

# Regional Cooperation for Development: An analysis of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference

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We, the undersigned, as the Heads of Government of majority-ruled States in Southern Africa, offer this declaration to our own peoples, to the peoples and Governments of the many countries who are interested in promoting popular welfare, justice and peace in Southern Africa and to the international agencies who share this interest.<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

The term 'coordinated regional development' has taken on a new meaning in Southern Africa over the past five years. With the emergence of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), regional patterns of interaction have evolved which are proving to be conducive to economic development in the 'southern nine' states.

The SADCC, as the name implies, is a highly flexible organisation dedicated to the economic development of member states and the reduction of dependence on South Africa. The nature of the SADCC's goals has been the source of some confusion. Some commentators view the SADCC almost exclusively as an organisation which seeks to reduce ties with South Africa. This viewpoint is a misrepresentation of the objectives of the SADCC. As Weisfelder notes:

To be sure SADCC is a reaction against South African racism and economic hegemony. But it is also necessary to reiterate the predominantly positive character of SADCC goals, namely the promotion of economic independence, establishment of mechanisms for equitable economic integration, mobilisation of regional resources, and solicitation of international support for these objectives<sup>2</sup>

The situation becomes even more clear when one recognises that the goals of economic development and dependence reduction on South Africa are inevitably entwined, and that the former cannot occur without the latter.

The nature of economic interaction in Southern Africa is clearly illustrated in table two. As this table shows, the SADCC countries trade very little amongst themselves, while the Republic of South Africa is an important trading partner for all of the SADCC states except Tanzania, Zambia, and to a large extent Angola. The severity of the problem is further illustrated by the fact that South Africa's GNP is three times that of the SADCC states combined.<sup>3</sup> In addition, roughly seventy-five percent of Southern Africa's rail traffic transits through South Africa.<sup>4</sup>

TABLE 1  
Basic Indicators for the Nine Member States of the SADCC

	Population (millions) mid-1979	Area (thousands of square kilometres)	GNP per capita, (dollars) 1979	GNP per capita, average annual growth rate (%)	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1979	Average index of food production per capita (1969-71=100) 1977-79	Income Terms of Trade	Percentage share in total exports of three principal exports, 1976-78 (average) (b)	Per capita net official development assistance (dollars), 1979
Angola	6.9	1,247	440	-2.1	42	85	102	60.9	6.2
Botswana	0.8	600	720	9.1	49	89	N.A.	99.1	116.0
Lesotho	1.3	30	340	6.0	51	100	N.A.	100.0	48.8
Malawi	5.8	118	200	2.9	47	100	112	83.1	24.0
Mozambique	10.2	783	250	0.1	47	75	32	25.6	15.1
Swaziland	0.5	17	650	7.2	47	109	N.A.	58.9	98.2
Tanzania	18.0	945	260	2.3	52	94	104	55.4	32.2
Zambia	5.6	753	500	0.8	49	99	91	96.2	38.1

- a. Income terms of trade are an index of the value of commodity exports divided by import unit value.
- b. Commodity concentration is the current value of the three principal commodities in the exports of each of the SADCC member-states as a percentage of the total current value of merchandise exports.

N.A. = not available.

Source: The World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. (The World Bank, Washington, 1981), pp.143, 155, 156.

TABLE 2

Trade Statistics for the SADCC member-states

	Percent of total exports to region 1976-1977 (excludes R.S.A.)	Importance of R.S.A. as country of export (rank)	Importance of R.S.A. as source of imports (rank)
Angola	0.9	a	4
Botswana	1.7	3	1
Lesotho	0.6	1	1
Malawi	3.7	4	1
Mozambique	4.7	3	1
Swaziland	1.8	2	1
Tanzania	1.1	a	b
Zambia	1.0	a	b
Zimbabwe	N.A.	1	1

Source: Nsekela, *op.cit.*, pp. 236, 249, 261-263.  
 N.A. Not available  
 a = Less than fifth most important  
 b = Less than seventh most important

FIGURE 1

Southern African Transportation Network



Source: Kgarebe, A. (editor), SADCC2-Maputo : The Proceedings of the Second Southern African Development Coordination Conference, held in Maputo, People's Republic of Mozambique on 27/28 November 1980 (SADCC Liaison Committee, July, 1981), p.10.

Given the nature of the economies of Southern Africa, coupled with the political destabilisation efforts of South Africa<sup>5</sup>, it is to some extent surprising that a regional organisation such as the SADCC has survived. The focus of this paper will therefore be on those factors which have enabled the organisation to survive and function effectively. The major thesis emerging out of this study is that it is the pragmatic nature of the SADCC - including but not limited to its practice of avoiding supranational institutions, its flexible nature, and low-profile integrative goals - which is its strength, and which will provide the key to the organisation's longevity.

### From Arusha to Lusaka: An Historical Overview

Although the origins of the SADCC are not entirely clear, it now appears that it emerged from efforts on the part of Sir Seretse Khama to maintain and expand the regional cooperative efforts of the Front Line States to Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia once it was recognised that Zimbabwe would soon be independent. Khama, the President of Botswana, hoped to avoid 'sterile confrontation' between the Front Line States and South Africa once the war in Zimbabwe was over.<sup>6</sup> Rather, he foresaw the development of a regional organisation committed to the development of member-states.<sup>7</sup>

Over the period 1977-1978 a number of background and technical papers were prepared which dealt with regional issues, primarily concerning transportation. This was followed in May 1979, by a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Front Line States in Gaborone at the invitation of Botswana. At this gathering it was decided that further meetings would be beneficial. A conference of economic ministers was therefore scheduled to be held within the following months in Arusha, Tanzania.

#### SADCC I

For the Arusha conference it was decided to invite not only the economic ministers from the five Front Line States and Zimbabwe, but also representatives from Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and representatives from a number of bilateral and multilateral aid organisations. The former were invited due to the recognition that broad-based regional economic development efforts should include all the independent states in the region, no matter how closely they might be tied to South Africa. The latter were invited in an effort to obtain funding for regional development schemes. This also ensured that bilateral and multilateral aid organisations could express their opinions regarding the plan of action to be adopted,<sup>8</sup> and also to ensure that potential donors felt a part of the SADCC from the outset, encouraging aid donations.<sup>9</sup>

The Arusha conference, known as SADCCI, consisted of two meetings. The first was a meeting of Economic Ministers of the Front Line States which set the basic programme of action in broad terms, and required final ratification by the Heads of States of each of the participant governments. A second meeting took place between the Ministers of the Front Line States and representatives of various aid agencies. It was at the latter meeting that the role foreign aid would play in the development of the SADCC member states was discussed. By the end of SADCCI the Front Line nations had adopted a draft declaration expressing four main development objectives to be pursued within the framework of the SADCC:

1. the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;

2. the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
3. the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies;
4. concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation.<sup>10</sup>

#### The Lusaka Declaration

The following April, representatives of the 'southern nine' assembled in Lusaka and adopted the Lusaka Declaration, which laid down the strategies and priorities of SADCC, first outlined at Arusha. The Lusaka Summit was delayed to allow participation by newly-independent Zimbabwe, and also to allow time for careful consultation with the non-Front Line states of Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland to ensure their participation in the SADCC.

The goals of the SADCC were expressed through the publication of a book entitled Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation. The volume, edited by the Tanzanian High Commissioner to England, Amon Nsekela, contained the Lusaka Declaration as well as sectoral papers prepared in a two-year period before the Arusha meeting. The book served as the primary document of the SADCC. Future members must accept the goals of the book in order to gain membership.<sup>11</sup>

#### FIGURE 2

##### Chronology

May 1979	Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Front Line States	Gaborone, Botswana
July 1979	SADCC1 - pledging conference	Arusha, Tanzania
April 1980	SADCC Summit Meeting - Lusaka Declaration signed	Lusaka, Zambia
June-July 1980	SADCC meeting to establish SATCC	Maputo, Mozambique
August 1980	SADCC conference on manpower needs and training requirements in Southern Africa	Ezulwini, Swaziland
September 1980	SATCC meeting of Council of Ministers	Beira, Mozambique
September 1980	SADCC ministerial meeting	Harare, Zimbabwe
November 1980	SADCC2 - pledging conference	Maputo, Mozambique
January 1981	SATCC ministerial meeting	Maputo, Mozambique
		(continued)

FIGURE 2 (continued)

March 1981	SADCC meeting on regional trade and industrial cooperation	Dar es Salaam Tanzania
May 1981	SATCC coordinating committee meeting	Maputo, Mozambique
June 1981	SADCC Council of Ministers meeting	Mbabane, Swaziland
July 1981	SADCC second summit conference	Harare, Zimbabwe
July 1981	SADCC meeting on energy	Luanda, Angola
August 1981	SADCC meeting to discuss establishment of a southern African Development Fund	Lusaka, Zambia
November 1981	SADCC - third conference	Blantyre, Malawi
March 1982	SATCC meeting	Maputo, Mozambique
July 1982	SADCC ministerial meeting	Gaborone, Botswana
October 1982	SADCC Secretariat opens in Gaborone	
December 1982	SADCC energy conference	Harare, Zimbabwe
January 1983	SADCC pleding conference	Maseru, Lesotho
May 1983	SADCC Council of Ministers meeting	Dar es Salaam Tanzania
July 1983	SADCC Heads of State meeting	Maputo, Mozambique
October 1983	SADCC trade meeting	Dar es Salaam
February 1984	SADCC pledging conference	Lusaka, Zambia

Sources:

Africa Research Bulletin, January-February, 1981, July-August, 1981, February-March, 1982, July-August, 1982, January-February, 1983, April-May, 1983, October-November, 1983; 'SADCC Summit opened', in The Daily News (Botswana), February 3 1984, No.23, p.1; Kgarebe. op.cit; Weisfelder, op.cit.

The first priority established by the SADCC was transportation and communications. To this end it was decided to establish the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC), which was subsequently based in Maputo, Mozambique. Although the SATCC was not established until September 1980, it had been in operation for a number of months.<sup>12</sup> Headed by Luis A. Santos, the Minister of Ports and Land Transport for Mozambique, the SATCC began work on coordinating a number of project proposals. The SATCC grouped projects into six different categories: roads, railroads, ports, civil aviation, telecommunications, and training, with major emphasis being placed on railroads. A four stage process was instituted which allowed SADCC states to prioritise different projects. Projects which were presently in progress and which did not require supplementary funding were given top priority. Second were new projects for which feasibility studies were undertaken and financing was promised. Third were projects for which feasibility studies had been undertaken but which lacked financing. Last were new projects which were without feasibility studies and which lacked financing.<sup>13</sup>

By establishing this four stage process, the SADCC member states were responding in a pragmatic manner regarding how to prioritise goals, which served both to fulfill developmental needs in the areas of transport and communications as quickly as possible, and also to engage aid organisations in the decisions as to what other projects should be implemented. To aid in the identification of projects and ensure project feasibility, the Danish Consultancy group of Hoff and Oversaard was hired for a study of the transport and communication sectors. Their report involved a projection of regional trade and commodity flows to the year 2000. Out of this emerged project feasibility and utility studies.<sup>14</sup> As a result of the pragmatism on the part of the SADCC member states and the thoroughness of the consultant's report, out of a total of 102 projects, 37 were already operational as of late 1982, 50 still needed financing, and 15 were still projected.<sup>15</sup>

A second priority of the SADCC was agriculture, due to the recognition that all of the countries were dependent upon successful agricultural development. The major step taken by the SADCC was the establishment of a regional centre of the International Centre for Research on Agriculture in the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRASAT, based in India) in Botswana.

Emphasis was also placed on training and on the harmonisation of policy in the areas of mining, industry and energy. In the area of training, it was hoped that this would reduce the problem of reliance on expatriates. In the areas of mining and industry it was hoped that this would increase trade between member states in both minerals and industrial products, and enhance the complementarity of regional production. Finally, emphasis was placed on the energy sector to reduce energy dependence on non-SADCC members as well as encourage trade in energy related products between SADCC countries, such as oil from Angola or coal from Zimbabwe.

## SADCC 2

Let us make our Conference an important step forward for the success of the combined efforts of our capacities and potential. Let us make it a clear demonstration of our just objectives and common commitment to an exemplary cooperation, rich in imaginative and effective solutions, for the benefit of all our peoples.<sup>16</sup>



In early September 1980, twenty-one Ministers from the nine SADCC states came together in Harare, Zimbabwe to finalise preparations for SADCC2 to be held in Maputo.<sup>17</sup> The conference took place the following November. Chaired by Peter Mmusi of Botswana, the pledging conference brought together over fifty bilateral and multilateral aid donors. By the time the conference had ended U.S. \$655 million had been pledged over the 1980-1985 period, with additional indications of support coming from a variety of sources. Discussion has taken place regarding the nature of the money committed. Of the pledges for aid, less than twenty percent was 'new' money - money that was not already committed to SADCC countries.<sup>18</sup> Yet as Weisfelder notes, the distinction between 'old' and 'new' money is unnecessary:

If regional initiatives help to trigger bilateral support to a member state for a project of recognised mutual significance, then the underlying objective is fulfilled even if no funds are 'credited' to SADCC.<sup>19</sup>

A majority of the money went to transportation and communication projects, with Mozambique the prime beneficiary. This was due to its geographical location, with ports serving Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and to a lesser extent Botswana and Zambia. The distribution of project dollars for transportation and communication projects is indicated in table three below:

TABLE 3

Distribution of Dollars for Transportation  
and Communication Projects, in percents

Countries	Percentage
Angola	2.0
Botswana	3.7
Lesotho	12.9
Malawi	5.4
Mozambique	47.8
Swaziland	3.6
Tanzania	11.6
Zambia	9.6
Zimbabwe	3.1
Regional	0.3

Source: Tostensen, op.cit., p.104.

### The Third SADCC Conference - Blantyre

It soon became clear following the Maputo conference that donor commitment was somewhat less than desirable. By the time Ministers from the SADCC states gathered in Blantyre, Malawi one year later, only US \$273 million out of the US \$ 655 million pledged had been committed through legally binding agreements.<sup>20</sup> As a high government official from one of the SADCC states commented:

Some countries made promises in Maputo and then went home and forgot. This meeting is to remind them.<sup>21</sup>

Some twenty government and twelve bilateral and multilateral donor agencies attended and, although this was not a pledging conference, most donors reaffirmed their commitment to the SADCC.<sup>22</sup>

### The Fourth SADCC Conference - Maseru

The following July 1982, a Heads of State Summit was held in Gaborone, Botswana. At this summit meeting a review of progress made to date was undertaken. The progress report noted that, out of cost estimates of US \$ 1,741 million, US \$ 450 million had been allocated, and US \$ 370 million more had been pledged by donor agencies but not yet allocated. The report also noted that the SATCC was in full operation, and praised its work.

Discussions also took place regarding preparations for the Maseru, Lesotho pledging conference to be held the following January, 1983. It was noted that an agenda for action had been decided upon, with agriculture and industry<sup>23</sup> being added to transportation and communications as the primary topics to be discussed. As a report emerging from the Gaborone summit stated:

The adoption of industry and agriculture as the focus for the Maseru Annual Conference demonstrates the progress made in programme articulation in the moving towards concrete project identification in these areas. The coordination of projects in these areas, together with projects in Transport. The proliferation of sabotage attacks immediately preceding the Maseru meeting inevitably heightened the political dimension of SADCC.<sup>29</sup>

### The Fifth SADCC Conference - Lusaka

The most recent conference took place in Lusaka in early February 1984. The focus of the conference turned inevitably to the serious drought situation throughout southern Africa. Requests were made for food aid as well as aid in the form of seed, implements, fertilisers, and agricultural credit for rehabilitation of farmlands devastated by the worst drought in recent history. Aid was requested from over fifty donor countries and international agencies. Yet by the end of the conference only US \$ 100 million had been pledged out of a total request of US \$ 268 million, of which a substantial portion was in the form of food aid.<sup>30</sup>

The conference also followed the tone of the Maseru conference, dominated by attacks on South Africa's destabilisation efforts in the region. Zambian President Kaunda opened the conference with a speech concerning South Africa's efforts to destabilise SADCC member-states both through economic and military means 'because to them, SADCC is the arch enemy'.<sup>31</sup> President Kaunda called on donor nations to support

the SADCC in order to lessen South Africa's economic hold on the region. Botswana's Vice-President Peter Mmusi, chair of the conference, supported President Kaunda's statements by condemning economic destabilisation, sabotage and acts of armed aggression.<sup>32</sup>

We now turn away from a discussion of the historical origins of the SADCC and the annual conferences to a discussion of its organisational structure. The purpose here will be to further clarify the structure and functions of the SADCC in order to better understand the reasons behind its success to date.


### SADCC: Organisational Structure

As mentioned previously, the SADCC has avoided the establishment of supranational institutions. Emphasis has been placed on a decentralised decision-making process. Regardless, certain minimal structures are necessary in order for the SADCC to function effectively. The following organisational structure was formalised according to the Memorandum of Understanding adopted at the Heads of State Summit Meeting in July of 1981.

The organisational structure of the SADCC is indicated in figure three:

FIGURE 3

#### Organisational Structure of the SADCC



The summit, consisting of the Heads of States of member nations, is the supreme decision-making body of the SADCC. It is responsible for the general direction of SADCC policies, and controls activities. The members of the Summit elect a chair who presides over the annual meetings. Decisions are established by consensus.

Next is the Council, consisting of one minister from each country, which is responsible to the Summit. The Council is responsible for the overall policies of the SADCC, and also coordinates and supervises SADCC institutions, as well as supervises and executes SADCC programmes:

The Council adopts a work programme for SADCC and designates a member state to take charge of coordination of activities in specified fields.<sup>33</sup>

The areas which are covered by the various countries are illustrated in table four below:

TABLE 4  
Division of Responsibilities

Angola	energy
Botswana	crop research animal disease headquarters of Secretariat
Lesotho	soil conservation land utilisation
Malawi	fisheries wildlife
Mozambique	transport communications
Swaziland	humanpower development training facilities health
Tanzania	industry
Zambia	Southern African Development Fund mining
Zimbabwe	food security land utilisation soil conservation

Source: Thompson, op.cit., p.14; Weisfelder, op.cit.

These assignments have not been entirely non-controversial. As one participant stated:

the members must have an extraordinary sense of humour to allocate responsibility for finance to Zambia, industry to Tanzania, and soil conservation to Lesotho...<sup>34</sup>

Regardless, the method of assignment indicates that the SADCC members seek to reduce conflict between member states on such issues, and also indicates the faith placed in each member state by all the SADCC members. The Council meets at least once a year and makes decisions by consensus.

Below the Council are any of the Sectoral Commissions established by the SADCC. Presently the only Sectoral Commission in existence is the SATCC. The SATCC is responsible to the Council. As with any Sectoral Commission which may be established, the SATCC

will be governed by a convention adopted by the Council and ratified or acceded to by the member states.<sup>35</sup>

Also responsible to the Council is the Standing Committee of Officials. Decisions are made by consensus, and the Committee meets at least once a year. This Committee is in charge of the sub-committees established by the Council which deals with functional areas of interest to member states.

In July 1982 a Secretariat was established in Gaborone. Headed by a Zimbabwean, Arthur Blumeris (36), the Secretariat served four basic functions:

- a. general servicing of and liaison with SADCC institutions;
- b. coordination of SADCC property;
- c. custodianship of SADCC property;
- d. such other functions as may from time to time be approved by the Council.<sup>37</sup>

Headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana, with a professional staff of eight and expenditures estimated at one-quarter million dollars, the Secretariat functions with a minimal bureaucracy.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, and very importantly, are the annual conferences. Although these exist outside the institutional framework of the SADCC, the conferences serve as important links between the SADCC member states and donor countries.

### **Regional Integration: The Unconventional Nature of the SADCC**

#### Integration Theory

Regional integration theorists have identified a number of obstacles to effective integration in the Third World. Recognition of these problems has emerged due to the resounding failure of regional integration schemes throughout Africa, Asia, Latin and Central America. Writers have identified six basic threats to regional integration. First and foremost is the unequal distribution of benefits between member states.

Regional disparities in wealth, income, levels of industrialisation, and other comparable factors are typically made worse by regional integration. This was one of the reasons behind the break-up of the East African Community.<sup>39</sup> In an effort to tackle this very thorny problem, integration theorists have devised mechanisms whereby lesser developed partners would receive benefits from their more-developed counterparts.<sup>40</sup> This has had some positive effects in the Economic Community of West African states, as well as in the Andean Pact.

A second problem has been the ideological differences between member states. This was another factor leading to the disintegration of the East African Community. Ideological differences frequently translate into different strategies for development, hindering effective integration between members.<sup>41</sup>

A third factor leading to the failure of regional integration schemes, according to theorists, is the existence of weak institutional structures. As Bond notes with regard to Latin America:

Latin American states simply have not been willing to create institutional structures with sufficient resources, autonomy, and decision-making authorities to expedite integration.<sup>42</sup>

The solution offered by integration theorists is the creation of strong supranational institutions which will have sufficient power to elicit compliance among member states.

A fourth factor which negatively affects regional integration is external, and concerns such issues as intrusive power involvement. This can range from aid or trade to multinational investments. The negative implications can be factors such as tied aid or restrictive trading practices.

A fifth factor, serving as a political threat to regional integration, is the politicisation of integration issues.<sup>43</sup> Economics is 'high politics' in the Third World.<sup>44</sup> As a result, decisions are made in a political rather than a bureaucratic environment. This, argue integration theorists, hinders the effective implementation of integrative policies and makes compromise difficult.

A final factor which threatens regional integration in the Third World is nationalism. Proponents of the argument state that Third World leaders will not be willing to limit sovereignty to enhance the effectiveness of a regional integration scheme.

### Integrative Issues and the SADCC

If one were to examine the SADCC based on the criteria presented by integration theorists, one would hold little hope for the organisation's future. Yet, as this section will illustrate, it is the unconventional nature of the SADCC that allows it to succeed where other regional integrative schemes have failed.

Perhaps the most important factor in the success of the SADCC has been the avoidance of supranational institutions. The Secretariat is one of the few supranational institutions existing within the SADCC, and it is budgeted less than a quarter of a million US dollars. Following the wishes of the SADCC member-states, the Secretariat performs only the minimal functions necessary to keep the organisation running smoothly. Regarding the Summit and the Council, the consensus model of decision-making is used. Despite critics of the model, it has served the

SADCC well. The nine member-states have managed to maintain a high degree of agreement across a wide range of issues.<sup>45</sup> Even the routine, daily work has been decentralised. As table four illustrated and Weisfelder noted:

Each of the participants has been asked, but not forced, to select a sector... for which it will assume initiative and responsibility... New responsibilities will be allocated as the need and capacity to handle them emerges.<sup>46</sup>

Therefore, because of the nature of the SADCC - its decentralised, consensus-style decision-making structure - it has successfully avoided confrontation among member states.

A second concern of integration theorists is the heightening of regional disparities due to regional integration. This is a potential threat to the SADCC member-states, especially because of the economic strength of Zimbabwe. Despite this political threat, the SADCC offers no mechanisms by which benefits can be redistributed. One would expect, therefore, a maldistribution of benefits which would lead to political problems. Although benefits have not been distributed equally, most have gone to Mozambique rather than Zimbabwe, which has not had severe political repercussions. This is due in part to the focus on transport, where projects for Mozambique have real and tangible benefits for most of the land-locked SADCC states. It is also due in part to the concerted efforts of the nine member-states to allow each a say in the location of projects in the functional areas to which they are assigned.

A third concern arises regarding ideological differences between member states. There is indeed a wide diversity of ideological stances among SADCC states, ranging from Angola and Mozambique on the left to Botswana and Malawi on the centre right. Yet few actual problems have arisen. This is due in large part to the low-level integrative goals of the SADCC, as discussed earlier, and the ability of the SADCC states to recognise their common interest. All member states are in agreement about the need for transport infrastructure. One might point to the potential for future conflict in issue-areas such as agriculture or industry, for example cash crops for export versus food crops for domestic consumption or heavy industry versus light industry, yet to date very few problems have arisen. A possible reason for this lack of conflict might be a fourth factor found in the integration literature, the politicisation of integration. Integration is indeed 'high politics' in the Third World, yet this has had positive effects for the SADCC. First, efforts have been made to accommodate other member-states when each country has drawn up its sectoral proposals. This is illustrated very clearly in the sectoral papers in both the Nsekela and Kgarebe volumes.<sup>47</sup> Secondly, a number of bilateral arrangements between individual SADCC member states have developed over the past five years, serving to strengthen member-state commitment to the SADCC. Finally, the fact that integrative issues take place within the realm of 'high politics' ensures leadership commitment to the organisation and enhances its chances for survival.

A fifth factor concerns intrusive power involvement in the region. This has raised problems for the SADCC. The SADCC depends heavily on foreign aid to meet its development objectives, leaving room for pressure from donor countries. For example, the United States has clearly stated its preference for bilateral rather than multi-lateral aid, favouring Botswana and Zimbabwe, and hesitant about giving aid to Angola and Mozambique. Similarly, the European donors are hesitant to give aid to Angola or Mozambique because neither are signatories to the Lomé agreement. Arab aid donors have expressed their displeasure with Lesotho's ties with Israel by not attending the pledging conference in Maseru, indicating the vulnerability of the SADCC to donor

political attitudes. Finally, aid donors have proven to be very selective regarding what projects would and would not be funded. This also illustrates the heavy influence donors have over recipients. Aid, therefore, is perhaps where the SADCC member-states are most vulnerable.

A final factor is nationalism, which integration theorists argue is a hindrance to effective regional integration. Yet this has not been the case with the SADCC, primarily for two reasons. First, SADCC member-states view the organisation as a means by which internal options can be expanded, for example through the enhancement of export opportunities and productive capabilities. This is especially the case since the source of financing is external to the organisation, therefore critical trade-offs between nation-states are less necessary. A second and very important factor is the unifying presence of South Africa. Most SADCC member-states feel threatened by South Africa. This has had the effect of overriding nationalistic concerns between African states because of the existence of a very real external threat.

### Conclusions

We have witnessed over the past five years the birth and maturation of a "daring and innovative"<sup>48</sup> regional organisation which finds strength both in the positive goal of cooperation for regional development and also in the goal of dependence reduction on South Africa. The unconventional nature of the SADCC, and its resultant success, has been the theme developed throughout this article. Regardless of its past successes, however, there are a number of potential threats to its future. One problem could be an increasingly belligerent South Africa, with stepped up attempts at subverting the governments of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Another possibility could be increasing pressure coming to bear on Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland to reduce their ties with other SADCC member-states. This could occur either through increased conflictual acts or increased cooperative acts, primarily in the economic realm. One purpose of the SADCC is to lessen this vulnerability.

Another possible threat to the future of the SADCC is external to the region. The SADCC's dependence on aid is severe. Political decisions made in Western Europe and North America will have profound effects on what the SADCC is able and not able to do. The SADCC member-states are extremely vulnerable to the shifting of political winds in the West.

In addition to the external threats to the SADCC, there are possible internal threats. The most prevalent is differences between member-states themselves. A problem arose, for example, when Botswana began accepting large numbers of refugees from western Zimbabwe in early 1983.<sup>49</sup> Problems also arose when Mozambique accused Malawi of supporting the Mozambique National Resistance guerilla movement.<sup>50</sup> Yet cooperative acts between member-states far outweigh any of the negative acts. Bilateral trade agreements between many of the SADCC member-states is more the order of the day. Cooperative acts far outweigh conflictual acts.

Perhaps the future of the SADCC can best be summed up in the following quote by Peter Mmusi of Botswana, the chair of SADCC2:

We have embarked on the long struggle for economic liberation. But we can be quite confident that we are not alone in that struggle. It will be a long struggle, longer even than the struggle for



political liberation and we are reassured that we can count on the solidarity of the international community ...

The results of this Conference will not only bring reassurance to the peoples of free Southern Africa. Those who have joined us in Maputo have also brought a message of comfort and encouragement to those who are still struggling to be free. For our efforts to reduce our dependence on a racist South Africa are also directed toward the total emancipation of our continent.

A luta continua!<sup>51</sup>

### Notes

1. This is the opening paragraph of the so-called "Lusaka Declaration", signed by the nine member nations of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe on 1 April, 1980. See Nsekela, A.J. (Editor), Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation (Rex Collings, London, 1981), p.2.
2. Weisfelder, R.F., "The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)," in South Africa International, Vol.13, No.2 (October, 1982), p. 77; see also Green, R.H., "Constellation, Association, Liberation: Economic Coordination and the Struggle for Southern Africa", in C. Legum (Editor), Africa Contemporary Record, 1979-1980; Green, R.H., "Southern African Development Coordination: Toward a Functioning Dynamic?", in Bulletin, Vol.11, No.4 (Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1980); and Green, R.H., "Southern African Development Coordination: The Struggle Continues", in C. Legum (Editor), Africa Contemporary Record 1980-1981.
3. Thompson, C.B., 'Development Without Dominance? The Southern African Development Coordination Conference', in the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars Newsletter, No.8 (September, 1982).
4. A clear and concise exposition of this can be found in an article by D. Winder entitled "Why Black Africa can't Break Hidden Trade Ties with S. Africa", in the Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 1983, p.3.
5. The most blatant efforts have been directed against Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique. In Angola, South Africa not only backs Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, but has repeatedly invaded Southern Angola. See the Africa Research Bulletin, September-October 1979, July-August 1981, November-December 1981, and September 1983. In Lesotho, South African troops killed at least 37 people in a Maseru raid in early December 1982. In addition, the underground Lesotho Liberation Army allegedly has the tacit approval of South Africa in its sabotage attacks against Lesotho. See Africa Report, March-April 1983; Africa Research Bulletin, August 1982, December 1982, March 1983, April 1983, June 1983, and September 1983. In Mozambique, South African Defence Forces have led a number of raids into Mozambican

territory, and have also given support to the Mozambique National Resistance guerilla movement. See Africa Report, March-April 1983, May-June 1983, July-August 1983; Africa Research Bulletin, February 1981, September 1981, March 1982, August 1982; Christian Science Monitor, October 22 1982, April 25 1983, and May 25 1983. For information on general destabilisation efforts, see "Regional Destabilisation in Southern Africa", Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, December 8 1982.

6. See Hill, C.R., 'Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa' in African Affairs, Vol. 82, No.327, 1983, particularly pages 222-223.
7. A few authors have suggested that the SADCC emerged as a result of efforts by the Western powers, especially the United States, to implement a 'Marshall Plan' for Southern Africa. This argument is less credible, however, as indicated by subsequent actions by the United States and Europe. The United States has been hesitant about giving aid on a regional level because the aid would so go partially to Angola and Mozambique. Most European countries, on the other hand, were not receptive to giving aid to Angola and Mozambique because neither country had signed the Lome Convention. Given these factors, coupled with the low levels of U.S. aid forthcoming, indicate that the 'Marshall Plan' argument is not credible. For an exposition of the 'Marshall Plan' argument, see Leys, R. and A. Tostensen, 'Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: The Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference', in Review of African Political Economy, No.23, 1982.
8. Nsekela, op.cit.
9. Weisfelder, op.cit.
10. Nsekela, op.cit., p.3; see also Tostensen, A., Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: 'The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)', Research Report No.62 (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1982).
11. Although membership is open to any African nation which accepts the document Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, respects the sovereignty of member states, denies bases to dissidents, and accepts the doctrine on non-interference in the internal affairs of other members, in practice only an independent Namibia will likely be allowed to join (see Hill, op.cit.). Given the policies of the Mobutu regime, it is not likely that Zaire will be allowed to join. The final candidate, South Africa, will be allowed to join only when "apartheid has been liquidated", an unlikely prospect.
12. Tostensen, op.cit.
13. Leys and Tostensen, op.cit.
14. Ibid; Tostensen, op.cit.
15. See Appendix One for a list of railroad transport projects. A complete list of projects in all sectors can be found in AED, Vol.21, January 1983, pp. 30-36.
16. Opening speech by President Samora Machael of Mozambique, in Kgarabe, op.cit., p.28.

17. Ibid.
18. Leys and Tostensen, op.cit.
19. Ibid., p.85
20. Tostensen, op.cit.
21. Africa Research Bulletin, November-December, 1981, p.6237.
22. For a discussion of the Blantyre conference see "SADCC members gather for key progress meeting", The Herald (Zimbabwe), November 17 1981, p.5; "SADCC blasts Pretoria on destabilisation", The Herald (Zimbabwe), November 19 1981, p.1; "New routes to harmony opened up at Blantyre", The Herald (Zimbabwe), November 21 1981, p.3.
23. See "Tanzania prepares 17 projects", in the Tanzanian Daily News", June 30 1982.
24. Botswana, Republic of, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, "SADCC Maseru International Conference: January 27-28, 1983", (mimeo) 1983, p.13.
25. Arab donors were absent at the Maseru conference due to Lesotho's links with Israel. Only Kuwait attended. See Africa Research Bulletin, January-February 1983.
26. See "The future for pragmatic Sadec looks bright", in the Johannesburg Star, February 26, 1983, pp.1-2.
27. See "Millions for SADCC", in Commerce, March 1983, pp. 11, 13.
28. Africa Research Bulletin, January-February 1983, p.6717; see also Commerce, loc. cit.
29. op.cit., p.6
30. See "Pledges to SADCC fall below target", The Herald (Zimbabwe), February 4 1984.
31. The Botswana Daily News, op.cit., see also "SADCC talks open with attack on SA", The Herald (Zimbabwe), February 3, 1984.
32. The Botswana Daily News, op.cit.
33. Tostensen, loc. cit.
34. See Thompson, op.cit., p.106.
35. Tostensen, loc. cit.
36. See "SADCC Heads in Gaborone", in Commerce, September 1982; "Blumeris spells out aims of SADCC", in the Herald, September 8, 1982.
37. Tostensen, loc. cit.

38. Leys and Tostensen, op.cit.
39. See Ravenhill, J., "Regional Integration and Development in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community", in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1979.
40. See Axline, W.A., "Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World", in International Organisation, Vol. 31, No.1, 1977.
41. See Bond, R.D., "Regionalism in Latin America: Prospects for the Latin American Economic System (SELA)", in International Organisation, Vol.32, No.2, 1978.
42. Ibid, p.404; see also Ravenhill, op.cit.
43. Vargas-Hildago, R., "The Crisis of the Andean Pact: Lessons for Integration Among Developing Countries", in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 17, No.3, 1979.
44. Ravenhill, op.cit.
45. Tostensen, op.cit.; Weisfelder, op.cit.
46. Weisfelder, op.cit., p.80
47. Ibid.
48. So characterised by Thompson, op.cit.
49. See the Africa Report, May-June, 1983, p.39.
50. See the Africa Report, January-February, 1983, p.36.
51. In Kgarebe, op.cit., p.151.

## SADCC Railway Projects

Country	Project	Status	Cost (\$m)
Angola	Benguela railway Rehabilitation. Three years	projected	45.0
	North-south rail	projected	1.0
Botswana	Southern border-northern border Track renewal. Two years.	financing being sought	24.0
	Railway telecommunications Rehabilitation. Three years.	financing being sought	5.8
	Trans-Kalahari railway study. Two years.	projected	5.0
	Instruments/signalling Rehabilitation upgrading Two years.	financing being sought	7.2
	Maintenance depot Construction Two years.	projected	5.0
Lesotho	Customs terminal, container depot. Construction. Two years.	financing being sought	1.6
	Rolling stock Supply Two years.	financing being sought	12.0
Malawi	Salima-Mozambique border	financing being sought	10.0
	Rolling stock supply Two years	financing being sought	27.0

Country	Project	Status	Cost (\$m)
Mozambique	Almada-Zimbabwe border, Rehabilitation. Three years.	operational	42.0
	Beira-Dondo Rehabilitation, upgrading Six years.	operational	22.0
	Dondo-Malawi border Rehabilitation, upgrading Three years	operational	68.0
	Nacala-Malawi border Rehabilitation, upgrading Three years	operational	190.0
	Maputo and Matola yards. Study One year.	financing	1.0
Mozambique/ Swaziland	Machava-Matsapa Rehabilitation, upgrading Three years	financing being sought	67.0
	Electrification of Joint railway system. Study One year	operational	0.6
Tanzania/ Zambia	Tazara Rehabilitation Four years	financing being sought	44.0
	Tazara Locomotives Supply. Three years	operational	38.0
	Tazara Wagons, Supply Three years	projected	30.0

Country	Project	Status	Cost (\$m)
Tanzania/ Zambia (continued)	Tazara, New Kapiri-Mposhi station Construction Three years	projected	15.0
	Tazara Mechanical equipment Supply One year	financing being sought	9.0
	Tazara signalling and communications equipment. Supply. Two years	financing being sought	36.0
	Tazara Training One year.	projected	1.3
Zambia	New rail links: 1. Lusaka-Mchinji (Malawi) 2. Tazara-Mpulungu port (Lake Tan- ganyika) 3. Kafue-Zawi (Zim- babwe line) 4. Katete-Moatize (Mozambique) 5. Chingola-Nucussueje (Angola) 6. Livingstone-Groot- fontein (Namibia) Studies Six months	projected	0.6
Regional	Rolling stock Study 15 months	operational	1.2
	Training programmes Study One year	operational	1.0

Country	Project	Status	Cost (\$m)
	Transport of minerals Study One year	operational	3.0

Source: AED. No.21, January 1983, pp. 30-36.