a mark of political respectability.Consequently while there is no Apartheid, thereis no Parity either, only the dominance of oneracial group and its culture to the exclusionof any other. In these territories the over-whelming majority Š 95 per cent in Angola,97 in Mozambique Š are of the negro race;only a handful of these, together with the3-5 per cent of European and Mixed Race(Mesticos) play a role in political decision-making as a function of their cultural commit-ment; simply being a member of the Africansociety of these territories is no ground fortaking part in their government. Portugueselike to point to Brazil as the model for their64African States (as they are now officially de-signated) but in that country traditional societyhas been all but obliterated: the indigenousIndians constitute only 3 per cent of the popula-tions while persons of European descent ac-count for over 63 per cent, bound to those ofmixed and African blood by common ties ofculture and religion. However unrepresentativeBrazilian Government may be, most Brazilianshave some means to promote or protect theirshared interests. The African in Mozambiqueor Angola will never enjoy such opportunityunless there is a conscious policy for economicand social advancement; advancement which,as has been the case elsewhere in plural societiesof Africa, can occur only at the expense ofthe non-African minorities.CONCLUSIONTo summarise, the multiracial state is aEuropean vision, designed to protect the whiteminority in perpetuity. Whatever its form, itsees the African in the role of the learner, thesupplicant for white values in a world of whiteinstitutions. Separate Development, Integration,Partnership, Assimilation, are all varieties ofthe same myth. Mr. Smith's 'ResponsibleMajority Rule' is just one more to be addedto the list. At the heart of this myth is aconcept of Africans, or what Africans mightbecome, expressed in these words of the liberalSir John Moffat in 1959 calling for an harmoni-ous multiracial state in Northern Rhodesia:a genuine partnership between the races. . . can develop only ... by educationand by closing the cultural and econo-mic gap between the races. We need... a large and prosperous Africanmiddle class . . . [and the creation of]group loyalties based on common in-terests which cut across race.Today, independence under an Africangovernment is enjoyed in a Zambia that dis-plays anything but harmonious race relations.That country demonstrates the truth aboutmajority rule, that as Ali Mazrui has pointedout, it is an ethnic, and not a democratic, con-ception.5 In 1965, just before U.D.I., leadersof the European community in Kenya, such asMichael Blundell and Humphrey Slade, senta message to Ian Smith, telling him that lifefor Whites under a Black Government was notso bad after all. 'Come on in', they said, 'thewater's fine.'7 But Mr Smith has remained,resolutely, a non-swimmer. The point is thatmultiracialism is not achieved by the removalof racial discrimination; Blundell, Moffat andmany others thought so, but surely GeneralAmin has finally disillusioned them. For Afri-cans engaged in discovering their own identity,it is the principle of Racial Sovereignty that isimportant, so important indeed that in assert-ing it, the suffering caused to themselves mayrival the excesses of the Slave Trade.I have just been re-reading the 1955 Hand-book of the now defunct Capricorn Society,with a crest of a zebra on a background ofAfrica. It is explained that, 'the crest symboliseshow each race is dependent on the other.Although the Zebra has both black and whitestripes, it is one living organism and has butone heart. If a bullet pierces the zebra, theharm to the animal is the same whether thebullet has entered through the black, brownor white part of his skin'.8According to the ecologists, unless we actquickly, there will be no zebras left alive inAfrica. But the logic of conservation makeslittle impression on African peasants in needof food and living space. Likewise withoutco-operation from the majority, the multiracialzebra has no chance Š he must face immediateextinction or a slow death in some Europeanzoo.REFERENCES^Colonial Policy and Practice. Cambridge, Univ. Press, 1948, especially pp.303-12.zjbid., p. 123.sRhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Commission 1968 [W. R. Whaley, Chairman], Salisbury, GovernmentPrinter, 1968, p.ll."Quoted in H. Adam, Modernising Racial Domination, Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1971, p.59.sSir John Moffat, 'The function of the state in Northern Rhodesia', in Rhodesia, The Development of a Multi-racial State, ed. O. Prescott, [Lusaka] The United Northern Rhodesia Association, 1959, Proceedings of StudyConference No. 3, p.21.s'On the principle of racial sovereignty', in A. A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana, London, Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1967, pp.21-41.?For Blundell's approach, see East African Standard, 22.X.1965.eThe Capricorn Africa Society, Handbook for Speakers, Salisbury, 1955, answer to question A15.65