The Migratory Labour System and the Social Conditions of BLS Migrant Workers on the South African Mines Main Aspects of Issues Involved with Special Reference to Unionisation Prospects By Dominic Milazi INTRODUCTION This paper seeks to traverse the much trodden area of migrant mine workers from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In doing so, it focusses on what has specifically been termed "the mass of hitherto peasant populations" now turned "a depressed 'temporary' proletariat class of the capitalist SOcial System". It will be shown that for some, mining employment is seen as superseding farm income and farm activities as supplementing it. Put another way, subsistence agriculture alone no longer provides enough for "migrant" families and, whatever farm household income there is, does not suffice for adequate family maintenance so that off-farm income sOurces are taken to be a necessity. This, by the way, is partly because of the deliberate policies over the century, to allow the flow of movable factors of production, chiefly migrant labour, from their home base. Such dependence as exists on the periphery of South Africa especially of migrant mine workers on the booming gold mines has, of course, historical roots in that the countries affected were in the main, British Colonies intended eventually to become appendages of South Africa. No reasonable improve- ments were made, either in terms of infrastructure or economic development. They were merely sources of cheap labour from which economic surplus was extracted. TOday, the scars of that historical link are still in evidence. The migratory labour system is very much a lively phenOmenon and indeed a fundament that, over the years, has significantly contributed to industrial advance and economic prosperity of South Africa. The theme under consideration lays no claim to a comprehensive coverage but will limit itself to the following: 37 - the migration cycle that renders migrant workers both part of and separate from the home and host country labour force: on the one hand, they constitute workers in the most in- secure jobs (their employment is regarded as temporary), they suffer discrimination in wages, training and promo- tion, and are a non-free labour force most defenceless and un-unionised. On the other hand, they face a bleak economic future with few, if any, alternative work opport- unities for self-realisation or effective development; - we shall also examine how the Chamber of Mines takes advantage of the situation to regulate migrant labour on behalf of the collective interests of its affiliate members in the mining industry; and - the options available to supplier states within the migrant system in terms of extracting major economic benefits from a negotiated "commercialised" migration policy. A trench- ant, but brief, comment on a "retention" labour policy of qualified manpower will be made; - last but not least, we shall deal with the case for unionisation of foreign mine workers if they are to dis- engage from perpetual economic subordination as labour units that can be imported or exported at will without collective bargaining machinery. 38 The Chamber of Mines Amongst its multifarious interests, the Chamber of Mines regulates the supply of labour and employment policy for its affiliate members in the various subsectors of mining in- dustry. These include gold, diamond, platinum, asbestos, copper and other metal industries. Its actual recruitment and supply of labour to individual mines both from South Africa and supplier states is managed by parallel organisa- tions - the Mine Labour Organisations (MLO), the Witwaters- rand Native Labour Association (WENELA), and the Native Recruitment Corporation (NRC). These are individual corpora- tions, most of whom are also members of the Chamber of Mines. There is, however, no clear analysis available in respect of breakdown of foreign/labour ratios or interlocking directo- rates and cross-holdings of investments. Suffice it to say that the Chamber of Mines is a key element in the foreign labour network which, in addition, provides its own budget for administration, gold marketing, public relations, train- ing and research running in excess of P17 million annually.1 Various other activities are connected with the Chamber of Mine's employment policy particularly the recruitment com- ponent. It has, for example, its own "skilling" programme for training team leaders, technicians, artisan aides, etc. Within the confines of the host country laws,2 there is re- division of labour through re-classification and fragmenta- tion of artisanal work - in order to circumvent industrial colour bar. This focus on the importance of the skill com- ponent of the labour supply is intended, inter alia, to pave the way eventually for a successfull introduction of new tech- nology and, in turn, to encourage workforce stability.3 At the more general level of procurement of "cheap" i.e. un- skilled labour, the Chamber of Mines mobilises its research programme to: - assess maximum work levels per shift and motivation for maximal physical work; - use weight categorisation for placing recruits under e.g. Category A: comprising almost all workers with sufficient "working capacity for moderate rates of work". i.e. those with 130 lb. minimum weight. Category B: of men less than 130 lb. minimum weight but with adequate physical working capacities for moderate work. 39 - check (a) m~n~mum oxygen intake rating in order to deter- mine the underground labourer's capacity for physical work (shovelling, tramming, timber transporting, etc.); (b) weight/work/endurance capacity differences of urban and rural recruits, and individual worker or gang productivity. The parallel "sister" organisation, Mine Labour Organisation, takes responsibility for the transport of contractees, their subsistence en route and arrangements for return to the point of recruitment upon completion of contract only after, of course, ensuring that contracters comply with all labour laws of supplier areas. In the lines that follow we shall specifically focus on the mine recruitment "phases" and conditions required in each phase, the explicit or implicit basis of pre-selection, con- ditions of life on the mines and briefly other basic interests and policy orientations of Chamber of Mines as the representa- tive of the collective interests of its affiliate members. The volume of labour migration and the intensity of recruit- ment in the Southern African region varies according to the country affected and the degree of economic development or viability, but much also depends on the Mine Labour Organisa- tion which extensively "projects" propaganda at its "supply source" in order to make easier, and cheapen securement costs of, the "flow" of labour to its depots. Taking 1970 as the base line, recruitment among the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland countries shows increases or decline as evidenced by statistics on the periodic absence of able- bodied men in various surveys. According to Breytenbach, the average number of employees from these countries working on the mines was 166, 264 in 1970. A year later another survey estimated that some 45,000 Batswana or apprOximately 16 per cent of Batswana's workforce (aged 15-65) were temporarily employed in South Africa.4 The exact number of migrants is difficult to determine for Lesotho but 210,000 in the mid- 1970s may come nearest to the truth,S About 70,000, includ- ing 25,000 women are estimated to be in South Africa on a non-circulating basis.6 Swaziland exports a smaller number of its labour force estimated at 17,000 in 1977.7 In that country, the modal age-group is 20-29 accounting for nearly 40% of the absentees,8 If comparisons are anything to go by, then it would appear (from the foregoing figures) that Lesotho has a very strong migration dependence. The variations in labour dependency have been differently interpreted. Others, such as Bohning,9 note that whereas migrants 'originating in rural Botswana and rural Swaziland seem to perceive of their homesteads as their economic base, and of migration as a 40 supplementary source of income, rural Basotho seem to perceive of their home areas as complementary, if not supplementary, to mining employment. Bohning also argues that Botswana and Swaziland seem to face the least control problems due to the interaction of a less crushing level of poverty, low degree of migration dependence ~8d the population's emotional ties with their home countries. I Much of this generalisation, in our opinion, requires deeper research. Still others (mainly anthropological researchers) speak of the sustained pressure exerted during the colonial rule to cultivate an asillation of men between two modes of produc- tion as part peasants and temporary proletariat such that the absence of male workers (which the World Bank once called the 'bleeding' of able-bodied men from the land) ensured, in most instances, stagnation of rural production. Except, perhaps, for Swaziland which has a relatively high level of formal sector wage employment, conditions or pro- spects of employment in other BLS countries do not significantly match. For the average Swazi, land is relati- vely available for viable subsistence farming and for adequate means of livelihood even though the existing land tenure system (and not erosion of land or aridity of it as in the case of Lesotho and Botswana respectively) constitutes one of the serious problems to viable agriculture. Because of these differential capacities to absorb labour among supplier states, the Chamber of Mines has been able over a century to successfully, recreate a depot system spreading throughout Southern Africa to recruit "surplus" man- power but also to provide the organisation with basic informa- tion and intelligence on local conditions and prospective labour surpluses.11 As already stated, the Mine Labour Organisation ensures that contractees comply with all labour laws in supplier areas. But there are a number of other in~ dicators which enable an informed assessment of the system's performance: - certain age groups are for the most part specifically ex- cluded from recruitment e.g. those over 40 years who are considered "too old", the infirm, the feeble-looking, those with records of communicable diseases, or the under-weight or "too small" in size;12 - other recruitment requirements include transfers to central depot in South Africa (Johannesburg centre) for a second medical examination (X-rays and fingerprinting etc.). The first exercise of this kind is carried out at the local depots. Rejectees are either repatriated - in severe cases - or given surface work at lower rates of pay; 41 - the mode of travelling is variegated. Some workers travel by rail on tickets bought by Mine Labour Organisations (e.g. Basotho); others travel by air (e.g. recruits from Maseru to Welkom). Mine Labour Organisation operates an air net- work - WENENA Air Services, but in other circumstances use is made of national airline facilities including special terminal facilities at Jan Smuts. Obviously the advantage in the utilisation of air services lies in the savings in time; - as indicated, Mine Labour Organisations depots preselect on an explicit or explicit height/weight basis (said to have some logical validity). "Costs per recruit" vary greatly up to R40 from local depots to far-flung states;13 - during contract health is regularly monitored; - in addition records of recruitment, expenditures, repatria- tions, etc., but also deferred pay, are kept. Of course recruitment expenditure and the Chamber of Mines health policy in general must be viewed in strategic cost/ benefit terms since they are firmly based on profit con- siderations.14 This is also evident from the fact that there is no obligation of social responsibility shown to either the black miner or his family in terms of short or long-term social security. Beyond the initial recruitment processes there are the in- ductions into the mining world itself with peculiar patterns of social control, or institutionalisation and a curious assortment of tribal and paternalistic authority structures: entry into the mine world requires communication skills - the learning of a linqua franca (fanakalo) and normative guide- lines - safety instructions or "rules of the mines". Perhaps the most detested device of social control, which as one observer has put it, inculcates "docility and submissiveness", is the SO-called "acclimatisation" process. TO be "acclima- tised" takes four hours at a time throughout a working day in a heated room known as "The House of Satan". The process, usually of 4 to 5 days duration, consists of "trotting up and down a step about one foot above floor level, the height being adjusted to one's weight.15 Stopping leads to penalty of re- starting." For a long time, the Chamber of Mines has been engaged in acclimatisation of workers to the mines .the objective being to achieve "O~timisation in the division of labour and job- allocation".1 There are, however, indications that this trend may diminish with "stabilisation" POlicies where the 42 trend is towards a lower proportion of, at least, foreign workers that are recruitable only on the basis of valid re- engagement certificates. Patterns of authority and of social control are closely linked to the character of the compound system and the condi- tions of life in the compounds. The system defines very much and dominates every aspect of mine life - after work.17 - entrances and exits are normally 'guarded' such that during disturbances every personal movement may be circumscribed; - except for some mines, accommodation remains founded on the basis of ethnical and tribal division. It is thus a source of intra-worker factionalism; - "boss boy" or induna system still operates to mediate worker/ management relations - and in some groups probably in- effective "works committees" function; "rapport" between workers and supervisors remains largely cemented to "traditional" steriotypes of submissiveness found in the "boss/boy" syndrome; food is reportedly "mass produced" in an unattractive form and in an uncongenial setting. Clearly the Chamber of Mine's strategy and basic interests are complex - involving social, economic as well as political factors. We can observe a policy of extensive manpower re- cruitment over vast catchment areas coupled with a "skilling" programme - an advantage which for supplier countries may be a disguised disadvantage if the necessary social structural or occupational reforms are delayed too long. Social li- abilities are entirely excluded, yet migrant families are expected to produce and reproduce labour. This and the facts of institutionalisation (mass accommodation, mass feeding, etc. often under reportedly indecent condition), confirm the view that the migrant labour system is based on profit rather than human considerations. Remittance and Investment Prospects Whilst there are certainly pecuniary gains connected with the migrant system e.g. cash earnings 'away' that are being remitted, there is, however, evidence which seems to indicate that migration has not augmented capital formation in the countries of emigration. We refer to the following "non- pecuniary costs" which are likely to be substantial. 18 43 1. - Q'()()ds produced in the recelVlng country that are deemed ~uperior to substitute local products and their con- sumption bringing social status. 2. - the "demonstration effect" whi:::happears to be a direct result of exposure to the host country through emigra- tion. 3. both 1 and 2 raise consumption levels beyond the pro- duction capacity of the supplier economies. These, then, are some of the externally-generated patterns of consumption and expenditure. Yet one of the main concerns of supplier governments is (or ought to be) the integration of financial remittances and deferred pay into national economic planning and their invest- ment on behalf of returning migrants. Taking again 1970 as the base line, Breytenbach claims that in that year the value of remittances and deferred pay of mine workers was: Botswana Rl~1 million, Lesotho P4.4 million and Swaziland PO.6 million. A higher estimate for Lesotho in 1972/3 in terms of the total financial returns from migrant workers was R16 million.20 Comparable data for Botswana and Swaziland is not available. One survey on Swaziland, however, estimates that almost three-quarters of the country's mine workers send home more than E15 per month, about half remitted more than-E25 per month.21 Despite these financial returns, there is hardly any supplier state with investment policy regarding deferred pay by other remittances. Neither is the needed practice of accounts and accountability linked with the national economic planning or investment on behalf of migrants. Comparative figures on deferred pay on the other hand are quite substantial. Thus 99% of Batswana participate in the vOI~ntary deferred pay scheme which deducts 60% of their pay; 2 in the case of the Swazi miners it is 95% who regularly participate in a similar scheme. 23 For Lesotho, the new mandatory system as against the previous voluntary one, used by 90% of the Basotho, requires the mining houses to transfer 60% of the cash earn- ings during the middle four months of each six-months con- tract concluded in the country. Except in Mozambique, where there appears to be a greater pro- clivity to improve agricultural holdings or to invest capital in artisan trades,24 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland countries, by comparison, still have to show similar proclivity to channel such capital-in flows into migrant schemes. To date 44 workers appear to "invest" a greater proportion of earnings available in cattle, food, ~lothing, households goods, school fees and even luxury goods. 5 Interestingly enough, the colonial authorities in the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland countries collaborating with the host country could claim, originally when money was deferred and deposited with banking bodies in South Africa, that they were donating to welfare services in the supplier countries: If so, then there is even more reason for supplier countries themselves to channel these remittances into development plans. Possible Strategies/Option for Supplier States What strategies, so far, have been advocated on the question of foreign labour migration? In this section, we shall focus briefly on the following suggested options: la) the "lock-in" approach by Wahl, (b) a commercial strategy by Stahl, and Ic) the retention and re-integration of qualified men as part of a possible future policy by Claus et. al. The "lock-in" approach upheld by ward26 proceeds from the viewpoint that what is abundantly clear is that the migra- tion of labour, in this case Basotho workers, constitutes the most fundamental factor in the survival of the economy. He then continues: "Lesotho should train its labour in a much wider variety of technical and vocational skills and sell their services direct to fnreign industrialists operating in their own countries".27 A formulation such as this, for planners in the economy of Lesotho, whereby the state "locks in" its future to the South African labour market is essentially a strategy which underpins recent recommendations for Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho made by Stahl. The latter has advocated a "commer- cial policy of labour export" under which the "governments of BLS (countries) should approach the South African government and negotiate an arrangement whereby BLS could take up employ- ment in the secondary and tertiary sectors".28 Both advocates admit that there are advant~ges accruing to such controversial and perhaps unconventional policies - which they add - may be politically unacceptable. But, they argue further, labour migration at present just "happens" and it is more influenced by the South African government labour con- trol and regulations and the mines' recruiting policies than by the supplier government policy. 45 Evidently, the suggested options for Lesotho, take into account the fact that the country has limited natural poten- tial and circumscribed economy that relies for the majority of its people - squarely on crops and livestock vulnerable to weather conditions. An economic system of this nature is still very inadequate in terms of capital formation because farmers, the major producers, are more concerned with immediate needs than with future productivity. As a result several studies29 have called for rapid improvements along with the structural transformation of the country's economy at multiple sectoral levels, perhaps "prioritised", e.g. reform of the agricultural system, reducing overgrazing and erosion, aiming at a fair degree of self-sufficiency at least in staple foods as a pre-condition for the development of a country whose main natural resource is the soil, providing greater incentive values in the agricultural system and import replacement policy of industrialisation as well as forming a nucleas of competitive industries and increasing the effort to 'domesticate' migratory labour through ~olicy-based labour- intensive development schemes. Thus wh1lst the 'lock-in' or 'commercial approach to migrant labour questions may have its short-run advantages (political implications northwithstanding) in the long-term the solution of the problem largely depends on mapping up a clearly defined socio-economic development path. Overall, therefore, Stahl and Ward argue for the optimisation of conditions of employment in terms ranging from those of attestation of fees, deferred pay, wages, bonuses and compensation benefits i.e. mainly strategic financial considerations to transport 'bottlenecks' such as overcrowded trains and buses, inadequate working and living (compound) conditions including the mutable variations in mine training and treatment, occupational statuses and promo- tional prospects and not least the lack of collective bargain- ing machinery in the presence of apparent vulnerability emanating from the insecurity of contracts or their possible abuse. These are but a few of the irregularities in the employment practices related to mine workers in the migratory system. It is thus a negotiating strategy, one that becomes even more powerful when alternatives to migratory labour including more labour-intensive growth strategies and structural transformation of the source country economies are rapidly improved. It follows that in the absence of the latter, any action designed to affect the number of migrant workers must be very seriously weighed. Equally important are the assessments or taking into account of the differential fortunes related to individual countries, including the ex- istence of intra-regional disparities in levels of economic development, opportunity and resource base. These are sig- 46 nificant issues partly because they are part and parcel of the 'pros and cons' facing supplier states both when related to individual countries and at a jOint inter-state level. Theoretically then, such measures as outlined above, seek to mitigate "unintended" consequences of the labour migration system and to optimise benefits. This is only a short-term if not one-sided option. By itself it will, when carried to fruition, undoubtedly bring into the open the dependence, public or social (as over against the "private" gains) of the individual mine worker, associated with migration. In general, as labour oscillates, it is an advantage to supplier states, at least to the limited extent of ameliarating un- employment (a safety-valve) and of providing remittances for subsidising the rural households of contracted migrants. As such it has economic and even pOlitical connotations - and it is no doubt the fruits of a two-fold contradictory pursuit or financial benefits which by implication cultivate greater dependency on the host economy. On the other hand, it can become - under radically altered circumstances - an instance of genuine interdependence, of both host and supplier states through jOint negotiation. The implications of such a situation are contingent upon in- stitutional links and mechanisms (machinery, if you like), of collaboration to be established - if only to limit or accommodate conflictual/competitiv~ interests. Different, perhaps, in character, the negotiating states nevertheless face common and continuing problems of maintair:in<1 nilt ionil1 independence from a 'dangerous' dependence. ~;e shall briefly mention some of these from the view point of the receiving country: - it is common knowledge tLilt th. mines have embarked on a mechanisation programme, i.e., replacing manpower with machinery, which means that instead of being labour- intensive, work will be capital-intensive and there will therefore be little or no need for a lot of labour fro:"". outside South Africa. At the same time mine owners are delibera- tely letting more black miners become skilled and increas- ingly employing domestic labour from the "homelands" - in the hope of steming the unlimited dependence on foreign labour; South Afirca, like any other country, is faced with a problem of unemployment. It might decide to employ more of its locals rather than foreigners to reduce the rate of unemployment. If the rates of unemployment are such that they reach alarming proportions, South Africa,_in the in- terest of her own internal security, may phase out foreign labour migration, 47 - another issue is that there is after all a decrease and decline in the volume of gold - it being a non-renewable commodity, so that eventually some mines will be closed down rendering less pressing the need for labour from the present 9perational mines. The tendency in South Africa to substitute labour-intensive with capital-intensive production processes while it may be linked to state subsidisation and tax abatements for capital investment, to the nature of foreign investments, and to the notion that advancement means using the latest capital- intensive technology, it is also - in a strategic way ~ connected to the development of black wages; this is a factor that seems to pave the way for capital-intensifying production technologies in white areas - thereby reducing the employment opportunities for black workers in these areas. That the long-term costs involved in 'considerable wages' paid to African mine labour may become too heavy to be out-weighed by the short-term benefits accruing from such labour is quite evident from Harry Oppenheimer's presidential address to AnglO-American Corporation. He had this to say to the mining house that remains supreme in terms of relative dis~ tribution of African labour: ~There comes a stage in the development of any country at which the trend towards a more capital intensive economy is necessary and irreversible and the possi- bilities of sustaining economic growth on a low-wage labour intensive basis becomes exhausted. South Africa is certainly in that stage".30 The point is made here that, whilst it is important, very much so, that supplier states work, plan, and act jointly and in concert if they are to achieve the desired objectives, the process of maximisation of benefits accruing to labour is, in the final analysis, not exhaustive. The imperative towards forced withdrawal on the part of the receiving country is clearly in vogue. And the system of contract/foreign labour is gradually on the wane. 'Unforeseen circumstances' may even shake the fundaments of supplier states: government, the larger society but espe~ally returning migrants and their dependents. There will be grave consequences and defensive adjustments to make. It follows then that any moves designed to affect the number of migrant mine workers must be very seriously viewed. Unlike in some western indus- trialised countries where government policy has been directed towards the integration of foreigners already working in the country - and their families or at least tolerance of the idea of foreign workers prolonging their stay even when un- employed, this is by no means the case in South Africa. 48 The long-term destiny of foreign labour migration is thus a big economic and political question mark - a perspective which should render imperative fundamental labour migration policies, but more importantly, viable alternative outlets for genuine manpower utilisation-cum-development. Claus et. al. studies the point in this direction. The deeper underlying thrust of their investigation in terms of research findings and the policy implications thereof shows evidently that basically the fulcrum of the whole exercise should be the mobilisation of labour. We shall look at some of the issues raised, issues that are sectoral rather than global in perspective and which also, in my view, need looking into by means of further research. In a study titled "Migration of Qualified Technical Manpower from Lesotho to the Republic of south Africa" the team out- lines some of the possibilities of retention and re-integra- tion of qualified men as part of a possible future policy - although they are aware that Lesotho is bound to continue to export unqualified men, at least in the short-run. Some of the measures put forward step into a minefield of economic, political and even ideological controversy. They are bound to be disputed by others - particularly the proponents of the withdrawal strategy. With that warning, let us nonetheless proceed to an outline of the recommendations which are by no means exhaustive: - the Lesotho government should do all it can to make the rniora- tion of unqualified manpower to the RSA continue as smoothly as possible for at least the foreseeable future; - this does not exclude the possibility that the government may need to prepare itself for a massive return of qualified manpower in case of emergency - political changes - and of changes in manpower needs in the RSA; - qualified workers should be persuaded to come back or at least be retained in Lesotho. To implement such a policy, the team further recommends the following measures as necessary: - co-ordination and planning of research in the fields of man- power, wages, and migration; - greater activity of the labour department and the labour offices in job placement. This would inform possible jOb- seekers on the state of industrial development, jobs and wages in Lesotho as well as give workers confidence in these institutions with the possible effect of retaining or re-integrating potential migrants; 49 - further development of trade tests, of labour legislation and adjustment of wages. Entrepreneurs and managers should not only be represented in the trade test committees but also be involved in the corresponding tests "and so be con- vinced of the quality of a worker with a trade test"; - wage increases in the RSA will have to be followed by Lesotho in order not to widen the wage gap. SOme government companies could overcome their acute shortage of skilled workers if they could fix their wages independently from the government pay scale; - adjustment of professional training to conditions on the labour market particularly the initiation of efforts by both the technical training institutes and the labour departments to inform companies regularly about their final year students and the trade descriptions which are prepared by the insti- tutes along with such professional training, in-service and on-the-job training and evening courses should be encouraged in order to upgrade semi-skilled and skilled WOrkers. A few COmments are in order. Claus et. al.'s approach clearly stands apart from the "lock-in" or "commercial" strategies by Ward and Stahl respectively. At the level of qualified man- power, the emphasis is on retention, re-integration and con- trol along with providing attractive employment opportunities, job incentives as well as monitoring the allocative process. It is implied here that the supplier states can achieve greater independence and "higher" forms of national self- reliance in the furtherance of domestic development since they have access to the much needed labour for development plans. At the "lower" levels of manpower utilisation, this approach recognises the fact that if conditions or prospects of employ- ment have not improved at home, migration has some advanta- ges, notably: 1. absorption of unemployment. 2. living off the resources of another country instead of one's own and 3. acquisition of certain skills. In terms of 3 the balance of "positive" effects of work ex- perience derived in South African mines tends generally to be in regard to work discipline, industriousness, teamwork, etc. Beyond this, some mines ~ provide, on a limited scale, training courses in various fields, including literacy and apprenticeship in several artisan trades - though thes~ are 50 .L'I:;;;~"".L..L"", ....'I:;;;U .....1. ... .L"-' ......~ ....l ........1. ..... -.;;.1. ... .L"-'.L'""~ ..,~-.;;;;.l.l .... "-'.L ....._ .....v ........... 1J:t ~ .......... '-£.l~ and Works Act and the powerful White. Mine Workers Union res- pectively. Even here it would seem, as indicators are, that 'labour units' are now becoming people. The very fact that government failed to support white mine workers in their strike for colour bar - a few years ago - is in itself a revolution in labour policy. Suffice it to say, however, that vocational training, whether in the country of or~gin or the country of immigration, is an essential element of any migra- tion policy. Indeed an appropriate policy must take account of all links in the migratory chain, includi~~ departure, the stay abroad, and return to the home country. Prospects for Unionisation of. Migrant Mine Workers In "Another Blanket,,32 several researchers expressed a feel- ing of the migrant mine miners that "when (they) lodge their complaint they are expelled". Upward communication through works or Liaison committees is severely hampered. These committees cannot discuss wages, because that is a matter decided by the Chamber of Mines. This cuts out probably 80% of the worker's interest. The committees cannot enforce their requests because they h~ve no right to strike. The committee system, therefore, appears to remain in the realm of "toy telephones".33 In the circumstances, to ameliorate the working conditipns, especially in the absence of meaningful change, unionisation, if encouraged, might prove a more profitable gain for migrant workers than promoting only a policy to secure revenues and by implication labour markets for the mines. We can further explain the case for unionisation of foreign mine workers on the basis of the following: the need for advocates on behalf of victims of mine health hazards or work injury. The precarious situation of the miner and his family or dependents should'be more than responsibility of mining houses and the host country in which they are' located rather than the burdensome problem of the labour supplying countries; - there is the equally important need for pension funds, to redress labour costs since the migration system lies at the heart of the underdevelopment of the mine workers involved: especially in view of the fact that the socio-economic cost of upbringing, education, health and general social welfare is assumed by workers or their home countries and the fruits of their labour go to mining industries. The country re- presentatives from which the mine workers originate have a civic responsibility in this regard; 51 - that responsibility extends to current "controversial" issues such as the so-called "minimum average" wage en- trenched through the monopolistic centralisation of labour recruitment by the Chamber of Mines. This eliminates com- petition for black workers and the effects that would result of pushing wages up. Progressive mining houses e.g. Anglo-American (AA) and the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment compan~ (JCI) have often broken away from the "minimum average" 4 and in the case of AA, have declared their "intrinsic in-hostility" to the unionisation of their mineworkers.35 Trade unions in supplier states should take opportunity of this to jointly negotiate terms of co- operation. In a foreword to "Another Blanket" D.A. Etheredge, chairman of the Gold and Uranium Division of the Anglo-American Cor- poration whilst telling us the AA is "as anxious as anyone to find out what black employees are thinking and what their grievances and aspirations are",36 went further to point out some of the "changes AAC has in hand" which will ameliorate the grievances in Lesotho: 1. a new hostel in Maseru "which will make a big difference" at the point of recruitment. 2. plans to fly recruits between Maseru and Welkom - a measure that will render the position "much better than at present". 3. provision of better accommodation for wives at the mines. 4. hostel designs with greater privacy for individual miners. Ameliorating the working conditions of mine workers seems, therefore, feasible for Lesotho and by implication can be negotiated by other BLS supplier countries. Other recommendations such as those contained in "Another Blanket" - a joint product of some mining houses and Lesotho institutions - are levelled at government, mines, and labour unions respectively. As yet they have not been fully ex- plored. We summarise some of these as pertinent. - Indunas should be genuine leaders - elected and maintained by the workers who would have to be taxed for this purpose; - extending visiting time and easing formalities; - Lesotho government be expected to set up labour representa- tives in the main migrancy centres of South Africa. 52 - Lesotho Federation of Labour (LFL) should be assisted to investigate immediately provident fund, compensation, and insurance for migrant mine workers and demands made to the mining companies to implement immediate and adequate arrange- ments in this respect. One important critisism likely to be levelled against such a case for unionisation is that the perspectives have a "con- sumptionist" orientation, that prospective unions would strongly be oriented towards bread and butter issues. Con- sequently they would seek to exte~d their benefits under the existing political and social system rather than effect basic changes in the system itself. And yet given the "real- politik", these recommendations can do no more than scrape the surface of the problem. Many would not: cut much ice with the tough managers of mining houses let alone those in the government. However, governmental intervention and trade union collaboration &long with representatives of the CM who see eye to eye on these other related issues can have a common commitment. Indeed, with the reform/negotiation strategy, hitherto the relative cheapness and docility of labour is no longer to be taken lightly. It is, in the long- term, a costly social and political liability for both host and supplier countries in the regions'stability - more so now that the argument about social security measures affecting the profitability of the mines "because of the fixed price of gold" no longer holds. 53 FOOTNOTES 1. D.G. Clarke: The South African Chamber of Mines - Policy and Strategy with Reference to Foreign African Labour Supply, DSRG Working Paper NO.2, Pietermaritzburg, April 1977, p. 1. 2. Ibid., p. 35. 3. Ibid. 4. W.J. Breytenbach: Migratory Labour Arrangements in Southern Africa, Africa Institute, Pretoria 1972 and C.W. Stahl: Labour Export in Southern Africa - Some Welfare and policy Implications with Regard to a Joint Policy on Recruitment Fees, WEPR Working Paper, ILO: Geneva, July 1977, p. 2. 5. W.R. Bohning: Black Migration to South Africa - What Are The Issues? WEPR Working Paper, ILO: Geneva, June 1977, pp. 4-9. 6. Ibid., p. 43. 7. W.R. BOhning, Ibid., p. 23. 8. Fion de Vletter: Migrant Labour in Swaziland - Characte- ristics, Attitudes and POlicy Implications, WEPR Working Paper, ILO: Geneva, February 1978, p. 15. 9. W.R. Bohning, op. cit. , p. 44 and 46. 10. W.R. Bohning, Ibid. , p. 44. 11. D.G. Clarke, op. cit. , p. 5. 12. D.G. Clarke, Ibid. , p. 5. 13. D.G. Clarke, Ibid. , p. 7. 14. D.G. Clarke, Ibid. , p. 11. 15. D.G. Clarke, Ibid. , p. 12. 16. D.G. Clarke, Ibid. , p. 13. 17. D.G. Clarke, Ibid. , p. 21. 18. C.W. Stahl: Labour Export in Southern Africa - Some Welfare and Policy Implications with Regard to a Joint Policy on Recruitment Fees, WEPR Working Paper, ILO: Geneva, July 1977. 54 19. W.J. Breytenbach, op. cit., pp. 45 and 57. 20. M. McDowall: Basotho Labour in South African Mines - An Empirical Study, October 1973 (memeo). 21. Fion de Vletter, op. cit., p. 43. 22. W.R. Bohning, op. cit., p. 30. 23. W.R. BOhning, Ibid., p. 37. 24. Fion de Vletter, op. cit., p. 55. 25. See, for example, consumption patterns by migrants, in: Beth D. Rosen - Prinz and Frederick A. Prinz: Migrant Labour and Rural Homesteads - An Investigation into the Sociological Dimensions of the Migrant Labour System in Swaziland, WEPR Working Paper, ILO: Geneva, September 1978, p. 44. 26. Michael Ward: Lesotho - Hard Labour for Life? UBLS, 1974 (mimeo). 27. Ibid., p. 11. 28. C.W. Stahl: A COmmercial Strategy in the Labour Export Market with Reference to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana Notes and Records, 7, 1975. 29. See, for example, the following interesting studies: Alan Rake: World Bank - Agriculture, Urban Poor Are Priorities, in: African Development, October 1975, pp. 21-23 and John Jilbert: Population Change in Lesotho 1966 to 1976 - Some Implications for National Planning, in: Mohlomi, Journal of Southern African Historical Studies, Vol. II, 1978. 30. Quoted in: Anne Golley: Skilled Workers - South Africa is Falling Further Behind in Its Needs, The Star, 12 November, 1978, p. 28. 31. The OECD Observer, No. 76, July/August 1975, p. 13. 32. AIM, Another Blanket: Report on an Investigation Into the Migrant Situation, Johannesburg, June 1976. 33. Ibid., p. 25. 34. Z.J. de Beer: Industrial Relations in Free Enterprise Societies and Guidelines for South Africa, Optima, Vol. 26, No.4, 1977, p. 191. 55 35. AIM, op. cit., p. III. ABREVIATIONS WEPR World Employment Programme Research DSRG Development Studies Research Group NUL National University of Lesotho BIBLIOGRAPHY V.T. Ramahapu: Towards a Study of Basotho Labour in the Orange Free State Gold Mines - The Mechanisms of Social Control, NUL, ILO Research Project on Migrant Labour in Lesotho, January 1977 (Mimeo). B. Claus et. al.: Migration of Qualified Technical Manpower from Lesotho to the Republic of South Africa - Possibilities of Retention and Reintegration, Berlin: Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik, Aprik 1977 (Mimeo). 56 APPENDIX SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AFRICAN WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1964/1970/1977 (IN THOUSANDS) SECTOR 1964 1970 1977 MINING 281 352 288 - AFFILIATED TO CM 231 267 208 - NON-AFFILIATED MINES 50 85 80 AGRICULTURE 144 45 16 MANUFACTURING 23 12 10 CONSTRUCTION 4 6 9 COMMERCE 2 5 4 DOMESTIC SERVICE 8 21 14 GOVERNMENT SERVICE 7 10 10 OTHER 14 4 6 ANNUAL TOTALS 484 455 357 SOURCE: G.M.E. Leistner, 1967 Mine Labour Organisation, Annual Report, 1964-77 Department of Statistics, Population Census (Report No. 02-05-01); P~etoria, 1971. Republic of South Africa, House of Asembly Debates, 3-7 April 1975, pp. 555-556. 57 UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1970-76 (.:..£Q.Q.) YEAR LABOUR UNEMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT % SUPPLY NUMBERS 1971 8,820 7,614 1,206 13.7 1972 9,066 7,733 1,333 14.7 1973 9,319 8,008 1 ,311 14.1 1974 9,563 8,233 1,330 13.9 1975 9,783 8,406 1,476 14.1 1976 10,033 8,573 1,460 14.6 SOURCE: Charles Simkins, Measuring and Predicating Un- employment in South Africa, 1960-77, in C. Simkins and D.G. Clarke, Structural Unemployment in South Africa, Natal University Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1977 • 58 SURFACE AND UNDERGROUND WAGES DATE OF INCREASE SURFACE MINIMUM UNDERGROUND MINIMUM DECEMBER 1974 120c 160c JUNE 1975 140c 220c JUNE 1976 155c 250c SOURCE: AIM, Another Blanket, Johannesburg, June 1976. S9 NUMBER OF AND AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS OF SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK WORKERS EMPLOYED BY THE GOLD - MINING INDUSTRY, 1972-76 YEAR ANNUAL AVERAGE EARNINGS NUMBER EMPLOYED ('000) 1972 R 257 87.2 1973 350 86.8 1974 365 87.4 1975 947 121.9 (JULY) 1976 950 174.6 (JULY) SOURCE: Charles W. Stahl: Labour Export in Southern Africa: Some Welfare and Policy Implications with Regard to a Joint Policy on Recruitment Fees, WEPR Working Paper, ILO, Geneva, July 1977. INCREASES IN AVERAGE MONTHLY UNDERGROUND CASH EARNINGS DURING THE 1970's 1971 R18 1972 21 1973 30 1974 47 1975 81 1976 88 SOURCE: John Kane-Berman: Labour Supply on the Gold Mines in the 1970's, AIM, Another Blanket, JOhannesburg, 1976 60 NUMBER RECRUITED AREA 1975 1976 INCREASED % TRANSKEI 37,015 54,475 47 BOPHUTHATSWANA 7,998 15,358 92 NATAL AND KWA-ZULU 5,354 12,159 127 LEBOWA 2,089 4,551 179 CISKEI 2,692 4,228 57 GAZANKULU 448 1,095 144 VENDA 202 600 197 SWAZI BANTUSTAN 286 843 195 CAPE "WHITE" AREA 14,704 26,849 83 TRANSVAAL "WHITE" AREAS 1 3 200 O.F.S. & QWAQWA 4,310 8,104 88 WITWATERSRAND & VAAL TRIANGLE (URBAN 2,646 5,347 102 BOTSWANA, LESOTHO & SWAZILAND 61,875 73,006 18 SOURCE: John Kane-Berman (Labour Editor of the Financial Mail in: Another Blanket: Report on an Investigation into the Migrant Situation, June 1976, AIM. 6\ MIDDLE OF 1976 - TOTAL BLACK COMPLEMENT (MINE WORKERS) SOUTH AFRICA 170,000 LESOTHO 85,000 MOZAMBIQUE 79,000 BOTSWANA 26,000 ZIMBAm-iE 16,000 SWAZILAND 13,000 ANGOLA 3,000 OTHERS (INCLUDING NAMIBIA) 1,700 MALAWI 182 TOTAL (ROUNDED) 394,000 SOURCE: John Kane-Berman (Labour Editor of the Financial Mail) in: AIM, Another Blanket: Report on an Investigation into the Migrant Situation, JOhannesburg, June 1976. The following table indicates how the flow of men from the various parts of South Africa have been increasing: 62