Transformation 2 (1986) Article THE TRIBAL PARADIGM AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM: a case study of polltical structures In QwaQwa Tim Quinlan In South Africa ‘traditional’ chieftainships and tribesmen of all sorts saturate the media. The colonial categories of Tribe and Chief appear to be as entrenched and as unchanged as ever, albeit enmeshed now in ‘home- land' civil service bureaucracies. Co-opted ‘homeland’ leaders commonly espouse ancestral ties with great chiefs of the past. The composition of ‘homeland' government cabinets evoke a picture of dynastic rule through royal lineages. Homeland residents are called upon to identify with a tribal name as a necessary affiliation for obtaining citizenship and mate- rial rights in their ‘homeland’. In short, the tribal paradigm appears to have been successfully integrated with the broader ideology of Ethnic Nationalism, and to have remained a significant structural basis of ‘home- land’ government. The political reorganisation of South Africa's reserves poses a particu- lar problem for the analysis of political process in these territories. Tribe and Chief are undoubtedly remain powerful ideological categories. Yet, as is al] too evident in the ‘homelands’, neither Ethnic Nationalism, the tribal paradigm, nor correspond with the material conditions of the majority of 'homeland' residents. They also fail to explain how colonial categories of government serve the political and materia] interests of ‘homeland' leaders. To resolve this paradox a first premise is to avoid face value treatment of the categories, Tribe and Chief. While understanding that they are more complex than just a decaying edifice of class interests now being eroded by capitalist interests in the ‘homelands'. Their persistence suggests com- plex processes within the political structures of the ‘homelands’. In order to understand these processes, this paper focuses on the manipulation of the colonial categories by co-opted 'homeland' politicians in order to highlight the dynamic of political and ideological structures of Ethnic Nationalism. For the purpose of this discussion, the paper focuses on Qwa Qwa.! Qua Qva is situated at the juncture of Lesotho, the Orange Free State and Natal. Previously known as Witsieshoek, this reserve became the legislated "homeland' known as Basotho Qwa Qwa in 1974. Quwa Qwa is supposed to be the place of residence for Africans whom the South African government has 31 Quinlan Transformation 2 designated to ,be 'South Sotho’ people. The area of Qua Qwa is approxi- mately 480 kms, containin g one town called Phuthaditjhaba. Over a third to of the territory consists of mountain slopes while on much of what used be arable land now stand large shanty slums that house most of the de jure population of 500 000. Since the 1950s aspirant leaders in Witsieshoek have organised them- selves around the South African government's emerging political progranme for this and other reserves. This programme, conmonly titled as ‘Separate Development’, proposes that 'tribes' which share a conmon language, terri- tory and history be brought together to forma national ethnic entity. For Witsieshoek, this programme has virtually run its course. From the 1950s to 1975 authorities of the two designated political units fn the reserve, the 'Bakoena' and the ‘Batlokoa' ‘tribes’, were brought together to consti- tute administrative bodies capable of taking on more responsibility for the government of the reserve as a whole. During 1975, Witsieshoek became Qwa Qua, a self governing territory with its own legislature and civil service. The fledgling legislative assembly was expanded to include members elected from the recently created ‘South Sotho' citizenry and subsequently, a Chief Minister and his Cabinet were appointed to manage the newly formed mini- stries. The official perspective is that Qwa Qwa will gain its indepen- dence at some stage in the future in the manner of the Transkei, the Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. Qwa Qwa seems to have successfully welded its tribal political structure into the broader ethnic nationalist paradigm. Several points need to be addressed, however, to comprehend political processes in this ‘homeland’. Firstly, the installation of the ethnic nationalist paradigm has become a lynchpin of conflict amongst co-opted and aspirant leaders in the terri- tory. In that conflict, the political structures of the past and the present have been manipulated. Secondly, the manipulation of those struc- tures, and of Separate Development generally, by local actors has opened new channels for the abuse of political authority and, hence, made Qwa Qwa more susceptible to authoritarian government. Thirdly, between the ideology of Tribe and Chief and the new reality of an ethnic nationalist ‘homeland’, there are contradictions which are significant because the former has some popular legitimacy. Finally, the current conflict between local actors and its discussion by residents commonly eschews recognition of class interests and any challenge to the entire state construction of ethnicity. Transformation 2 Quinlan THE TRIBAL PARADIGM AND SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT IN WITSIESHOEK When Witsieshoek became subject to Apartheid legislation it had been a reserve for nearly a hundred years. The reserve was formed in 1867 by the Orange Free State government to accommodate a group of refugees from Moshoeshoe's Basotho polity. The leader of the refugees was Mopeli Mokhachane, half brother of Moshoeshoe, and previously a chief (morena) within the latter's political hierarchy. Mopeli Mokhachane negotiated a treaty with the Orange Free State government independently of Moshoeshoe as a result of an accumulation of events. During 1867, the colonia) forces once again had military control over mich of the land used by Moshoeshoe's followers. Furthermore, there js some evidence to suggest that Moshoeshoe’s authority over his subordi- nates was in doubt. In 1866 his son, Molapo, who was the chief of many communities in what is now north eastern Lesotho, conceded this land to the Orange Free State government in a private treaty (Thompson, 1975:288-90). There also seems to have been some intrigue amongst Moshoeshoe's other sons at this time over the political future of the Basotho polity,. and Mopeli Mokhachane's own future as a chief was in doubt as a result. By August 1867 Mopeli Mokhachane had concluded his treaty with the Orange Free State government and subsequently he left for Witsieshoek with a following of approximately 700 people (J de ev mis, vol 43, 1866:29). Although Mopeli Mokhachane's followers were no more than refugees of war Jed by a competent leader with a few trusted advisers, the treaty with the Orange Free State government elevated the identity of the group. Once under the jurisdiction of the settler republic, Mopeli Mokhachane became the chief ('Kapitein') above a stratum of subordinate chiefs ('onderhoorige kapiteins') of the ‘Bakoena tribe’ (Eybers (ed), 1981:320; 325). Colonial construction of African political units had deemed that Mopeli Mokhachane's clan name (shared by all his agnates within and beyond the Basotho polity) identify specifically his own following, and thus the ‘Bakoena tribe’ was born. The experience of Mopeli Mokhachane and of his followers indicates the economic reasons for the formation of ‘tribes’ on the highveld. Indigenous pastoralists and farmers needed land which was rapidly coming under the contro] of the colonial settlers, and which was only being allocated to recognisable groups. Hence, it was in the interests of many African refu- gees to form groups according to colonial settler conception of African society. In this manner Witsieshoek was settled by two more groups between 1867 and 1875. Identified throughout the colonial area as the 'Makholokoe' and ‘Batlo- 33 Quinlan Transformation 2 ns from a koa' tribes, these groups were no more than splinter formatio of the colonial number of chiefdoms which were disintegrating in the face invasion of the highveld (Keegan, 1983). Both of these groups were settied each other and from Nopeli Mokhacha ne's followin g. on land separate from of the differen t groups in relation to each other, however, was The status not fixed. In terms of the 1967 treaty, Witsieshoek was the territory of the 'Bakoena' tribe. Yet, although oral tradition records that Mopeli Mokhachane objected to the immigration of other ‘tribes’, he was overruled a by the Orange Free State government. Instead, Mopeli Mokhachane retained status as the most senior African authorit y in the reserve. Nonetheless, informants on the history of the 'Makholokoe tribe’ assert that this community remained an autonomous unit until 1910 when their chief agreed to its incorporation into the ‘Bakoena tribe’. In contrast to this, oral history records that the 'Batlokoa tribe' consisted initially of about 50 people under the leadership of Koos Mota who, despite asserting territo- rial independence for his following, accepted a position as a chief subor- dinate to Mopeli Mokhachane. This somewhat flexible construction of administration in the reserve marked the parameters of the tribal paradigm in Witsieshoek. The early years of the twentieth century witnessed the formalisation of tribal divi- sions in the reserve. On the basis of de facto existence of a ‘Batlokoa tribe', the ‘Batlokoa' chief used a personal dispute with the ‘Bakoena' paramount chief to obtain official demarcation of the reserve into two tribal areas in 1925. . Although the political structure of the reserve gave the impression of an insular society, this was not matched by the economic conditions of the residents. Shortage of arable land was a growing problem (Report of the Native Land Conmission, UG 22, 1916) such that many residents were migrant wage workers. This contradiction became fully apparent during resistance to agricultural betterment schemes which began in the 1930s, and which culminated in a popular but unsuccessful rebellion in 1950 (Hirson, 1977; Moroney, 1976). As the populace rallied around individual leaders, including chiefs and migrant workers, and local community organisations, the authority of the ‘Bakoena' chieftainship as a whole crumbled. Popular respect for the ‘Bakoena’ paramount chief faded as his moderate but unsuccessful negotia- tions with the colonial authorit ies were openly challeng ed by militant chiefs and individuals who rallied under the banner of a militant group called Lingangele (‘Those who stand firm’) (Lodge, 1983:272). Lingangele appears to have been a militant faction formed by some members of a local migrant worker association known as Leihlo le Sechaba (‘Eye of the Nation’) Transformation 2 Quinlan which had links with fhe Communist Party of South Africa (Hirson, 1977:124; Lodge, 1983: 270-73). Furthermore, political affiliations were confused by the successful resistance of the ‘Batlokoa' tribal area residents led by the regent and later, by her son and heir, Wessels Mota. Throughout their campaign the *Batlokoa' leaders relied on the legitimacy of the tribal structures to achieve their aims. For instance, those people who were prepared to accept the South African authorities’ regulations were threatened with expulsion from the tribal area. Also, according to informants, livestock culling regulations were sidestepped by the leaders’ persuasion of the colonial authorities that yearly slaughtering of livestock during initiation cere- monies were effectively an indigenous culling programme. The state Commission of Enquiry once the rebellion was put down never came to grips with these developments, locked as it was into the triba) perspective on African societies (Commission of Enquiry, 1951). In turn, the Separate Development programme accepted the tribal paradigm as a basis for projecting the broader horizon of ethnic nationalism. Separate Development in Witsieshoek was implemented in the same way as in the other reserves. The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act which outlined the programme was applied to Witsieshoek in 1953. In terms of this Act, poli- tical authority in the reserve was divided between two ‘Tribal Authori- ties’, one for each designated tribe. Each Tribal Authority had to include ‘the chief or headman of the tribe or community in question and council- lors'. In Witsieshoek, the ‘councillors’ were nominees of the 'Bakoena’ paramount chief and of the ‘Batlokoa' chief. The Tribal Authorities were empowered to administer comunity affairs within their respective tribal areas. In practice, however, their actions were dictated by the local magistrates who intervened between them and the Union government. Proclamation R110 of 1957 outwardly ratified the tribal status of the African authorities in Witsieshoek. Chiefs and village headmen were to be appointed according to local custom but official recognition would be given only to two newly proclaimed offices, ‘chief' and ‘headman’. The new office of chief was that of the locally described position of morena emoholo (paramount chief). The new office of headman was effectively a composite office which described any territorial] authority under the over- all jurisdiction of the ‘chief'. Consequently, the local distinctions in Witsfeshoek between morena emoholo, morena (chief) and ramotse (village headman) were set aside. The Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act of 1959 detailed the ethnic nationalist paradigm which was to be adopted in the reserves. Various reserves were identified with particular ethnic categories. Wits ieshoek 35 Quinlan Transformation 2 ’ people. This Act also was identified as the territory of the 'South Sotho in each reserve. These endorsed the creation of a ‘Regional Authority’ ritie s and they were to bodies were to be superordinate to the Tribal Autho latte r agenc ies. be formed from the senior leadership in the intention to grant The Regional Authorities marked the government's of government of the Tribal Authorities increasing responsibilities ied by reserves' populations. In Witsieshoek these intentions were modif in both of the triba l areas during the creation of a Regional Authority subordinate to the executive 1962. Each Regional Authority however, was the ‘Batl okoa' tribal area. authority of Wessels Mota, chief of defin ed the next step in the evolution Both the 1951 and the 1959 Acts an population of South Africa. Each of ethnic identities amongst the Afric Triba l ‘Territorial Authority’ . The reserve was to be allowed in time a s and itute the Regio nal Autho ritie Authority of each reserve would subst be a fledg ling legis lativ e body with limited administrative powers would ve. In short, the creation of Terri- over all other agencies in the reser ves a limited form of self govern- torial Authorities would grant the reser ed the Basotho Ba Borwa ment. In 1969, a number of Proclamations creat Wits iesho ek (Government Gazette, (South Sotho) Territorial Authority for the ‘Bakoena’ paramount chief, 1969). This body consisted of the each Tribal Authority. ‘Bat lokoa’ chief and six councillors from n (the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of Shortly thereafter, legislatio ituti on Act of 1971) prepared the way for 1970 and the Bantu Homelands Const Qwa. Proclamation R225 of 1971 the transformation of Witsieshoek into Qwa into a Legislative Assembly. converted Witsieshoek’s Territorial Authority k into a self-governing Then in 1974, Proclamat fon R203 converted Witsieshoe the reconstitution of the territory of Basotho Qua Qwa and sanctioned rs. These members included 40 Legislative Assembly to include 60 membe tives (26 from the 'Bako ena tribe’ and 14 from nominated tribal representa and 20 elect ed repre senta tives of the ‘home land's‘ the ‘Batlokoa tribe’) rs of political citizens. The elected representatives were to be membe ’ e and which could parties which could be formed by ‘South Sotho peopl creat ed within and beyond contest43 number of constituencies which had been QuaQwa. i (paternal uncle General elections were held in 1975 in which TK Mopel ount chief ) and his Dikwa nkwet la Party won 19 of the of the ‘Bakoena' param i was duly elected 20 available seats in the Legislative Assembly. TK Mopel e Assem bly (Verbatim Re- as ‘Chief Minister’ of Qwa Qwa by the Legislativ appoi nted membe rs of his party and ports, vol 9, 1975:3). Subsequently, he six gover nment minis tries (Verb atim Reports, chief Wessels Mota to head the vol 9, 1975:8). 36 Transformation 2 Quinlan The Dikwankwetla Party repeated its initial victory in the 1980 and 1985 elections during which time the Legislative Assembly had been used to consolidate the ethnic nationalist paradigm. In 1983, TK Mopeli's govern- ment decided to increase the number of representatives in the Legislative Assembly from 60 to 80 (Verbatim Reports, vol 29, 1983:162-63). The number of the tribal representatives (40) remained constant but in future, there were to be 34 elected representatives and the government would also be allowed to appoint six nominated representatives from the public. In short, the potential capability of tribal representatives to block initia- tives of the ruling political party was annul led. Furthermore, during the same year TK Mopel{ outlined a new map of the electoral constituencies which would be formed for the 1985 elections. Three electoral constituencies were drawn in Qwa Qwa in place of the single existent constituency (Verbatim Reports, vol 29, 1983:162-65). Since these new constituencies cut across the tribal area boundaries, the door was open for political parties to compete against the Tribal Authorities for the new political affections of the residents. Likewise, the creation of new ‘farm constituencies’ challenged the authority of resident village headmen and directed the attention of residents to the authority of a new ‘national’ government. These constituencies were created in rural areas outside Quwa Qwa to draw in people who had been designated ‘South Sotho’ but who lived on farms in the Orange Free State, Transvaal and the Cape province (Verba- tim Reports, vol 29, 1983:164). Juxtaposed to these developments was the Qwa Qwa government's codifica- tion of the ‘homeland's' chieftainship through the 1982 Qwa Qwa Administra- tion of Authorities Act. In the wake of this Act, Qwa Qwa was divided into ten districts to which the government appointed ten chiefs. According to the Act, Qwa Qwa contains two tribal areas located around the 'Bathlokwa (Batiokoa) tribe’ and the ‘Mopeli tribe’ (previously known as the ‘Bakoena tribe'). Both tribal areas have a paramount chief. In the 'Batlokoa' tribal area this chief was superordinate to three district chiefs while in the ‘Mopeli' tribal area, it is superordinate to seven district chiefs. Within each district the resident chief is superior to the stratum of village headmen. The main body of the Act specifies the regulations governing the tribal authorities. In each tribal area, the paramount chief has to forma ‘Tribal Council’ consisting of himself and his nominated ‘councillors’. In prac- tice, these councillors are largely the district chiefs and village head- men. The Tribal Councils are the main institutions of ‘tribal government’ and they exist to ‘administer the affairs of the tribe(s) in general’. What constitutes ‘tribal affairs’, however, is subject to the decision of the Quinlan Transformation 2 of affairs' currently include a variety Chief Minister of Qwa Qua. ‘Tribal conse rvati on, tion to flora and fauna concerns, ranging from land administra h and welfa re. Conce rns such as education, building con- to local healt ces are in the contro] of the mini- struction, pensions and trading licen stries. unity Councils’ are supposed to In addition to the Tribal Councils, ‘Comm ions to the former bodies. In fact, be formed to carry out simi lar funct the ngfully separ ate entit ies from the Community Councils are not meani s and inclu de resid ent chief Tribal Councils. A Community Counci] must nity elect ed adult , male counc iltor s, village headmen, in addition to commu coun- ‘comm unity ’ nor speci fies the numbe r of but the Act neither defines cillors who may be elected. a ‘Council of Chiefs’ in each Finally, the Act requires the formation of ge headmen and the chairmen of tribal area which must also include two villa These chief s' counc ils are simply advisory bodies the Community Councils. on the matte r of dutie s and appointment of to the government ministries chiefs and village headmen. tion in Qwa Qwa, there is no Despite the complexity of the administra the type of society and the ambiguity in the 1983 Act's perception of The chieftainship appears to be structure of authority in the territory. an socia l mould . In reality, the Act cast froma clearly defined Afric the actua l histo ry of local polit ical power but its reveals little of ing of the tribal paradign to existence suggests a necessary restructur ds of ethnic nationalism. subordinate the tribal authorities to the deman from triba l reserve to nationstate Likewise, Witsieshoek's legislative path adict ions which have developed within the casts little light on the contr insti tutio ns. The persp ectiv e on these contradic- territory's political ficant aspects of the tions which is offered below proposes that signi Qua is to be found in the material reality of political process in Qwa local polit icians. manipulation of Separate Development by THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN WITSIESHOEK/QUA QWA Separate Deve- The two outstanding figures to emerge during the era of 1970s, TK Mopeli. Before lopment were Wessels Mota and, since the early the de facto supreme African authori ty in 1970, Wessels Mota had become the transfo rmation of Witsies hoek into Qwa Qwa, 1K Witsieshoek. With the dominan t politic ian in the territor y. The changing Mopeli became ence of different political fortunes of these two personalities is a consequ hoek undersc ored by changing reactions to Separate Development in Witsies material interests in the territory. Transformation 2 Quinian Between the 1950s and 1974 the 'Batlokoa' and the ‘Bakoena’ authorities adopted different political strategies. Wessels Mota emerges during this period as a leader who exploited the features of the legislation which promoted political divisions of ‘tribe’ against ‘tribe’. This strategy enabled him to raise the status of the 'Batlokoa tribe’ vis a vis the ‘Bakoena tribe' and in the process, his own status as a leader. The strategy of the 'Bakoena' authorities was to manipulate perceptions of the nature of African ‘tribal’ society and the history of the ‘Sakoena' tribe. This strategy was used to reassert the primacy of the ‘Sakoena tribe' and its chieftainship in the history of administration of the reserve. Signi- ficantly, both sets of strategies articulated popular attachment to land and the historical significance of agriculture for the African population. However crudely, these conditions were recognised in the tribal paradigm but in each case, their exposition was different. The tribal paradigm had served Wessels Mota and his predecessors well as is evident in the official demarcation of a ‘Batlokoa' tribal] area in 1925, and in the residents’ successful resistance against the agricultural betterment schemes. Resistance to these schemes, for instance, reflected economic interests in the ‘'8atlokoa' tribal area even though it was couched in terms of tribal custom. Government efforts to restrict herd sizes, to relocate villages away from mountain slopes and to create restricted grazing areas threatened local income from livestock, portended difficul- ties in using arable land to resite villages and implied increased govern- ment contro] over trade between residents and mohair traders from Lesotho. Historical precedent pointed out a strategy for Wessels Mota but the Separate Development legislation provided the incentive for him to rise beyond his status as a tribal chief. With the institution of Tribal Autho- rities, the South African government effectively gave the ‘Batlokoa' autho- rities political parity as a body with the ‘Bakoena' authorities. It is not surprising then that Wessels Mota was the first African authority to accept Separate Development and to forma Tribal Authority (Rand Daily Mail, 01.03.74). Subsequently, Wessels Mota was in a position to raise his own political rank. With parity at the level of the Tribal Authorities, he and his subordinates could block the establishment of a single Regional Authority and maintain that parity through the formation of two separate Regional Authorities. In turn, his appointment as the head of the executive commit- tee drawn from these two bodies was undoubtedly influenced by the statutory political situation at the time. During this period the statutory leader of the 'Bakoena tribe’ was the wife of the deceased paramount chief who was acting as a regent on behalf of her infant son. Her appointment was Quinlan Transformation 2 ntion held that only men hold poli- considered unusual at the time as conve In the context of the patri archal attitudes of the popula- tical office. tage, aS @ chief of a tribe and as tion, Wessels Mota held a personal advan These or’ authority in Witsieshoek. a man, for recognition as the ‘seni a position to obtain equal accumulated conditions then put Wessels Mota in r ena' ‘tribes’ on the 14 membe representation for the ‘Batlokoa’ and 'Bako lf to be elected as the ‘Chief Coun- Territorial Authority, and for himse arrived at the highest cillor'. As Chief Councillor, Wessels Mota had ve. political position then available in the reser ls Mota, the 'Bakoena’ In response to the political ascendancy of Wesse ate Development. In- authorities did not contest the overt logic of Separ logic al conve ntion s: one, stead, these authorities manipulated two socio d a fundamenta] that kinship in general and lineages in particular forme ture; and two, that tribe s had a primordia! basis of tribal social struc . By these attachment to defined territories and to particular traditions sary conditions to means the ‘Bakoena‘ authorities accumulated the neces obtain a favourable dispensation in the polit ical struc ture of an ethnic nationalist Qwa Qwa. others, the Settlement in the reserve by the 'Bakoena tribe’ before any rities, and primary status given to Mopeli Mokhachane by the colonial autho in the consistent prominence of the office of the ‘Bakoena' paramount chief ical claim s which could be the administration of the reserve, were empir elaborated as propaganda to influence the South African government. In addition the ‘Bako ena' autho ritie s propa gated the inacc urate impre ssion that political authority in their tribal area had always been held by a ‘royal lineage’ of Mopeli agnates. In fact, Mopeli agnates only began to constitute a majority of the chiefs during the reign of Ntsane Mopeli, Mopeli Mokhachane's successor. Yet, even by the 1950s, several chiefs and most of the village headmen were not Mopeli agnates. Yet, Proclamation R1200 of 1957 added credibility to the ‘Bakoena’ authorities! claims. Following the rationalisation of political offices to ‘chief' and ‘headman', most of the Mopeli chiefs took the state salaried Position of ‘headman' and thuS obscured from official sight the local ly recognised village headmen (ramotse). One consequence of these develop- ments was that legislation since the 1950s has spoken of the 'Mopeli tribe’ in favour of the 'Bakoena’. Another tactic of the '8akoena' authorities was to ensure that their tribal area remained the largeSt in the reserve. Whenever land was allo- cated to Witsieshoek as in the 1950s and in 1964 (Makhanya, 1970:193) they appealed successfully for its iMclusion in the 'Bakoena' tribal area. As a result, they accumlated a Scarce resource which not only attracted imni- 40 Transformation 2 Quinlan grants to their tribal area, thus making the ‘Bakoena tribe’ numerically larger than the 'Batlokoa tribe’, but also refueled popular perceptions about the nature of African ‘tribal’ society. By these means the 'Bakoena' authorities undermined the personal poli- tical victories of Wessels Mota, and accumilated significant empirical reasons to support proportional representation for the two ‘tribes' in the political structure of the ‘homeland'-to-be. Consequently, the newly constituted Legislative Assembly of 1974 included 26 representatives of the ‘Mopeli tribe’ and 14 from the ‘Batlokoa tribe’. In the meantime, TK Mopeli who was a close advisor of Mampoi Mopeli, the ‘Bakoena' regent and mentor of her heir (H Robinson, persona) communication) had become involved in the political development of Witsieshoek as a member of the Territorial Authority. Following the success of his Dikwankwetla Party at the polls in 1975, his election as ‘Chief Minister’ was inevitable. A new political era in Witsieshoek's history had begun. TK Mopeli inherited a complex political structure which had yet to be tested against the South African government's ideals of ethnic nationalism. Although the Yast decade has seen TK Mopel{i consolidate his political position in Quwa Qwa, the many contradictions within the 'homeland' political structure have become apparent. ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN QWA QUA Since 1975, the elaboration of ethnic nationalism in Qwa Qwa has been on a separate tangent to the material conditions of the majority of the popu- lation. For the majority the economic realities of residence in Qua Qwa are harsh. Most of the people are recent imaigrants to Qva Qwa who have been displaced from predominantly rural] homes elsewhere in South Africa as a result of population relocation policies and changes in the broader economy of the country (Krause, 1982; Robbins, 1982: Morris, 1976; Sharp, 1982). An intimation of their plight is indicated in the extraordinary growth in the territory's population. Since 1970, this small 22km x 22km territory has witnessed increases in the de jure population from 23 860 to an estimated 200 000 in 1977, to 300 000 in 1980, to 500 000 in 1984 (Krause, 1982:2; Niehaus, 1984:13). There has been no corresponding development of the economic infrastruc- ture in Qwa Qwa. Much of the available arable land has been taken over for housing the population such that agriculture has a place only in history for most residents. Wage paying jobs are rare in Qua Qwa. For instance, figures from one official record that in 1983 Qwa Qva's three industrial sites in Phuthaditjhaba housed about 73 firms who employed only 4 382 41 Transformation 2 Quinlan people (ie approximately 1% of the de jure population) (Niehaus, 1984:59- 61). In 1984, the average weekly wage for an unskilled factory worker was between R12 and R20, and women, in some cases, earned as little as R5 a week (Niehaus, personal communiation). Despair of finding work was high- lighted during that year when men rampaged through an industrial site chasing women away from their work places. The net result of these condi- tions is that most can only find formal wage paying jobs through migrant labour contracts. The ever present problems such as employment opportuni- ties is highlighted by the extent of informal trade activities through Qwa Qua. Under these conditions, the tribal paradigm, let alone ethnic nationa- lism, is an incongruous political ideology. Nonetheless, the implementa- tion and relative success of the ethnic nationalist paradign lies in the material interests which support it. Apart from massive support from the South African government (R32-million for administration in 1982) (Rand Daily Mail, 04.04.83), Qwa Qwa is a source of. cheap labour for many indus- tries in and beyond the territory. Furthermore, a growing number of people are economically dependent upon the ‘homeland’ administrative machinery. The civil service, for instance, which now includes eight ministries, employs many teachers. Qwa Qwa is noted for its large number of Schools and has been favoured by many parents who wanted to remove their children from trouble torn areas outside the territory (Robinson, 1983). For many professionally trained Africans, the Qwa Qwa government offers higher salaries and better jobs than they could normally obtain outside the ‘home- land’. Whatever their political views on ‘homelands’, employment in Qwa Qua is a central means for these professionals to finance homebuilding and business interests inside and outside the territory. Also, the Qwa (wa government's legal control over matters such as pensions and tertiary industrial development makes it a powerful patron of many residents outside the administrative apparatus, Against these interests, the tribal authorities have little to uphold and promote their authority, Positions of power are to be found in the neal meeetes in which tribal status has not been a particularly mportant criterion for en has also been tarnished. try. The legitimacy of the tribal aut!horities Firstly, the tribal authorities! basis of patrona litical con- trol in the form of arable land and other natural resources. was affected Pyheconsequentdenteos 2m The enormous denand for nous0, ross exploitation of the imigran of natural resources became a means ots had to pay the notorious ‘resi Nts (Bank, 1983: Niehaus, 1984). Inmigr@ nd dence fee' to chiefs and village headmen 19 order 42 Transformation 2 Quinian to receive the letter required by the government ministries for legit ima- tion of residence and citizenship in the territory. In addition, gratui- ties to the tribal authorities commonly support applications to use natural resources while arbitrary fines follow misdemeanours against loca) regula- tions. In short, the heritage of reciprocal balance between political control and access to and use of productive natura] resources has deterio- rated. Moreover, for many of Qwa Qwa's residents, the modern situation is their only experience of local tribal authorities and, accordingly, many hold no strong attachment to the history of the tribal paradign in the territory. Secondly, the capacity of tribal authorities to be effective local government agents has been whittled away by TK Mopeli. Since 1975, Qwa Qua's legislature has given only token budget funding to the Tribal Autho- rities. It was noted in the Legislative Assembly, during 1979, that the Tribal Authorities always ran out of funds by the middle of each year (Verbatim Reports, vol 19, 1979:188; 192). In 1980, TK Mopeli conceded that the 'Mopeli’ and the ‘Batlokoa' Tribal Authorities received respec- tively R20 000 and R10 000 for that year (Verbatim Reports, vol 23, 1980:5253; 62-63). Thirdly, Separate Development legislation since the 1950s has gradually transformed the tribal political structures. The various ‘Authorities’ created since 1953 were, in effect, state sanctioned bodies irrespective of their composition of chiefs and village headmen. The chieftainship in the ‘Bakoena’ tribal area was virtually dismembered by the legislation. The rationalisation of tribal offices to include only 'chief' and ‘headman' generated confusion over the relative status of locally described offices. In turn, the appointment of a limited number of Tribal Authorities to the Regional and Territorial Authorities not only placed some 'Batlokoa' vil- lage headmen on a par with 'Mopeli' chiefs but also, within the ‘Nopeli' tribal area, limited political power to a few chiefs. By 1975 the chieftainship was hardly a coherent political structure. What came out of the legislative process was an institution which displayed Pretoria's obsession with cultural particularities as indicated in a sec- tion from Proclamation R203 (Government Gazette, 1974): A chief in Qwa Qva shall continue to enjoy ... the perso- nal status he has hitherto enjoyed with regard to ceremonial and tribal matters and at ceremonial occasions within his area take precedent over the Chief Minister and Ministers except in matters of occasions connected with the business Transformation 2 Quinlan of the Legislative Assembly. In sum, the ethnic nationalist paradigm has been promoted in default of the tribal paradigm. Legislation and current material conditions favour the government ministries as the site of political patronage, while the tribal paradigm becomes the locus of extortion from a vulnerable popula- tion. , Chief (morena) and village headman (ramotse) are stil] popularly recog- nised offices, but they satisfy popular imagination of African societies rather than reflect the realities of political power in Qwa Qwa. This condition is highlighted by the 1983 Qwa Qwa Administration of Authorities Act. Nevertheless, the dynamic behind this condition must be answered through the question of why the image of Qwa Qwa as a tribal society is still politically significant to TK Mopeli. The 1983 Act clearly subordinates the Tribal Authorities to the contro] Of Qwa Qua's Chief Minister. Furthermore, the Act does little to promote Popular participation in local government. The Community Councils, for example, have no value. The legal? proviso that only men can vote for the Membership of these councils excludes the resident majority of women. Likewise, the Act excludes from official recognition most of the locally recognised chiefs. In the 'Mopeli’ tribal] area, only six of the 15 locally recognised chiefs were appointed to fill the seven district chieftaincies. Out of the 15 candidates only one of the four chiefs who were not Mopeli agnates retained his status. The outstanding vacancy was filled by an individual who was not a chief according to local prescriptions but who was 4 Confidant of the Mopeli paramountcy. Ironically, for the first time in history, a fully fledged chieftainship was created in the ‘Batlokoa' tribal area by the 1983 Act. With three district chieftaincies to fill, Wessels Mota followed ‘tradition’ and appointed his wife, his son and senior advisor (letona) as his subordinate chiefs. Mopeli has preserved the image of a tribal society and also, he has €ndorsed the convention that political divisions and, hence, political Competition in Qwa Qwa are based on ethnic and territorial categories. The intimation to contenders for political power is that political authority ests ona territorial base as in the colonial past, and that political Power can be gained by working through the tribal paradigm. The image, ver, remains an illusion which, more correctly, is a political trap for Tk Mopeli's opponents and as such highlights the political relevance of the tribal paradigm in Qua Qva today. This manipulation of tribal ideology is aptly illustrated by current Conflict between TK Mopeli and a group which calls itself the 'Makholokoe Transformation 2 Quinlan Tribe’. This group is potentially a major threat to TK Mopeli’s contro] of political authority in Qwa Qwa. The group has been conducting a campaign for official recognition of the 'Makholokoe Tribe' as a legitimate resident of Qwa Qwa and, therefore, with a right to representation of its authori- ties in the territory's political structure. At present, most of the execu- tive of this group live outside Qwa Qva. Their designated chief lives in Clarens, Orange Free State. The secretary lives in Orlando, Johannesburg, and other members are to be found in towns throughout the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The '‘Makholokoe Tribe' is itself a product of the tribal paradigm. Throughout the history of Witsieshoek, the name 'Makholokoe' has been present. Witsieshoek was named after Oetsi, chief of a nineteenth century ‘Makholokoe' chiefdom and as noted, a splinter group from another ‘Makholokoe' chiefdom was an early settler in the reserve. Generally however, the 'Makholokoe’ chiefdoms were casualties of the political uphea- vals of the nineteenth century. The major chiefdom, under chief Mahlase, split into a number of refugee groups during the Lifagane, and it is highly probable that many of the surivors were incorporated into chiefdoms which survived or grew out of that catastrophe. Certainly by the twentieth century ‘Makholokoe' chiefdoms were not officially recognised by the colo- nial authorities and their members were scattered over farms throughout the Orange Free State (Keegan, 1983). The appearance of the 'Makholokoe Tribe’ coincides with the latter stages of Witsieshoek's transformation into Qwa Qwa. It was formed during the late 1960s with the aim of getting a tribal area of its own in the reserve. On the basis of this old ploy from the colonial times, the ‘Makholokoe tribe' have become a well organised pressure group. It has received recognition in principle as a ‘tribe’ from the South African government and, during 1982-83, it received state support to conduct a census survey to find ‘Makholokoe' people amongst the Orange Free State population. Informants claim that the group has received tacit support from Wessels Mota but equally there are claims that during the 1970s, TK Mopeli was involved in attempts to obstruct the group's efforts. TK Mopeli could hardly deny in public the legitimacy of the group's aspirations given the tribal premises of Separate Development and his own acceptance of the programme. He has tried, however, to turn the rationale of Separate Development against the group as indicated in one of his speeches (Verbatim Reports, Vol 19, 1979:176-77). Our government is prepared to assist them (the ‘Makholokoe Tribe') in every way possible and to help them 45 Quinlan Transformation 2 culture ... We have build their nation and maintain their s ... in an attem pt to acquire land now commenced discussion and have reque sted that the Makgo lokwes (sic) for them to them according should be counted and that land be granted There are some Basot ho leade rs who are to their numbers. effor t to preve nt us from achie ving causing confusion in an and who encou rage the Makgo lokwe peopl e to this goal ... and deman d the land which they say belon gs to the come here ignore their Wetsis (reference to chief Qetsi), and to I would like to emphasise the fact that present chiefs. We have two chief s in the Qua Qwa that will not happen. remai n... 1 infor med the homeland and that is how it will e resid ent in Qua Qwa) that if they wish to Makgotokwes (thos in the propo sed censu s, which will affec t them take part directly, they should advise their chiefs (the ‘Batlokoa' they and ‘'Mopeli' chiefs) accordingly and tel] them that would prefer to come under autho rity of the new chief (the tsa Moloi ), so they may be remov ed ‘Makholokoe' chief, Letsi from this homeland and resettled in their homeland. Thts rhetoric has not deterred the 'Makholokoe Tribe’ but their strategy fs unlikely to be successful. They may obtain a tribal area in Qwa Qwa but TK Mopeli has already shifted the bases of power away from the tribal paradigm. Nonetheless, it is important to TK Mopeli that they continue to base their claims on tribal/chief identity and that he answer those claims fn the same language. When the moment of compromise arrives, the 'Makholo- koe' will find that their newly acknowledged tribal status will be a limi- tation to their aspirations for political power in Qwa Qua. CONCLUSION The colonial categories, Tribe and Chief, and residential ‘tribal areas’ are economically irrelevant to most of Qva Qva's residents. Given the {mpoverishment of agriculture and the longstanding need for wage employ- ment, both heightened by state resettlement policies, the tribal paradign has no corresponding material base. The political economy of Qua Qva is now geared towards the potential provision of patronage in settlement into and movement out of this impoverished ‘homeland’. It fs a development which not only usurps the earlier political order but which also gives the Chief Minister the dispensation to determine the face of the tribal para- dige in that territory. 46 Transformation 2 Quinian Political conflict in Qwa Qwa highlights local exploration of methods for manipulating tribal ideology to meet the exigencies of resettlement and ‘ethnic’ agglomeration. The realities of TK Mopeli's administration demon- strate a particular dialectic between the tribal paradign and ethnic natio- nalism by which the latter succeeds not through any attempted correspon- dence with current material conditions but through default of the former. The material abrogation of the tribal paradigm identifies a process of refashionment, the results of which are aptly displayed in the ‘Makholokoe' case. Local actors embroiled in conflict over interpretation of Separate Development mark the success of the state in channelling rural politics along premeditated lines. FOOTNOTES 1 For comparative illustrations elsewhere in South Africa see J Comaroff (1974); W Hanmond-Tooke (1975); F Haines (et a/) (1984); S Marks (1978); B Rogers (1980); R Southall (1983). 2 Sotho praise poems (M Damane and P Sanders, 1974) highlight Mopeli Mokhachane's exploits in defence of Moshoeshoe's chiefdom and an occasion when he was slighted by his nephews. | Thompson (1975: 285- 94) suggests that Moshoeshoe was ailing at the time (he died in 1870) and that, in addition to Molapo's defection, his others sons were not only divided but, perhaps contemplating how to divide the chiefdom amongst themselves. In the context of colonia] military dominance and the political instability of Moshoeshoe's chiefdom, it is possible that Mopeli Mokhachane perceived a threat to his own safety and future career. 3. Lodge seems to imply that Leihlo le Sechaba was revived as the Witsieshoek Vigilance Association during the resistance and that this Association was entirely separate from Lingangele. Oral reports from participants in the resistance state that Leihlo le Sechaba functioned continuously from its creation in 1914 to 1950. It had originally cultivated close ties with the ‘Bakoena' paramountcy as a patron of migrant worker interests in the reserve. During the resistance, the meabership divided over strategy and support for the *Bakoena’ para- mount chief. This led to the formation of Lingangele by militant members of Leihlo le Sechaba. 4 Representatives of ‘South Sotho' people were elected from constituencies created in a number of Orange Free State towns. Transformation 2 Quinlan REFERENCES Bank, L- (1983) - ‘Town and “closer settlement" in Qwa Qua: a study of resources and struggle’ (Social Anthropology honours dissertation, University of Cape Town) Camaroff, . 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