The Institutionalization of Military Rule: The Case of Togo s. Decalo In recent years there has been growing interest in the underlying causes of the steadily increasing number of coups in Africa, and in the nature of the ensuing mili- tary regimes. With fourteen subsaharan states currently under military rule (and several others with a record of coups or other military upheavals) the new militocracy is an established part of the African scene. At the same time, however, it is becoming evident that the new juntas frequently resemble the civilian elites they replaced in their inability to provide purposeful, cohesive, stable and corruption-free leadership in pursuit of programs of l socio-economic and political development. As a small West African state with little international impact, a small population and a barely viable economy Togo might appear to offer few instructive insi~hts into the pre- requisites of stable military rule. Yet paradoxically, the little studied administration of General ~tienne Byadema is one of but a handful of exceptions to the gene- rally negative record ccmpiled by military regimes in Africa. Nothing in the ethnic and ecological parameters or in the early history of independent Togo would have 103 suggested other than that the country would follow the pattern of grinding political decay so visible in her sister state, Benin, where thirteen years of independence have seen a revolving door procession of ten Presidents, six coups and perennial instability.2 In many ways Togo is a mirror image of her neighbor possessing similar geographic and ethnic configurations, a wobbly economy, intense regionalist sentiments and inter-elite strife. Indeed, having herself experienced two military takeovers Togo appeared well on the road to developing into a praetorian system.3 Yet the past ten years of military rule unde~ a remarkably cohesive Army and mixed civil- military administration have negated such expectations and brought the country a degree of political stability, economic development and social tranquility. This in itself merits attention and analysis especially when con- trasted with the failings of military regimes in Benin, Uganda, Burundi, Congo/Brazzaville, Mali, Sudan or the Central African Republic. Regionalism and Political Decay As elsewhere in West Africa the most distinc- tive feature of Togo's socio-economic infrastructure is the system of reinforcing cleavages that sharply differen- tiate between the northern (Kabre, Gurma, Kotokoli) and southern (Ewe, Mina) populations.4 In the mainstream of outside influences, possessing a system of values stress- ing individualism and upward mobility and conducive to adaptation, the Ewe and Mina of the south have tradition- ally been more socially advanced than the northern groups. The lopsided colonial policies of both Germany and France and the spread of a cash crop economy in the south further gave impetus to the growing socio-economic gaps between the two parts of the country. Longer affected by missionary activities and avid pursuers of Western educa- tion, modern avocations and life-styles Ewe society rapidly evolved and modernized during the colonial era, 1~ contributing important elements to the French administra- tive apparatus in Africa and later spawning Africa's first nationalist movement.5 Regional disparities on practically every dimen- sion punctuate Togolese statistics on literacy, distribution of social and health services, and economic growth rates, resembling data culled from two different countries. Thus, for example, 1970 school attendance figures (of children between the ages of 6 and 14) ranged from 99% in Lome to 18.6% in Sansanne Mango in the far north.6 Cultivation of cash crops (especially coffee and cocoa), extractive indus- tries and higher per capita incomes are all concentrated in the south. Elsewhere income levels and economic acti- vity are relatively depressed, a function of over- population, soil erosion, poor communications and the discriminating socio-economic policies of the past. And the absence until fairly recently of an all-weather road connecting the country along its north-south axis greatly retarded economic development in the north and kept inter- ethnic social-interaction to a minimum. The general weakness of the erratic Togolese economy, dificitary budgets (until 1968) and a perennial17 negative balance of trade have all placed serious limita- tions on prospects for economic development. Togo's economic growth rate durin~ the years 1956-1965 was the lowest of the tvelve francophone states.? Scarcity of developmental resources and pressures for administrative positions by unemployed Eves resulted in minimum attention to the problems of the underdeveloped north by Togo's first tvo Eve-led civilian regimes and a svelling of the largely Eve civil service, already over-staffed by some 30%. Potentials for national integration have also been hampered by northern mistrust and fear of domination by the south stoked by the arrogant and ccntemptful atti- tude of Eve administrators p'osted to hinterland locali- ties. Only vith the rise of the northern-based Eyadema regime have some of these fears eased, and as the 105 economy moved out of the doldrums in the late 1960's - due to a pickup in economic activity rather than real economic development - increased government revenues have made possible a more balanced program of social and econo- mic modernization which is very slowly erasing the worse regional disparities. Togo's regional fissures, early Ewe nationalism and social consciousness, and northern resentments at de-facto southern domination have indelibly affected the evolution of political life in the country. The multipli- city of reinforcing cleavages, personal elite rivalries and antagonisms, and competition for supremacy in a poli- tical system with few alternate channels to patronage or power, sharpened political strife, exacerbated ethnic tensions and encoureaed a "winner take all" mentality among the political combatants. The emergence in the 1950's of mutually exclusive ethnic groupings and politi- cal parties reflected these inherent domestic tensions and the inability of the major regional leaders to find a common roof within a united national or interethnic insti- tutional framework. Though Togo eventually became a uni- party state under the leadership of Dr. Sylvannus Olympio and the largely Ewe Comite de l'Unite To~olais (C.U.T.) this was largely the result of intimidation, imprisonment and cooptation into the party of political competitors, and the quasi-legal banninr of the other political group- ings in the country. Indeed, Olympio's authoritarian political style and strict fi~cal policies alienated many of his own C.U.T. colleagues as well, and further contri- buted to the instability of Togo's first government.8 The veterans' coup of January 13, 1963 that resulted in Olympio's assassination, thou~h mounted by northern elements, did not suhstantially change the poli- tical and economic array of power in Togo. The very selection of Olympio's brother-in-law, Nicholas Grunitzky, as the next President, wns in a sense a return to the 106 pre-independence style of politics though assuredly Paris exerted si~nificant pressure in the mutter. Regionalism was allowed its institutionalized expression in the form of political parties which were in reality elitist link- ages between modern power brokers and traditional nota- bles united alon~ an ethnic axis for the purpose of garnerin~ a measure of political influence and patronage in Lome. Political aspirants roundly defeated by Olympio in the U.N.-supervised 1958 election as well as politi- cians swept into jailor exile after independence promp- tly emerged to claim their place in the sun in Grunitzky's wall-to-wall cabinet. Yet despite the change in political style from Olympio's authoritarian- paternalism to Grunitzky's consensual approach (with resultant debilitating immobilism and/or vacillations), and though for the first time important northern elements participated in policymaking sessions, the political fulcrum still rested solidly in the south and develop- mental policies (still lackin~ necessary financial resources) only paid lip-service to northern emancipation or national integration. Numerically neither Ewe nor Kabre (the principal northern tribe) representation in the cabinet shifted with the former still holding two- thirds of the portfolios. Moreover, the new constitu- tional arran~ement was inherently unctable - balancing the indecisive and conservative Grunitzky against his ambitious militant northern Vice President, Antoine Meatchi - within a wider societal context in which Grunitzky had no real power base being mistrusted in the north because of his familial link with Olympio, and despised by the Ewes for accepting power from the assassins of his brother-in-law. When Grunitzky's balancing prowess finally failed him he collapsed as the straw man which he actually was to the true power- brokers in Togo - the Army. 107 The Internal Dynamics of the Togolese Army The previous analysis briefly noted some of the more prominent social, economic and strllct'lral weaknesses of the Togolese political system which are mutatis mutandis equally pr~sent in most African states. Contrary to much of the literature on political instability there is no direct causal relationship between systemic failings and military upheavals though obviously such weaknesses play a certain role in coups.9 Though motives behind military interventions in the political realm are complex and some- times h~rd to unravel they frequently stem from the inter- nal dynamics of African armed forces and in particular from the interplay of ambitions, fears and ~rievances within the officer corps. Hence, in order to p~rceive some of the covert reasons for the 1967 ToGolese coup as well as the reasons for the Army's remarkable cohesion (as compared to the frequent splinterization of armed forces elsewhere) and success while in office, it is necessary to delve into the social composition and internal dynamics of the Togolese military hierarchy. The pre-independence Mandate and Trusteeship provisions under which Togo was governed prohibited mili- tary recruitment in the country, yet a military career appealed to many who wished to escape the shackles of a moribund economy and traditional village life. This was especially true in the underdeveloped anri overpopulated north where Kabre youth, socially and economically locked out by France's lopsided developmental policies,were attracted by the upward social mobility potentials of an Army career. The proximity of the Dahomean border and the ease of enlistment there a8 "Dahomeans" assured a steady flow of To@:olese "Dahomeans" into the French Colonial Army in the 1950's. Few ~wes joined in this trek since their superior skills and education allowed them easy entry into more advantageous positions in the 108 civil service and the trades. Even later, when indigeni- zation drives in other ex-French territories flushed back to Lome expatriate Ewes who could not be easily absorbed by the bloated Togolese civil service,few opted for the traditionally Ewe low. status military careerj and those who did join the Army ended up concentrated in non- command pORitions in the service units. At inr.ependence the Togolese army was a min- iscule 250-man force trained and commanded by French expatriate officers with few indi~enous NCO's and only one middle-rank Togolese officer - Major Kleber Dadjo. Both Dadjo and the bulk of the extremely docile force were largely Kabre, performed super-police duties and were held in very low esteem by Sylvannus Olympio whose views on the absurdity and excessiTe cost of an Army were well known. Yet among the Kabre NCO's - who felt ill at ease in, and discriminated by the southern host culture - and among the French commanding officers - who knew their promotion prospects within a one-company Army were limi- ted, to say the least - there were potentially explosive grievances against Olympio and pressures for an increase in the size of the Army. When France demobilized much of her colonial armies, repatriating to Lome her Togolese "Dahomeans", the interests of the returning veterans converged with those of the "expansionists" in the local armed forces. The Kabre veterans, unskilled in other crafts and loath to return to the very same socio-economic stagnation that had orir,inally driven them from their villages in the north, petitioned Olympio for their integration into an expanded Togolese Army, a move supported by most of the local NeO's and officers. Olympio's flat rejection of even their minimum demand - the integration of only sixty of the best qualified men - led to the 1963 confrontation in which the assault group obtained support and weapons from key personnel in the Army. The elevation of 109 Grunitzky to power and his general political vulnerability assured that the gains secured by the veterans (a tripl- ing of the Army, higher salaries and allocations, and officer rank for most of the key figures) would not be threatened during his tenure of office.lO His imminent collapse, however, so apparent during 1966 when he faced continuous assaults upon his authority both from within his cabinet and from the Ewe elites and masses in the coastal cities, threatened far more than the Army's cor- porate interests. For in light of the virtual impossibi- lity of forging either a northern-led civilian regime or another maleable national coalition, it seemed as if power might slip into the hands of Olympio's C.U.T. lieutenants whose major policy plank was the arrest and trial for murder of their dead leader's assassins. The 1967 coup can thus be seen to have stemmed primarily from the direct threat to the personal freedom and security of Colonel Eyadema (who admitted firing the shots that killed Olympio) as well as other by-now high-echelon officers who had been with him on that fateful night. Hence the assassination of Olympia inadvertantly assured that the Army would always stay at least at the periphery of poli- tical power out of fear of possible future retribution. No matter the degree of "civilianization" or liberaliza- tion the Army may undertake in contemporary Togo the key officers involved in the 1963 murder of Olympia are not likely to allow the formation of a true civilian regime. The various anti-Eyadema plots durin~ the past seven years (many masterminded by Noe Kutuklui, Olympio's spiritual heir) have overlooked this fact as well as that Eyadema is ~ the only figure standing between them and an Ewe civilian regime. Most of the above factors also throw light on the reasons for the remarkable internal cohesion of both the ruling military clique and the Army as a whole. The self-commissioned officer clique that eained control of 110 the Togolese armed forces in 1963 were of roughly the same age and social orifins, had shared similar sociali- zing experiences including combat duty, had assimilated the same cultural influences and were drawn from the same ethnic ~roup - the Kabre - as were the bulk of the rank and file in the Army.ll Moreover, the complicity in the 1963 coup of Olympio's Kabre commander, Major Kleber Dadjo and other personnel, their retention and promotion in the post-coup Army, ensured that no schisms were to develop between the two segments of the armed forces. While it is true that the key conspirators and their Army supporters leapfrogged to intermediate officer rank (Eyadema, Bodjolle, Kongo and Assila, the Ewe odd-man- out) - with Etienne Eyadema, one of the youngest and brightest of the N.C.G. veterans percolating to the top _ promotions have since been routinized without excess favoritism. This remark3ble professionalism by the non- professional N.C.O.'s-turned officers has r,one a long way in preventinr the development of personal resentments and animosities and their inevitable repercussions in the form of attempted power grabs, factionalism and purges. Thus the integrity of the hierarchy of command 11'1sremained extremely stable over time. Dadjo - a few generations removed from the new young elite in the army _ was retained for several years as Chief of Staff even though his powers were in actuality quite nominal. Later, he was fently "promoted" to non-operational duties as Eyadema took over as Chief of Staff. Also, Lt. Colonel Assila - the ~we member of the veterans' inner clique in 1963 - was consistently retained at top governmental and Army command positions right through mid-1972 even though he had developed a critical kidney ailment which kept him incapacitated for over two years in a Paris sanitorium. Indeed, the only serious friction within the officer corps occured when Major Bodjolle, the original head of the 1963 inner clique, tried to wrestle away the leader- 111 ship he had lost to Eyadema consequent to his backing out of the coup-attempt at the last moment. And even this power-struggle was resolved without factionalizing the Army or tearing asunder the hierarchy of command. The Institutionalization of Military Rule The Army has consolidated its authority in Togo by linking the continuation of military rule with the economic satisfaction of ~roup interests. At a later stage, as the refime became adept at manipulating the political process and weanin~ away potential opposition with patronage, it moved to expand its ler,itimacy by partly institutionalizing itself. The military regime has been greatly aided in its efforts to consolidate its authority by the general pick-up in the economic pace of the country as phosphate exploitation moved into high gear and by the sharp increase in world prices for cocoa and coffee. Both developments have f3vored the Ewe coastal areas where the phosphate and cocoa rerions are located,and have generated important new revenues for the government especially after the latter acquired a 32% share in the phosphate works. Similarly, a major slash (50-80%) in duties on luxury imports (alcohol, perfumes, watches, tobaccO) sparked off a veritable boom in smuggling acti- vities into Ghana that has always maintained high tariffs on imports. Lome's market women, the "principl'Ilsocio- economic force in the country,,12 have benefitted most from this illicit trade and the relaxed import-export code. Indeed, so sensitive has Eyadema been to the interests of the m~rket women that much of his most ardent _ and vocal _ support in the south is precisely from this powerful group: when the R.P.T. party waS established in 1969, for example, they contributed 500 000 CFA to the party coffers and joined it en masse. 112 Annually larger government revenues from these reduced taxes on a much higher volume of imports and exports (as much as 40% of which might be destined for, or arriving from, Ghana) have permitted an expansion of state services throughout the country, but especially in the north. For the first time in Togo's history there has been a consistent attempt to develop the Kabre areas (though mid-Togo and the Savanes regions have remained neglected), even as Lome and the coastal areas have seen a major face-lifting as well. Since 1968 the expanding and balanced budget has allocated lArger sums to the various bureaucracies, which have continued expanding to the satisfaction of the civil service unions. Neither has the Army been neglected. Since 1963 it has grown sevenfold to over 1 800 men equipped with better materiel and receiving higher salaries. In like manner Eyadema has paid attention to complaints from traditional chiefs regarding the erosion of their authority and slashes in their state remunera- tions under previous regimes. In a very popular gesture that gained the government the allegiance of the tradi- tional authorities Eyadema raised chiefs' salaries by 50% and established provisions for regular contact between them and the regime. These policies were in particular appreciated in the south due to the much greater pulveri- zation of chiefly authority under the impact of modern influences. The increase in the symbolic status of the chiefs, and Eyadema's frequent visits to the north (and in particular to his natal village, Piya) have not alienated either the coastal populations or youth who have discovered increasing patronage outlets under his admini- stration.13 The regime has also tried to emphasize its "national" character and that in Eyadema's cabinet both major regions are equally represented by young, untainted and competent technocrats. While the latter is certainly 113 true, and Togo's cabinets have been marked by stability over time, the ethnic distribution of portfolios favors the Kabre and the true locus of power is squarely in the hands of the military (see T~BLE A). Thus while in 1975 8 civilian Ministers were indeed equally drawn from North and South Togo, three of the other four ~inisters are northern officers, and many major policy decisions are actually made by the military inner group in an informal manner, later "ratified" by the cabinet. TABLJ;; A ETHNIC REPRZSE"J'ATI(JN IN TCGO'S CABIIlETS Grunitzky's Under Ethnicity and % At 1yadema Independence last cabinet of Population 67 70 25 Ewe (44) 22 20 42 Kabre (23) 0 0 8 to'oba (7)(North) 11 0 0 Central Togo (5) 0 0 0 Gurma (5) (rlorth) Kotokoli (7)(Central- 0 10 17 ilorth) 0 0 8 ethers (9) Fi~ures expressed in perce~tap,es. Source: Donald Porrison, et al., Black Africa: R Comnarative Handbook, The Free Press, New York, 1972 Most of the active opposition to the military regime h"s come "rom sl'"lall groups of exiled politicians either shut out of the administration or unwillinr to make their peace with l:,Vpdema. Foremost amonr these is Noe Kutuklui, a former Clympio hinister and heir-apparent 114 of the C.U.T. (though in actuality he seems to have little support left amonf, the Ewe), who has been behind most of the plots th'tt punctuated Lome's civic life during 1967-1970. Based in Cotonou Kutuklui has been able to attract a motley group of aspirants and dis- gruntled fringe elements whose ineptitude in coup-making has only been matched by the wide-scale publicity given their arrest and trials in Lome. ~ost of the former Bwe political elite has retired from public life or have joined the Eyadema bandwar,on accepting sinecures in the higher levels 0' the civil service. The economic success of the regime has ~ained it grudr,ing approval among the coastal popu12tions who while still unable to accept the northern and military credentials of 1yadema are also paradoxically unwilling to see his government collapse. This was strikin£ly demonstrated immediately after an alleged 1970 Kutuklui plot when thousands marched to the Presidency, in Lome's first truly "spontaneous" solida- . d . 14 r1ty emonstrat1on. During Eyadema's first two years in power (1967- 69) great stress was placed on the temporary nature of the military regime, a cleansing interregnum prior to the re-establishment of civilian politics. By 1969 with the economic picture greatly improved and under pressure from both the Army command and northern elements who feared a reassert ion of Ewe hegemony, the regime moved to legitimate its continued control of the nation. The process was a slow and very cautious one and was marked at the outset by quite transparently stage managed public demonstrations in support of continued military rule: indeed, so obvious was the Togolese equivalent of the reluctant acceptance of the Crown by Caesar that one observer quipped thRt Eyadema \olas"perhaps a Bokassa. pretendinr: to be a Lamizana,,15 alludinp; to the differinl'; personal ambitions of the military heads of the Central African Republic and Uppe~ Volta. However that May be us on January 17, 1969 Eyadema bowed to "public pressure" - which included government-paid tele~rams from the interior and village delegations brought to Lome by the administra- tion - and renounced his recently announced decision to han d over power t0' C1V1'1' 1an par t' 1es. 16 The "transformation" from a military regime to a legitimate national government accountable to the masses, albeit still under the control of a Kabre-military inner group, was achieved through the creation of a national party to whom the government was made responsible, and a plebiscite held to confirm Eyadema as the people's choice for President. The Rassemblement du Peuples Togolaises was duly established in September and the carefully screened members of its Constitutive Congress promptly declared that "the participation of the military in public affairs is expressly recop;nized,,17in lip;ht of the Army's past contributions to Togo's social and political develop- ment. Eyadema was expressly re~uested, in the name of the R.P.T. acting as respesentatives of the people, to stay on as Head of State. Simultaneously the R.P.T. chose a respected Ewe official (Edouard Kodjo) as Secretary General: later, when it became obvious he was not as malleable as had been expected Kodjo was replaced by a 15 man civil-military Folit~cal Bureau with a northern majority. The next phase in the legitimntion of the regime took place at the first Coneress of the R.P.T. in November 1971. Held in Falim~, the ceLter of the south's cocoa frowing district, Hnd scene of economic prosperity consequent to risin~ world prices, the assembled 2 000 hand picked delegates promoted 8y~dema to General, rejec- ted their Central Committee's proposal for a civilianiza- tion of the ref'ime~'the people consider the idea of con- stitutionalizin[; the rep;ime as inopport'me and pre- matur-e,,18),approved the holdinf of a referendum on Eyadema's Fresid~ncy and announced the site of the next 116 Congress - Lama Kara, the capital of Kabre country. In the January 1972 referendum (in which villages voted "en bloc") Eyanema WRS confirmed as the peoples' choice by 99.09% of the voters. The official transformation was complete; directly elected by the populace to head a n~tional civilian r,overnment in which there is no dis- tinction between civilian or military elements, Eyadema became institutionally accountable to the H.P.T. through its Political Bureau, that in turn represents the various segments of the population. The reality of power does not flow as neatly as the institutional diagram would suggest, nor is the H.P.T. a living force. Needless to say the institutional facade of power has chanr,ed with the adoption of the concept of ~ forma accountability, a sliCht decentralization in decision-making authority ann the inclusion of a larger group of trusted officials at the fringes of power within a more complex institutional settinF. Political power in Africa has always been viewed as totally indivisible ann hence has heen jealously guarded, in civilian as well as military regimes,19 and there is no reRson to expect a different orientation from Eyanema. It is important, however, to drive home this dispRrity between theory and reality in the case of Togo partly because the regime's favorable press abroad h~s overstressed Togo's institu- tionalization, and in ~art because Togo's stability depends on several fRctors which may not turn out to be lasting over time. First, Eyadema's political style, his penchant, has leaned towards the reification of formal trappings of power. Again, rare is the African political party or movement thct truly has prass roots to any considerable negree. The R.P.T. is no exception. Structurally it is somewhat an anamoly with each party branch directly linked to Lome without intermediate hierarchies, cRusing blockages in the capital whenever 117 party structures have been utilized. More importantly, hovever, is the lifelessness of the edifice in the country- side; even in the north - where it is quite correctly vieved as a Kabre dominated hierarchy - it elicits little attention or involvement, and is both understaffed anc .f . ft' delegate d f ev spec~ ~c unc ~ons. 20 Th R e •••PT' ~s nel.th er a control mechanism (the military or administrative net- york is utilized for this), a political recruitment hierarchy (the Lome bureaucracies are still the best avenues) or an aid to national integration (Eyadema's con- cept of integration appears to encompass only levelling economic disparities). Its establishment has created some nev administrative positions for Togo's elite and it has provided, in its Congresses, for some very timid, low- keyed discussion of socio-economic options. The regime has been from the outset quite heavy-handed with the few ambitious political reformers who managed to slip through the screening process, as the demotion of Kodjo has illustrated. And the fact that some members of the Political Bureau are also either Cabinet Ministers, or secondary figures of the de facto political elite, assures the synchronization of R.P.T. and government deliberations. As to the second point, it should be remembered that Eyadema's liberal personality aside, much of the stability of the re~ime has been consequent to the quickened econom;.c pace of the country, vhich in turn is greatly affected by external factors. Thus, for example, the possible abolition of hieh import tariffs by Ghana (already contemplated) would overnight shatter the pros- perity and threaten the standard of living of thousands of market women (some of whom are among the richest of Lome's nouveau riche) and other coastal elements who thrive on the two-way smu~glin~ across the border. A joint Togo-Ghana agreement to try to curb this traffic (actually concluded in 1972) mi~ht have a similar effect, vhile the Ewe cocoa cultivators - who turned against 118 Olympio when he imposed a 5 francs per kilogram tax - might greet a decline in world cocoa prices with massive defections from the Eyadema bandwagon. Similarly, phosphate exports have been going up in tonnage since 1968 though state revenues until 1974 have been level or declining due to lower world prices for this commodity. Though prices startlingly tripled in the mid-1970's a sharp drop or world ~lut could place the industry in a precarious position, contracting state revenues and in- evitably affecting levels of socio-economic services and state patronage that can be provided in a societal con- text of rising expectations. Such a sequence of events would likely trigger a feeling of relative deprivation 21 with its inexorable consequences. Togo's prospects are not so dim, however, unless all the above factors coincide to shatter the economic picture. Moreover, Eyadema's personality, his liberal policies, the relative non-visibility of the Army and the absence of major scandals connected with it, have soothed and reassured many segments of the popula- tion that could not have conceived previously a benign nortnern military administration. If the government can build upon these social credits in its favor by involving more top level Ewe personalities in major policy-making the Eyadema regime may well start making inroads towards national integration, a goal no previous administration has seriously aimed at. More importantly, moves in this direction would do far more to consolidate and legitimate the government than attempts to date to create and sustain from above control and support structures which remain largely ineffective due to ~eneral civic non- involvement. 119 F 0 0 T NOT E S IFor a review of the literature see Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, Yale University Press, 1976 and "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, March, 1973 2Samuel Decalo, "Regionalism, Politics and the Milirary in Africa," Journal of Developing Areas, April, 1973 3David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Samuel Huntington (ed), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, The Free Press, 1962; Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army," Comparative Politics, April 1969 4For a general overview see Robert Cornevin, Histoire du Togo, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1959 5Claude E. Welch, Dream of Unity : Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa, Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1965 6 Togo-Presse, August 7, 1970 7Togo-Presse, December 2, 1967. See also Samir Amin, ~frique de l'Cuest Bloquee, Paris, Lditions de Minuit, 1971, pp. 125-134, 149-156 8 See Samuel Decalo, "The Politics of Military Rule in Togo", Geneve-Afrique, Winter 1973-74 120 9See, among others, Ruth First, Power in Africa, Pantheon Books, 1970; Donald C. Morrison and H. M. Stevenson, "Political Instability in Independent Black Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1971; Claude Ake, "Explaining Political Instability in New States," Journal of Modern African Studies, September 1973, and Samuel Decalo, "Praetorianism, Corpcrate Grievances and IdiosyncraticFactors in African Military Hierarchies," Journal of African Studies, August, 1975 10Helen Kitchen, "Filling the Togo Vacuum," Africa Report, February 1963 and Russell Howe, "Togo : Four Years of !':ilitary Hule," Africa Heport, May 1967 llRobert Cornevin, "Les Militaires au Dahomey et au Togo," Revue Francaise d'Etudes Politiques Africaines, November 1969 12"Togo : Une Remarquable stabilite," L'Annee Politique Africaine 1970, pp. 67-72 13Despite the official freeze in appointments to the civil service the latter grew by 7.8% between 1968 and 1971 to over 11 000 14Le ~;onde, August 12, 1970. Also, "Behind the Togo Coup", West Africa, August 22, 1970 and Africa Research Bulletin (political series), January 1971 l5West Africa, October 18, 1969 121 16The New York Times, May 25, 1969 17Afrique Nouvelle, December 11, 1969 18Afr1que . Nouve 1le, November 26 , 1971 19C1aude Ake, Journal of Modern African Studies 20Fieldwork by the author in LAma Kara, Niamtoueou and Nuatja during 1971-3 21See James C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," The American Sociolop;ical Review, February 1962 122