- 114 - BOTSWANA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE STRATEGY FOR REGIONAL CO- EXISTENCE J.c. aD:PASUIA AND K. MITI Soothern Africa: 'lhe Region and its Realities In order to appreciate BotswanaI s position in Southern Africa, it is important first to have a clear picture of the region and the changes that have roved Botswana fran becaning a semi-Bantustan of South Africa to being a centre of major efforts to reduce South Africa's daninance. For one thing, while Botswana has mademajor strides to extricate herself fran South Africa s stranglehold, I the country remains dependent on South Africa for migrant la1x>ur, trade and transport links, as well as custans and excise revenue. This paper, therefore, starts off by defining L~e Southern African region and by looking at the realities and situation in the region that has been characterized as the "voltex of violence" (Callaghy 1983). We might as well start by asking oorselves the question "what coontries constitute the Southern African Region or sub continent and what is the criteria for inclusion?" Potholm (1972) defined the Southern African region in terms of White danination that extended all the way from South Africa to fuzambique, Rhodesia and Angola. This danination is not only at the political level (white power and racism), rot also at the econanic level. At the econanic level, white danination, with its main centre in Sooth Africa, extended to the black independent states, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, that were - 115 - surrounded by the white regimes and went further to include r1alawi and Zambia that were dependent on white controlled transport routes. While still defining the region in terms of white danination and the centrality of South Africa within the region, Grundy (1973) introduces an element of core and periphery to the analysis of the region and uses various criteria to allocate countries to both core and periphery. Using geographic criteria, especially proximity to South Africa, the core is constituted by countries under white rule and those completely surrounded by white ruled states (Le. South Africa, South West Africa, r-Dzambique, Lesotho, Swaziland) and the periphery is constituted by those countries which share borders with white and black African states. Using the economiccriteria, the core is represented by South Africa and Rhodesia while the rest becane the periphery. under the political, diplomatic and strategic criteria, the core is made up of the tripartite alliance of South Africa, Portugal and Rhzambique. But because of the continuing \\e.r in M:>zambique that dates back to FREI...IID's liberation \\e.r beginning in 1964 and which has continued after rbzambique's independence with the South African supported MNR, the M:>zambicanroute is no longer reliable, and can no longer satisfy the transport needs of Zimbab.-/e and Zambia. Zaire's natural route is, of course, Angola through the Benguela railway but because of disruptions due to the \\e.r, this rail\\e.Y has remained inoperative for IlDst of the 1970's and 1980's. 'n1e Benguela Railway also served Zambia's needs before its disruption. In the third instance are those countries that can be described as under South Africa's military sphere of influence. In its struggle with the oppressed black population in South Africa and Namibia, South Africa has defined its defence line or defensi ve perimeter. 'n1is line runs across the Zaire-Tanzania border, which used to be the divide line between independent black Africa and white daninated Southern Africa. South Africa in the 1960's and 1970's tried all it could to keep its defence perimeter by suworting Portugal and the Smi th Regime (lb:xiesia) against the liberation forces. With the independence of the Portuguese colonies and mxxIesia, it has tried to ensure that these newly independent countries are - 117 - depri ved of the means to sUfP)rt the liberation struggle in South Africa by resorting to political destabilization and economic sabotage. 'Ibe main victims of these efforts by South Africa have been Angola, which South Africa invaded in 1975 in an attempt to prevent ~1PIA taking pcMer. South Africa has since remained in Angola and continues to support the lmTA rebels under Savimbi. It has also destabilised lvbzambique which has been a scene not only of South African incursions but a battle ground between the South African strongly sUfP)rted MNR and the FRELlM) government. Other countries in the region have not escaped the South African military machine though they have not sufferErl the same level of disruption as Angola and M:Jzambique.Given the above, the countries that constitute the Southern African region are: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, S\-,aziland, Zimbabwe, zambia, Malawi, Angola, and f.bzambique. Zaire has been drawn into the pictur .. of Southern Africa on two camts. First, its transport dependence on the region be it via South Africa or Angola. Second, because of its collusion with South Africa and the USA to prevent t'he area falling under socialist influence. 'Ibis collusion was well man;"~stE!<1in the Angolancrisis of 1975/76 (Stockwell ~978). Tanzania has been drawn in the Southern African picture by its being the base of IlPst of Southern African liberation JlDVements in t'he region. It has actErl as training grOl.llrland suW1y line for the guerrilla struggles in the region. As such, it has ccme to be identified, wit'hin the Southern African affairs, as the centre of opposition against white danination. It has consequently been at the core of the Frontline states (acting as chairman of this grouping right fran its inception in 1974 up to 1985) and at the forefront of the SAIXX:. Tanzania could t'herefore be described as the disruptive periphery of the South African sphere of influence and danination, while Zaire constitutes t'he ooq>erative periphery of that influence. Fran . one can already have a the very definition of the reg1.on gl~ of what have been the realities and characteristics of - 118 - the region. The first characteristic of the region is of course white-racial danination of the area both at the social-economic and political levels. Whenthe rest of Africa was gaining independence in the 1950's and GO's, the whites in South Africa were busy entrenching their poNer. It has taken long years of bitter fighting to dislodge the whites from power in M:)zambique, Angola and Zimba1:we.The struggle, ho,..rever,still goes on and is becaning more bitter and disruptive as the centre of white bastion fights back against the forces of liberation. The second characteristic of the region, therefore, is that it has been the voltex of violence and bitter wars in Africa only canparable to the Biddle Fast. This violence which is being perpetrated by South Africa and its allies has not only been disruptive and costly, but has prevented the sm:)Oth develo~nt of this very rich area. CXlecannot build under a war situation which is the case in Southern Africa (CannoBolealth Secretariat 1979): Violence and war has brought to the region super power rivalry. The West, in particular U.S.A. and Britain, have speci fic interests to G~fend and have acted as allies to the white poNers in the region. Western support of Portugal in its attenpt to hold on to its colonies which was carried out in the nameof a NATO ally has already been well documented (Isaacman and D9.vis 1981), the busting of sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia by the West which enabled it to hold up for 15 years is a very well kno,..rn fact. The support received by South Africa from the Western poNers and the constant refusal by the West to imposesanctions on South Africa is also kno,..rn. Also kno,..rn is Americanintervention in Angola. What need be pointed out here is that the West, and in particular the U.S.A., have stood in the path of liberation and have helped to escalate violence in the region under their constant call for peaceful change. It is erntgh to take a glance at the United States foreign policy in the Southern African region to understand the Western - 119 - powers' collusion. American foreign policy in the region has been guided by (i) its increasing desire to open areas in Africa for direct American economic penetration as a source of valuable raw materials, areas for investment and a pranising market. In this regard South Africa has proved to be the ideal place, for the supply of strategic minerals (the main argument against sanctions) investment (standing at $2,600 million in 1981) and as a market (with the value of trade between the tl«> anounting to $4,4OOm) (Nicol 1983). (ii) Anti-cCJlllll1Ilism which has been levelled at every serious liberation IlOvement,and (Hi) South Africa I s importance as a daninant regional power which is seen as crucial for maintaining regional stability and fighting cCllllll.ll1ism. '!his has led to American resolve to preserve South Africa, nles of this pooling together are of course the Frontline grouping and the SAOX:. Weshall have occasion in the latter " and constraints part of this paper to talk about the rea 1ltles of these alliances. '!he OJntext of Foreign Policy t Botswana's situation at '!here are three main points a ........... ~, Botswana's extreme poverty at independence • ~M nee on Sooth indepen:ience. '1\«), Botswana's quasi total det""'.-e . Africa. 'lhree, Botswana's isolation fran the rest of Afnca as - 120 - a result of being surrourrled by \ white racist regimes. '!hese have been the main constraining factors on Botswana's foreign policy. Four main goals have guided Botswana's foreign policy since independence. First, Botswanaaimed at developing allies among other Mrican states so that she would not have to face her p::7Nerful neighbour alone, and as a means of avoiding total isolation from the rest of Mrica. '!he membership of Botswana in the Frontline states grouping and her crucial role in the Southern Mrican Developnent Coordination Conference (SADCC), which we shall discuss in thi s section, testi fies Botswana's success in this regard. Second, being surrourrled by apartheid regimes, Botswana had to avoid creating an impression that it corrloned apartheid. On this score, Botswanahad to create an exemplary democratic and non racial state and society. '1his on the one hand would act as an exampleof the possible changes in South Africa itself. On the other hand, this derrocratic image would generate Western sympathies and protection against Sout.h Africa. Botswana also had to condemn the apartheid regime, but without giving cause for South Africa's retaliation and attacks. '!his was a tenuous and risky path and forced Botswana to hold to specific principles. Oneof these principles is non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. '!his principle was well stated by President Khama thus: Wewi11 not permit Botswal1dto be used as a base for the organization or direction of violent activities directed towards other states (Parson, 1984). 'Ibis meant that while Botswana corrlemnedapartheid, it \OtOUld not support any military action against the overthrow of the South African regime. Emerging from the first principle \I\1aS the preference for peacefully negotiated solutions. '!hus, President Khama stated that: - 121 - Botswana will not condemn toose who resort to violence to gain freedan in such situations. It is possible of course to be IlOre or less sceptical a1x>ut the chances of success of violent tactics in different situations. But that is a matter of political and military judgement and not IlOrals (Parson 1984). '!he above two principles reflected Botswana's vulnerability and the limited role the country could play in the Frontline Grouping and in the increasingly violent situation in Soothern Africa. '!hirdly, Botswana had to quickly develop an international nucleus of aid not only to avoid relying on Sooth Africa for material and manpcwerresources (which South Africa has continued to offer, and which Botswanahas consistently refused) but also to alleviate the stark poverty it inherited at independence. Botswana has indeed succeeded in obtaining substantial aid, but her indebtedness has remained small and manageable to date (Table 1). lastly, Botswana had to develop an international visibility in order to prevent diplcrnatic and econanic isolation. This meant participation in international forums where the country could present a good image of stability and adherence to deno::ratic principles. In both these goals, Botswana sought Western allies with major interests in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. Closer relations with toose countries and their camnitment to an independent Botswana in Southern Africa, became a useful shield against South Africa. Being alllOst totally surrounded by South Africa and totally dependent on it, Botswana had perforce to deal with South Africa. Hard choices had to be madeon what type of relations to maintain with South Africa. Diplanatic relations were precluded as this would be interpreted as condoning apartheid. Botswana however, had to keep contact with her fOierful neighl:xx.Ir. '!he ca.mtry settled for what has been labelled as "telephme diplanacy" which meant meeting South Africa s I officials on an ad hoc basis to discuss issues of mutual - 122 - interest and resolve potential conflict. Table 1: BotSNana Government Debt leal th Dev. Corporation ,I 0,1 US IXUAR Ull\NS IBRD 45,9 67,3 76,7 91,7 145,7 1M 12,2 15,1 16,7 17,6 25,8 USAID 19,8 24,9 27,6 32,9 50,5 Oil Price Alleviation FUOO(OPAF) 5,3 5,9 6,2 8,6 in Africa (BAEDFA) 4,2 0,6 3,2 6,6 11,8 WDP Housing Iaan 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,4 OPEX: 2,3 3,4 3,8 5,6 9,3 First National Bank of Boston(mBB) 32,S 25,9 21,4 Federal Financing Bank 1,1 4,4 SPEnAL DIWmI; RIGf1'S Ull\NS African Developnent Bank/FUOO 8,9 9,0 15,0 19,6 44,2 (IFW). 0lHER CURREH:m; I)mish Govt. (I)mish Kroner) 3,3 3,4 3,8 3,6 5,6 SAUDI EUID (SAUDI Riyals) 5,5 8,9 20,9 KUWAIT EUID (KUWAIT Dinars) 4,9 8,9 25,1 European Investment Bank (EllA) ,2 1,6 1,8 2,1 Ilords (Rands) 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,6 1,6 1,5 Olinese Govt. (Rinminbi) 1,8 KFW (Deutsche Mark) 0,6 French Govt. (Francs) 0,2 'lU12\L EX'.lmW, IEBT 98,7 132,5 199,2 232,4 380,8 B. IXH:STIc IEBT rosa Ebtswana Government EbOO 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 'lU12\L :nmaw, IEBT 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 C. GRAND 'lU1'AL 99.1 132.9 199.6 232.7 381.1 - Soorce: Bank of Botswana - Annual Bulletin. December, 1985. - 123 - Cile sb:>uld note, l1cMever, the fact that the situation has oot remained static. '!he fall of the Portuguese empire, the liberation of Zil1ll::labole, the increasing violence in Sooth Africa and the heightening of liberation forces there have catpletely altered the situation and Botswana is forced to make new choices as she enters her third decade of independence. 11ilitary raids fran South Africa and possible destabilization is already a factor in Botswana s foreign relations. I Given the volatility of the situation, Botswana is likely to be drawn into the struggle that is grcwing inside South Africa. '!he consequences of being drawn into this struggle are horeoooos. But Botswana has reached a threshold where it can 00 longer remain neutral in the fight for majority rule in Sooth Africa. Having stated the broad outline of Botswana's foreign policy, let us noN look specifically at her relations with the Frontline states and the SAOCC grouping. BotSMana in the Frontline States '!he grouping referred to as the Frontline states emergedout of the initiative of President Kauroa of zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa to find a peaceful settlement for ffi10desia (ZimbaDie), after the military coup d'etat in Portugal in April 1974 that signalled the possible iOOepeOOenceof Rhodesia. With the buffer zone arooOOSooth Africa crumbling, Vorster was eager to influence events in Rhodesia in order, on the one hand to curtail the possible spill over of the liberation efforts into South Africa, and on the other haM to pra:luce a JD:)re favourable regime there. Iroachto a peaceful change in SOOthem Africa ". Reactions - 124 - ta..erds the Kaumajvorster initiatives were initially hostile. '!he states within the region saw Kaunda's initiatives as a betrayal of the liberation cause since South Africa \\as directly supporting the Smith regime. The same oostility \\as to be expressed to the whole grooping by the rest of African coontries whenBotswana, Tanzania and FreliIlO finally joined Zambia so as to formulate a uniterl policy for negotiation with the RhodesianGovernment. To the OI\U and the African states, talking to Sooth Africa at a crucial nonent when the white bastion aFPOOI'erl to be crumbling, was interpreted as capitulation. ~ver , the grouping managed to convince the other African states that they were playing a crucial role in the liberation process and not jeopardizing it. '!hus in April 1975, the Frontline states \ooOn formal recognition as an ad hoc camnittee of the Assemblyof the Heads of States of the OI\U. Fran its inception in 1974 and until the independence of Zi.ml:aboiein 1980, the main focus of the Frontline states was the settlement and final indepemence for Zimbaboie. In the first instance, the Frontline states realized. that they did not have any leverage over Smith to force him into a negotiating table. '!heir task, therefore, was to use toose with such leverage. '!he state with leverage over Rhodesia was South Africa, that \\as not only helping Smith (Rhodesia) to buSt sanctions, but also providerl military hardware and personnel to fight the guerrillas. Withdra\>al or threat of withdrawal of such sur:port woold force Smith to negotiate a settlement with the fighting nationalists. It \>as such a threat by South Africa that forced Smith to release the imprisoned nationalists and to attend the first of the series of negotiations in AugUSt 1975. fb.tever, So.lth Africa, operating a similar racist regime CQ11dnot be totally trusted to force a settlement that was in favoor of majority rule in Rhodesia. Secondly, the Smith Regime did not at"'ln<>~~ r~ to be' serIOUSon negotIatIons .. and was not prepared to give any COI1cess' IOns. 'lhe other two states with leverage over Smith were Britain and the United States. '!he diplanatic offensive was to force - 125 - Britain to assume responsibility for its former colony. As for the United States, it had to be convinced to change its foreign policy in 'Southern Africa and its conviction that change COlld cane only through the white minority regimes (National Security Study Memorandum 39). It was also necessary to convince the USA that liberation IIOvements did not stand for cannunism and that their support of the minority regimes and continuous refusal to support the nationalists thrCMsthem into the hands of the USSR. T\o.Q things ha~ned in 1976 that were to change the scene and heighten the tempo for a negotiated settlement. These were, the defeat of South Africans in Angola and the failure of American policy in Angola. '!he failure of the American policy in Angola tarnished America s I image in Africa and exposed its duplicity. 'Ib cover up its failure the United States nCM joined the efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and hence the Kissinger ini tiati ves that culminated in the Geneva talks in October - December1976. With the entry of the USA into the scene Britain could no longer remain unconcerned over Rhodesia, it had also to join the efforts for a settlement. '!he Frontline states realized quite early, particularly after Smith had ShCMn that he was not prepared to make any concession, that the only leverage in their hands was to intensify the guerrilla struggle. '!he major obstacle, hCMever, was the disunity arong the nationalists. Efforts to keep the nationalists united, particularly the first forging of the United African National Congress (UAOC) under Muzorewa in 1976 and the subsequent efforts to reconcile the groups, have been regarded in some quarters as having retarded the liberation struggle, for given the differences, the split of the Nationalist Front was inevitable. '!he defence to this accusation given by the Frontline states, which a~r to be credible, is that if a negotiated settlement was to take place then the nationalists must present uniform demandsso as to aVOl 'd se11 out s. In fact, l't was the very split within the - 126 - nationalists camp that led to the internal settlement in 1978. While the Frontline states failed to keep the alliance they had created under the tnnbrella of l..V\OC, at least they managedto foster an alliance between the two main parties of ZMlJ and ZAPUunder the Patriotic Front which enabled the success of the lancaster Housenegotiations in 1979 that brought independence to Zimbabwe. Oneof the main tasks of the Frontline states was to provide sUfPOrt to the guerrillas. It was realized that, only through the intensification of fighting inside Rhodesia could Smith be brought to the negotiating table, the United States and Britain be convinced that the Rhodesian problem needed an irrnnediate solution and hence pressure Srni th for negotiations. It was indeed the success of the guerrillas that changed the tables and convinced Britain and the United States who were itching to recognize the internal settlement that without the participation of the combatants, no settlement wouldbe workable. Nhile Botswana participated vigorously in the diplomatic offensive for the solution of the Rhodesian problem, her foreign policy principles as well as her position within Southern Africa limited her participation in the support to the guerrillas. Her main contribution in this regard was to act as a transit corridor for those wishing to join the guerrillas. These wouln be quickly transferred to Zambia and on to Tanzania and t>bzambique. It is mainly these countries that took the responsibility of directly supporting the guerrillas. However, the intensi fication of confl ict in Rhodesia had many repercussions in Botswana. First was the flow of refugees running away from the growing fighting. Refugees in Botswana grew from 2,500 in 1974 to 23,000 in 1979 and IlOst of these were from Rhodesia. Since the settlement and independence in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)in 1980 the number of refugees dropped to 1,300 (see table 2). Besides the cost of maintaining the r~fugees, for which Botswanawas helped by the United Nations High Camniss' f ion or Refugees, the refugees became part of an - 127 - excuse for Rhodesian raids. Table 2: Numberof Refugees in the Frontline States 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Angola 220,000 250,000 141,000 56,000 73,000 Botswana 2,500 2,500 4,000 4,300 19,000 23,000 1,000 M:>zambique 14,500 27,000 42,000 100,000 150,000 100 Tanzania 193,000 171,000 154,000 163,000 160,000 155,000 n.a. Zambia 40,000 36,000 33,000 64,000 70,000 57,000 51,000 Source: Carol B. '1l1anpson,1985. p.85. With only a police force, Botswana could neither prevent the guerrillas crossing her border nor repel the Rhodesian forces with their hot pursuit pretexes. '1l1usBotswanawas to suffer both material and human losses. As a result, Botswana had to divert her development budget to the creation of a Military Force beginning in 1977. To this must be added the fact that Botswana imposed limited sanctions on Rhodesia, that included the banning of the passage of military equipment and petrol products through its country. '1l1is meant that Botswanahad to purchase the railway that crossed the country fran South Africa to Rhodesia (which ONI1edthe railway), J::uy its own rolling stOCK, create its 0NI1 oil storage depot and initiate many other projects for which it was dependent on Rhodesia. While this may be regarded as a positive step in as mch as it decreased the country's dependence, it nonetheless, involved the use of funds which were not previously budgeted for. 'Jhe initial impetus for the Frontline states was the securing of a negotiated settlement for Rhodesia. In 1979 this goal was achieved and Rlodesia, 1'10;01 ZimbabNe,became independent. - 128 - lbNever, the grouping to which had been added Angola in 1976 and Ziml::Jab..le in 1980 remained in existence but with a renewed focus on Namibia and South Africa. 'Ibe settlement for Namibia, to which the Frontline States have focused their main attention since 1980, has stalled because of external interests, particularly those of the United States, that has tried to link the independenceof Namibia to the reIlOval of CUban troops in Angola: a corrlition unacceptable to the Frontline states. '!he other reason for the stalling of the Namibian settlement is that the West is not prepared to pressurise South Africa to give up Namibia. Here the Frontline states have less leverage partly because of their dependence on South Africa which has taken a very aggressive posture and resorted to destabilization of the whole Southern African region. As for the liberation of South Africa itself, the Frontline states appear to be counting rore and IlOre on grCftlling internal tlll"IlOil. 'Ibis turnnil is expected to increase the threat to Western interests in the country and to culminate in the awlication of sanctions. '!he Frontline states can do relatively little on their own to force change in South Africa. One last thing to be noted here is that the Frontline Grouping has given rise to other avenues of cooperation in the area, the main one being the Southern African Developnent Coordination O:>nference (~). It is to this that we shall J1000I turn. '1he Soothern African Developoent Coordinatic::n Conference '!here are two views as to the initiation of~. 'Ibe first ('!hanpson, 1985) sees SAIXX: as the direct continuation of the cooperation that developed between the five Frontline states during the war of liberation. '!he peli tical cooperation of the Frontline states imparted ecoocrnic lessons that translatro themselves into eco' ' ... f natUc coordInatIon under~. 'IbIS IS 0 CCXlrse the official view of the SAIXX: states. '!he secorrl view, sees SADcx:: as emerging fran diplanatic initiatives of African and Western states for a massive programmeof reconstruction in Soothern Africa after years of war, that is, a kind of "M:lrshal Plan" f or the region financed by Western countries (Anglin 1982). - 129 - One gains very little by laoouring on the origin of SAIX:X: for as Leys and Tostensen (1982) note, ooth initiatives coincided and hence certain camron interests and forces are behind the initiative. What is clear, however, is that the first step to the formation of SAlX'C was the resolution by the Frontline Fbreign Ministers I meeting in Gaooronein May1979 to work out the possibilities of establishing an ecornnic grouping. 'Ibis was followed by the decision of the Heads of the Frontline states in Arusha in July 1979. SAIX:X: was then officially inaugurated in Lusaka in 1980 with its main goals being: a) to reduce econanic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Replblic of South Africa; b) to prarote cooperation between states in the region; c) to IlVbilize resources in order to carry out national, regional and international projects; d) to act in concert vis-a-vis aid organisations in order to acquire finance and teChnical assistance. By this time the decision had already been taken to include the other Southern African states that were not part of the Frontline states namely Lesotho, Malawi, and SWaziland. 'Ibe above goals emerged frClllthe main characteristic of the region which include South Africa s I ecorx:mic danination of the area and the dependency relationships on South Africa on the part of IlVSt of the nine memberstates of SAOCC. '!he econanic dClllination of the region can quickly be glimpsed fran Table 3 which shows that South Africa's GNPis three times greater than the canbined GNPof the SIIDXstates. 'Ihe Table also illustrates the poverty of Southern African states. only Tanzania and Angola escaped total deperoence on and danination by South Africa. With six of the nine countries being landlOCked, the region has remained deperrlent on SOUthAfrica's IlDre efficient transport network. M:>stof the countries in the region have continued to act as labour reserves for SOUth -130- Africa with 357,000 of their citizens working in Sa.1th Africa in 1977 and 288, 000 in 1983 (Gavin 1984). South Africa equally provides a greater part of the imports for the region and absorbs the exp:>rts fran the SAIXX:: grouping. Table 3: Pq:lulation, National Product and Per Capita Incane SAIXx: Camtries and South Africa, 1980 Country Population GNP GNP (mill) ($ mill) per capita ($) Botswana 0,8 750 910 Lesotho 1,3 520 390 Swizi1and 0,6 380 680 l-bzambique 12,1 2810 230 Angola 7,1 3320 470 Zambia 5,8 3220 560 Zimbal:we 7,4 4640 630 Malawi 6,1 1390 230 Tanzania 18,7 4780 280 Total SAOCc 59,9 21490 359 South Africa 25,0 66960 2290 a:>te: Namibia = 1,0 1420 1410 - Source: Maasdorp Gavin, 1984 p.33 Because of its desire to consolidate danination over the region, South Africa has sought to establish an econanic constellation of states with itself at the centre. '!be latest of these efforts was its attempt to sell its idea of the Constellation of Southern African States (a:NSAS). '!be term CX'6SAs was first coined by Vorster in 1975 and first spelled oot in sane detail by R.F. Botha, South Africa I s Minister of - 131 - Foreign Affairs in March 1979 and elaborated by Prime Minister P.W. Botha in November1979. CCNSAS was envisaged to canprise all of Africa south of the Kuneneand Zambesirivers and its goal was the coordinated regional developnent strategy of which industrial deceptralization would be the linchpin. The overtures by South Africa to its neighbours which were ca.lpled with the offer to finance important developnent schares were correctly characterized by the neighbours as South Africa's attempt to Bantustanize Southern Africa. In fact, the constellation of states was part of what South Africa calls "total strategy" against a total onslaught. The other aspects of the "total strategy" were of course the full implementation of the Bantustan policy and the MaSsive build up of its military capacity. Besides South Africa s I danination of the area is the stark poverty of the region, notwithstanding its rich natural endowments. It is this poverty that accounts for the third and fourth goal of SALCe. Indeed, without massive aid fran outside, econanic developnent would be muchslower. While one can not say that there has been no res.fX)nse, external pledges have been far lower than the needs of the region as can be seen fran Table 4 which shows project costs and canmitments. As of 1983, only 26.2 percent of the needed costs were already ccmmitted. If one adds the fact that these camnitmentsdo not canpletely represent new pledges but old canmitments to projects in the region, then the res.fX)nse could be characterized as minimal. This would anount to US $150 million (Leys & 'Ibstensen 1982)• If it was assumed that by coordinating their efforts to secure international aid the SAJX:C grouping would attract IlPre furrls in the region, this has not been borne out by the outcane to date. Let us now turn to the other goal of SALCC - the prcm:>tionof cooperation within the region. ~st of the ventures at ecoronic cooperation in Africa have not met with success. And ironically, within Eastern and Southern Africa, the only ecoronic system still functioning roderately SIlPOthlyis that - 132 - Table 4: Project Costs and Camni tments Total Costs Total Canmitted Project Group us $ Mill % US $ Mill Col. (3) as % Co1. (1) Operational Coordination (1) (2) (3) (4) 9.4 9.4 3,8 40.4 Training 2 0.1 1.6 80.0 Port Transport systems: Maputo 552 21,7 160 29,0 Beira 414 16,3 58 14,0 Nacala 235 9,3 101 43,0 I::ar-es-Salaam 339 13,4 22 6,5 lDbito 90 3.5 14 15.6 Intra-regional surface 404 15,9 41 10.1 transport Civil Aviation 258 10.1 155 60.1 Telecannunications 235 9.3 108 46.0 'Ibtal 2538.4 100.0 664.4 26.2 Scurce: Maasdorp Gavin 1984, p.19 - 133 - centred on Pretoria and reaching well beyond the area of the Southern African custans union. '!his abysmal failure at Africa's ventures for economic cooperation has induced the ~ countries to take a functionalist decentralized m::rlelof operation by which each country is given coordination over a particular area with its own particular style and general decisions are made by consensus between the ca.mtries either at the Heads of State level or Ministerial level. Allocation of Responsibilities Between Southern African States O:luntry Area Angola Energy conservation and security Botswana crop research in semi-arid tropics Animal disease control and SIIDX Headquarters Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation Malawi Fisheries, Forestry, wildlife t-t:lzambique Transport and camnunications SWaziland Man~er developnent and training Tanzania Industrial developnent Zambia Developnent Furrl, Mining Zimbal:we Food security 'lbe choice of this model is based on the acceptance of the great divergences in the level of ecoI'XllIicdevelopnent and in 'd 1 eolog1cal 1ncl1nat10ns 0 0 0' avC1lled capitalism at one extreme 'al° (of the (Malawi, SWaziland and Botswana), and aVC1lled. SOC1 1sm zambO and ~xist-Ieninist type) at the other extreme (M:> 1que Angola), with other ca.mtries falling between. '1here are also - 134 - divergent political practices, with the multi-party system on the one hand in Botswanaand Zimbab,..re,a single party system in Tanzania, zambia, Angola, Mozambique,Malawi and a ITOnarch in Sleziland and Iesotho. FurtherITOre, while all countries take apartheid as a CCXIIIIOn enemy, the group do not have a distinct dI'ld unanillOus policy ta.ards South Africa. '!he p:>licies diverge from extreme hostility, to accommodation (albeit forced), to clear s~rt. Unlike the Frontline grouping SAOCC is not designed to bring da.m the South African regime and as such there is no cannPn strategy on hCMthe struggle against apartheid will be fought. While each country has been given a specific aspect to coordinate, clear emphasis has been placed on the transport sector. It is the transport sector, ITOrethan any other, that expresses the dependence of SAIXX: countries on South Africa. n is a particularly acute problem to the land locked states. But, since SAOCCis IIOstly involved in the rehabilitation of the transport system than in starting up new projects, it has been relatively easy to obtain funds for SAOCC projects. On the part of the donors, the transp:>rt sector is reasonably straight forlerd, administratively and technically. It is ITOre easily delimited in time and space with relatively precise cost estimates, and the final product represents a standing structure with the stamp of the donors. cne hCMever sbJuld not also forget the caranercial interests of the donors since transport facilitates external trade. It remains to be seen whether donors will respond equally to ITOre integrative regional projects that would prarote trade within the region. South Africa's response, it a~rs, has been to prevent the SAOCCcountries from extricating themselves fran its transport network by saootaging the transp:>rt routes in fobzambique and in Angola. 'l11us the very success of the SAIX:C efforts is depenient on the regaining of stabi li ty within the region and for 11 . a mtent and p.lrposes such stability can not cane until the apartheid structure is dismantled. In other words, the very success of the ~ grouping canes to centre on South - 135 - Africa. Given this fact a question is raised as to what would happen to SADCC if and when apartheid is dismantled and there is majority rule or power sharing in Sa.1thAfrica. Nobody has addressed this question for it represents the very weakness of the grouping. Definitely, SWaziland, Lesotho am Malawiam in part Botswana and M:>zambique WCllldincrease their links with an independent South Africa, Angola and Tanzania ~ld not need South Africa, although sane form of trade can be envisaged. Zimbatwe is likely to be a canpetitor with Sa.1thAfrica for the regional market. Given its econanic weakness Zambia is likely to continue its links with Sa.1th Africa. The above raises the question of the future of ~ given the fact that there is no trade between the grouping. Trade between SADCCmembers is only 2-3 percent of their total trade. The Preferential Trade Area (PrA) arrangement, ha.o1ever, might change this. It is not far fetched to imagine Sa.1th Africa's danination increasing after the liberation of South Africa. The transport net-IIoOrkwhich is being emphasised might be used to facilitate South Africa's trade with the neighbours. It is with this in mind that the business group inside South Africa, in particular the major conglanerates, are seeking to find a non violent solution to South Africa's apartheid. As for the present, the success of SAOCC will depend on (1) the maintenance of political goodwill anong members (2) the maintenance of political stability in member countries (sanething which they cannot guarantee by themselves), (3) the efficient operation of sectoral responsibilities, especially of transport services (4) an equitable distribution of benefits of membership (in this instance external assistance) and (5) an ability to attract funds greater than that which the countries can individually obtain. All in all the group will need exceptional ingenuity to sustain its solidarity. - 136 - O:nclusial '!his paper has shownthat, on the external front, Botswana has emergedfran potential isolation at independence to asstnning an increasing leadership role in Southern Africa. Notwithstanding her continuing dependence on South Africa, Botswana has played a significant role among the Frontline States. The growing violence in the region, and especially in South Africa, is likely to continue to spill over into Botswana. '!his will certainly have a destabilising effect on Botswana. Given this situation, Botswana has to cement her good relations with her Western allies, particularly the USA and Britain, so that they can exercise a restraining hand on South Africa's actions against Botswana. Botswana has been at the forefront of the SAJ:Xr initiatives. In fact, the country is reputed to have been the originator of the initiative. While the implementation of SADCC transport sector will open alternative transport routes for Botswana, they are not likely to reduce Botswana s transport I dependence on South Africa SUbstantially. Besides, what holds together the SAOCCgrouping is the apartheid enemy. With the demise of apartheid, hCME!ver, the continued future of SALCCis in doubt. 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