African Goals and Ideologies: "African Socialism" Revisited NGILA MWASE Introduction The purpose of this paper is to highlight some salient features of the problematic in the search for socialism in Africa. This in essence invol ves a discussion of the goals and ideologies of a number of African countries that have attempted to go socialist and their attitudes to imperialism and class struggle; in reality it amounts to a re-examination of "African Socialism". It is hard to define in concrete terms the meaning of "African Socialism". not only because of the gap between theory and practice, but also because of the different policies by different African Socialist Governments. While some African leaders have sympathies toward (genuine) socialism, others demonstrate in words and deeds that they arc hostile to it Needless to say that it does matter whether one was in England with the FabIans like the late Kenyan President Kenyatta or whether one' s power sprung, in the words of Mao from the "barrel of the gun", with its inherent revoluntionary flavour like the Mozambican FRELlMO militants. In the case of Malawi for instance, Dr. Banda's background particularly his education underlying the extremely Pressbyterian Glasgow influence left him with values emphasizing the virtues of hard work and the importance of individual striving, sacrifice and personal attainment. This partly accounts for his formulation of an essentially pragmatIc capitalist development strategy. The choice ot a development path may be less on proven economic grounds and more on the type of society that the leadership wish to mould. In the case of Malawi for example, five important variables are dominant 54 il the legacy at independence; iil the character and beliefs of the leadership; ii iI the small Slze of the domestic market; ivl the country's resource endownment; and vI her geographical position. Suffice it to pinpoint that mass guerrilla warfare does make for a high degree of political consciousness and involvement 1n political life on the part of the ordinary people, for whose support, serious instalments of sOClal reform have to be accepted as part of the independence package, not to mention the weeding out of capitalists from the movement in the process. However, there was in most countries no bitter struggle, no legacy of animosity on both sides as, at least initially, in both Guinea Conakry and GUInea Bissau which could easily justify or prompt stringent measures to put the neo-colonies on the path to socialism. "African Socialism" Theory and Practice Among the socialist-oriented states In Africa, much quant1tative changes as a prelude to a "transition to soclal1sm" has been made but the structure of the economies is still neo-colonial, and necessary "disengagement" from international finance capital has hardily began. Few, if any, have reached a social democratic revolutionary stage, a !though, from some, even this 1S too radical' ThIs is not to say that there are no differences (in attitudes of mind, to say the least) to such key issues as :- i) the nature and causes of undervelopment; ii) the impl1cations for social relations of various economic systems; and the way out of this state of backwardness, etc., 55 So varied are the differences in concept and practice that one could say that in Africa there are as many brands of socialism as there are countries, parties or leaders. Despi te this diversity " African Socialists" genera lly hold certain common attitudes towards capitalism. They argue that society must be protected from the capitalist exploitation of man by man. They view capitalism and colonialism, or imperialism, l rather, as Lenin said they were - two sides of the same coin. 2 They see, as Nyerere has argued, a capitalist option as an invitation for foreign dominance of the economy since there is too little indigenous private capital accumulation and too few local entrepreneurs capable of mobilizing resources on the scale required for massive and urgent development. While this could be seen as a blessing in disguise for socialism, it also implies few experienced talent to fall on for the management of socia list enterprises. Th is problem was explicitly rampant in Guinea Conakry with the sudden departure of the French in 1958. Even in Tanzania where a lot of effort and resources have in recent years gone into manpower training and development the management of the nationalized concerns e.g. the now defunct State Trading Corporation left much to be desired - often surviving, not only due to lack of competition, but also exhorbitant prices, frightening off socialist sympathizers. lndeed as Elliot Berg notes, "socialism with the larger state role that it assumes, is not less but much more complicated than a 'capitalist' or market system relying heavily on decenralized decision-making in the market". 3 On the other hand, a SOCI 1 t 1 ' bl 'a is so utlOn to African development pro ems in seen as being in harmony with the communal traditions of African society. There are differences though about what is to be harnessed and modernized whether its the village, the kinship group, the coopera ti ve societies or communal villages. It suffices to pinpoint that young leftists, more orthodox I'n approach observing the emergence of the kulak in the villages are qUick to pinpoint that Russian populists at the turn of the 19th century said many of the same 56 things: by bUll ding on the tradition of vlllage socIalism, society can skip a stage of history - the destructive, individualistIc capitalist stage, Despite its rather loose definition, several general characteristIcs can be mentIOned about "African socialIsts" :- a) Emphasize on plannIng; b) SympathetIc to natIOnalizatIon of pnvate industry, but dIffer VIs-a-VIS timIng and the scope to he accorded 10 the pnvate sector; c) Admittance of the need for foreIgn Investment, Including private, though WIth varYIng degrees of enthUSiasm; d) Land ownership poliCIes dIffer (rangIng from encourage- ment to discouragement of indiVIdual tenure) e) Agriculture IS, perhaps reluctantly. not Ignored; f) State "particIpatIon" In the ('conomy, passive to maSSIve state intC'rvcntlon. IS acknowledged. In the latter case It IS secn as a drivln,'S forcr oj development. In some cases thlS IS taken as cl contInuIty of colonial policy. As EllIot Rerg has noted: "More often than not African peasants were told what to produce, who to sell to, where, when, at what [. price". Moreover, an indigenous capitalist class was either absent or very weak, and even then it dId trade rather than industry and was "compradore" in character. It was generally composed of alien-Oriented "ethnic" trading "castes": Indians in East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, etc. , a nd so were not easily reconcillab Ie with the "black is beautiful" politics of the nationalist triumphal. Most Governments however, limited state interventIOn to large projects only. "African Socialism": Why Hundred Flowers Blossom 57 Despite the diversities in ideo logical orientation, one can nevertheless provide a simplified two-angled summation, the best of which has S been made by the late Guinea-Conakry's President Sekou Toure and Tanzania's ruLng party, in its 1971 Guidelines (MWONGOZO) on how to guard, consolidate and advance the Tanzanian and African Revolution. Sekou Toure had stated: The OAU consisted of two Africas; the African of sub- mission, of homage to, and complicity with imperialism and the African of dignity, of anti-<:olonialist and anti- 6 imperialist combat In its interpretation of developments in Africa in this regard, TANU sta ted Today our African continent is a hot-bed of the libera- tion struggle. This struggle is between those who have for centuries been exploiting Africa's natural resources and using the people of the continent as their tools and as their slaves, and the people of Africa who have, after realizing their weakness and exploitation, decided to engage in the struggle to liberate themselves TANU, aware of the problems involved, adds Its both a bitter and continuing struggle: at times it is a silent one, occassionally it explodes like gun-powder, at other times the successes and gains achieved by the people slip away. 7 Why has this been so? Part of the answer lies in history: the colonial impact, but more s o th e nature 0f the nationalist struggle, the aim of which was to get independence, be it, as the TANU Guidelines referred to it, "flag independence", (which was indeed what was won for many an African country) or even to borrow from the assassinated Kenyan politician and Mau Mau d etainee J.M. Kariuki, "independence minus independence". 58 Many of the nationalist parties, whether patron or mass parties, were contented with a national flag, a national anthem, a seat at the UNO and 21 gun salutes for its President. And in general, as the Senegalese writer, Alioune DiopS noted, neither the growing parties, nor the opposition were class-based, most leaders were of the petty bourgeoisie origin. Since revolutionary literature allowed in the "mother" country was banned In the colonies, not many leaders had read or taken seriously Frantz Fanon' s 9 warnings of the dangers of a "false decolonization" and "the pItfalls of nationalist consciousness" the replacement of white faces by black faces leaving the pre-independence structures intact, thus turning the rISIng expectatlOns of hope into rIsing frustrations and despair. But even those who like Nkrumah had been exposed to revolutionary llterature could still under the circumstances argue: "Seek eye first the political Kingdon and all else would be added onto it. 10 National independence took priority over socialism or class struggle. This implied that in most of Africa, alliance was made with chiefs, traditionalists, large businessmen, 'verandah boys', etc., provIded they agreed to the often too simple denominator of black ruk. Unfortunately, even in recent years many black AmerIcans for example, in their search for inspiration from Africa hailed the murderous and tyrannical regime of Idi Amin merely because of Amin' s ostensibly anti-white and Africanist stance, exemplified in the expulsion of Asians, some of them Ugandan citizens, in 1972. The assertion by progressive voices in Africa that Cuba's Castro and the CIA victim, the late Chilean Marxist leader Salvador Allende for example, were more brotherly to Afncan people than some Africa n leaders is not easily swallowed; at least it was not at the SIxth Pan- 1I AfrIcan Congress in Oar es Salaam In June 1974. The more bourgeois-oriented elites, once they had gained political control, qUIckly lost their radicalism; Ivory Coast Presldent Houphouet Boigny, initially a member of the French Communlst Party is a case In pomt. Unfortunately, even today factlOnal natlOnalist groups In. say, South S9 Africa, do not differ over the need and occasslOnally even the method of attaining political power; but most groups or partIes have not explicitly stated how they would use that power "to translate", to quote the authors of the 1968 "October RevolutlOn" 10 Somalia, "independence into bread and butter" for all. However, even if this pledge was made we must as in Siad Barre's SomalIa dIstInguish empty "scientific socialism" rhetoric and actual practIce. Not only has Somalia failed in this regard, but she IS actually at war for and on behalf of imperialism. ln his treatise on "Problems of BuildIng SocIalism In an Ex-colonial Country" President Nyerere has stressed the problems paused by this conglomerate of "interest groups" of composite formations, extremely heterogenous both socially and ideologically, united only in its opposition to foreign rule, but basically aspirant of the fruits of capitalism, which the colonizers enjoyed. He sees the nature of the anti-colonialist struggle as indeed intensifying the diffIcultIes. This is because of : a) leaders who desired to occupy the prIvileged positions of the former exploiters; b) political organ isa tions too exclusively geared to the straight forward demands of nationalism and therefore destined to "lose support" and atrophy; c) ideologies which easily degenerated into 'racialism' and mere black nationalism, pro-viding no rea I defence against the underlying structures of capitalist exploitation; d) in the circumstances (especially with lack of ideological clarity) the masses were easily confused by the simplistic nostrums of na tiona li sm to see s uc h Africa n- isation as a significant accomplishment. The emergence of such a situation is by no means accidental. Putting to question this make-up of the nationalist political parties, Fanon wrote : 60 The workers, primary school teachers, artisans and small shopkeepers who have begun to profit at a discount, to be sure from the colonial set-up have special interest at heart. What this sort of following demands is the betterment of their particular lot: increased salanes, for example. The dialogue between these political parties and colonialism is never broken off - a large number of natives are militant members of branches of politlcal parties which stem from the mother 12 country . The Colonia list 0 Containment 0 Strategy With the "winds of change" for independence blowing like the Monsoons. the different colonial Governments, save for the Salazar/Caetano Portuguese fascist regime opted for a "false decolonization". The French attempts In this regard are vivid VIs-a-VIS Algeria and Guinea- Conakry and indeed the rest of Francophone Africa - an attempt (which at independence failed in these two countries mentioned a bove but succeeded elsewhere) first to keep them in the French Community, failing, to hand as they did "the instruments of independence" to their stooges men in some cases "more Fren:h than the French themselves", who then form, to quote the TANU Guidelines (MWONGOZO), a Government of foremen or puppets. Such a Government will allow the imperialists to exploit national wealth in 13 partnership with the local bourgeoisie. Although in Anglophone Africa the nationalists had not been so integrated In the Westminister system as the French-speaking "evolues" 14 (some boast of having ruled France), they had nonetheless been greatly Westernized through the educational system which was upper class-oriented, through training at the UK elite military academy at Sandhurst or Oxford University. No wonder the late Ghanaian reactionary PremIer Kofi Busia had the temerity to write: "Oxford .. my second IS home, It h as ma d e me ,,15 . 61 "Indirect Rule" had also played its part. This other alternative, as Macaulay P"-'t it with respect to India is here relevant : the creation of a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern - a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and . lnte 11ect . 16 Thus as against earlier opposition to demands for freedom, Sir Andrew Cohen, a former Governor of Uganda and head of the African Division of the colonial office, advised that Britain needed a changing policy for Africa. She should recognize that "successful cooperation with nationalism" was the "greatest bulkwark against communisim". "The. transfer of power to colonial people needed not to be a defeat, but a strengthening of the Commonwealth and the free world". 17 Recent reve la tions emerg ing from publication of the UK colonial office files on the Mau Mau war in Kenya underline this strategy. Even a radical leadership and a mass Party such as Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party (CPP) was bound to neutralize its revolu- tionary flavour as it underwent the customary "dual rule" transitional stage of sharing power with the colonizer. 18 Much popular support and enthusiasm was lost during this 'collaborationist phase'. To take but one example, Fitch and Oppenheimer have noted of the CPP attitude vis-a-vis the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) in the 1950's: Nkrumah and the CPP did not choose to use their powers as members of the CMB to strike out in directions that would have led to a confrontation with British power. The CMB under CPP control continued to levy what were in effect huge export taxes, Sen d cocoa profl ts to G rea t Britain and thus help Britain maintain them while renouncing, or at best postponing, attempts to start Ghana in the direction of economic independence and development 19 Thus it is not surprising that at independence Some even failed to make even the customary, a Ibeit rhetorical distinction that "political 62 freedom is illusory unless, or until, it is accompanied by economIc . ,,20 emanCIpatIOn, How could they? The late first Gabonese President Leon Mba was more honest when he stated unashamedly: "Gabon IS Independent, but between Gabon and France nothmg 21 has changed, everyth mg conllnues as before" Gabon has one doctor to tens of thousands of peasants and yet Leon Mba built a cllmc in France, And he would not fall-Gabon's uranium merits intervention by French paratroopers, as they did In 1964, As Rene Dumont noted : ln Dahomey, for example, 60% of internal budg('tary Income goes on to salaries of Government personnel (not unusual under colomal regimes either), Tiny Gabon has one MP to under 7,000 people; France only one to 100,000, But these MPs get far more than their French counterparts, and over twice as much as the BrItish MP - all this m 22 poverty - stricken banana or groundnut republic~ Thus an MP who works for three months of the year, receIves in SIX weeks what the peasant receives In 361 years, a life-tIme, Dumont has estimated that the cost of some African Presidential and Ministerial establishments was probably higher in relation to National Income than the cost to France of the Court of Louis XIV In 1788 (just before the French Revolution of 1789), The late Tom Mboya' s 23 wedding was noted in the lnternational press for its lavishness in the high style of upper-class European elegance, (to the deep disillusionment of campaigners of "War on want"), Or we could note the lavish, if not outright profligate reception at "Africa's wedding of the decade" in Abidjan of the late Liberian PreSident Tolbert's son and adopted daughter of the Ivory Coast President respectively, The excessive corruption of President Tolbert, his family and political associates was exposed after the coup and his murder in 1979.24 Houphouet Boigny recently boasted of being "worth billions", 25 63 But developments in society are not only based on the benevolency of the leadership. Non-Marxists, as the majority of them were, African leaders could not afford to ignore developments or contradic- tions internal to the system, which made changes inevitable. To quote President Nyerere The choice is not between change or no change. The choice is between change or being changed by circums- tances beyond our control 26 The Ethiopia revolution for one, offers the best example in this regard. In Ethiopia even after the soldiers were in the streets, Parliament refused to approve even the very moderate demands for some mild land redistribution. Force finally did it amidst landlords resistance and bloodshed. African leaders were faced with a situation where there was no easily visible "external enemy" to whom to point an accusing finger. The second "scramble for Africa" or Neo-colonialism _ (the colonialists coming by the back door), true though they were, were not easy scape- goats to pick for non-fulfilment of Party Manifestos. The masses were told they would not take on the positions of the Whites, but "Black Europeans" were everywhere for all to see. Even in a peor country like Tanzania, the rapid emergence of differentiation reflected in the "wabenzi" (a stratum of mercedez benz car owners) was evident. Calls, actions and indeed struggles for what was described as the search for "a second independence" (a second Revolution) were made. Indeed actual armed struggles occured. In Zaire for instance we had the left-wing "Simba rebellion" by the murdered Pierre Mulele in the early 1960s. A stage was reached where no African leader dared declare himself a capitalist. Everyone baptized himself a socialist or at least paid lip-servIce to social transformation. S orne were quite genuine attempts at a "move to the left". To some it was a rejection of the excesses of materialism under c t 1 h api a ism on t e one hand and a rejection of what they considered as oppression of communist dictatorship on the 64 other. Many would accept Alexander Dubcek 's "Socia I ism wi th a Human face". To some, thIS would at least be, to aVOld what they consider as the long-term horrows of a class war. But even those who paid lip service to socialism invented the facade of "African Socialism" to camouflage their capitalist tendencies. The seemingly very convmcmg argument was that the Marxist-Leninist model (as applied in the Soviet Union) was either "foreign" to Africa, or for some of the more enlightened, had to be moulded to fit African conditions, and in particular incorporate the traditional AFrican values especially the extended African family system which IS seen as reflective of the communalistic values destroyed by the colonizer's capitalist system. Unlike the Maoist approach, this "moulding" to fit local conditlOns was tantamount to a watered-down protest against exploitation when done by foreigners or still sadder, to a deliberate ignonng of the basic tenets of socialism. Furthermore even the most radical, from Nkrumah to Nyerere at least in their initial pronouncements on the "socialism" they were constructing, rejected the existence of classes m Africa. Nyerere had in his 1962 paper "Ujamaa The Basis of Afncan Socialism" rejected the existence of classes In (traditional) Africa. He wrote : indeed doubt if the equivalent for the word "class" exists in any indigenous African language, for language describes the ides of those who sphoke it, and the idea of 'classs' or 'caste' was non-existent in 27 African society If the above quotation is attributed to a then "moderate" Nyerere, the radical Nyerere of the post - Arusha Declaration era, could still say of "Ujamaa" : It is opposed to capitalism which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man, and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism WhICh 65 seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of 28 inevitable conflict between man and man "African Socialists" rejected further the Marxist dogma of class warfare and a theism. Some like Senghor. generalized this supposedly "classless" societies to presignify the achievement of continent-wide socialism, and to argue that "our problem is not how to put an end to the exploitation of man by his fellow man, but to prevent its ever h appemng ." 29 However, it is significant that Nkrumah, in his post-coup revisit to the subject in his book Class Struggles in Africa 30 accepted the existence of classes in Africa, saw himself and his "socialist" bid in Ghana as a victim of a right-wing backlash comprising international finance capital and their local agents and saw class struggle and continental unity as the only logical alternative for genuine socialism in Africa. "African Socialism" in Practice Different Brands As years went by, several brands of "African Socialism" purported to be peculiar to Africa evolved, with similarities and differences both between countries and time periods. We could briefly refer to severa I of the major brands. We shall start with "Arab Socialism". According to Aly Sabry, Nasser's Egypt leading ideologue, the Egyptian Revolution laid down SIX principles to achieve "Arab Socialism". These were: eradication of imperialism and its agents, eradication of feudalism, eradication of monopoly and the control of capital over the Executive, setting up a strong national army, establishing social Justice and setting up a sound democratic system. Despite progress towards some kind of a "transition to socialism" under Nasser, his death ushered in the de-Nasserization process, the detention and purge of lefts including Aly Sabry, the ditching of the Arab Socialist Union Party and the rapproachment and later capitulation of Sadat's Egypt to the Israeli USA designs. This swept Egypt not only into the capitalist camp, but also set the hitherto progressive and non-aligned United Arab Republic into a Willing ally and tool of imperialism. 66 Sekou Toure's Guinea said "No" to de Gaulle's French Community designs and was one of the leading anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist countries in the 1960s, and therefore the most haunted by neo-colonial forces in Africa. However, in latter years she made a U-turn and portrayed a very reactionary and counter-revolutionary foreign policy. Internally the "communaucrat1que" Afncan socialism of Sekou Toure's Parti Democratique de Guinee was 1ntact only in form but hollow In content. Afterall foreign policy reflects the dynamics of the internal interplay of forces. Much has been written31 about Senghor's "African Path to SocIalism" which springs from his philosophy of Negritude. 32 The latter embodies Euro-centric cultural overtones and a pathological hatred of Marxism. Despite Senghor's pretensions that classes never developed in Senegal's supposedly egalitarian society, other more objective analysts have different V1ews. Markowitz for example has noted: the men who were at the top of traditional society seem, by and large, to have come out not too badly in their modern re la tions as well. Caste 1S still of the 33 greatest sigmficant in modern Senegal Recent studies in the Senegalese "Animation villages" portray the same class differentiation. 34 In Kenya Tom Mboya' s "African Socialism" was a dead letter even before Mboya' s own death in 1969. Kenya had a large settler popula- tion and the Mau Mau uprising was fought basically over the land question. Colonial Government policy was, as in the Zimbabwe case, bent on creating an African middle class which would accommodate more easily the essentially white propertied class or at least be a buffer between these classes and the common man. I ndependence did not reverse this for Kenyatta' s approach as reflected . 1n his book "Suffering Wit h out B.1t t erness "was to "let by-ganes be be gones". 3)- As in the Zimba b wean case now, there was a lot of effort at "reconciliation" and reassuring the whites". The Government's 67 development philosophy came in 1965 in Sessional Paper No. 10 titled 36 "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya". As Oginga Odinga, Kenya's fi.rst Vice-President documented in 37 his autobio- graphy, which is significantly titled, Not Yet Uh uru, it sounded, according to one critic as "neither socialist or African". Informed opinion had it that it was drafted by an American Professor in Mboya's Economic Planning Ministry. Following the footsteps of Nyerere, Toure, Senghor, Nkrumah etc., the Sessional Paper declared The sharp class divisions that once existed in Europe have no place in African sOClalism and no parallel in African society. No class prob lem a rose in the traditional African society and none exists today among Africans . 38 The Sessional paper claimed that through "traditional political democracy" and various controls on resource use, the class divisions that Marx deplored in Europe could be prevented. In practice Kenyan development policies are by any standards capitalist. No nationalization measures were carried out, at least lTIltially the only "public service" acquired was the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, and only in the 1970s was there some minor Government participation in industry including in one commercial bank. Even the Christian Council of Kenya in their study, Who Control Industry 39 in Kenya conservative as the church is generally held to be, were astonished by foreign (private) control of commerce and industry in Kenya and called for nationalization. Indeed the disintegration and collapse of the East African Community reflects in part the consolida- tion of the bourgeoisie in Kenya geared to filling the vacuum created by the collapse of the hitherto socialized EAst African Community Corporations. 40 Although Kenya has a lot of smallbolder production there is extensive large scale farming at the expense of the peasants some of whom are landless. An ILO Report on Kenya pin-points that many of the 68 country's employment problems stem from the fact that there is no access to the land. Thus not only is Kenya not on any socialist road. "Africa n" or otherwIse, but there is no longer any claim to be so; Indeed not daring to call a spade a spade i.e. capitalism. Kenyan leaders are avoidIng all "isms". Reference has already been made to Nkrumalism. The case of Nkrumah's Ghana IS important for it was a bold attempt to build some sort of socialism which crumbled down. Nkrumah's version of socialism combined the communal values of society and a guided economy. His major socialist drive was In 1961/62 with the famous /Dawn Broadcast" against corruption and high living by Party and Government leaders, and two subsequent major policy documents the CPP' s "Programme for Work and Happiness" and the lauching In 1963 of the Seven - year Development Plan, when five categories of ownership and control were set up. The plan marked a belated recognition of the inadequancy of the Arthur Lewis export-oriented development strategy embodied in the First and Second Development Plans. These Plans rather than confront- Ing international finance capital increasingly relied on it to finance and construct among others. the Volta Dam Project. Nkrumah' s resolve that socialism had to go hand in hand with industrialization made him over-reliant on foreign aid despite his knowledge of Its adverse effects. 41 Over 50% of the finances for the Seven-Year Development Plan (1963-1969) were targetted to come from private capital. The latter was to provide the avenue for the capitalist countries squeeze of Ghana's economy, partly by withholding aid (including IMF credit facilities) at a time when cocoa prices were collapsing. The notion that foreign private capital would let itself be used to lay a foundation for socialism and that a state dependent on financing by private capllal could retain the upper hand proved equally deceptive. Nyerere's Tanzan ia IS still soldiering on, despite serious economic constraints. In the case of Tanzania the pre-Arusha Declaration poliCIes were a classic example of "African Socialism". Indeed the paper on which It was based was titled "Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism". With the 1967 Arusha Declaration - with its nationalization 69 of the "commanding heights" of the economy, the purification of the leadership through a Leadership code, emphasis on rural development including the collectivist "uj amaa villages", etc., and the 1971 Party Guidelines (MWONGOZO) - with its emphasis on worker partici pation/ control, political education including the training of a peoples militia; there was an attempt to transcend the "African Socialism" brand in favour of a more radical approach. Despite these efforts, and the honesty and dedication of President Nyerere, Tanzania is 42 far from a success story. Summary and Concluding Remarks We started with a two-angled view provided by Toure and TANU of the situation in Africa. With the exception of two or three countries, which have set on to create internally integrated and self-reliant economies and simultaneously attempting to create the foundations for the emergence of a "socialist man" in the sense of establishing the appropriate mechanism and institutions to guarantee these socialist relations of production, we could after the above analysis regrettably view the situation prevalent in the continent as follows: a. a petty bourgeoisie elite controls the Afncan states, ensuring neo-colonial control by international finaLce capital, and their own priviledged access to surpluses; b. the mass of the population are either demobilized and/or manipulated; c. poli tica 1 structures (whether mi li ta ry-cum-bu rea ucra tic regimes or otherwise) are instruments to facilitate the above in the interests of the newly dominant classes; and d. the official ideologies serve primarily to rationalize and legitimize just such exploitative relations. The analysis in the paper showed that 11 .. genera y two positions are held by Afncan leaders vis-a-vis social stratification; that 70 i) class formation and crystallization have not and may not occur; ii) or if emerging are of peripheral importance to social confl ict. Observa tion (i) a rises partly from the uncri tica lover - eagerness to grasp traditional Africa, which might be overdone. As in any society, the heritage of traditional Africa is far from being uniformly positive: it contains for example illiberal traditions of the "feudal" past. Nor was submission to custom automatic. Indeed as Gohen 43 has stated there were many portrayed clear-cut lines of social stratification, sometimes enforced by ethnic and religious distinctions. Indeed Nyerere has, despite his tradition-based "Ujamaa" philosophy pin- pointed the shortcomings of traditional Africa: people did not use proper tools and women were overworked. Nevertheless the search for the birth of a "new man" - what Che Guevara called "the 21st century man" "the socialist man", must continue by restructuring not only the economic but also the social and cultural values of society. But Africa is not Mao's China. The values of many a leadership favoured the status quo; not only because of their Western colonial legacy /orien ta tlon but also because they stand to gain out of it. I ndeed the g rea test da nger wi th the socia I ist ex periments in Africa is the possibility of the emergence of a "new class". The natlOnalisa- tions which are the customary signal of a sociallst trend, does place the politIcal elite in a special relationship to the means of production - they do not ow~ (but especially in the absence of effective Worker's Management) they control. This IS a situation in which a gap could WIden between the rulers and the people. The ensuing class struggle in thIS case will not be the classic MarxIst one between SOelo-economic class(>s whose antagonism stem from the contradiction between private own(>rship social production, but from the antagonism between and controlling the society as a whole, includIng the a political elite of production, and the rest of the population. ThIS major m(>ans 4 IS the t'new class" SItuation. AccordIng to Cabral.4 the ell t(> ("the revolutIonary petty bourgeoisie") in the new natlOns. has two alterna- 71 tives to betray the Revolution or to "commit suicide" as a class. While individual members can "commit suicide". it is unlikely that a whole class can without being forced to do so. Here is where "the development of a revolutionary consciousness" is called for. One p re- req u i s ite for the long-term success of socialism is the constant improvement of the people's material well-being. This implies increased production. more equitable distribution of the national surplus and blocking of exploitation by international capitalism. Promises of a better tomorrow. when "to each according to his needs" becomes the distribution principle. while their present standards of living deteriorate. will not generate the kind of enthusiastic support needed to push forward more radical policies; hence the need for a proper balance between today' s consumption and the sacrifices for a better tomorrow. Africa has the highest ratio of frontiers to total areas of any continent. Unless common policies are laid down by geographically related groups of Africa states. each of them is either through "demonstration effects" or otherwise at the mercy of policies followed by their neig'I- bours. With capital-shortage and a limited market, the need for a larger market and joint industries in the framework of regional cooperation is paramount. but with ideological divergencies. this is almost impossible. The disintegration and collapse of the East African Community. arising particularly from conflicts between a Kenyan laissez faire policy oriented towards Western private investment and a Tanzanian policy fostering "Ujamaa" is a case in pOlnt. in cases of extreme ideological divergencies. the neighbouring country could be a base for plots against the socialist country. This raises the question (which initially faced revolutionary Russia) of whether "Socialism in one country" is possible in Africa. ideology can gIve direction, hope and inspire efforts for a better tomorrow. The "isms" must enter a developmental equation. "But ideology", notes Berg, "has its dangers too. 1t hardens thought. It restricts the search for alternatives and makes changes of direction d iffIcu 11. n It might even be wrong in its picture of the World and in its policy .. preSCrlpt10ns ,,4. 5 Un f ortunate 1y f or Af rica, this fear thrives. African leaders including the progressive ones are either slow to appreClate Berg's warning or are ideologically immature; sometimes coming to terms with it when it is too late. Even for the intellectual and politician of Nkrumah' s stature, clarity in h1s analysis matured after his fall when he could write: There 1S only one true socialism and that is scientific socialism, the principles of which are binding and unlversal. The only way to achieve it is to dev1se policies aimed at general soclalist goals, which take thelr form from the concrete, speClfic circumstances and conditIOns of a partlcular country at a definite hlstorical period . He added We must therefore be on our guard against measures which are declared to be 'socialist' but WhlCh do not In fact promote economlC and social development. Dismissing as muddled thinkIng the very suggestion of the eXIstence of an "African SOClalism" peculiar to continent, he argued rhe socialist countries of Africa may differ In the pollcies. There are different paths to detaIls of thelr have to be made to suit SL1C id II 5 m• dnd adjustments But they should not be Pdt-tlcular ci rcumstances. vagaries of taste. drtl1tranlv decided, or subject to 46 They must be sClenttflcally explained Footnotes The H1ghest Stage of Capitaltsm, 1. V.I. Lentn: Imperialism i)rL"grcss. Moscow. 1970. 2, Freedom and SOClalism. Oxford Universlty Press, ].K. Nyerere: lQ6S. 73 3. Elliot Berg. "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1964. 4. Elliot Berg, Ibid. 5. This was made in the heydays of his radicalism. Sekou Toure's Guinea, was once torch-bearer of the African Revolu- tion. In his latter years President Toure pursued very reactionary and counter - revolutionary foreign policies. 6. See, Ngila Mwase, "African Goal and Ideologies" in Africa, London, No. 66, February 1977. 7. TANU. MWONGOZO WA TANU (The Party Guidelines), Dar-es- Salaam, Government Printer, 1971. 8. Alioune Diop. Panafricanism Reconsidered (edited by American Society of African culture, University Press of America, 1962. 9. Frantz F anon. The Wretched of the Earth. New York, 1968. 10. Kwame Nkrumah. Speak of Freedom. Heinermann, London, 1961. 11. Report of the Sixth Pan-African Congress, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar-Es-Salaam, 1976. 12. Frantz Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, New York, 1968, (first published in 1961. 13. TANU. Mwongozo wa TANU (The TANU Guidelines) , Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1971. 14. Several Francophone African leaders notably Leopold Senghor (Senegal) and Felix Houphouet Boigny (Ivory Coast) were Ministers in France. Several other personalities in French- speaking West Africa were deputies 1.e. Members of P arli ament in France. Many retained French nationality. 14. K.A. Busia. Africa in Search of Democracy, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967. 16. See V.P. Menon. The Transfer of Power in India, London, 1957. 17. See. Thomas Hodgkin. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. London, Frederick Muller, 1955. --------------- 18. The latest form of transitional administration in Africa was the Lord Soames Governorship in Zimbabwe prior to indepen- dence in April, 1980. 19. Bob Fitch, and Mary Oppenheimer. Ghana: End of an Illusion, Monthly Review Press, New York, 196"'6~.------------- 74 20. Kwame Nkrumah. Africa Must Unite International Publishers, New Yor, 1972 (first published 1963).' 21. Rene Dumont, op cit., Dahomey is now called Benin. 22. Rene Dumond. False Start in Africa, Andre Deutsch, London, 1966 (first published in French, 1962). 23. Tom Mboya was the father of Kenya's "African Socialism". 24. Colin Legum (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record, London, 1980. 25. Colin Legum (ed.) Africa Conteporary Record, London, 1983. 26. J.K. Nyerere. Freedom and Development, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1971. 27. J.K. Nyerere "Ujamaa The Basis of African Socialism" in Freedom and Unity, Dar es Salaam, Oxford UniversJly Press, 1966, pp. 162 ~ b4. 28. J.K. Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1967. 29. Leopold Senghor. The African Path to SOClalism, 1986. 30. Kwame Nkrumah. Class Struggles In Africa, International Publishers, New York, 1970. 31. See for example, Nglla Mwase, "African Socialism RevIsited" Proceedings of the Southern Afncan Uni versi l1es Socia I Sciences Conference, Dar es Salaam, June, 1979. 42 pages. 32. Leopold Senghor. On African Socialism, Mercer Cook, Praeger, 1964. Senghor was President of Senegal since independence in 1960 to his retIrement in 1979. He is along with politICIans such as Willy Brandt, Mano Soares, Menachen Begin, Habib Bourguiba etc., a member of the "Socialist International". 33. 1.L. Markowitz. Senghor and the Politics of Negritude, London, Hemamann, 1969. Senghor recognized the presence of castes, but rationalIzed this phenomena by claiming that they were of "Arab-Barber importatIOn" rather than indigenous. 34. See for example Johathan Barker, "Political FactlOnalism in SE'negal" Canadian Journal of African Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 287 - 303. 35. Jomo Kenyatta. Suffering Without Bitterness, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1968, 36. KE'nya GovE'rnment. African socialism and its application to Planning In Kenya, Sessional Paper No. la, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1965. 37. Oginga Odinga. Not Yet Uhur_u, Heinamann Educa tlon Book, 1967. 75 38. Kenya Government, op. cit. 39. Christian Council of Kenya. Who Controls Industry in Kenya, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1968. 40. See Ngila Mwase. "Regional Economic Cooperation and the Unequal Sharing of Benefits: Background to the Disintegration and Collapse of the East Africa Community", Africa Development CODESRlA, Dakar, No. 2/3, 1979. 41. See Kwame Nkrumah. Neo-Colomalism: The Last State of Impe'rialism, International Publishers, New York. 1966 (first published 1965), 42. For a critique of this "Ujamaa" socialism experIment see among others, Issa ShivJi. The Sllent Class Struggle, and G6ran Hyden. Beyond UJamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry, London, 1980. 43. R. Cohen. "Class in Africa: Analytical problems and perspec- tives" Socialist Register, pp. 230 - 56. 44. Amilcar Cabral. Revolution in Guinea, R. Handyside, 1971. 45. Elliot Berg, op. cit. 46. Kwame Nkrumah. Class Struggles in Africa, International Publishers, New York, 1970. 76