The 1896-97 Southern Rhodesian War Reconsidered. H. Bhila The debate about the Shona war of resistance in 1896.7 against colonial rule continues to gather momentum. There are three dim.ensions, possibly four to it. First at the level of organisation, Terence Ranger argues that the co-ordination of the war was achieved through a 'millenarian religious leadership,l but David Beach claims that majot' Shona spirit mediums had much less e:xtenaiveareas ot influence than Ranger ascribed to them;2 Julian Coobing has denied that the Mwari cult played any signi- ficancant role in the risings at aU or that itexe:t'eised any influence ove:t'the Ndebele.3 The thi:t'ddimension of. the debate is ideologic.al. MadZi.wanyika Tl;;omondo contends that 'Ranger blunders by eXClusively associating Shona resistance with the collective liberation wa:t'et1896~7,.4 rre cogently argues that the ShOna had never acceptedco1onial rule and that the war 'revolt'er re-bellion' because aubm:itt~dtoaiien rule. HI .5 int~od't1ction of cOlonial to the fOUrth aspect of individual paramounticies. In this War as in similar resistance movements, notably the Maji-Maji in ~anzania, and Bambata in Zululand.6 some African rulers either remained neutral or collaborated with the aliens. In each case both contemporary historians have been curious to establish motives the Manyika kingdom did not participate. :Basically two explana- tiOns have been advanced, first that Mutasa stayed out of the war beCause his Old rival and neighbour, Makoni, ruler of the Maungwe kingdom in the west had joined the war,? secondly that the arrest ora POt'tuguese pat'ty in 1890atMutasa's court inspired fear in uim.8 !Both views miss the point. What has not been appreciated by historians is that sOllieAfrican potentates, notably Mtoko of Budyaand Mutasa of Manyika had already experienced 'an extreme degree of social,pol,itical,military and economic dislocation}9. !Fuey had been actively resisting colonial rule since 1890 and by 1896 were not in, r 'position. mora.llyo,r materially to prosecute a. larger .war'. Tn the Ca.se of. the Manyika the scramble for mine- ralcconce.ssions between the Mo~a.mbiqueand British South Africa. Oompa.ni.e.s' ct'eated'dies.ension in the king's council and in the process' undermined his authority and prestige. After the elimi- nation ottheMozambiq.ueCompany by the British South Africa . Company rHSA Oo.),the ecramble for land and mineral concessions assumed a new. inte.nsity between the African Portuguese Syndicate and the BSACQ.' from 1890 to 1894. It is in this context - a mini-scramble for mineral concessionsa.nd ia.nd in Manyika - that Tendai Mutasa's non-participation in the war becomes intellig- ible. !Fhe history of. the mini-scramble for Hanyika dates back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The Portuguese had had trading contacts with the east, north east and west of Zimbabwe since the' sixteenth century. They were trying to re- establish themselves after their expulsion from these regions at the turn of the seventeenth century. men partiCUlar, co1.onel Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrada and Manuel An'timi.o Souza cloeely associated with the Portuguese govern.me,nt its attemJ?t to rGsu.sci tate o Portuguese commercial as intrDducing Portuguese poli- tical control over Andrada was a 'businessman to African states.ll As a result, he was in a position to grab land, give bogus protection treaties and sometimes marry into African royal families in order to claim the right to succeed the ruling king. Because 'of these activities, the Portuguese. government decided to exploit his influence and multiple con- tacts with African rulers in the region, especially in the king- dom of Manyika, which he claimed as his because he had helped the ruling.king to acceed to the throne. In return for his services, the Portuguese government undertook to educate his sons in Lisbon and gave him an honorific title and a sinecurial position. The 1880s and early l890s are replete with the preda- tory exploits of Andrada and de Souza, backed, of course, by the 12 Portuguese government. As a result, that government put up claims to large parts of Zimbabwe. These claims were contested by the British g01l'ernment which was also interested in colonizing the area. The British government sought to realize its ambitions by supporting an ad1l'enturer.Cecil John Rhodes, who formed the BSA Coo, for the purpose. The scramble for Manyika between the British govern- ment and the BS! Co on the one hand and the Mozambique Company of Andrada. and de Souza and the Portuguese government on the other, resulted in the partition of the kingdom of Manyika in 1890. Andrada obtained a concession to form a company in 1878.13 The following year he brought out a company in Paris called La SocH~t~. des Foundateurs de la Campagne Generale du Zambeze. The cpmpany was liquidated in 1'88:;and Andrade formed two compa- nies,. the-East African Company, which was never floated, and the and soon went into fOllowing year when he of :;0 000 mUreis met with extra- ordinary difficulties because. of wars which a half caste family known as da Cruz, had been waging against the Portuguese in the Zambezi since 1856. The concession expired and Andrada who was in Portugal was unable to obtain an extension of the time allowed or fresh capital .. After considerable negotiations, he started another comp.!:\TIY called the M021ambique Comp,my, wi th a capital of was legally constituted by a decree of 20th December, 1888. The generous terms of this concession en- a1>ledthe companyto establish its agents in the goldferous regions of the kingdom. notably the ~lutari, Rebvuweand Baizi Valleys. The companyhad stores spread allover the country and carried on a system of trading within the hydrographic basin of the rivers Buzi and Arua~gwaand the country above the Save river. 14 It is also said that it had stores at Mutasa's court. The headquarters of the companywas in Lisbon and was purely Portuguese although a considerable amount of French money was involved. It was represented at Masekesa in 14anyika by Baron de Rezende. As far as one can ascertain no treaty existed. bet- ween the African rulers in the area and the company. and it would seem that the local population treated it with indifference. The companyemployed a number of Africans from the east coast who were armed, and evidently acted as soldiers ~nd bodyguards.15 It would seem, however, that.the company did not itself prospect for gold on any significant scale apart from the RebvuweValley which it had reserved for itself bec;B.useit believed that there was plenty of good quality gold there. It employed a French prospec- tor. 101., d'Llambly, to carry out surveys in this valley. 16 How- ever, the companyissued mining licences to anyone "whOapplies and complies with certain rulesu .17 The miners had to pay ten Shillings per annum and most of them, a twenty pe!'cent royalty. The concessions varied in ex:tent but it would appear that the oondi tionswere alike .. were seoveral parties of miners at work on allu- vial deposits in the valleys the Chua, Chilllezi, and Nyahombwe ri verso 0 One these parties wClrl<:itlLg in the Chimez'i found a rich spot several large nuggets. While settling on preliminary works would enable them too start large scale. the spent part of thei!' washing and 'although washing helped property ownerS notably in the most talked of' Braganza and R:Lchm.Qndproperties in the'Ohimed Valley. Such was the excitement abQut the EldQradQ in Hanyika that 'news-to-hand from Paris shQWS that the attentiQnQf the financiers ia direc- ted.towards thegQ1dminers Qf Macequece, until now regarded rather indifferently in EUrQpe,.19 Already the gold properties registered in Manyika had exceeded 6 000 claima, 656 beingaUu- vial and 5 344 reef, an.d 'many prOspectors. a.re explQ.ring the country in apite of the high grasa maki.ng their Work uneaay ••:20 However, gold was not the only item that enticed monQ- poly capitalists to Manyika. There were large foresta of India rubber in the territory occupied by the Mo~ambique Company. The forests extended from the coaat to 700 metrea altitude. These rubber trees had been cultivated for a long time in the past by Africans who traded the produce with the Indian merchants for 21 salt and limbo. These gold prospecting activities had aerious political implications for the king of Manyika. The Mo~ambique Company held its authority to prospect for gold not from the k:Lng of Manyika, Mutasa, but from the Portuguese government. The Mozambique Company and other companies ignored Mutasa. Complain- ingabout the activities of the COmpanies and their encroachment upon his authority, Mutasa was reported by officials of the Brit:Lsh South Africa Company to have said 'They are there and 1 don't interfere. I don' tknow the n!.llnber .. 1 have never given anyone a concession. ! am. getting nothing. I ams.ittingwatch'" . ,22 J.ng .. It Wo~ld seem that the king had also lost authority over certain portions of his kingdom .. 1f the reports of the BSA Go., offici<'.lscan be relied. 'Q.pOn, ,there were then new terri- tories 'under men indunas of Manic<'.who have rebelled, accO;t;'dingt9 ~~ta$.a~,,,;Uhth.ecovert $.upport and encouragement of 23 tlie.Portuguese' .• Regarding his borders Mutasa was reported to have said, 'I have been pressed on all sides by the assegai,.24 His neighbours, Ganda of Uteve,. Chirara of Zimunya and Makoni of Maungwe were apparently on good term.s with the Portuguese who encouraged them to be hostile to Mutaisa.. The Portuguese thOUght that if Mutli.sawere isolatep. fromhisneighbo'U:t'sand el;!t,ranged from his SUbjects, he would co'ncede them wi thout muoh re'si.S1:;arlc~l'. strongly ba,cked by the Portuguese government, the MozambiqueCompanybased its claims to these auriferous parts' of Hanyika on what it called the 'ancient rights' of the Portuguese. It should be noted that the Portuguese government was also making claims at this time to large parts of the Shona country'on the flamebasis. The Portuguese based their claims on the g:vounds that their traders and adventurers had penetrated this region during the early sixteenth century and introduced trading posts known as ~' feiras in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.25 The prospecting activities of the Mozambique Company were 'not the only ones which threatened to destroy the independ- ence and territorial integrity of the Manyika kingdom. A monopol- ist company known as the African Portuguese Syndicate (APS) was also making.a bid to obtain mineral concessions froni King Mutasa of Manyika. '1'he origins and validity of the APS are confused to 26 say the least. It would seem that the APS claimed to be a con- cession company as a result of a verbal agreement between Mutasa and four men, George Wise, Edward Ross, Rebert Perry and Thomas Madden, who had come from Johannesburg to negotiate a concession. These men had heard rumours from a f.1anyika and a Ndau, probably. migrant labourers on the Rand, that there was abundant gold in Manyika. The stOl'Y is that both the Manyika and the Ndau guided George Wise and his team as far as the king's royal court. 'with the aid of a Zulu interpreter, George i'iise con- du.cted n~gotiations for a mineral concession in 1888. Much of 'what is known about the history of these negotiations and the conces,sion itself cpme$ from the recollections of George Wise; record,ed 'six years a.fter the event. 1t emerges from the aCCou.nt that,\tJ'ise,and his colleagues Were sent by Grice 'and Lawley; for whomWise was working in Johannesburg; to Secure a mineral con- cession from the ruler ofl-lanyika. Gdce and Lawley fitted the team of negotiators w:ith a waggon and oxen for their transport. They lost some-of their cattle when they passed through a tsetse- fly iiJ.:festeiI area and were force,d to stOp at a spot aPout eight daysaW/3,y;:f£omUllt~sals.royalcGttrt~ Fri)m there they picked u,p Zulu interpreter withwh~mWi:se proce,ededtp Mutasa's strong- hold, ::leaving the rest of the party wIth -the waggon. Afi;~r a law days at Mutasa t s .stronghold, Wise returned to the waggon ae~om" panied by some of Mutasa's men,to C$.rry the presents O'f blankets and suridrya;rticles whiCh vlise and his team had bt'o~ght from GI;l.p-e ~~ . 144 Wise reported to,his frie'nds that he had seen Mutase. who confirmed that there was much ,gold in\his kingdom and that Mutasa had given three or four small parcels of gold which weighed all.ounce altogether. He also reported that Mutasa was willing to grant them a mineral concession. The team decided that George Wise and Thomas Madden should go to Mutasa to secure a written concession to mineral rights that Mutasa had promised Wise. The tW9 men together with the king's carriers proceeded to Mutasa's court. On their arrival Wise and Madden interviewed the king who, it is alleged, professed his liki~g for the English and hatred of the Portuguese. The king then sent'his men down to the Rebvuwe valley to show Wise and Madden where gold was plenti- ful'. After a thorough survey of the Rebvuwe Valley; they chose the ground they wanted and went back to Mutasa's court to finalise the deal. With the help of the Zulu interpreter, Wise wrote out the terms of the mineral concession which Mutasa and his heir apparent, Chimbadzwa, subsequently approved and signed. When this had been done, both Wise and Madden returned to where they had left the waggon, only to find their companion Ross, dead, mauled by a lion, the driver of the waggon suffering from fever and the cattle all dead. They immediately decided to return to Johannesbu.rg and leave the waggon where it was. As soon as they arrived in Johannesburg, Wise looked for theconces~ sion so that he could hand it over to Lawley. He could not find it. He m/3.dea verbal report of the concession and Lawley asked him to write it out of memory. In May 1889~,Wise and Madden went to Na'tal where they met Lloyd and Benningfield .. The latter was connected by marriage interests the AfriCan Portuguese Syndicate. Af'E'era ,discussion of their experiences, in Manyika, it was decided tna;t Wil:;e"Madden l'lnd 'Benningfie1d shoulli go to see Mutasa and re- negotiate the concession. They left for Manyika and, on reaching Inya~bane in southern Mozambique, hired eighty five men to Carry the l~ggage they hali brought' from Durban. On the third of November, 1889 they arr:ived at l-l'utasa's stronghold and interviewed him for the s.econd t:ime. Unfortunately fo,r"Wise and his collea- gues, they found that the ground they had previously chosen for their concession had been Portuguese pros- 145" peetors. An attem!lt to .get the Portuguese out failed. Mutasa then deci,ded to give them an alternative site, four miles wide on each side of the river Mutari, from its source down to its confluence with the Odzi river. In all the concession covered 240 sQl1are miles. As in the previous case Mutasa and hts son, including a number elf promineut councillors and Wise, Madden and Benningfield signed it • .In exchange for this, the concessionaires .agreed to pay Mutasa an annuity of 200 b1ankets. The gold prospecting activities of" the syndicate amoun- .. 27 ted to nO more than mounting signs and driving pegs here and there. Indeed .this might have been the reason why there did not seem to have been any friction between the APS and the Mozambique Company. Nor did thE) prospecting activities of the APS, for what they were worth, worry Mutasa. This situation did not last long, however, before the relations between the APS and Mutasa were complicated by the arrival of the BaA Co., in Mashonaland in 1890. In that year, the BaACo. first fought and militarily defeated the Mozambique Co~y and then turned to the APS and fought a long legal battle in which it emerged victorions only in 1894. The commercial interests of the Mozambique Companyand those of the BaA Co., were 'so mixed up that sooner or later a collision was inevitable'. 28 If the BSACo., wet'e to exploit the mineral resources of the Shona country to the ful~, it was essen- tial 'that it should gain control of the only outlet to the sea, the pot't of ~eira. then contro~led by Mozambique Company. Also, as long as the Pungwe River route, which Was the main wate;!;' way to and from Beira remained unde:!:'the control ()f the Mozambique Company, there could no prospect ot a ra.pid e"plqita.tion otthe . minel'al .weal th of MasA-onala.nd BSA t.i 11'eroute a:l.tel:!:'1Jia no:rth,wards from Gape 'rownwould havfl entailed .great expense de;I.ay.29 SUChconsidE;!rations compelled the :BSACo., to impose a September, 1890.30 The treaty pro" These developmentagoaded theMozambiqu.eComp •.n.yinto taking steps that were deaigned to put preaSUreon Muta~ to re- pudiate the treaty impOsedo:tl. him by the aSA Co. In a' t,pical 'gun boat diplomacy' the Mozambique Company sent a militaryexpe .. dition to Mutasa'sclturt on 8th November, 1890 under the pretext that Mutasa hl;l.d ceded his entire kingdom tOll, PortuguelO.e prazero, Gouveia. As soon as the BSA Co., heard about this they also sent a party Of armed men to Mutasa'S court. They tOoK the Portugu~se party by surprise, dispersed it and arrested its leaders includ- ing Gouveia, the Baron 'Rezende who was the managing director of the Mozambique Company and Paiva de 4ndrada, the concessionaire. The property of the Mozambique Company was confiacated without compensation.3l This incident marked the end of the Mozambique Company in what later became the BSA Co. section of the Manyika kingdom in 1890. The Hozambique Company administered vast terri- tories of what was called Manica and Sorala south of the Zambezi river. The BSA Company was left to fight its second opponent, the African Portuguese Syndicate. The APS contended that the BSA Co. was treapassingon its concession not only without King Mutaaa'a permission but against his wishes and in spite of his protests; that the BSACo. was acting in a high-handed and oppressive manner towards Mutasa and hia subjects, who desired that the BSA Co. might be ordered to retire from the land. The APS also wanted the BSA Co. and the BritiSh government to recognise the concession treaty they had b.ought from Bennin.gfield in 1889.32 On the other hand, the British government and the BSA Co. arg-ued that the cance.j3sion treaty whiCh the APS sought to esta.blishwas.undated as.waj3thetransrerendorsed upon it from Be,nningfieldtothe APe; thattheeorreSpOfiJ.ience between the AP6 '.andthe British goV"er-ltm.ent.in tlecem'ber1890 did not bear the signatttreofan interpreter. It was aJ,.sopointed out that until the Mutasa petition of 1893. the APS had made no attempt to asign a date to the Concession and that the APe was attempting to remedy the deficiency by a declaration extorted from Mutasa in 1893. ln the absence of any corroborative eVidence, the British government refused to given the lliltt~r arranged privately with a leading eettler to enli!lta burgher force and at the same time issued a warrant tor the arrest of the representative of the APS, 'W.H •. 1'aylor .• Th~magistrate later justi,fi,ed his action on the grounds that it was n.ecessary to beabsolut~ly firm with Chikanga. He had to insiat u:pl>nhis l>rdersbeing obeyed because nQt to have don.ewowo'Qldhave been known to many hundreds of Manyika. Thie \IIQUldhaV'ebeen construed by them as a sign of weakness and fear. In the long rul'l., this\lll>uld haveendag~red th~ lives and property Of the sa~tl commul'l.ityof some one hundred white settlers in the 4istrict. The. magistrate, accompanied by his burgher police men armed with revolvers, proceeded to the royal residence for the p~pose of compellin.g Chikanga to supply the required labour. The party was met at the entrance to the royal reaidence by Fambesa, her husband, who was also Mutasa'.s induna. When he de- manded their business, the magistrate immediately ord~red his arrest •. Falllbesa lIlanaged to struggle away and much alarmed, fled to the royal l'esidence •. ~eanwhile, a considerable number of goatS. and sheep belonging to the local peopl~ had been si~zed by order of the magistrate. As a r~Bult of this action as well as the attempted arrest of' Fambesa. considerable excitement prevailed among the Manyika, and one of the poli<:e men attempting to stop Fambesa after his escl1ipe had his revolver taken from him. Fambesa shortlY after re-appeared ait'med with a. Martin-Henry rifle and ammunition in a bandolier; he refused to allow the polic~ to approach his wife because he .did not want to 'take into my house to, /See my wife a lot' armed menl. demanded. Acoord- ing revolver from one of the police and What immedia- tely happeIied the dence. One thing is certain. Immediately after Fort went for- ward with a revolver in his hand, a volley was fired by. the police and Fambesa fell mortally wounded,dying almost immedia~ly. The BSA Co., with its labour demands and intervention in Manyika politics alienated the rulers and pushed them into the hands 01: the APS. The incident of Fambesa, deplorable in itself, indica- ted in a special degree the evils caused by concession seeking, a system by which the live.s and property of the indigenes were sacrificed to the pecuniary greed 'of monopolist companies. Com- menting on the 'Chikanga Affair', W. G. Cameron, general adminis- trator and high commission, pointed out that:- if Her Majesty's-government is to continue the policy of recognizing rival concession seekers, then we mUst contiriue to look forward to a repe- tition of similar proceedings until-there are no more concessions to be obtained ••••45 The 'Chikanga Affair' was intricately linked with the case of the Taylor brotl1ers.Fambesa openly told the magistrate that the aniy aliens he recognized as having permission to be in l-fanyikawere the Taylor brothers. As a result bf this both bro- thers were arrested in February 1894 on three indictmentst on two of which they were a.cquitted but convicted on the third to the effect that:- both Taylors at divers times ano with various acts and words endeavoured to bring and did bring the government of the territory of J.1ashonalandinto hatred and.contempt and did excite and did raise discontent aIllongHer territory; 'between whereby the endangered ••• 46 sureties for .£100 each and to guarantee' that they would not approach Mutasa1s court or hold any communication with him or his indunas for one year. The net result of this injuction was tbat the agents of t~leAPS were denied aCcess to Mutasa's court, thus practiCally preventing the syndicate from paying its annual tribute to king. 15;3 The arrest of the Taylor brothers was a turning point I'll the syndicate's relations with Mutasa. The magistrate in Umtali advanced four reasons for Mutasa's sudden reversal of policy towards the BSACo., from hostility to cordiality. The arrest of the Taylors, according to him removed the doubt in the minds of the Manyika as to their own powers. They also realized, it was contended, the 'hollowness of the African Portuguese Syndicate's pretensions and recognized the undisputed power of the lISACo~' SecondlY the glamour of presen1;s which the Syndicate had sent in 1893 had by this time been forgotten; Mutasa's 'passion for presents was reviving and he turned to the BSACo. again to see if anything was to be had from thel1l'. This interpretation of Mutasa's action misses the point. It only shows that the magistrate never understood Mutasa through- out his dealings with him. It was not the gifts that made Mutasa side with the APSor the BSACo. It was the need to preserve the territorial intergrity of his kingdom intact which guided his course of action. He turned to the BSACo•• not because he wanted presents but because after the shooting of Fambesa, he knew that the end had come and he might as well make his peace as quickly as possible. He realized that not only was the power of the syndi- cate broken, but its representative, I,tilliam Taylor, had already left the country while Herbert Taylor had resigned his appointment under ~he syndicate and 'Wasshortly about to leave the country too. The attitude of Mutasa when he. met the magistrate at the end aT May 1891+,forms such an integral pa:rt of the hj.story of his relationship to the BSACo., and the APS that it seems pertinent to relate it as it emerges from the acting magistrate's account. With great reluctance and only at the urgent. persuasion (If Taylor, did the king consent to. crass the Odzi ri1l'er in the west to where Fort and others we:re waiting for him. Almost his first words were to the effect he was.a friend of the BSACo., and that they could his kingddm for gold. He then expressed his willing- ness to pay hut-tax followers, enjoined them any complaints huts. The regime, Mutasa was presented with a set of oonditions and state- ments to endorse. Nothing so'far had happened to Change into friendship the sullenoppoaition he e~1bited to the officials of the :SSA Go. in 1893. Mutasa1s f:inal surrender to the BSA Co. had $er10U6 repercussions for the subsequent devel:opment of Manyika politics. It oonstituted a parting of the ways between Mutasaand his son, Chimbadzwa. Chimbadzwa\'s support of the AI'Swas matched by his hatred for the BSA Go. aygettingMutasato SUPPort its oause, the :aSA Go. had put a wedge between father and son. The dissen- sion within the royal family whioh resulted from this episode offered the BSA Co. an excellent opportunity to drive father and son eVen further apart. The BSA Co. did not want Ghimbadzwa to sucoeed his father to the throne 'because when Ghilllbadzwacomes into power he will endeavour to OaUse trouble and misohief and is evidently endeavouring to ooncentrate his views through his father,.47 The BSA Co. made sure Mutasa followed their line. He obviously had no alternative. It is not olear how the BSA Co., aohieved its goal but what i$ olear is that, from then onwards, Mutasa began to groom another son, Chiobvu, for the throne. Chiobvu was a staunoh supporter of the BSA Co.'s pretensions. It is likely that this difference explains more than anything else, Chimbadzwa's and Chiobvu's 1895 disputes over the right to sucoeed their father to the throne.48 As far as Manyika customary law of suooession was concerned, Chimbad?wa was the heir ,apparent. 1t would" seem that Mutasa flurrendered to the BSA Co •• he with Chimbadzwa, as e1.'enteleading to Chimbadzwa's and 'Natal in 1893 indicated. AOQording to the portion' king's subjeots born after Mutasa, had the ch~ldren born before Manyika kingship. In a quarrel that ensued between the two, Chimbadzwa oapt_ured a large number of oattle belonging to Chiobvu. The event oame ,to the notice of the native commissioner who ordered the trial of Chimbadzwa. He was found guilty and ordered to return all the cattle he had forcibly taken from Chiobvu. He was alsQ called upon surrender the fireJarlnSin possession" ill; the number of fifty. He wa.simprisoned and was angry with him that he refused to intercede on behalf of his son in spite of the pleading of' Chimbadzwa's mother. After having served his sentence Chimbadzwa picked yet anqther qUa~rel with his father.: This incident which also invol- ved his ,sisters, Muredzwa, the Manyika spirit medium, ,and Chikanga, co.incided with the outbreak of the 1896-7 Shona war of resistance. The quarrel originated from the fact that Mutasa's chief wife, Chikahanwa, mother to Chimbadzwahad recently died. Chimbadzwaand his two sisters accused one 'of Mutasa's wives, mother to Chiobvu, of having bewitched and caused the death of their mother. They demanded that Mutasa should either banish or execute her. The king refused to do either, with the result that in December, 1896, Chimbadzwaand his two sisters, including 500 people left Manyika for the neighbouring kingdom of Barwe in the north. They only returned a year later. It can thus be seen that the rivalry between the BSACo. and the APS indirectly influenced Mutasa's non-participation in tIle 1896-7 uprising. There is some validity in Terence Ranger's assertion that Mutasa quarrelled with his son, Chimbadzwa. over the issue of participation in the war, but this is not the whole truth,. The issues involved were far more complicated than that: they went deeper and further back into the rivalry of the two ri val mono:po1ist companies.• There was a possibility that Mutase. .might iu~ve joined the other Shona ru1ers had Chi.mbadzi,Ja not lost his influence W'i th the king and. had the Manyika not been divided and feUding e.mongthemselve.s at this crucial time .• From the early days of the 'rivalry betW'een ESP.Co. and to have seen the future more clearly both father and son W'anted their. The rise of the second $u~gest$ that since the heir on policy, the old king him- the second son. The fact the heir a:pparent of the heir a1'1'a- to natural disaster in the forJlloo! raging famine eXacerbated the situation. It was reckoned that a.!ter the famine in 1896 the entire kingdom had less than 200 heado! cattle and that the. number of sheep and goats had been greatlY redUCed, many having been killed or traded .away tor g.rain on account of the famine. Commenting on why Mutase. didnthus be seen that the weakened economic state of his kingdolll,,%pnsequentupon famines, as well as the dissension amonghis.subJect$ resulting from the rivalry between the BSA Co. and the AI'S madeit impossible for Mutasa to raise an army and j.o:t:n'his fel:Low ...menin the war of liberation. This study demons- tl::'ates howimportant it is to approach tl1.e question of collabora- i;ion and non-collaboration in resistance to the imposition of colonial rule from the point of view of the internal politics of the state concerned. It was not in every case that African rulers failed. to participate in wars of l'esistance because they Were, to U.SeIi woirdout. ofourcontelllporary lexicon, stoogeS. F 0 0 T NOT E S lRanger, T. 0., Revolt in Southern Rhode~ia (London, Heine.mann, Paperback edition ,1979) x.... xii 2Beach, D. N., "Chimurenga" The Shona lHping of 1896"97.' Journal of African Histor1 (JAH:),20,; (1979) 395..420 3cobbing,Julian flTheAbrentPriepthood: AMtherLook at the Risingp of 1896,,1897" J!lH:,XVItI,I(1977) 64.. 84 4Tsomondo, Madziwanyika, !'ShonaReaction and Resistance to the European Colonization of Zimbabwe", Journal of Southern African Affairs, II, (1977) 15 6Maji-maji Research Project: Collected Papers. Dar es Saalam, University College, Department of History, (1968) 8. For the so-called Bam'bata rebellion see Marks, Shula,Re1uctant Rebellion: The 1901-1908 Disturbance~ in Natal (Oxford, OUP, 1970) 7Ranger, T. 0., Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 197 8Hole, High MarShall, The Making of Rhode.sia (London, .Frank Oass, 19(7) 171 l\taugham, R • .F., Zambezia: A General Descri of the Zambezi from with its Histor, ic .London, John. Murray, 19 159 12A.ndrada,IIReJ:a.tioriol• ~aS~illl;'<'l\rchivo Historico Ultralllarino .. A.llU - Lisbon) 1 Reparticao, pasta 2: Instructions for the new governor of Manicaop.cit.; IICon6u1 O'neill to Marquis of Salisb\U'1.Koza!llbiqlle $O•. vi;i.i 1888n in Confidential Print 5904•. A.fricaSOl,lthN'o •••2: Correspondence Respecting the. AQtion of rro'la~gal in. Kashonaland and in the Districts of the Shire in ;take N:fl;ltl. (1890) 76,..Q 13"Petrie to the Marquis of Salisbury, 1. viii 1889" .in Confidential Print 5904 Africa South, NO.2. opocit. 14National Archives of Rhodesia (NAR) CT/1/5 Mozambique Company's Affairs: A.R. Colguhoum to Secretary BSACompany 30 xii 1890 '15Ibid• --- .. .... ),6. MAR1)1£8/5/3 Mministrato!'. BS,! Co•• to Denis Doyle, 17 xi 1890. Encloeu!'e .2 17Ibid •. 18 .. The ,-.aniea Mining Journe.L (May 1900) 14J 19Ibid• 20Ibid• LY 21Ibia• f!+J 22NAR D'1:8/5/; !\d,mini$trator13SA Co., Mashonaland, to Denis Doyle, 1890 encl. i; Portuguese Co., Kimberley. i. 1891; Secretary, 27 ... NAR CT1/2/3 G. Seymour Fort, The Afriean Portuguese Syndicate's 'Claim in Manica: Memorandum to High Commissioner, ,0.'\1i,1894 28NAR CT/l/12/1 G. F.Thomas to Rhodes. 22.vh1891 29Ibid• 30NAR C'1'1/12/8Colguhoun to cecil John Rhod.es 19.LX.1890; NAR C'1'1/12/1Hugh Marshall ROle, Actingsecret$.ry, 'J3SACO., to Secretary, C,ape Town ..23.VlI .1892; NAR p'l'8/5/'Administrator toP. DoYle, l?XI.l890. Xn addi .. tion to the specified. items, Mutasa received rifles, ;powder caps, white calico, coloured. .ca.licoand what wl;lscalled uEuropean clothing" (c.oat.s,trousers, hats,shirts) a.nd ruglil ,1NAR cT1!fl/1/7-B currie, Foreign Office, ere) to:BSA Co., -yendon, 20.Vt.1891 NAR CT1/l1/1/? ..8 J. R. Sanderson, Fa to BSA co., London '"W.viH.1891 32NAR CT1/2/3 The Petition of Mutasa, King of Manica, South East Africa to the Rt. Honourable Secretary of State for Colonies 3.i.1894; . NAR CT1/2/;Graham Vigne, Mallet (solicitors for APS) to R.E. -sir Loch, Cape Town. 3.xi.1894 33NA.R CT1/~(' Fa, Edward Fa.irfield to African Portuguese Syndicate -a8'. iii .1894 ,: ;4'NAllCT1/2/1G. F., TholllllstoOedl J. RhodlilS,ManagingD:tvectolt of the :BSA Co. 24.'\1i.1891 , 35:aenne1"haSlSei;t. Rose and Sheeman, Luoy.,Ad'Ven'P'U~e$. in.Ml!ts~ona;tAAd (New. York. Macmillan, 1893) 180 Cl;l,ldeQot1; to Administratol:' 9.5I;ii.189:; Pl:'O',testofthe. agent. of .th.eAf1"ican.1?ortuguese lIet'pel'tJ.'J?aylol:' , to Civil Commis.siOnel',:aSA Co., .Acting Magistrate, Mining Commisaioner to to Resident 1/l?/8 Colquhoun to Rhodes, 19.xi.1890 1/2/; G. Seymour Fort to Captain Scott Turner 23.viii.1894 CT 1/2/"$ G.Seymour F01"t to High Commissioner, Cape Town .;O.'ITi.1894 39G• SeYlllO!lrFort, llr~emorandumll,0;l'.cit. 161 4()!bid. 411bid. 4ZC'f 1/Z/3 The Fetiti()nof Mutasa, King of Manica, South East Af1'iclil, to tb;e Rt. Ronourab1e Secretary of State for Colonies ,.i.1894 ' 43CT1I2/3 Fort. ,flMelllo):'andunr'.op.cit. aT 1/Z/30lilldeoott t~ Fort 14.i.1894 , Alsl;>,see Evi~enceo,f JilllTholllas, The Fingo interpreter who delivel'ed the message in hie evidence at the trial of the Taylors on 28 February, 1894. OT l/2/3 Fort to A. H. Duncan IX.1894 CT 1/2/2 lierbertTaY1l;>r t~ Civil Commissioner 9.i.1894. For a detailed accoun.tof the "Affair" see CT 1/2/3 Fort to Duncan 9.i.18c91j. <.5 tf.) 1j.4, ' G. S. Fort's "memorandum" 45public Record'Office; Confidential Print 879/42 'Cameron to Marquis of Ripon. 9.xxii1894 46 Fort' 5 "Memorandum"op.ci t. 47NUA 1/1/1 Native Commissioner (Ne) to chief Native Commissioner (CMC>, Salisbury. J. 11i. 1901 48 NUll. .Z/1/1 NC to ONC 21.xii 1896 N 1/1/11 NO to CNe 19.ix.1897 Historical Manuscripts Colleotion (Rist. MSS Collect.) MA 14/1/1. J. Machiwenyika "The History and Customs of the Manyika people" :Lesson 108 50~IUA1/1/1 NO Umtal;i to CNe SaUsbury 1.iii.1901