Regional Cooperation and Socialist Transformation in Southern Africa: Lessons for independent Namibia by Ngila Mwase Introduction Among the problems facing the less developed countries (LDCs) is heavy financial, technical and enterpreneurial dependence on the industrialised world. These exploitative dependency relationships are deepened by the LDC's limited internal market, coupled with low effective demand, both of which partly account for slow, if any industrialisation. This somewhat "vicious circule" is exacerbated by non-revolutionised economic structures, whereby nations produce what they do not consume and consume what they do not produce. In 1974, Thomas argued for a reversal of this situation in which case African economies would produce what they consume.! One of the options out of this predicament has been regional economic integration. This, it was hoped, would facilitate the attainment of economies of scale, rationalise location and relocation of production units, encourage specialisation in production and pnhance industrial efficiency. Regional groupings were furthermore expected to help reduce national autarchy, external dependence, and vulnerability of African ('conomie~, boost their boo ~aining power vis-a-vis the outside world, accelerate :-'outh-:-'outh "collective self-reliance" and be the prelude for eventual political unification. They could indeed provide a springboard for the Thomas kind of structural transformation to set the economy on a "transition to socialism".2 Integration Benefits States form various types of economic integration schemes i.e. Common Markets in search of the following actual and potential benefits: I. greater bargaining power 2. minimisation of duplication and wasteful competition 3. a cheaper and more efficient transportation system 4. expansion of trade, incomes and employment due to the free movement of goods labour and specialisation in production 5. greater division of labour and specialisation in production 6. greater possibilities of technological advance and innovation In connection with (I) it is important to note that while cou~tries like Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania can make a vigorous attempt to bargam, there are other countries, land-locked and/or too poor to make their voices heard, and accept the 'status quo' or a costly compromise more out of hopelessness than chOice. In a way their hopelessness is not very different from that of the "bu~fer st~tes" of Leso~ho, Swaziland and to some extent Botswana with regard to relations with South Africa. Hence the need for a community-approach. The dictum "we mus hang together or we 45 will be hun~ separately still holds.,,3 Indeed Green and Seidman have i~ Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (1968) argued that Jomt mter-~ta~e projects in Africa would open better prospects for overc.ommg the RegIon s dependence on the Metropoles. With respect to (2), it could be noted that because of the large number of small states in Africa and their low purchasing power, the individual domestIc mar~ets pro~lde neither the capital nor the optimum markets especially. for basic. industries e.g. Iron and steel, industrial and farm machinery, heavy chemICal, fertlllser, electrical and transport equipment, etc., which are critical for the structural transformatIOn of African \ economies. This is neither a question of foreign versus local enterprise, nor of public versus private concerns dimensions, but simply the technical problem that small MPckets in a non-revolutionarised LDC-type economies do not permit certam types of products to be produced at anything less than prohibitive costs. A restructured economy and a revolutionary people whose purchases are geared to the domestic market can make quite some difference in this regard. With respect to point (3) it can be stated that the 24 land-locked African States face high transport costs becA(je of the greater "economic distance" to world markets and the constraints of transport arteries through her neighbours some of whICh like the minority re~imes in Southern Africa are hostile and/or have to be boycotted. Zambia, for example, has as Hall (J 969) verified, paid a high price in her transport diversion northwards especially through Tanzania, conditioned by the changing political scene in Southern Africa of the past two decades. The very essence of the nine-nation Gaborone-based Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is to reduce dependency on the South African transport outlets. The number of neighbours per land-locked State in Africa rAl';;es from one (Lesotho) to eight (Zambia). Bilateral agreements or joint provision and administration of transport facilities as in the Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA)4 have been r(sorted to, to reduce the 3.dverse impacts, giv,~ the land-locked state some leverage on its "gateway" to the sea5, and lay a basis for greater cooperation in the future when there could be no trade barriers. The Major African Economic Groupings The UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) had since its inception in 1958 and especially in the early 19605, promoted the idea of wider economic communities in Africa •. H~wever, the UNECA had until lately fallen into complacency following the formation In 1967 of the then much-acclaimed East African Community. More recent UNECA efforts .e~ially through its Gisenyi, Yaounde-Niamey- Tangiers and Lusaka-based MultInational Programming and Operation Centres (MULPOCs) have led to the launching of the 15-nation Lagos-based ECOWAS and the Lusaka-headquartered Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The former, embracing all th~ Angloph~e ~nd Fr~ncophone states in the West African sub-region ranges from t~ mighty and oll-nch Nigeria to the poverty-stricken Sahelian states such as Mali, Niger and Upper .V?lta. Surviving alongside ECOW AS are smaller economic groupings suc~ ~s the AbldJan-~ Conseil de L 'Entete grouping Marxis~-oriented Benin, c';:lt?lIst Ivory Coast, Niger, ~~o and '!pper Volta; and the Mano River Union of L .ena and Sierra Leone. ThnvIng too IS the Bangui-seated customs and Economic g:.Of Central Africa grouping Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Congo and The ~t interestillll: integration schemes however are in the Eastern African sub-region. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have had until lately close economic ties dating back to the 1920s. In 1967 this integration scheme developed into the East African Community (ECA) - a Common Market coupled with shared common services of a transport and communications nature.6 Four statutory corporations were established to administer on commercial principles shared rail, harbour, airways and posts and telecommunications. If neither Rome was built, nor the Treaty of Rome implemented in a day, the ECA, despite its comparative youth, was in some respects more advanced than the European Economic Community (EEC) havinR from outset adopted a common external tariff, abolished internal tariffs with the sole exception of transfer taxes7 (in the short-run), and operated joint economic services etc. Serious industrial imbalances between Kenya and her less-industrialised partners reflected in deficits in inter-state trade were experienced. In the case of Tanzania the ratio of imports to exports (vis-a-vis the Common Market) was 4:1 in 1962, 8:1 (967), 4: I (J 974) and 3: I (977). Failure to redress these imbalnaces coupled with dIfferent economic policies underlying their divergent development paths led to continued dissatisfaction which reached a crisis situation in the mid-1970s with unilateral break of the provisIOns of the EAC Treaty, a futile attempt to save the EAC from collapse through the Demas Treaty Review CommiSSion 0975-75)8 and the subsequent disintegration and collapse in April 1977.9 In East Africa both economIc cooperatIOn and the federal aspiratlOns,IO which were viewed as two Sides of the same coin, are at their lowest ebb. Despite these setbacks Regional economic groupings at various stages of development are emerging. They include the SADCC and the PT A. The former established in 1980 soon after Zimbabwe's independence is geared at Increased economic and technical cooperation through the promotion and coordination of industrial, agricultural, energy, trade and particularly transport links amongst themselves and with the countries to the north to counterbalance ItS present dIsproportionate dependence on South Africa. A full-fledged SADCC CommiSSion on Transport and CommunicatIOns hasf'rl In Maputo has the task of re-routing the rad and road traffic towards the Mozambican and Angolan outlets. This entails rehabilitation of networks destroyed dUring the (ongoing) liberation wars in the sub-region. The continued damage of bridges, pipelines, rail tracks etc., by the UNIT A and "M07amblQue NatIOnal ReSistance" (MNR) in Angola and Mozambique respectively, not to mention South Africa's own destabdlsation offensive makes the Commission's task not only difficult and costly, but absolutely necessary. Indeed the SADCC could as Seidman and Makgeta (J 980) have noted, be a prelude to the liberation of Namibia and South Africa itself, which would increase the potential for rapid regional transformation by building on its extensIVe industrial base. The PTA, a branchild of UNECA Chief, Professor Adebayo Adedeji has a potential membership of 18 states, 14 of which are already members.!1 With the EAC failure and economic integration difficulties elsewhere especially In Latin America i.e. the Andean Pact, It is doubtful whether such a conventional Vinerian free trade approach emphasismg the removal of trade and other barriers and downplaying political and other associated constraints can withstand the test of time. Tanzania, despite her strong Pan-African ideals, found the PT A gains less appealing than the pressure of the border closure (closed since the EAC collapse in 1977) on Kenya to seriously negotiate the distribution of assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC. In the final settlement Kenya is expected to pay both Tanzania and Uganda. Membership of, and adherence to the PT A Treaty would have forced Tanzania to re-open the border with Kenya, which is critical for intra-pTA trade.l2 Tanzania's membership would not only have allowed such mter-stateioint ventures, like the EADB and the T AZARA to be expanded and transformed into spring boards for PT A cooperation purposes, but would also have added the significant moral force of Tanzania and its President to supplement the economic muscle represented by the economically stronger members such as Zimbabwe. However such large economic groupings as ECOWAS, SADCC and PT A are milestones towards the OAU LaRos Plan of Action target of an "economlcal!y UnIfIed, self-reliant continent by the year 2000". Because of their relatively large SIzes, these economIC Rroupings have the potential to overcome the limited markets that handIcap most of the countries individually. Arrangements are under way to institute structural and operational reorganisation of the Kampala-based East African Development Bank (EAOO) entalhnR ItS.expansIOn mto a PTA Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank. ThIs could ensure more funds for the poorer partners and an avenue for financial arrangements and multilateral settlement among the banks perhaps along the lines of the West Afncan ClearinR House, which could boost inter-state trade. Such a ClearmR House could help to promote: 1. the utilisation of the currencies of the member states for sub-regional trade and other transactions, 2. economies in the utilisation of foreign reserves of the member states, 3. trade liberalisation in the sub-reRion, 4. monetary cooperation and consultation among members, 5. harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies However, the EADB cannot be transformed into such a Bank without one of its shareholders, Tanzania, joining the PTA. The PTA Treaty provides for the establishment of a PTA Payments and Clearing House. Initially one Central Bank of a PTA member state will perform this function. 13 The Unequal Distribution of Benefits As argued elsewhere (Mwase 1978) economic cooperation between partner states with geoRraphical proximity, but differing levels of economic and social underdevelopment, not to mention structural and ideological differences, have had distribution problems of benefits with greater gains accruing to the partner able to attract more investments. Such a partner has greater internal and external economies of scale, better physical and social infrastructure, higher levels of industrial growth, etc. Such was the case with economic cooperation in East Africa. Kenya (the "white HiRhlands" and Nairobi in particular) with its concentration and centralisation of "superiors" economic, social and infrastructural facilities, experienced greater "spread effects". Kenya appropriated the lion's share of the benefits and the rather autarchic checks to redress the imbalances might have been at the expense of growth in East Africa as a whole. Nor is this inequality reflected mostly in industrial imbalances and trade deficits for the less industrialised a result of mere arbitrary decision-taking. Indeed such perpetu,,:l ConcentratIon of. benefIts IS ~ necessary cost of trying to build a Common Marke~ In a capltal1st settmg. These Imbalanced, exploitative, geographical relations are neither accidental nor easily compensatable. Th-:re are ~erefore several ways at which individual countries Can look at a joint prOject and Its revenue in an integration scheme: 1. The project can be viewed, and sometimes is, erroneously, as an entirely e¥ternaJ organisation (compare the balance of payments, with the project as a foreign country), 2. since it is jointly owned, it could be regarded by each country as one half Internal and the other external, 3. it can be regarded as internal, provided that such country has its own revenue target i.e. the costs and revenue are attributed to each country. The virtual adoption of case (a) position by the individual countries was central to the disintegration and break-up of the EAC Corporations especially the East African RaJiways Corporation, which paved the way for the Community's own demise. Theoretically at. least, the question of these imbalances could be resolved in four different ways: 1. the proportional distribution of any benefits according to the differential growth rates of the various national economies, 2. the redistributIOn of the benefits in favour of the poorer and slower growing economies, 3. the "uncontr'JlIed" sharing of benefits, whereby the lion's share accrued to the strongest and fastest growing national economy, ~. the equal distributIOn of costs and benefits. In East Africa recognising the unequal benefit accruals that charactensed the EAC predecessors, the 1967 EAC Treaty for East African Cooperation officially adopted option (2) above; but it seems Kenya did not wholly accept the logic oj this distributional devise which would have meant that she would have to "mark time".l4 She would have preferred option (1); her non-adherence to the Treaty and general intrasigence was partly responsible for the actual benefits and costs distribution which approximated option (3). Other "like-mindedness" cooperation ventures like the TAZARA have opted for alternative (4) above. Here the sharing of the expenses including loan repayment is on a 50-50 basis.l5 The unequal access to Common Market benefits is partly a feature of the historical structural imbalances; evolving partly from differential resource endowments and colonial policies. For example, Zimbabwe and Harare in particular - like Kenya and Nairobi in the EAC case - is the SADCC's hub of commerce and industry. With such a concentration of economic activities, the free play of market forces (includinR factor mobility) could especially if it ensured high growth rates, further strenRthen the general agglomeration advantages. On the other hand strict Government -directed industrial programminR cannot be accepted given the market-orientation of numerous capitalist-oriented economies. There is therefore the need to balance benefit accruals vis-a-vis coverall growth. This includes the overall question of which imports the stronger partner (e.g. Zimbabwe in SADCC) could bring in from its weaker partners, even at the cost of not establishing certain industries of their own even If they had a comparative advantage therein. This would further entail granting. each other tariff and import quota abolition or reductions, etc, thereby furthenng not only the industrialisation of the junior partners but also reducing the industrial imbalance. The EADB contained provisions for a bias to the less industrialised partners in its loan offers. Of the funds to be invested, 22+'-' had to be invested in Kenya and 3~ in each 49 of the other partner states. If the envisa~ed PT A Bank can, as ih the case of the CARIFTA Development Bank, favour the weaker partners both in its contributions to the Bank's equity capital and ~ranting of loans,. it can redress the. lni2uahty In accessibility to the benefits of the Bank and by ImpltcatlOn the Commumty. Other Regional Cooperation Problems Economic cooperation problems are compounded by the differences between the inte~rating states. The SADCC and PTA states (Appendix 2) for example are dissimilar in size, economic set-up, potential and level of development, Ideology and politics. AnF;ola for example is 72 times as large as Swaziland. Population density ranges from 43.9 people/sq km. for Malawi to 1.2 people/sq. km. for Botswana. As in the EAC case some SADCC countries offer Western-oriented African capitalism (Swaziland, Malawi, Lesotho and Botswana) in contrast to socialist-oriented policies (Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The former group of countries will be more eager to give greater concessions to external capital and their local accomplices than AnF;ola, Mozambique or Tanzania. Such divergent inclination is not a good omen for industrial Cooperation (as envisaged in SADCC) or the harmonisation of fiscal inventives. The problem of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) member states in this regard has been well summarised by Landed-Mills: In joining the Customs Union, these countries effectively forfeit control of indirect taxation, which is normally a very important fiscal tool in developing countries. It is beyond dispute that the tariff is determined by the economic needs and social philosophy of the. Republic of South Africa, which are not the same as those of BLS (1971)17 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS countries) are members of the South African-dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU).I8 It entaJls abolition of trade barriers within the Union and the imposition of a common external tariff. Both Lesotho and Swaziland are also members of the Pretona-control1ed Rand Monetary Area. Although the two countries have their own currenCIes, they are wholly backed up by the Rand which also circulate in these two countries. The BLS countnes perceive tangible economic benefits in these links and are unlikely to "disengage" without compensatory arrangements.19 The SADCC countries membership of different organisations is Indicative of their differences and affects in particular their external relations especial1y with the donors. . The problems of SADCC projects funding from the European Economic Community (EEC) due to Angola and Mozambique's non-membership of the EEC-ACP groupmg. (u~r the ~EC-African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries Lome ~nventl~) IS a c~ m point.20 The SADCC states attained their independence at different times, startmg With mamland Tanzania in 1961 to Zimbabwe in 1980. Their forms of Government differ from Marxian one-party Republics (Angola and MO~blque) to <:onstl~~tlOnaJ.and absolute monarchies represented by Lesotho and SWazl~andrespectively. Unltke East Africa which shared the same British colonial expenen<::. which meant more or less the same legal, legislative, administrative and com~ercl c?"tro~, the SADCC states harbour German, British and Portu uese ~~~a1 SI~~!es bke ~iUerent "lingua franca" and administrative norms. IngEast arwJ/ca, t~ ~ ~as ~ widely spoken I~uage and most leaders went through Makerere ~~ := EngI~5peaki Olverslty. of East AfriCa. . Although some of the leaders of the E~ ~:oc~ in South Afri ng C?otmtrtesof Southern Afnca went through the Fort Hare University were ~ leaders backgr~s are more dissimilar than Appendix 2 indicates are even mor~terogThe PTA countnes and their Governments as eneotJs. The transport issue is quite complicated. Five of the nine railway gau~es in use In Africa are for very small railway lines and therefore unimportant vis-a-vis regional Integration. However the imperial gauge (found in ex-British, - Bel~ium and Portuguese colonies) and the metre gauge (used in ex-French colonies) cause great difficulty. The latter was used In "German East Africa" (e.g. Tanzania). Since the TAZARA gauge IS the former type, the entire network from Cape Town to Oar-es-Salaam is now on the same gauge, but politics hinder the possibility of a Oar-Cape Town train drive. We could note that even af,er South African apartheid is wIped out problems reminiscent of the one preventing Kenya-Tanzania transport links could stIli ar ise. In 1974 to avert road damage Tanzania halted Kenyan traffic through Tanzania by I1mltln~ road transport vehicles to 19.4 tons, without a trailer, making the traffic uneconomic. Kenya lost the route altogether with the Kenya-Tanzania border closure In February 1977. Indeed inter-state freight haulage has long been a subject of Inter-territorial licensing. As far back as 1969 the EIU documented the fear both by Uganda and Tanzania that: free movement would result in far more movement of vehicles licensed in r o.Vl 0 0'> '" '" " " <:t- O'> 00 It'\ It'\ " \D \D " \D" 0 00 <:t- 00 It'\ OO 0 '" 0 0'> - N It'\ " 00" 0'> - '"- '" - <:t- III ..D 0'> <:t- 41 « I 52 N <:t- <:t- N -- O~ \D~ N It'\ N \D C <:t- ... .c. ...0 ~ u .. a- < I 41" ........ ... -a- uJ -- -- -~ -- VI~ 41_ t: E I U - '" - '" - O 0 0'> 00 It'\ U"\ <:t- a- N -=t C o.Vl X:J 0 '" '" N " " <:t- a- " \D \D It'\ '" N -=t 0 " N 0 -=t N a- III C U"\ 0 .- .c.C U 41 ::l W~ U"\ N U"\ <:t- '" '" .c.~ ", 41 ~-~ III ", " 41 .. -" ... .c. ~" -.. 41 00 C ... _.~ III ::l ~lll U 0 ....;: "3 ~C C III VI < U"\ 00 U"\ 41 .. C 41 ?fl." ~OC 0.< a- N U"\ -=t U"\ <:t- <:t- - '"r-:- "" '"r-:- \D 0- It'\ -=t <:t- "" U"\ U"\ N <:t- U"\ It'\ '" '" 0 \D -=t "" III C III III C III C lll- l:C~ "u.. E .c E 41 ... -- .c. ';:E O~ o 0 ::l 0 _t..:1 >. be C it .. Vl o .....- C E c "l:l c: --" 1/)._ ,,~ a- "" v\ " "" \D -- .. .... .. C 0-6::2: ~~ .. III C ... .. - .;:: c: 0 " N N N It'\ <:t- 0 -=t 00- '" "" N N It'\ N -=t N 0 III C III C C III III C 41" in 41 uJ 41 ", III a. .. 0.. 0 VI 41 a. O~ III 41 III .c E 41 E 5 ", .. U ;;: 41 Vl ..,. '" ..,.~ It'\ .; t..:1~ -a. 0 0 U :J « '" III ...Ji 0 \D III III III -=t '" 0 U"\ ..,. (1\ U"\ -=t 00 " '" '" -=t '" N -=t C C C C 5t..:1 Vl III -=t '" -=t -=t '" "" It'\ '" '" '" ;:- 41 Vl .. 8.", 0 ... .c. c .;;: a. E '" " 01:: 00 - - ~ .. III 0"" "'2 0 a- N "t "i. c 0 \D '" 0 <:t- l'i ..,. 0 \D N '" " -=t '" N 0 -=t N 0 '"-=t 0 00 N 0 -=t 0 \D 00 " 0 '" 0 N 0 0 '" O~ 0 00 N III C " -" 0 0 00 N .. 0.- 41 ... 0 5 \D ... 41 N N '" "" v\ OO~ ..D DCa. in ..... III 0 ...... 41 .5 ~a. ell ~... c U 41 - ", 0 ".c. .;:; X-I- U 0 -E lll~ u fi.~ .... " a- 41 • 0 ", 41 E 0 a. 0 a- 00 ..& v\ 0- N \D~ U"\ r-:- 00 0- 0- It'\ - - '" ~ 0 00- ..D It'\ N oc. .; N <:t-~ N \D 00- .; 00- 0- 0 '" '" 0 " 0 .c.= "'00 -a- 0_ !l'; < Vl 41 ... .c. Bu ..,. -=t o O~ ", .... ":. N <:t- .c.ell ...0 - "'" "'" '"a:: "- '" '" '" '" uJ 41 lllN U"\ \D \D 00 oc N 0 N "'0:: ~g " 00 0 0 oo '" 00 '"N '" a~ 41 0 <:t- N N -=t N -=t 00 U"\ N ..0 U"\ C It'\ I-.c. «9 l'i ..0 tl ... 41 x" 41 C a- " ~ ell .. " .. ", 41 a- 41 ::l CT :aE &/ ~ III III C " .! 0 ell '2 III '6 ell .. III U :; ;: 0 "i '" .!! '" ::l ;: - .. ::l(1\ .!'- _ell -&/ <>. Z 41 .c E :J .. .. .Sl ell .~ ... 41 .c Is .c. ell "&c ~ ell III :aE ~ :l ~ .c. 0 III N III >. "" c C III C ::l tI ~ E t ~ 0E >. III u '~ iO N 0 ell N E 0 ~ ...I&/ c '" I-li ~" ::>llC 0::~ III ::l l:C N ili ell ::2: 0- U J! ~ ~ .., JB/ < ::2: ::2: N l:C Vl ...: N '" '" .; ..,; ~ 00 a\ 0 ...: N - - - -'" i. - - - ...; ..D ~ ~ ~ 0 N £ Bibliography 1. Abote, W. "Inter-Territorial Transpor-t in West Africa with special reference to the Economic Community of West African States", in Transport, the Chartered Institute of Transport Journal, May 1976, pp. 112-114. 2. Cooper, C.A. and Massell, B.F. "Towards a General Theory of Customs UniOnS for Developing Countries", Journal of Political Economy, October, 1965. 3. Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU, East Africa Transport Study, london, EIU, August 1969, (5 volumes). 4. Faaland, J. and Isaksen, J. "Economic Dependency and RegIonal Cooperation~ DERAP WorkinR Paper No.l47, Bergen, March 1979. 5. Green, R.H., "The East African Community: A Valediction Forbidding Mourning", The African Review, Vol. 8, Nos.1 and 2, Dar e.s Salaam, 1978 6. Green, R.H. and Seidman, A. Unity or Poverty? The EconomIcs of Pan-Africanism, 8altimore, Maryland, Penguin Books, 1968. 7. Hall, Richard. The High Price of Principles, Harmondsworth, Pt"nguIn, 1969. 8. Hazelwood, A. Economic Integration: The East African Experience, london Heinemann, 1975. 9. landell-Mllls, P.M. "The 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement", In Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 9, No.2, 1971, pp. 263-281. 10. lenin, V.I. "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", Selected Works, Moscow, Publishers Progress, Vol. p.662. II. livingstone, I. "Socialist Planning in Tanzania: The Second Five Year Plan" 1969, ERB Paper, Dar es Salaam, reprinted in KIm et.al. (J 979). The Poltttcai Economy of Tanzania, london, Heinemann, 1979. -- 12. Mikesell, R.F. "The Theory of Com~on Markets as applied to Regional Arrange- ments among DevelopIng Countries, In Harrod, R. and Hague, D. International Trade Theory In a Developing World, london, Macmillan, 1963. 13. Mwase, N.R.L. "How the Community's Tax Department declined and fell" in African Development, Vol.8 No.2, london, January 1974. 14. Mwase, N. and Essack, K. "East African Federation", Sunday News Dar es Salaam December 9 1975. -- .... __ -"-".::: 15. Mwase, N.R.L. "Regional Economic Integration and the U I Sh - Benefits: Background to the Disintegration and Collapse fnequth a arAIng of C o mmUnl-t"y, In- The Af rlcan - - 0 E east frlcan ReVIew Dar es Salaam V I 8 N reprinted in Africa Development, CODESRIA Dakar V 01'_' N°S.2,1 and 2, 1978; ---'~-"-'-':"::'::.::J::== " O. IV, O. 3, 1979. 16. Mwase, N.R.L. "The Collapse of the East Af - F lessons for SADCC", paper given at the SAUSS~c~ ~deral Aspirations and Mwase "East African Federation: The End of Salaam, (forthcominp,). an ill u "a.. JUTIY1982, see also USlon In AAMUlI, Dar es 56 17. Nixon, F.I. Economic Integration and Industrial Location, Longman, London, 1973. 18. Organisation of African Unit (OAU>,The Lagos Plan of Action for the Implemen- tation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Develooment of Africa, Lagos, April 1980. 19. UNECA. Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States Treaty, Lusaka 1981. 20. (Raisman Commission), East Africa. Report of the Economic and Fiscal Commission, London, H.M.S.O. February 1961. 21. Rake, Alan. Africa South of the Sahara, Europa, London 1981. 22. Seidman, A. and Makgetta S. Outposts of Monopoly Capitalism: Southern Africa in the Changing Global Economy, Westport, Connecticut, Lawrence HIli & Co., 1980. 23. The Department of Finance and the SWA/Namibia Information Service (J 983) "Public Finance and the Business World 10 SWA/Namibla", Windhoek, Mimeographed, p.6. 24. Thomas, Clive (I 974) Dependence. and Transformation: The EconomiCs of TranSItion to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974. and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: 25. African Develo ment Coordination Conference 26. Viner, J. Studies in the Theory of International Tra~, New York, 1937. 27. World Bank World Development Report, Washington, August 1981.