

# SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS SADCC NEIGHBOURS

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## Introduction

The Portuguese coup d'état of April 1974 unleashed a chain of events that were to lead to a complete transformation of the Southern African subcontinent. Up till that time the white's control of the region appeared unassailable. The Americans had by 1969 come to the conclusion that:

The whites (in Southern Africa) are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists (Lemarchand 1981. 35).

A number of African countries had also come to a similar conclusion and had by 1970 began to call for dialogue with South Africa. The call for dialogue that began with Ivory Coast's President Houphouet-Boigny's announcement on 6th November 1970 that "we will not achieve the solution to the problem of apartheid in South Africa by resorting to force of arms" was premised on the following arguments:

1. The African states both lacked the military and economic resources to challenge South Africa successfully;
2. The trade embargo against South Africa was bound to fail since powerful non African powers such as the U.S.A, Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan have maintained their

trading links with South Africa, and many African states could not afford not to do so;

3. The efforts of the National Liberation Movements have so far not been encouraging enough to warrant pinning all hope on them (Ajala 1985.8).

Both the United States and a growing number of African countries had come to realise the military and economic hegemony of the white minority regimes under the umbrella of South Africa and the weakness of the liberation movements in the region. However, the coup d'état and the subsequent collapse of the Portuguese empire leading to the independence of Mozambique in June 1975 and Angola in November 1975 marked the beginning of the collapse of the white empire in Southern Africa. South Africa reacted to the new situation by, on the one hand, offering the benefits of "Peaceful Coexistence" to the new government in Mozambique (the transitional government that had taken over power in August 1974) and announcing its commitment to a policy of "detente" with the countries of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana and its readiness to jointly pursue the search for a "durable, just and honourable solution to the Rhodesian problem" (the ending of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by white Rhodesians proclaimed in 1965). Ironically, it was this South Africa's offer of mediation in Rhodesia that led to the formation of the Frontline States Grouping in 1975 that was initially constituted by Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and FRELIMO (which was part of the transitional government in Mozambique). To this was later joined Angola in 1976 and Zimbabwe in 1980. This grouping has become a major diplomatic force in the region's struggle against white domination and the source for a broader SADCC grouping.

On the other hand South Africa sought to intervene in the Angolan civil war on the side of the FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA. South Africa's

intervention in Angola was partly prompted by promised western and particularly American support as they sought to limit the extension of Soviet influence in the area. Failure of such support because of African reaction was to breed in the South Africans a sense of abandonment by the western allies and to force them to work out a unilateral strategy to defend their interests in the region. South Africa's intervention was further prompted by its interests in Namibia which it was occupying against the United Nations resolutions. A hostile government in Angola would provide support for SWAPO that was fighting South Africa in Namibia. Secondly, the control of the Benguela railway would give it leverage over the lifelines of Zaire and Zambia.

In invading Angola South Africa was banking on western support, which as noted above was not forthcoming. It was also banking on the competence of UNITA and FNLA to takeover and maintain a government structure in Angola, which as the war progressed became a disillusionment. Lastly, it was banking on a non hostile African governments' opinion as a result of the lobbying by the other African governments in support of FNLA and UNITA. However, as South Africa's involvement in the war became public, there was an all out African indignation. South Africa's intervention was seen as a way of perpetuating racism and extending apartheid imperialism. Africa's fear of South Africa's intention could not be calmed with the cry of the communist menace. Given the hostility of the African governments that forced the western countries to withhold support for South Africa; the military and organisational weakness of UNITA and FNLA and; the massive support given by the Cubans and Soviets to MPLA, South Africa was forced to retreat out of Angola by March 1976.

South Africa's Angolan debacle shattered once and for all the myth of the invincibility of South Africa's military might. This fuelled a government crisis inside South Africa and led to the collapse of the Vorster regime and

the ascendance of the military at the apex of the government machinery. It also fuelled a new wave of African resistance against the apartheid regime inside South Africa that started with the Soweto uprising in 1976 which has not completely lost momentum to date. The outcome of these two internal crises was the elaboration of a comprehensive strategy by South Africa over the Southern African subcontinent - "the total strategy." It is this strategy that underlies South Africa's war against the Frontline States and SADCC.


### **Pretoria's Southern African Strategy**

The fall of the Portuguese empire that brought an end to the unholy tripartite alliance between Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa; South Africa's defeat in Angola and the inevitability of Rhodesia falling into black majority hands precipitated a siege mentality among the white South Africans. The Pretoria regime began to see itself as facing a "total onslaught." In answer to this situation they began to elaborate what has come to be known as the "total strategy."

This new regional strategy was first conceived in the 1977 Defence White Paper. It called for the mobilization of economic, political and psycho-social as well as military resources to defend and advance the interests of the apartheid state both at the internal and regional levels. Internally, the new strategy called for changes in the internal power arrangements to enable the regime to combat internal resistance. In this respect two major changes have taken place from 1978. The first was the decisive centralization of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and later the state President. This was accompanied by a corresponding diminution of the role of the cabinet and parliament. A permanent cabinet secretariat was set up in the office of the Prime Minister (later State President) to deal with national security, constitutional, economic and social affairs. This has

replaced the cabinet as the centre of decision making.

The second major change has been the militarization of the decision making and administrative structures of the state by the creation of a National Security Management System under the State Security Council. The State Security Council is constituted by: The President as Chairman, The Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Law and Order and the Senior Cabinet Minister if he is not one of the above three ministers; The Head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), The Chief of the South African Defence Forces, The Director General of Foreign Affairs and Law and Order and the Commissioner of Police. Other ministers can be coopted at the President's discretion. The Security Council has its own Secretariat and supervises 15 interdepartmental committees and 15 internal and external management centres. Legally, the responsibility of the State Security Council is to advise the government on the formulation and implementation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic. In essence, however, it is the primary decision making body and



concerns itself with and manages the total range of policy strategies of the state. Thus to defend white minority rule the state was turned into a military/police state.

Regionally, the total strategy in the first instance involved South Africa's use of its economic links with its neighbours to further the state's strategic objectives in the region. The most important linkage was the provision of transport for its landlocked neighbours. South Africa possesses 75 percent of the region's railway network and the best port facilities. With the closure of the Benguela railway in Angola and the closure of the Rhodesia-Mozambique boarder in 1976 the landlocked countries within the region came to depend on South Africa to transport most of their imports and exports. The opening up of the Rhodesia-Mozambique boarder did not change much of the situation as the Mozambique transport network became subject of sabotage operations by the South African supported MNR. South Africa thus handles about 70 percent of the traffic of the landlocked countries of the region. It handles all the import and export traffic of the BLS countries. In 1983, it handled between 65 and 70 percent of Zimbabwe's imports and exports; 50 and 60 percent of Malawi's and 40 percent of Zambia's imports and 70 percent of its exports. This gives South Africa a big leverage over its neighbours which it has not hesitated to put into use. For example, in 1981 it withdrew a large number of locomotives, freight trucks and tanker cars that were on loan to Zimbabwe railways and thus precipitated a transport crisis and fuel shortages there. In 1983, South Africa imposed strict searches on the cross boarder road traffic between South Africa and Lesotho which resulted into such immense congestion that Lesotho's tourism and commerce were temporarily crippled.

Beside transport South Africa supplies the bulk of imports of its neighbours. Botswana obtains about 78 percent of its imports from South Africa, Lesotho 74 percent, Swaziland 90 percent, Malawi 40 percent, Zambia 21

percent and Zimbabwe 19 percent. The SADCC countries absorb 20 percent of South Africa's non gold exports and provide an annual trade surplus of about \$1.5 billion. which is about half of South Africa's current account surplus in the mid-80's (SADCC 1988. 114-5). Because of the benefits accruing to it, South Africa would not like to reduce its imports in the region but can and has temporarily used import restrictions on its neighbours thus creating shortages and dissatisfaction which, in the case of Lesotho, resulted into a coup d'etat in 1986.

Lastly, South Africa provides employment to citizens of the neighbouring countries. In 1983 the total number of migrant workers from SADCC countries stood at 287,930 (Table 1). While the number of migrant workers to South Africa has continued to decrease over the past decade, the fact still remains that the neighbouring countries have depended on South Africa for the employment of large sections of individual country's labour force which would have otherwise remained unemployed. The migrant labour system has also been one of the major sources of a significant portion of government revenue and foreign exchange for the neighbouring countries. For example in 1984, Lesotho received in remittances R186.3 million, Mozambique R70.2 million, Botswana R23.6 million, Malawi R26.1 million and Swaziland R11.4 million (SADCC 1988). South Africa has constantly used the threat of repatriation of migrant labourers to silence its neighbours' criticism of its apartheid policy.

South Africa has since the late 70's used its economic leverage over its neighbours as a means of pressure on these countries. It was this economic leverage that prompted South Africa to call for a creation of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) in 1979. The nucleus of this grouping was expected to be South Africa and its independent Bantustans; Rhodesia which South Africa had been all along helping to bust sanctions and had helped to negotiate an internal settlement with Bishop Muzorewa

as head. There was all expectations that the Bishop would win the pre-independence elections and cement the existing relations with South Africa; and Namibia where South Africa was trying to impose an internal settlement under the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. To this nucleus could be immediately added Lesotho and Swaziland under economic pressure.

Table 1.  
Distribution of Workers from SADCC Countries in South Africa.

	1980	1981	1982	1983
Angola	281	69	128	68
Botswana	23,200	29,169	26,262	25,967
Lesotho	140,746	150,422	140,719	145,797
Malawi	32,319	30,602	27,558	29,622
Mozambique	56,424	59,391	52,323	61,218
Swaziland	19,853	13,417	13,653	16,773
Zambia	918	727	787	743
Zimbabwe	10,377	6,965	11,332	7,742
Total	284,128	300,764	279,760	287,930

Source: SADCC Macro-Economic Survey 1986.45.

These two, together with South Africa constitute the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) and with Botswana the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Then the other countries in the region - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Zaire would have later joined the grouping.

The defeat of Bishop Muzorewa in the Zimbabwe elections and subsequent formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), together with the unworkability of the Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia meant that the idea could not be implemented. However, the idea



was not completely abandoned and the goals which the Constellation of States was to serve were now to be achieved by other means. The underlying objectives of the Constellation of Southern African States were:

1. Lock South Africa's neighbouring states more firmly into the South African State and thus inhibit them from aiding South African Liberation Movements. In fact South Africa wanted its neighbours to act as police agents and prohibit political activity by refugees resident in their countries.
2. Force the neighbouring countries to indirectly recognise the independence and sovereignty of the South African Homelands and thus provide international legitimacy to its separate development policy leading to formal diplomatic recognition of Homelands by major western powers.
3. To create an international environment conducive to rapprochement between South Africa and the west.

Having failed to establish a Constellation of Southern African States and in response to the formation of SADCC that aimed at decreasing the neighbours dependency on South Africa, South Africa resorted to military tactics. The military offensive had two broad aims: to prevent any economic delinking by SADCC from South Africa and to force neighbouring states into nonaggression pacts and thus prevent any help to the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. The military strategy took three forms: the support of surrogate forces in the neighbouring countries to carry out sabotage activities in these countries; directly military invasion of the neighbouring states and sporadic raids on these states.

The main targets of South Africa's military offensive were Angola and Mozambique. The focus on these countries was mainly for three reasons. First, they were the main supporters of the liberation efforts in South Africa

and Namibia. These two countries having emerged to independence through guerrilla struggles found themselves bound to help their comrades. Besides, these two countries had long borders with South Africa and Namibia. The other country which was in a similar position with them was Zimbabwe. But given that country's long association with South Africa in the 15 years of UDI and the economic leverage South Africa had on this country, support for the liberation movements was bound to be limited. Secondly, the two countries presented the real alternative transport routes to the landlocked countries in the region that had come together under SADCC. The Benguela railway and the Lobito port had been the natural transport route for Zambian and Zairean traffic. The Beira corridor in Mozambique had been the major transport route for Zimbabwean traffic and could easily be used by Botswana, while the Nacala corridor served Malawi and Maputo harbour was used by Swaziland. These routes through Angola and Mozambique before the intensification of the regional conflicts carried 80 percent of the regional traffic. Thirdly, the proclamation by the two countries of a marxist ideology provided South Africa an opportunity to present its attacks on them as a defence against communism and western christian civilization and hence support from western countries, particularly the U.S.A that was keen on undermining Soviet influence in the region.

South Africa had withdrawn its invading forces from Angola in March 1976 after its intervention on the part of UNITA and FNLA had failed. In 1979, South Africa started re-organising and rearming the embattled UNITA and intensifying its attacks on Angola. Starting with the bombing of Lubango and Xagongo by South Africa Airforce in September 1979, South African attacks on Angola intensified in 1980 culminating in operation Smokeshell in June. This was followed by operation Protea and Daisy in August 1981, operation Super in March 1982 and operation Askari in December 1983 and January 1984. The last attack by South Africa

encountered stiff resistance from Angolan forces that had now acquired anti-aircraft missiles that robbed South Africa of its air superiority. This, with the American interests of showing to its electorate the fruits of constructive engagement in South Africa, forced South Africa to the negotiating table in Lusaka. The outcome was the Lusaka Accord by which South Africa agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola. However, it was not until April 1985 that the South African troops were finally withdrawn from Angola, but only to return a few months later to prevent a UNITA defeat. With the red carpet visit of the UNITA President, Savimbi, to Washington in January 1986 and the repeal of the Clark Amendment prohibiting American support to parties to the civil war in Angola, there was a reintensification of the South African attacks on Angola. However, in the meantime, the Angolan forces and their Cuban allies had acquired better offensive arms and were better organized to oppose South Africa's aggression. This forced South Africa once more to the negotiating table the result of which was the tripartite accord between South Africa, Angola and Cuba thus paving the way for Namibia's independence. This will bring to an end South Africa's attacks on Angola and an addition of a new member to the SADCC grouping. Lastly, Namibia's independence leaves South Africa as the only white minority ruled country in the region and this is likely to lead to the intensification of resistance inside South Africa itself.

At the independence of Zimbabwe, South Africa took over the support of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) that had been formed by the Rhodesian Intelligence Unit in 1976 to destabilize Mozambique and undermine that country's support of the Rhodesian Liberation Movements. South Africa used the MNR to sabotage the transport routes to Zimbabwe and the oil pipeline to that country. Besides, it engaged in direct military attacks in Mozambique. This included the Matola raid in January in 1981 and May 1982 and the Maputo raid in May and October 1983. The massive destruction inflicted by the MNR and the South African raids forced

Mozambique to the negotiating table in the hope that an accord with South Africa would bring an end to the fighting and suffering of the Mozambican people. The outcome of the negotiations was the "Nkomati Accord" of 16th March 1984 by which South Africa pledged to end support of the MNR and Mozambique agreed to remove all ANC personnel save for a small diplomatic staff. While Mozambique honoured its pledge with regard to the ANC South Africa did continue to support the MNR. Documents subsequently captured from the MNR bases indicate continued contact between the MNR and South Africa at the top level. In actual fact, the MNR did intensify its operations after the "Nkomati Accord", because South Africa had already built and stocked the MNR bases to allow it to operate for some time without new supplies and has subsequently been supplying the MNR.

The intensified MNR operations were not only a threat to the survival of the Mozambican government which found it incapable to protect its own citizens, but also a threat to Zimbabwe's traffic through the Beira corridor. To protect its traffic through Mozambique, Zimbabwe had to commit its troops to Mozambique (over five thousand troops are reported to be operating in Mozambique). Tanzania did also commit some of its troops to Mozambique and Malawi, after heavy pressure from its neighbours had to commit some of its soldiers. However, the war in Mozambique is far from over and is having broader repercussions as refugees from Mozambique continue to troop into the neighbouring countries.

Another country that has suffered from South Africa's surrogate forces and military raids is Lesotho. Up to 1973 Lesotho had very cordial relations with South Africa partly because of the help received by the Basutholand National Party (BNP) at the time of the independence elections. There was however, in 1973 a shift in the pro-South Africa policy in an attempt by the BNP first to undermine the opposition that had consistently criticised its pro-South Africa stance and secondly, to gain admission into African

diplomatic circles and to establish proper credentials within the OAU. Thus in 1973 the Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan, declared in the new Assembly that "Lesotho would not cease to give moral support and any other possible support to our fellow men in the liberation movements who are struggling to free themselves from the yoke of colonialism and racial oppression" (Ajula and Commack 1986.143). Lesotho then went ahead to improve its relations with the ANC. In 1976 it condemned the apartheid regime after the Soweto uprising, opened up diplomatic relations with Mozambique and refused to recognize the independence of the Transkei Bantustan.

South Africa responded to this new Lesotho attitude by the creation of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) from the members of the Basutho Congress Party (BCP) that had fled to South Africa after the Prime Minister Jonathan had annulled the elections. The LLA started bombing operations in Lesotho in May 1979 with the bombing of the Post Office and the Electricity Corporation Headquarters. This was followed by bombings in the northern part of the country, the destruction of bridges, telephone and electric poles. This forced Leabua Jonathan to meet P.W. Botha and the result was a temporary decrease of hostilities. In 1981 the LLA activities were resumed and there were sporadic attacks on ANC refugee residences and on the house of the ANC representative. This was followed by South Africa's raid on Maseru in December 1982 leaving 40 people dead. The pressure on Lesotho gained temper and included the imposition of sanctions in 1983 which were briefly lifted after ministerial talks, increased LLA activity and another commando raid on Maseru in December 1985 which was followed by a reimposition of border restrictions amounting to a full scale blockade the result of which was a military take over of the government on 20th January 1986.

South Africa's aim in Lesotho like elsewhere was to force it into a non-

aggression pact, like the one signed with Mozambique in March 1984 and earlier with Swaziland in 1982. Swaziland had succumbed to South Africa's economic incentives that included a supplementary payment of R50 million in 1982 under the Customs Union Agreement, an offer to cede the KaNgwane Bantustan and part of the KwaZulu Bantustan and the construction of a railway line to join Swaziland to Richards Bay in South Africa. While South Africa has not succeeded in forcing Lesotho into a non-aggression pact, the toppling of Leabua Jonathan led to an improvement of relations between the two and the curtailment of ANC activities there.

The other countries in the region have also tasted South Africa's military wrath. The South African military was behind the Super ZAPU dissidents in the Matebeleland province of Zimbabwe. Earlier, the burning of its military aircrafts was attributed to SADF. Botswana's capital and environs were subjected to SADF raids in June 1985 and May 1986 and the Zambian capital has been raided. However, for Botswana and Zimbabwe, South Africa has preferred to use economic pressure rather than direct military attacks, partly because it has greater economic leverage over these countries as noted above. The economic disruption that military action entails would negatively affect South Africa. While South Africa has failed to force these countries into non-aggression pacts it has ensured that the activities of the South African liberation movements are censured in these countries.

### **The Neighbours Response to South Africa's Total Strategy**

South Africa has forced its neighbours, in particular Angola and Mozambique, to remain in a continuous state of war. These two countries have had to direct almost all their resources to defence. There has been massive destruction of infrastructure, disruption of production and social services, loss of life and displacement of a large section of the population in these two

countries. Cawthra (1986) estimated the war damage to Angola by 1986 to have reached the tune of US \$12 billion and for Mozambique \$4 billion. Hanlon (1986) puts the total cost of South Africa's destabilization of SADCC countries between 1980 and 1986 at US \$18.7 billion (Table 2). The other countries in the region while not suffering directly from South Africa's military aggression have incurred many indirect losses that have included extra military spending in an effort to boost their defences against possible military attacks. For example, Botswana was forced to transform its para-military police into the core of its national army. Zimbabwe has been forced to send its troops into Mozambique to guard the Beira corridor through which its import and export traffic passes. There has also been increased transport costs, reduced production and of course the spectre of

Table 2  
The Cost of South Africa's Destabilization on SADCC States  
(\$ Million).

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985*	1986*
Direct War Damage	120	378	393	375	375	375	375
Extra Military spending	365	508	621	729	841	960	1080
Transport and Energy	70	170	197	223	250	295	340
Lost exports	0	24	20	90	100	140	180
Smuggling	5	19	43	70	55	75	75
Reduced production	35	96	131	205	330	400	475
Deferred Growth	0	81	310	626	979	1330	1680
Boycotts	16	24	40	62	62	70	75
Customs Union	12	12	12	233	67	80	80
<b>Total</b>	<b>681</b>	<b>1394</b>	<b>1872</b>	<b>2801</b>	<b>3291</b>	<b>4000</b>	<b>4680</b>
Cumulative Total \$ Billion	2.1	3.9	6.7	10	14	18.7	

Source: Hanlon Joseph, "Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War on SADCC", 1986.5 \* Estimates.

a new wave of refugees.

Secondly, South Africa has made the implementation of the major SADCC projects, in particular transport projects in Angola and Mozambique, impossible. No rehabilitation of the Benguela railway can be undertaken as long as the war rages in Southern Angola. The Mozambique transport system has been continuously sabotaged thus forcing the external aid donors to question the rationale of pumping money into the system. This has forced the landlocked countries in the region to increase their transport dependence on South Africa. Currently 80 percent of SADCC traffic passes through South Africa when twenty years ago South Africa only handled 20 percent of these countries' traffic (SADCC 1988:128).

Given the state of South Africa's aggression against its neighbours one would have expected these countries to have worked out a common defence against South Africa either through the Frontline States or SADCC. The main impediment to the formulation of a common defence strategy against South Africa lies in the general economic weakness of these countries which has affected the nature of the regional organizations they have formed and the various relationships of the individual countries to South Africa and to one another.

All the FLS and SADCC countries are newly independent, poor and backward countries. Their economies are very fragile and are heavily dependent on external aid and support. In this situation their major preoccupations are with their national economies and not with regional developments. They do not have the resources to contribute either for regional defence or regional projects. It is because of this that the two regional organisations have evolved as organs for soliciting external support with the FLS concentrating on diplomatic support for the liberation movements in the region and SADCC focusing on raising external funds



for the so called regional projects.

Secondly, the economic relations of many of these countries with South Africa prevent them from acting in concert against the very enemy. Of the nine SADCC states only Tanzania and Angola have no direct relations with South Africa. The countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland emerged to independence not only financially unviable but completely integrated into the South African economy. The three together with South Africa constitute the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and until 1976 when Botswana left the Rand Monetary Area were together part of that monetary systems. As we have noted above these receive most of their imports from South Africa and their export traffic runs through South Africa. South Africa is thus capable of economically strungling these three countries as the Lesotho case in 1985 has shown. Of the remaining countries, Malawi has had special political and economic relations with South Africa. Suspicious of its neighbours, in particular Tanzania with which it had a boarder dispute and marxist Mozambique, Malawi was the first country to embrace South Africa and establish diplomatic relations with it. It has also received a lot of economic help and increased its trade with South Africa. The sanctions against Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) since 1965 and the closure of the Mozambican boarder in 1976 brought that country closer to South Africa. It thus emerged to independence in 1980 as South Africa's major trading partner in the region. South Africa absorbs most of that country's manufactured goods and has extensive investments there. It is not likely to break up these linkages in the short run. As for Mozambique, the Maputo transport network was built to service South Africa. Besides, it has been heavily dependent on South Africa for mine employment of its citizens. While South Africa did decrease its traffic through Maputo and cut down the number of Mozambican migrant labourers after that country's independence, Mozambique is still eager, despite South Africa's support of the MNR to increase its relations with South Africa. Thus Mozambique's

position vis-a-vis South Africa remains ambivalent. Zambia's imports from South Africa have continued to grow overtime and its transport dependence on South Africa has not decreased despite the Tanzania-Zambia railway.

Given this high degree of dependence on South Africa it has not been possible to formulate a common stand on South Africa beyond the declaration of intent to reduce their dependence and let alone to enter a defence pact against South Africa. The two regional groupings have thus continued to bank on international support against South Africa's destabilization. International support however is limited and is dependent on external countries' interests in the individual countries in the region. For example, The United States has remained hostile to the Angolan and Mozambican governments because of their profession of marxism and has gone to the extent of supporting opposition groups there. Besides, the international community has its own interests in South Africa itself. It is these interests that have prompted the United States to pursue a policy of constructive engagement towards South Africa. Other western countries have interests to protect in South Africa and have been unwilling to apply comprehensive sanctions against the Pretoria regime. Thus as a group, the neighbouring countries appear to be helpless against South Africa.

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# NOTES