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   C0MMUNI8T            INFLUENCE          IN    SOUTH AFRICA
  US Statt Department Report to Congress
  SUMMARY
     The following report 1s 1n fulfillment of section 589 of the Comprehen-
  sive Anti-Apartheid Act of October 2. 1986, which requested that the Presi-
  dent transmit to Congress a report on the activities of the Connunist Party
  In South Africa, the extent to which comnunists have Infiltrated black and
  nonwhite South African organizations engaged 1n the fight against the
  apartheid system, and the extent to which any such comnunist Infiltration
  or Influence sets the policies and goals of the organizations with which
  they are Involved. The President's Executive Order (Ho. 12571} of October
  27, 1986, delegated to the Secretary of State the authority to complete
  this report.
     The South African Communist Party, banned since 1950, lacks a nass
  following but has exercised considerable Influence through Its alliance
  with the African National Congress. The SACP continues to view Its histo-
  rical alliance with the AHC as Its main hope for winning power 1n South
  Africa, although Its ultimate agenda for South Africa - rule by a Marxist-
  Leninist party loyal to the Soviet Union - goes far beyond the Freedom
  Charter.
     The strong Influence of the SACP within the AHC began during the civil
  disobedience campaigns of the 1950s and thus antedates the current near-
  total dependence of the AHC on the Soviet bloc for military assistance.
  Party Members are strongly represented In the AHC hierarchy.
     At the sane time, the SACP is only one element, although a very Iispor-
  tant one, of the coalition of interests represented In the AHC. The AHC and
  SACP are also far from being in a position to control the growing political
  and trade union activity within South Africa.
     SACP Interests are served by an Inflexible South African attitude to-
  wards negotiations with the AHC, by Isolation of the AHC from contacts with
  western governments, and by the AHC's focus on Increasing military pressure
  on South Africa. Should broader options become available for the AHC leade-
  rship, the question of the extent and direction of SACP Influence could
  become a major issue.
  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
     The South African Connunist Party (SACP) has been banned since 1950,
  shortly after the current National Party government took power. It has
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since maintained an underground c e l l organization, but most of its members,
especially since the crackdown on opposition organizations after the 1960
SharpeviHe massacre, have lived 1n e x i l e .                The clandestine existence of
the SACP for almost four decades has made solid information on i t s a c t i v i -
ties and following inside South Africa d i f f i c u l t to obtain.
      The SACP was formed In 1921 as a breakaway from the Labour Party, a
socialist party with predominantly white members. During its                          early
years the party viewed the South African situation In an orthodox Marxist
framework of class c o n f l i c t . The SACP championed the rights of white
workers against big business - and against attempts to                       replace them
with         cheaper black labour.             However, the party moved gradually, under
prodding from the Comintern, toward a p o l i t i c a l program that placed prio-
r i t y on f u l f i l l i n g black nationalist demands and ending white supremacy,
while retaining the ultimate goal of a classless society led by a vanguard
party. The SACP's increasing involvement in organizing blacks into trade
unions and In recruiting black party members (1500 by the time of Its 1950
banning), many of whom also joined the African National Congress, reflected
 a s k i l l f u l t a c t i c a l reorientation of party strategy to advance Its goals Dy
 capitalizing on black dissent. The South African Congress of Trade Unions
 (SACTU), though not formally subject to the party, in practice functioned
 as its labor arm.                                                                       .
       The African National Congress, founded in 1912. was during the early
 years of its existence an essentially moderate organization dominated Dy
 established members of the small black middle class. It was not until tne
 founding of the ANC Youth League in 1944 that a more activist generation or
 leaders, including communists, joined the ANC. The Youth League stood for a
 new African nationalism still largely middle class in orientation but
  impatient with the conservatism of the old ANC. The current old guard or
 the ANC, including Nelson Mandela and Oliver TamDo, entered politica lire
 through the Youth League. Their nationalist instincts led them initially x
 suspect ANC members affiliated with largely non-black o r j a m a ^ •«
 the SACP. Thus Mandela and Tambo joined an effort in the rnid-1940s
 remove SACP members from the Youth League.                                          -~mtrv
       The caning to power of the National Party in 1948 polarized the coun ry
 racially and politically, overshadowing differences between African n
 nalists and c a m b i s t s . The 1952 election as ANC President of Chief Albert
  Luthuli. later to win the Nobel Peace Prize, made collaborat on more feasi^
  ble. despite Luthuli'8 strong conservative and Christian orlentation^^Tne
  ANC under Luthuli deemphasized African nationalism In fa*~                             f
  racialism, to be promoted by the moral inpact of a peacefucampan of
  civil disobedience. The SACP. working clandestinely since its banning in
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 1950, began to exert significant influence over the ANC. not only through
 individual party Rentiers, but also through the ANC's alliance with SACP-
 infiltrated colored, white and Indian organizations, such as the Coloured
People's Congress, the Congress of Democrats, and the South African Indian
Congress, respectively. These essentially front organizations, despite
their numerically small followings, were given equal representation with
the ANC in an umbrella coordinating council, the Congress of the People,
formed 1n 1954. They were thus able to determine 1n large measure the
course of deliberations leading to adoption of the 1955 Freedom Charter,
which to the present day remains the program of action for the ANC and
affiliated groups.
    SACP members played a significant role in drafting the Freedom Charter,
which dovetailed with the Party's longstanding strategy of promoting
African liberation as the prerequisite to advancing the socialist cause.
The SACP, in adopting the Charter as part of Its short-term goals in 1962,
stressed that it would only be the first step toward creating a true
socialist society. Thus, although some critics of the SACP have accused it
of having a hidden agenda behind its opportunistic alliance with the ANC,
the SACP has made little effort to hide the fact that Its ultimate goal is
a Marxist-Leninist state.
    The Charter was well designed to appeal to a broad range of people. Its
insistence on multiracial ism and the full participation of non-blacks In a
liberated South Africa appealed to non-Marxist white opponents of apartheid
and also to the largely white and Indian members of the SACP who hoped to
transcend racial conflict through the class struggle. The Freedom Charter
held no brief for an orthodox Marxist revolution. It is a nationalist
manifesto focused on the issues of self-determination. Mandela Interpreted
the Charter's call for nationalization of the banks, gold mines and the
land as essential to opening up economic opportunities for the black middle
class. In this, it resembled nationalist policies elsewhere in Africa.
    The SACP's network of contacts In the labor movement, coordinated
through SACTU, remained largely outside the scope of Its relationship with
the ANC. The tight organizational Interlocking between the ANC and SACP
that became evident after 1960 had not yet developed, despite the prominent
role of individual SACP members In ANC policy-making.
    There is no evidence that during the 1950s the SACP tried to recruit new
members on a large scale. As a banned organization, on constant alert
against police attempts to infiltrate informers, the SACP has long eschewed
efforts at mass organization in favor of a strategy of Influencing and
directing other groups.
    A small elitist SACP allied to a larger and more diverse ANC fits the
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Soviet conception of how to Influence events 1n South Africa. An Ideologi-
cally pure SACP loyal to Moscow Is a more readily controllable Instrument
for Soviet influence in the ANC than a SACP with pretensions to a mass
following. Moscow long has shared the SACP's assessment of the ANC as the
major potential catalyst for political change, and It hopes to steer the
ANC In directions favourable to Soviet interests. However, the Soviets
also are aware of the broad range of views In the ANC. Moscow has learned
that It will be no easy task for the SACP to gain ascendancy 1n such a
diverse organization as the ANC.
SHARPEVILLE
   The Influence of SACP members was decisive at another turning point in
ANC history, during the period of banning and Incipient guerrilla activity
In 1960-63. A police massacre of black protesters at Sharpeville In 1960
unleashed a three-year cycle of violence and repression. The ANC and other
black nationalist organizations were banned, and a nationwide state of
emergency was imposed for the first time in South African history.
   The SACP hoped to profit from the situation. In 1962, in Its first
public statement after its 1950 banning the SACP called on Its followers to
work within the Congress Alliance for the first stage of a two-stage
revolution. The party also took the lead in organizing an armed resistance
movement, Umkhonto we S1zwe (Spear of the Nation), into underground cells
throughout South Africa to undertake sabotage and bomb attacks. The
Umkhonto leadership was at first overwhelmingly drawn from the SACP and its
affiliated trade unions. Although Nelson Mandela also played a role in its
founding, the actual direction of armed resistance was carried out largely
by SACP members with little Involvement by the ANC leadership.
   Effective Integration of Umkhonto and the ANC developed only years
later, after the police had either detained their leaders or driven them
into exile.
POLITICS OF EXILE
   Twenty-six years after its banning, the ANC leadership contains many of
the same people, and many of the same Ideological and strategic issues
remain contentious. Oliver Tanbo, a former law partner of Mandela who also
rose through the ANC Youth League became Chairman and later President of
the exiled ANC, maintaining the continuity of the leadership. The position
of non-black SACP members was regularized by a 1969 ANC decision to admit
them to membership though not to executive positions.
   Key issues facing the ANC were typical of those facing any exiled guer-
rilla movement with no immediate prospects of returning home. It had to
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   avoid becoming Irrelevant to developments within South Africa, Maintain
  channels of comnunication to sympathizers, reconcile I t s m i l i t a r y and poli-
  tical pressures on the government, seek International recognition, and deal
  with the role of SACP members and other non-blacks.
      The usefulness of the SACP In f a c i l i t a t i n g ANC access t o          Soviet-bloc
  arms supplies and funding grew steadily during the e x i l e y e a r s .             In addi-
  tion to military aid to Unkhonto, the Soviet connection assured the ANC a
  favorable reception by a world-wide network of front organizations that
  were in many instances well placed to influence International public
  opinion.
      The ANC also began to cultivate 'fraternal' r e l a t i o n s with several
  African 'liberation movements' that also received funds from the Soviet
  bloc. Some, such as the Angolan NPLA, had the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a Marxist
  vanguard party, while others, such as the Rhodesian ZAPU. did not. The ANC
  also developed links to the Liberation Carolttee of the Organization of
 African Unity, and became dependent on Tanzania (and l a t e r Zambia) for
 bases and f a c i l i t i e s . Independent of I t s SACP-Soviet t i e s .
     The ANC-SACP alliance was troubled by a strong undercurrent of African
 nationalism, which in some Instances was focused on resentment of the
 Prominence of non-blacks in the ANC; in other Instances It took the form of
 rejection of comunism as a non-African ideology.                 Such f e e l i n g s played a
 Part in the 1959 breakaway of a faction that formed the r i v a l Pan Africa-
 nist Congress (PAC). Similar tensions and attempted breakaways continued to
 trouble the ANC In e x i l e . The most serious unrest. In 1975, resulted In the
 expulsion or defection of eight leading ANC o f f i c i a l s who protested the
 Prominence of non-blacks In the ANC. It is significant that several d i s s i -
dents in t h i s group had themselves been black SACP members.
     As noted, the SACP has adhered to a long-term t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n taken in
the 1950s to align i t s e l f with the ANC as the most promising means of
organizing a mass movement against the Pretoria government. I t s continuing
tactical comaitment to Freedom Charter principles i s a price It pays for
this alliance. Old-guard ANC leaders repudiated indiscriminate terrorism
against c i v i l i a n s as repugnant to Christian-ethical p r i n c i p l e s . Host SACP
"embers also rejected such methods as damaging to i t s multiracial a l l i a n c e
strategy for transforming the struggle against apartheid Into a war against
capitalist oppression. Pressure from within ANC ranks for indiscriminate
terrorist tactics comes primarily from a younger generation of black
militants.
CURRENT SITUATION
    Tl» decade following the 1976 Soweto r i o t s has led t o new growth oppor-
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tunities for the ANC and also led to a gradual and complex shifting of
relationships within the ANC-SACP alliance.
    The 1975 establishment of HPLA rule In Angola under the protection of
Cuban forces for the first time provided a secure regional base for Soviet-
bloc military assistance to liberation movements In Southern Africa.
Training camps with Cuban and East German trainers were set up in Angola
for Urakhonto He S1zwe recruits. Visits to the region 1n 1977 by Soviet Vice
President Podgorny and Cuban President Castro demonstrated their conmit-
ment to increase military support for the ANC. The Angolan camps also
opened just in time to accommodate many of the South African youths who
began to flee the republic in 1976. These developments sharply reduced the
value of military aid and facilities provided by the OAU in Tanzania and
other African states and reinforced the predominance of SACP members and
Soviet/Cuban advisors in the ANC's military councils.
    A direct result of the sharply increased scale of military support was a
new phase 1n the ANC guerrilla campaign, beginning about 1980 with a series
of spectacular attacks on strategic targets and military personnel. These
attacks - e.g., on a nuclear power station outside Cape Town and on
military headquarters in Pretoria - gave a badly needed boost to ANC
prestige.
    The ANC was well positioned to take advantage of the groundswell of
black protest - which arose largely on its own - against the 1984 con-
stitution, which undermined continuing South African determination to ex-
clude blacks from central political institutions. This groundswell coin-
cided with the upsurge of black trade union growth in the early 1980s and
also resulted In late 1983 1n the creation of the United Democratic Front,
an umbrella organization including several hundred local groups. UDF
 leadership included a large contingent of former ANC members, and the
 government began almost Immediately a series of showcase trials of UDF
 leaders intended to prove that the organization was nothing more than a
 front for the revival within South Africa of the banned ANC.
 SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS
     The position of the South African government with regard to the ANC and
 SACP has fluctuated, partly on tactical considerations. Pretoria, in justi-
 fying suppression of the ANC emphasizes alleged SACP domination. This is
 for Instance, the case with the present state of emergency and accompanying
 security measures. South African officials have also at times emphasized
 the supposed conflict of interests between a SACP subservient to Moscow and
 an 'authentic' African nationalist wing of the ANC.
     This second H n e of the South African government was particularly promi-
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  nent during 1984-85, when rumors were rife of South African feelers to
 elements of the ANC. The SACP reacted with a lam. A typical reaction was
 that of Joe Slovo, a leading white military strategist of the ANC. In a
 June 1985 speech to the Angolan MPLA Congress, he accused Pretoria of
 spreading disinformation in order to wean the ANC from its 'unbreakable'
 alliance with the SACP. The sensitivity of the SACP Indicates genuine
 concern that a more flexible approach by Pretoria could find a favorable
 reception by elements of the ANC.
 CURRENT SITUATION IN THE ANC: ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY
     The ANC's National Executive Ccaaittee, at a July 1985 conference in
 Zambia, began to reassess the new situation created by the unprecedented
 levels of unrest that erupted in South Africa In late 1984. Several NEC
 decisions had important Implications for the position of the SACP.
     The conference admitted non-blacks to full membership, including the
 right to hold NEC positions. This legitimated the long-standing prominence
 of many SACP officials in the ANC alliance. The conference in fact elected
 five non-blacks, all SACP members, to NEC membership.
     The conference also acknowledged the working class as the 'Ideological
 lodestar' of the liberation struggle and called for unity within the trade
union movement - key elements of the SACP perspective.
     The ANC also rejected negotiations unless they were firmly tied to
discussing a transfer of power - quieting SACP worries that elements In the
ANC might cut a separate deal with the South African government.
     The NEC lineup after the 1985 conference gives a rough indication of the
extent of SACP Influence. Roughly half the 30 members are known or suspec-
ted SACP aeaters. Known or suspected SACP members dominate the leadership
of Unkhonto we Sizwe and SACTU, but evidence of SACP membership Is not
conclusive in several cases. Moreover, African nationalism is a strong
competitor with orthodox Marxism In ideological appeal.
ANC/SACP LINKS TO THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF)
     Although the SACP has firmly linked Its future in South Africa to the
fortunes of the ANC, its Interests would be enhanced by gaining Influence
in other groups that work more or less closely with the ANC. These Include
principally the UDF and the black labor unions that have sprung up in the
1980s, largely without reference to or support from the exiled SACTU
structure.
    The South African government has charged that the UDF Is a front for the
ANC and, by extension, for SACP subversion. It also places great impor-
tance on countering alleged efforts by SACTU to infiltrate the labor move-
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ment.
    There Is little reliable evidence on the extent of SACP Influence within
the UDF. This 1s largely due to the disparate and fragmented nature of the
UDF, which has been further disrupted by thousands of detentions since Its
founding. A number of well-known UDF officials have longstanding ANC affi-
liations. A clandestine SACP network of probably modest dimensions Is
believed to exist In South Africa alongside a parallel but distinct network
of ANC supporters. Its Influence on UDF groups undoubtedly varies from
place to place - as does the ANC's. But 1n general the UDF Is characterized
by an even wider range of views than the ANC.
    The Indians and coloreds who are prominent In the UDF organizations In
Natal and the Western Cape appear In many Instances to have links to the
SACP-oHented groups that played an Important role 1n their ethnic communi-
ties before the ANC was banned. SACP Influence 1s probably higher among
these groups than elsewhere.
    To the extent that a generalization can be made, the Influence of the
UDF In the ANC tends to weaken SACP Influence.
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
    The SACP sees Itself as the Leninist vanguard of the working class.
However, the labor movement In South Africa has In recent years developed
without It. In fact, after the passage 1n 1979 of the Industrial Concilia-
tion Amendment which gave legal standing to blacks 1n the government-
regulated labor relations system, the SACP-allied SACTU 1n Lusaka opposed
the registration of black unions. Although trade unionists Initially also
had misgivings over registration and concerns about government regulation
and control, black unions now participate fully 1n the Industrial relations
system and have grown In size and Influence within the constraints of
existing law.
    It was Inevitable that the politidzation sweeping the townships should
 Infect the labor unions, despite their leaders' concern to avoid steps that
could Invite government repression. The formation In late 1985 of the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), with UDF blessing and ANC
approval, hastened this politicization process.
    COSATU 1s a federation of 33 unions. Its smallest numerical component In
worker membership (about 10 percent of COSATU) was from 19 unions closely
 linked to the UDF and heavily staffed with ANC sympathizers. These unions
are mainly general worker unions (not organized on Industrial lines) which
were expected to dissolve themselves over time, as COSATU affiliates all
adopted the Industrial union model. The so-called UDF unions have yet to
dissolve, and some are widely considered to be a possible conduit for SACTU
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 Influence in COSATU. At present, these UDF unions appear t o have Influence
within COSATU disproportionate t o their mastership strengths.
    COSATU's two largest components are the member-unions of the former
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and the Hational Union of
Mineworkers (MUM). FOSATU brought into COSATU a well-trained cadre of
unionists, including a number of non-black Intellectuals who hail generally
from a strain of South African socialism that has evolved away from the
SACP loyalties associated in the 1950s with the unions then a f f i l i a t e d to
SACTU. On the other hand, certain leaders of the 250 000-strong NUN,
COSATU's largest matter, share SACTU's h o s t i l i t y t o the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The NUM has established friendly rela-
tions with the International Miners Organization, the Soviet-sponsored
alternative to the ICFTU-oriented Hiners International Federation.
    Many observers divide the COSATU leadership Into two factions, a numeri-
cally dominant 'worker1st1 faction (mainly in the FOSATU unions) that
favors the continued independence of trade unions and places trade union
Interests above political activism and a ' p o l i t i c a l ' faction that favors
close cooperation with the UDF and the e x i l e liberation movements. Such a
tidy division of COSATU factions probably corresponds t o a complex reality
no more closely than a dichotomy of Communist and non-Connunist elements in
the ANC. Host COSATU members l i k e l y are subject t o competing pulls toward
political activism and economic unionism.
    The question of SACP-SACTU Influence on COSATU cannot be resolved by
examining the personal a f f i l i a t i o n of union leaders. Radical UDF elements,
possibly 1n concert with the SACP or SACTU, have put pressure on COSATU
executive Barters t o take positions more extreme than they might prefer.
Township radicalization has also resulted in pressure and Intimidation
exercised against leaders of the other major black labor federation the
Congress of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), which has steered clear of overt
affiliation with the UDF or the ANC.
    Powerful moderating forces - Including the fear of police repression,
but also the concern of the union rank and f i l e that excessively radical
union activities could threaten their economic gains - will continue to
weigh against COSATU's links with the ANC.
    Broadly speaking, SACTU's goal Is t o steer South African unions away
from affiliation with Western labor organizations. However, SACTU Is far
from control or even significant Influence over the Internal affairs of
COSATU or most of i t s member-unions.
PROSPECTS
    The SACP continues to view Its historical alliance with the ANC as U s
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main hope for winning power in South Africa although Its ultimate agenda
for South Africa - rule by a Marxist-Leninist party loyal to the Soviet
Union - goes far beyond the Freedom Charter.
    The ANC is deeply beholden to the SACP and the Soviet Union (as well as
the Soviet-backed HPLA regime in Angola) for the arms and training that
made possible the upsurge In guerrilla activity that has boosted its pres-
tige In South Africa in recent years. Dependence on Moscow for military
assistance will continue to entrench Party Influence in the ANC and Its
strong representation In the ANC hierarchy.
    Both the old-guard ANC leadership, led by Tambo, and the SACP/SACTU
leadership will be replaced gradually by the younger generation. The
Influence of militant young blacks in Umkhonto we Sizwe 1s likely to grow,
but the SACP will not necessarily reap the benefits of this growth, given
its lack of a mass base and the widespread nationalist feelings that tend
to Increase black's suspicions of a party with such close ties to a foreign
power. On the other hand, if the prospect for negotiations remains bleak
and If a new generation of leaders Increases the emphasis on armed
struggle, the ANC will likely become still more dependent on Soviet-bloc
assistance.
    The SACP appears to have little or no influence on political and labor
groups inside South Africa. This lack of popular support gives non-
comnunist leaders of the ANC considerable counterleverage against SACP
efforts to dominate the group. Nevertheless, SACP members may be able to
operate through Its ANC connections on groups Inside South Africa, over
which the party has otherwise little Influence, 1n directions favourable to
SACP objectives. Such goals may include pressures on union leaders to
concert their activities with UOF militants and to curtail relations with
Western labor organizations.
    The future role of the UDF and the labor movement in shifting alignments
within the ANC alliance remains unclear, but on balance is likely to con-
tribute to diluting SACP Influence.
    If Pretoria reconsiders Its opposition to negotiations or if ANC rela-
tions with Western countries (and hopes for recognition by them) continue
to Improve, serious policy differences could surface within the ANC. The
Internal stability of the ANC and its main political tendency will be
shaped by the extent to which Pretoria tests - or fails to test - its shaky
cohesion. If the South African government pursues a purely repressive
policy, the ANC will be able to enjoy the luxury of postponing or avoiding
the real issues in its own ranks.
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