

BOTSWANA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE STRATEGY FOR REGIONAL CO- EXISTENCE

J.C. CHIPASULA AND K. MITI

Southern Africa: The Region and its Realities

In order to appreciate Botswana's position in Southern Africa, it is important first to have a clear picture of the region and the changes that have moved Botswana from becoming a semi-Bantustan of South Africa to being a centre of major efforts to reduce South Africa's dominance. For one thing, while Botswana has made major strides to extricate herself from South Africa's stranglehold, the country remains dependent on South Africa for migrant labour, trade and transport links, as well as customs and excise revenue. This paper, therefore, starts off by defining the Southern African region and by looking at the realities and situation in the region that has been characterized as the "voltex of violence" (Callaghy 1983).

We might as well start by asking ourselves the question "what countries constitute the Southern African Region or sub continent and what is the criteria for inclusion?" Potholm (1972) defined the Southern African region in terms of white domination that extended all the way from South Africa to Mozambique, Rhodesia and Angola. This domination is not only at the political level (white power and racism), but also at the economic level. At the economic level, white domination, with its main centre in South Africa, extended to the black independent states, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, that were

surrounded by the white regimes and went further to include Malawi and Zambia that were dependent on white controlled transport routes.

While still defining the region in terms of white domination and the centrality of South Africa within the region, Grundy (1973) introduces an element of core and periphery to the analysis of the region and uses various criteria to allocate countries to both core and periphery. Using geographic criteria, especially proximity to South Africa, the core is constituted by countries under white rule and those completely surrounded by white ruled states (i.e. South Africa, South West Africa, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland) and the periphery is constituted by those countries which share borders with white and black African states. Using the economic criteria, the core is represented by South Africa and Rhodesia while the rest become the periphery. Under the political, diplomatic and strategic criteria, the core is made up of the tripartite alliance of South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia. Grundy also introduces another element, particularly with regard to the periphery, and that is the attitude they have towards South Africa and white ruled states which may be cooperative or disruptive. Crucial to the definition of the region by both Potholm and Grundy has been white domination of the area which made the border to the region the Zaire-Tanzania belt. With the fall of the Portuguese empire in 1975 and the ending of the Smith Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1980, the white political domination of the area has shrunk to South Africa and Namibia.

What has remained, however, is the centrality of South Africa in the region. Indeed, what now remains in defining the Southern African region is South Africa's economic and military influence. Given this fact, the Southern African region is conterminous with the area under South Africa's domination and sphere of influence. This sphere of influence and domination decreases as one gets further from South Africa and manifests itself differently from country to country. We have in the

first instance those countries under the 'economic mercy' of South Africa, the so-called "Hostages" or "Labour Reserves" of South Africa - Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) that together with South Africa and Namibia constitute the Southern Africa Customs Union and which, with the exception of Botswana since 1976, form the Rand Monetary Area. These can be regarded as the core of the Southern African region.

In the second instance, we have those countries that are dependent on South Africa's rail and road transport network. These include, in addition to the BLS countries, Zimbabwe and Zambia that had traditionally depended on South Africa for their import and export trade, but also Malawi and Zaire. Malawi's natural route is through Mozambique.

But because of the continuing war in Mozambique that dates back to FRELIMO's liberation war beginning in 1964 and which has continued after Mozambique's independence with the South African supported MNR, the Mozambican route is no longer reliable, and can no longer satisfy the transport needs of Zimbabwe and Zambia. Zaire's natural route is, of course, Angola through the Benguela railway but because of disruptions due to the war, this railway has remained inoperative for most of the 1970's and 1980's. The Benguela Railway also served Zambia's needs before its disruption.

In the third instance are those countries that can be described as under South Africa's military sphere of influence. In its struggle with the oppressed black population in South Africa and Namibia, South Africa has defined its defence line or defensive perimeter. This line runs across the Zaire-Tanzania border, which used to be the divide line between independent black Africa and white dominated Southern Africa. South Africa in the 1960's and 1970's tried all it could to keep its defence perimeter by supporting Portugal and the Smith Regime (Rhodesia) against the liberation forces. With the independence of the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia, it has tried to ensure that these newly independent countries are

deprived of the means to support the liberation struggle in South Africa by resorting to political destabilization and economic sabotage. The main victims of these efforts by South Africa have been Angola, which South Africa invaded in 1975 in an attempt to prevent MPLA taking power. South Africa has since remained in Angola and continues to support the UNITA rebels under Savimbi. It has also destabilised Mozambique which has been a scene not only of South African incursions but a battle ground between the South African strongly supported MNR and the FRELIMO government.

Other countries in the region have not escaped the South African military machine though they have not suffered the same level of disruption as Angola and Mozambique. Given the above, the countries that constitute the Southern African region are: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Angola, and Mozambique. Zaire has been drawn into the picture of Southern Africa on two counts. First, its transport dependence on the region be it via South Africa or Angola. Second, because of its collusion with South Africa and the USA to prevent the area falling under socialist influence. This collusion was well manifested in the Angolan crisis of 1975/76 (Stockwell 1978).

Tanzania has been drawn in the Southern African picture by its being the base of most of Southern African liberation movements in the region. It has acted as training ground and supply line for the guerrilla struggles in the region. As such, it has come to be identified, within the Southern African affairs, as the centre of opposition against white domination. It has consequently been at the core of the Frontline states (acting as chairman of this grouping right from its inception in 1974 up to 1985) and at the forefront of the SADC. Tanzania could therefore be described as the disruptive periphery of the South African sphere of influence and domination, while Zaire constitutes the cooperative periphery of that influence. From the very definition of the region one can already have a glimpse of what have been the realities and characteristics of

the region. The first characteristic of the region is of course white-racial domination of the area both at the social-economic and political levels.

When the rest of Africa was gaining independence in the 1950's and 60's, the whites in South Africa were busy entrenching their power. It has taken long years of bitter fighting to dislodge the whites from power in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. The struggle, however, still goes on and is becoming more bitter and disruptive as the centre of white bastion fights back against the forces of liberation.

The second characteristic of the region, therefore, is that it has been the vortex of violence and bitter wars in Africa only comparable to the Middle East. This violence which is being perpetrated by South Africa and its allies has not only been disruptive and costly, but has prevented the smooth development of this very rich area. One cannot build under a war situation which is the case in Southern Africa (Commonwealth Secretariat 1979): Violence and war has brought to the region super power rivalry. The West, in particular U.S.A. and Britain, have specific interests to defend and have acted as allies to the white powers in the region. Western support of Portugal in its attempt to hold on to its colonies which was carried out in the name of a NATO ally has already been well documented (Isaacman and Davis 1981), the busting of sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia by the West which enabled it to hold up for 15 years is a very well known fact. The support received by South Africa from the Western powers and the constant refusal by the West to impose sanctions on South Africa is also known. Also known is American intervention in Angola. What need be pointed out here is that the West, and in particular the U.S.A., have stood in the path of liberation and have helped to escalate violence in the region under their constant call for peaceful change.

It is enough to take a glance at the United States foreign policy in the Southern African region to understand the Western

powers' collusion. American foreign policy in the region has been guided by (i) its increasing desire to open areas in Africa for direct American economic penetration as a source of valuable raw materials, areas for investment and a promising market. In this regard South Africa has proved to be the ideal place, for the supply of strategic minerals (the main argument against sanctions) investment (standing at \$2,600 million in 1981) and as a market (with the value of trade between the two amounting to \$4,400m) (Nicol 1983). (ii) Anti-communism which has been levelled at every serious liberation movement, and (iii) South Africa's importance as a dominant regional power which is seen as crucial for maintaining regional stability and fighting communism. This has led to American resolve to preserve South Africa, now being expressed in President Reagan's parlance as constructive engagement (Lemarchand 1981, Potkin 1986, Howe 1986 and Minter 1986). While the U.S.A. and the West have acted as allies of the white regimes, the USSR, the Eastern bloc and China have remained almost the only source of arms to the liberation movements in the region. This has only served to heighten the Western anti-communist cry and the super power rivalry.

The other characteristic of the region which need be mentioned here is the coming together of the independent countries in the region in opposition to white domination and South Africa's dominance. However, here the alliances have remained weak because of the very domination of the region by South Africa. Examples of this pooling together are of course the Frontline grouping and the SADC. We shall have occasion in the latter part of this paper to talk about the realities and constraints of these alliances.

The Context of Foreign Policy

There are three main points about Botswana's situation at independence. One, Botswana's extreme poverty at independence. Two, Botswana's quasi total dependence on South Africa. Three, Botswana's isolation from the rest of Africa as

a result of being surrounded by white racist regimes. These have been the main constraining factors on Botswana's foreign policy.

Four main goals have guided Botswana's foreign policy since independence. First, Botswana aimed at developing allies among other African states so that she would not have to face her powerful neighbour alone, and as a means of avoiding total isolation from the rest of Africa. The membership of Botswana in the Frontline states grouping and her crucial role in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which we shall discuss in this section, testifies Botswana's success in this regard.

Second, being surrounded by apartheid regimes, Botswana had to avoid creating an impression that it condoned apartheid. On this score, Botswana had to create an exemplary democratic and non racial state and society. This on the one hand would act as an example of the possible changes in South Africa itself. On the other hand, this democratic image would generate Western sympathies and protection against South Africa. Botswana also had to condemn the apartheid regime, but without giving cause for South Africa's retaliation and attacks. This was a tenuous and risky path and forced Botswana to hold to specific principles. One of these principles is non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This principle was well stated by President Khama thus:

We will not permit Botswana to be used as a base for the organization or direction of violent activities directed towards other states (Parson, 1984).

This meant that while Botswana condemned apartheid, it would not support any military action against the overthrow of the South African regime. Emerging from the first principle was the preference for peacefully negotiated solutions. Thus, President Khama stated that:

Botswana will not condemn those who resort to violence to gain freedom in such situations. It is possible of course to be more or less sceptical about the chances of success of violent tactics in different situations. But that is a matter of political and military judgement and not morals (Parson 1984).

The above two principles reflected Botswana's vulnerability and the limited role the country could play in the Frontline Grouping and in the increasingly violent situation in Southern Africa. Thirdly, Botswana had to quickly develop an international nucleus of aid not only to avoid relying on South Africa for material and manpower resources (which South Africa has continued to offer, and which Botswana has consistently refused) but also to alleviate the stark poverty it inherited at independence. Botswana has indeed succeeded in obtaining substantial aid, but her indebtedness has remained small and manageable to date (Table 1).

Lastly, Botswana had to develop an international visibility in order to prevent diplomatic and economic isolation. This meant participation in international forums where the country could present a good image of stability and adherence to democratic principles. In both these goals, Botswana sought Western allies with major interests in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. Closer relations with those countries and their commitment to an independent Botswana in Southern Africa, became a useful shield against South Africa.

Being almost totally surrounded by South Africa and totally dependent on it, Botswana had perforce to deal with South Africa. Hard choices had to be made on what type of relations to maintain with South Africa. Diplomatic relations were precluded as this would be interpreted as condoning apartheid. Botswana however, had to keep contact with her powerful neighbour. The country settled for what has been labelled as "telephone diplomacy" which meant meeting South Africa's officials on an ad hoc basis to discuss issues of mutual

interest and resolve potential conflict.

Table 1: Botswana Government Debt Outstanding (P. Million)

	Balance outstanding as at 31st March				
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
A. FOREIGN DEBT					
<u>STERLING LOANS</u>					
Commonwealth Dev. Corporation	-	-	-	,1	0,1
<u>US DOLLAR LOANS</u>					
IBRD	45,9	67,3	76,7	91,7	145,7
IDA	12,2	15,1	16,7	17,6	25,8
USAID	19,8	24,9	27,6	32,9	50,5
Oil Price Alleviation Fund(OPAF)	-	5,3	5,9	6,2	8,6
in Africa (BAEDEA)	4,2	0,6	3,2	6,6	11,8
UNDP Housing Loan	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,4
OPEC	2,3	3,4	3,8	5,6	9,3
First National Bank of Boston(FNBB)	-	-	32,5	25,9	21,4
Federal Financing Bank	-	-	-	1,1	4,4
<u>SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS LOANS</u>					
African Development Bank/Fund (IFAD).	8,9	9,0	15,0	19,6	44,2
<u>OTHER CURRENCIES</u>					
Danish Govt. (Danish Kroner)	3,3	3,4	3,8	3,6	5,6
SAUDI FUND (SAUDI Riyals)	-	-	5,5	8,9	20,9
KUWAIT FUND (KUWAIT Dinars)	-	-	4,9	8,9	25,1
European Investment Bank (EUA)	,2	1,6	1,7	1,8	2,1
Bonds (Rands)	1,6	1,5	1,6	1,6	1,5
Chinese Govt. (Rinminbi)	-	-	-	-	1,8
KFW (Deutsche Mark)	-	-	-	-	0,6
French Govt. (Francs)	-	-	-	-	0,2
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT	98,7	132,5	199,2	232,4	380,8
B. DOMESTIC DEBT					
<u>POSB</u>					
Botswana Government Bond	0,1 0,3	0,1 0,3	0,1 0,3	- 0,3	- 0,3
TOTAL INTERNAL DEBT	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,3
C. GRAND TOTAL	99.1	132.9	199.6	232.7	381.1

Source: Bank of Botswana - Annual Bulletin. December, 1985.

One should note, however, the fact that the situation has not remained static. The fall of the Portuguese empire, the liberation of Zimbabwe, the increasing violence in South Africa and the heightening of liberation forces there have completely altered the situation and Botswana is forced to make new choices as she enters her third decade of independence. Military raids from South Africa and possible destabilization is already a factor in Botswana's foreign relations. Given the volatility of the situation, Botswana is likely to be drawn into the struggle that is growing inside South Africa. The consequences of being drawn into this struggle are horrendous. But Botswana has reached a threshold where it can no longer remain neutral in the fight for majority rule in South Africa. Having stated the broad outline of Botswana's foreign policy, let us now look specifically at her relations with the Frontline states and the SADCC grouping.

Botswana in the Frontline States

The grouping referred to as the Frontline states emerged out of the initiative of President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa to find a peaceful settlement for Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), after the military coup d'etat in Portugal in April 1974 that signalled the possible independence of Rhodesia. With the buffer zone around South Africa crumbling, Vorster was eager to influence events in Rhodesia in order, on the one hand to curtail the possible spill over of the liberation efforts into South Africa, and on the other hand to produce a more favourable regime there. Kaunda on the other hand was eager to reduce the economic strains imposed on his country by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and the subsequent sanctions on Rhodesia since 1965. For different reasons, therefore, the two were eager for a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesia problem.

The initiative of Kaunda and Vorster culminated in a joint document in October 1974 titled "Towards the Summit: An approach to a peaceful change in Southern Africa". Reactions

towards the Kaunda/Vorster initiatives were initially hostile. The states within the region saw Kaunda's initiatives as a betrayal of the liberation cause since South Africa was directly supporting the Smith regime. The same hostility was to be expressed to the whole grouping by the rest of African countries when Botswana, Tanzania and Frelimo finally joined Zambia so as to formulate a united policy for negotiation with the Rhodesian Government. To the OAU and the African states, talking to South Africa at a crucial moment when the white bastion appeared to be crumbling, was interpreted as capitulation. However, the grouping managed to convince the other African states that they were playing a crucial role in the liberation process and not jeopardizing it. Thus in April 1975, the Frontline states won formal recognition as an ad hoc committee of the Assembly of the Heads of States of the OAU.

From its inception in 1974 and until the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the main focus of the Frontline states was the settlement and final independence for Zimbabwe. In the first instance, the Frontline states realized that they did not have any leverage over Smith to force him into a negotiating table. Their task, therefore, was to use those with such leverage. The state with leverage over Rhodesia was South Africa, that was not only helping Smith (Rhodesia) to bust sanctions, but also provided military hardware and personnel to fight the guerrillas. Withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of such support would force Smith to negotiate a settlement with the fighting nationalists. It was such a threat by South Africa that forced Smith to release the imprisoned nationalists and to attend the first of the series of negotiations in August 1975. However, South Africa, operating a similar racist regime could not be totally trusted to force a settlement that was in favour of majority rule in Rhodesia. Secondly, the Smith Regime did not appear to be serious on negotiations and was not prepared to give any concessions.

The other two states with leverage over Smith were Britain and the United States. The diplomatic offensive was to force

Britain to assume responsibility for its former colony. As for the United States, it had to be convinced to change its foreign policy in Southern Africa and its conviction that change could come only through the white minority regimes (National Security Study Memorandum 39). It was also necessary to convince the USA that liberation movements did not stand for communism and that their support of the minority regimes and continuous refusal to support the nationalists throws them into the hands of the USSR.

Two things happened in 1976 that were to change the scene and heighten the tempo for a negotiated settlement. These were, the defeat of South Africans in Angola and the failure of American policy in Angola. The failure of the American policy in Angola tarnished America's image in Africa and exposed its duplicity. To cover up its failure the United States now joined the efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and hence the Kissinger initiatives that culminated in the Geneva talks in October - December 1976. With the entry of the USA into the scene Britain could no longer remain unconcerned over Rhodesia, it had also to join the efforts for a settlement.

The Frontline states realized quite early, particularly after Smith had shown that he was not prepared to make any concession, that the only leverage in their hands was to intensify the guerrilla struggle. The major obstacle, however, was the disunity among the nationalists. Efforts to keep the nationalists united, particularly the first forging of the United African National Congress (UANC) under Muzorewa in 1976 and the subsequent efforts to reconcile the groups, have been regarded in some quarters as having retarded the liberation struggle, for given the differences, the split of the Nationalist Front was inevitable. The defence to this accusation given by the Frontline states, which appear to be credible, is that if a negotiated settlement was to take place then the nationalists must present uniform demands so as to avoid sell outs. In fact, it was the very split within the

nationalists camp that led to the internal settlement in 1978.

While the Frontline states failed to keep the alliance they had created under the umbrella of UANC, at least they managed to foster an alliance between the two main parties of ZANU and ZAPU under the Patriotic Front which enabled the success of the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979 that brought independence to Zimbabwe. One of the main tasks of the Frontline states was to provide support to the guerrillas. It was realized that, only through the intensification of fighting inside Rhodesia could Smith be brought to the negotiating table, the United States and Britain be convinced that the Rhodesian problem needed an immediate solution and hence pressure Smith for negotiations. It was indeed the success of the guerrillas that changed the tables and convinced Britain and the United States who were itching to recognize the internal settlement that without the participation of the combatants, no settlement would be workable.

While Botswana participated vigorously in the diplomatic offensive for the solution of the Rhodesian problem, her foreign policy principles as well as her position within Southern Africa limited her participation in the support to the guerrillas. Her main contribution in this regard was to act as a transit corridor for those wishing to join the guerrillas. These would be quickly transferred to Zambia and on to Tanzania and Mozambique. It is mainly these countries that took the responsibility of directly supporting the guerrillas.

However, the intensification of conflict in Rhodesia had many repercussions in Botswana. First was the flow of refugees running away from the growing fighting. Refugees in Botswana grew from 2,500 in 1974 to 23,000 in 1979 and most of these were from Rhodesia. Since the settlement and independence in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1980 the number of refugees dropped to 1,300 (see table 2). Besides the cost of maintaining the refugees, for which Botswana was helped by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the refugees became part of an

excuse for Rhodesian raids.

Table 2: Number of Refugees in the Frontline States

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Angola			220,000	250,000	141,000	56,000	73,000
Botswana	2,500	2,500	4,000	4,300	19,000	23,000	1,000
Mozambique		14,500	27,000	42,000	100,000	150,000	100
Tanzania	193,000	171,000	154,000	163,000	160,000	155,000	n.a.
Zambia	40,000	36,000	33,000	64,000	70,000	57,000	51,000

Source: Carol B. Thompson, 1985. p.85.

With only a police force, Botswana could neither prevent the guerrillas crossing her border nor repel the Rhodesian forces with their hot pursuit pretexes. Thus Botswana was to suffer both material and human losses. As a result, Botswana had to divert her development budget to the creation of a Military Force beginning in 1977. To this must be added the fact that Botswana imposed limited sanctions on Rhodesia, that included the banning of the passage of military equipment and petrol products through its country. This meant that Botswana had to purchase the railway that crossed the country from South Africa to Rhodesia (which owned the railway), buy its own rolling stock, create its own oil storage depot and initiate many other projects for which it was dependent on Rhodesia. While this may be regarded as a positive step in as much as it decreased the country's dependence, it nonetheless, involved the use of funds which were not previously budgeted for.

The initial impetus for the Frontline states was the securing of a negotiated settlement for Rhodesia. In 1979 this goal was achieved and Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, became independent.

However, the grouping to which had been added Angola in 1976 and Zimbabwe in 1980 remained in existence but with a renewed focus on Namibia and South Africa. The settlement for Namibia, to which the Frontline States have focused their main attention since 1980, has stalled because of external interests, particularly those of the United States, that has tried to link the independence of Namibia to the removal of Cuban troops in Angola; a condition unacceptable to the Frontline states. The other reason for the stalling of the Namibian settlement is that the West is not prepared to pressurise South Africa to give up Namibia. Here the Frontline states have less leverage partly because of their dependence on South Africa which has taken a very aggressive posture and resorted to destabilization of the whole Southern African region. As for the liberation of South Africa itself, the Frontline states appear to be counting more and more on growing internal turmoil. This turmoil is expected to increase the threat to Western interests in the country and to culminate in the application of sanctions. The Frontline states can do relatively little on their own to force change in South Africa. One last thing to be noted here is that the Frontline Grouping has given rise to other avenues of cooperation in the area, the main one being the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). It is to this that we shall now turn.

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference

There are two views as to the initiation of SADCC. The first (Thompson, 1985) sees SADCC as the direct continuation of the cooperation that developed between the five Frontline states during the war of liberation. The political cooperation of the Frontline states imparted economic lessons that translated themselves into economic coordination under SADCC. This is of course the official view of the SADCC states. The second view, sees SADCC as emerging from diplomatic initiatives of African and Western states for a massive programme of reconstruction in Southern Africa after years of war, that is, a kind of "Marshal Plan" for the region financed by Western countries (Anglin 1982).

One gains very little by labouring on the origin of SADC for as Leys and Tostensen (1982) note, both initiatives coincided and hence certain common interests and forces are behind the initiative. What is clear, however, is that the first step to the formation of SADC was the resolution by the Frontline Foreign Ministers' meeting in Gaborone in May 1979 to work out the possibilities of establishing an economic grouping. This was followed by the decision of the Heads of the Frontline states in Arusha in July 1979. SADC was then officially inaugurated in Lusaka in 1980 with its main goals being:

- a) to reduce economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
- b) to promote cooperation between states in the region;
- c) to mobilize resources in order to carry out national, regional and international projects;
- d) to act in concert vis-a-vis aid organisations in order to acquire finance and technical assistance.

By this time the decision had already been taken to include the other Southern African states that were not part of the Frontline states namely Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland. The above goals emerged from the main characteristic of the region which include South Africa's economic domination of the area and the dependency relationships on South Africa on the part of most of the nine member states of SADC.

The economic domination of the region can quickly be glimpsed from Table 3 which shows that South Africa's GNP is three times greater than the combined GNP of the SADC states. The Table also illustrates the poverty of Southern African states. Only Tanzania and Angola escaped total dependence on and domination by South Africa. With six of the nine countries being landlocked, the region has remained dependent on South Africa's more efficient transport network. Most of the countries in the region have continued to act as labour reserves for South

Africa with 357,000 of their citizens working in South Africa in 1977 and 288, 000 in 1983 (Gavin 1984). South Africa equally provides a greater part of the imports for the region and absorbs the exports from the SADCC grouping.

Table 3: Population, National Product and Per Capita Income
SADCC Countries and South Africa, 1980

Country	Population (mill)	GNP (\$ mill)	GNP per capita (\$)
Botswana	0,8	750	910
Lesotho	1,3	520	390
Swaziland	0,6	380	680
Mozambique	12,1	2810	230
Angola	7,1	3320	470
Zambia	5,8	3220	560
Zimbabwe	7,4	4640	630
Malawi	6,1	1390	230
Tanzania	18,7	4780	280
Total SADCC	59,9	21490	359
South Africa	25,0	66960	2290
Note: Namibia =	1,0	1420	1410

Source: Maasdorp Gavin, 1984 p.33

Because of its desire to consolidate domination over the region, South Africa has sought to establish an economic constellation of states with itself at the centre. The latest of these efforts was its attempt to sell its idea of the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). The term CONSAS was first coined by Vorster in 1975 and first spelled out in some detail by R.F. Botha, South Africa's Minister of

Foreign Affairs in March 1979 and elaborated by Prime Minister P.W. Botha in November 1979. CONSAS was envisaged to comprise all of Africa south of the Kunene and Zambesi rivers and its goal was the coordinated regional development strategy of which industrial decentralization would be the linchpin. The overtures by South Africa to its neighbours which were coupled with the offer to finance important development schemes were correctly characterized by the neighbours as South Africa's attempt to Bantustanize Southern Africa. In fact, the constellation of states was part of what South Africa calls "total strategy" against a total onslaught. The other aspects of the "total strategy" were of course the full implementation of the Bantustan policy and the massive build up of its military capacity.

Besides South Africa's domination of the area is the stark poverty of the region, notwithstanding its rich natural endowments. It is this poverty that accounts for the third and fourth goal of SADCC. Indeed, without massive aid from outside, economic development would be much slower. While one can not say that there has been no response, external pledges have been far lower than the needs of the region as can be seen from Table 4 which shows project costs and commitments. As of 1983, only 26.2 percent of the needed costs were already committed. If one adds the fact that these commitments do not completely represent new pledges but old commitments to projects in the region, then the response could be characterized as minimal. This would amount to US \$150 million (Leys & Tostensen 1982). If it was assumed that by coordinating their efforts to secure international aid the SADCC grouping would attract more funds in the region, this has not been borne out by the outcome to date.

Let us now turn to the other goal of SADCC - the promotion of cooperation within the region. Most of the ventures at economic cooperation in Africa have not met with success. And ironically, within Eastern and Southern Africa, the only economic system still functioning moderately smoothly is that

Table 4: Project Costs and Commitments

Project Group	Total Costs		Total Committed	
	US \$ Mill	%	US \$ Mill	Col. (3) as % Col. (1)
Operational Coordination	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	9.4	9.4	3,8	40.4
Training	2	0.1	1.6	80.0
Port Transport systems:				
Maputo	552	21,7	160	29,0
Beira	414	16,3	58	14,0
Nacala	235	9,3	101	43,0
Dar-es-Salaam	339	13,4	22	6,5
Lobito	90	3.5	14	15.6
Intra-regional surface transport	404	15,9	41	10.1
Civil Aviation	258	10.1	155	60.1
Telecommunications	235	9.3	108	46.0
Total	2538.4	100.0	664.4	26.2

Source: Maasdorp Gavin 1984, p.19

centred on Pretoria and reaching well beyond the area of the Southern African customs union. This abysmal failure at Africa's ventures for economic cooperation has induced the SADC countries to take a functionalist decentralized model of operation by which each country is given coordination over a particular area with its own particular style and general decisions are made by consensus between the countries either at the Heads of State level or Ministerial level.

Allocation of Responsibilities
Between Southern African States

Country	Area
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Angola	Energy conservation and security
Botswana	Crop research in semi-arid tropics Animal disease control and SADC Headquarters
Lesotho	Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation
Malawi	Fisheries, Forestry, Wildlife
Mozambique	Transport and communications
Swaziland	Manpower development and training
Tanzania	Industrial development
Zambia	Development Fund, Mining
Zimbabwe	Food security

The choice of this model is based on the acceptance of the great divergences in the level of economic development and in ideological inclinations -- avowed capitalism at one extreme (Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana), and avowed socialism (of the Marxist-Leninist type) at the other extreme (Mozambique and Angola), with other countries falling between. There are also

divergent political practices, with the multi-party system on the one hand in Botswana and Zimbabwe, a single party system in Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi and a monarch in Swaziland and Lesotho. Furthermore, while all countries take apartheid as a common enemy, the group do not have a distinct and unanimous policy towards South Africa. The policies diverge from extreme hostility, to accommodation (albeit forced), to clear support. Unlike the Frontline grouping SADCC is not designed to bring down the South African regime and as such there is no common strategy on how the struggle against apartheid will be fought.

While each country has been given a specific aspect to coordinate, clear emphasis has been placed on the transport sector. It is the transport sector, more than any other, that expresses the dependence of SADCC countries on South Africa. It is a particularly acute problem to the land locked states. But, since SADCC is mostly involved in the rehabilitation of the transport system than in starting up new projects, it has been relatively easy to obtain funds for SADCC projects. On the part of the donors, the transport sector is reasonably straight forward, administratively and technically. It is more easily delimited in time and space with relatively precise cost estimates, and the final product represents a standing structure with the stamp of the donors. One however should not also forget the commercial interests of the donors since transport facilitates external trade. It remains to be seen whether donors will respond equally to more integrative regional projects that would promote trade within the region.

South Africa's response, it appears, has been to prevent the SADCC countries from extricating themselves from its transport network by sabotaging the transport routes in Mozambique and in Angola. Thus the very success of the SADCC efforts is dependent on the regaining of stability within the region and for all intent and purposes such stability can not come until the apartheid structure is dismantled. In other words, the very success of the SADCC grouping comes to centre on South

Africa. Given this fact a question is raised as to what would happen to SADC if and when apartheid is dismantled and there is majority rule or power sharing in South Africa. Nobody has addressed this question for it represents the very weakness of the grouping. Definitely, Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi and in part Botswana and Mozambique would increase their links with an independent South Africa, Angola and Tanzania would not need South Africa, although some form of trade can be envisaged. Zimbabwe is likely to be a competitor with South Africa for the regional market. Given its economic weakness Zambia is likely to continue its links with South Africa.

The above raises the question of the future of SADC given the fact that there is no trade between the grouping. Trade between SADC members is only 2-3 percent of their total trade. The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) arrangement, however, might change this. It is not far fetched to imagine South Africa's domination increasing after the liberation of South Africa. The transport network which is being emphasised might be used to facilitate South Africa's trade with the neighbours. It is with this in mind that the business group inside South Africa, in particular the major conglomerates, are seeking to find a non violent solution to South Africa's apartheid.

As for the present, the success of SADC will depend on (1) the maintenance of political goodwill among members (2) the maintenance of political stability in member countries (something which they cannot guarantee by themselves), (3) the efficient operation of sectoral responsibilities, especially of transport services (4) an equitable distribution of benefits of membership (in this instance external assistance) and (5) an ability to attract funds greater than that which the countries can individually obtain. All in all the group will need exceptional ingenuity to sustain its solidarity.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that, on the external front, Botswana has emerged from potential isolation at independence to assuming an increasing leadership role in Southern Africa. Notwithstanding her continuing dependence on South Africa, Botswana has played a significant role among the Frontline States. The growing violence in the region, and especially in South Africa, is likely to continue to spill over into Botswana. This will certainly have a destabilising effect on Botswana. Given this situation, Botswana has to cement her good relations with her Western allies, particularly the USA and Britain, so that they can exercise a restraining hand on South Africa's actions against Botswana.

Botswana has been at the forefront of the SADCC initiatives. In fact, the country is reputed to have been the originator of the initiative. While the implementation of SADCC transport sector will open alternative transport routes for Botswana, they are not likely to reduce Botswana's transport dependence on South Africa substantially. Besides, what holds together the SADCC grouping is the apartheid enemy. With the demise of apartheid, however, the continued future of SADCC is in doubt.

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