

## Article

# COSATU, the ANC and the Election: Whither the Alliance?

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South Africa's 'liberation election' of 1994 registered a triumph for the 'Tripartite Alliance', which brought together the African National Congress with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) into a formal relationship. Based upon an organic relationship between the dominant and most progressive stream of the trade union movement and the liberation movement (which had its roots far back in history but which during the late-1980s had enjoyed spectacular success in spearheading resistance against apartheid), the Alliance was viewed from within the labour movement as designed to ensure that a working class bias prevailed in the policies and programmes adopted by the ANC once it became the principal party of government. Although it was always realised that as a governing party the ANC would have responsibilities to its wider support base (which extends far beyond the organised working class) and indeed, that in keeping with its character as a non-racial, inclusive party open to all South Africans, it would have to be committed to pursuing the *national interest*, the Tripartite Alliance was forged to ensure that, henceforth, newly democratic government in South Africa would be labour friendly.

In the event, as we all know now, the relationship between COSATU and the ANC-in-government has not been free of tensions. Most particularly, the ANC's effective abandonment of the progressive Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) – on which it fought the 1994 election – in favour, in June 1996, of the neo-liberal and fiscally conservative Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) continues to be a source of major stress, with COSATU being highly critical both of the substance as well as of the lack of consultation which preceded the adoption of the

new programme. In consequence, COSATU has joined the SACP as the other partner in the Alliance in being openly critical of GEAR, and in so doing has earned the wrath of government, having been publicly dressed down by both President Nelson Mandela and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. Yet, in the run-up to the 1999 election, differences between the various partners in the Alliance appear to have been smoothed over, and COSATU has given its full backing to the ANC manifesto, pronouncing it as biased in favour of workers and the poor. Furthermore, following nomination of some of 20 COSATU union leaders to the ANC's national list in 1994, four additional leading COSATU figures – including present general secretary Mbhazima Shilowa (since appointed premier of Gauteng) and President John Gomomo – ran for parliament in party colours in 1999. For the duration of the election campaign, at least, it would seem that the Alliance is firm and safe – even though COSATU has warned that it wants talks with the ANC before the election to develop a programme for the speedy implementation of the manifesto. In Shilowa's words, such an agreement would ensure that the new government 'hits the ground running from day one' (*Business Day* January 1, 1999).

However, the issue of the quality of the relationship between COSATU and the ANC simply won't lie down that easily. Indeed, it has recently been brought into focus academically by Adam Habib and Rupert Taylor, who argue in the latest issue of the *Review of African Political Economy* (1999:109-15) the virtues of a break in the Alliance. As we will elaborate, they are arguing that only the progressive labour movement has the capacity to forge an effective parliamentary opposition, and thereby to consolidate democracy and ensure a proper hearing for the poor in the corridors of power. However, the present writers believe that Habib and Taylor are reading the political tea leaves peculiarly mechanically, and that – quite simply – their argument has no particular virtue in the political context of South Africa prior to the election of 1999. We are going to argue this in terms of (i) querying their reading of the relationship between COSATU and the ANC since 1994; (ii) proposing, via reference to a recent survey of COSATU member attitudes, that there is as yet little basis amongst workers for any breach in the Alliance; and (iii) suggesting that a fracture in the Alliance is likely to be extremely dangerous in the foreseeable future.

We begin by what we trust is a brief accurate summary of Habib and Taylor's argument.

## **In Favour of Opposition: The Argument for Fracturing the Tripartite Alliance**

Habib and Taylor start not with the state of COSATU-ANC relations but the state of South African democracy. Basically they argue that, whether or not the ANC obtains a two-thirds majority in the 1999 election, that South Africa is stuck with the 'emergence' (1999:114) of a dominant party system.<sup>1</sup> They quite correctly point to the dangers this poses, arguing that for democracy in South Africa to be properly consolidated there is need for a party or parties capable of alternating with the ANC in power, as well as for opposition parties capable of monitoring government performance – the watchdog function. However, whilst strongly contesting the view that the electoral preferences of South Africans are determined by 'race', they argue that the existing parliamentary opposition parties 'are not serious contenders for power because they do not offer policies that would enable them to attract a significant electoral constituency' (1999:111-2). In consequence, they argue that a strong opposition party would only be viable if it were able to 'weave a policy programme capable of attracting the support of a diverse set of constituencies', and in particular 'the growing number of independent African voters' whose political loyalties are demonstrated by survey data which they cite as having become increasingly fluid. To break the mould:

such a party would have to offer a set of socio-economic policies that would attract the support of the lower middle-class, working class, poor and unemployed of all 'racial groups'. This would entail advocating a socio-economic programme similar to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) advocated by the ANC prior to its ascension to office. (1999:112)

In short, the failure to develop a strong parliamentary opposition is not the fault of the electorate, but that of present opposition leaders who are 'incapable of smashing the racial prism through which they view their electoral strategies'. So far, we might say, so good. But it is then, in our view, that they simply begin to push their argument too far.

After reviewing COSATU-ANC relations since 1994, they argue that there are now two views within the Alliance about its future. On the one hand, there is a layer of 'newly ascendant and recently converted' leaders who argue that the ANC's role is a de-racialising one, so that 'the African bourgeoisie and managerial and professional middle classes can have their place in the sun'. For this layer, they argue, an alliance with Inkatha is more

strategic than one with COSATU and the SACP. On the other hand, there is 'the leadership and activist layer of COSATU and the SACP' which is committed to a social democratic economy, and which places its hope in the fact that 'a struggle can still be waged for the heart and soul of the ANC.' It is then, they argue, that 'this latter view seems unrealistic'. Rather than enabling COSATU and the SACP to imprint a developmentalist political economy on the post-apartheid ANC, continued participation in the Alliance has placed increasing pressure upon them to abandon their progressive commitments. In short, precisely because they retain their social democratic ideals and because their natural support base of 'the working class, lower middle class and unemployed' is increasingly politically independent, they are 'well placed to break the racial divide and create a truly non-racial, and thereby viable parliamentary opposition'. This would serve as a counter to the ANC's neo-liberalism, allow the voices of ordinary people to be heard in the corridors of power, and also allow for the consolidation of democracy. But they add (and here is their let out clause) this can be viewed as 'a long-term project that is only likely to fully unfold in the new millennium' (1999:114). Having slowly climbed off the fence throughout the course of their article, they leap back on to it with a jump and a bound in their concluding sentence!

We do not fault the progressive motivation which drives Habib and Taylor's argument. However, we will proceed to suggest they are unintentionally offering a prescription for disaster.

### **COSATU and the ANC after 1994**

Habib and Taylor are quite correct that there are many within COSATU who believe that GEAR was adopted by the cabinet without adequate consultation with the partners in the Alliance, and that its macro-economic substance is actually regressive and unlikely to stimulate pro-poor friendly growth. However, we believe that the jump to the suggestion that there are, as a result (apparently only) two views on whether the Tripartite Alliance should be maintained is simplistic.

The strains and stresses in COSATU's relationship with the post-apartheid 1994 ANC was foreshadowed by *Taking Democracy Seriously: Worker Expectations and Parliamentary Democracy in South Africa* (Ginsberg et al 1995). This analysis and interpretation of COSATU worker attitudes noted (1995:61) that, *inter alia*, COSATU would be faced with a number of strategic questions, viz:

- Should it continue its membership of the Alliance in the hope of delivering what workers expect from the new democracy?
- Should it break from the Alliance on the grounds that the ANC-in-government will be forced to compromise with non-popular and international capitalist forces, and that, therefore, there would be a need for it to become subject to external, popularly-based counter pressures?
- Should COSATU end its alliance with the ANC, the party of nation, but retain its alliance with the SACP, the party of class? Or, should it align to some other party, or seek to create a new workers' party free of Stalinist baggage?
- Should COSATU detach itself from all political parties and devote itself to democratising the political economy from below?
- Should COSATU consider whether a genuinely participatory democracy is attainable within the confines of bourgeois liberal democracy, and if it decides it is not, should it not commit itself to a revolutionary socialist objective?

*Taking Democracy Seriously* did not attempt to prescribe any of these particular options. However – unlike Habib and Taylor – it did keep its feet planted firmly on the ground, noting that the good news for the ANC, as delivered by the 1994 survey, was that there was ‘overwhelming’ worker support for the new parliament, the then Government of National Unity, and for the continuation of the Tripartite Alliance. As we will argue below, that situation shows no sign of changing. But that is to anticipate, for we must also note that our authors have also ignored another major study which followed on from this earlier work.

Rather than focussing directly upon the Tripartite Alliance, Maree (1998) asks whether COSATU workers’ expectations of parliamentary democracy have proved to be reconcilable with the actual way in which that democracy is being practised in the new South Africa. He locates this against the historical evolution of what he terms ‘the COSATU participatory democratic tradition’, and elaborates – on the back of the 1994 and subsequent surveys – how workers generally transferred their understanding of trade union shop-floor democracy directly to their expectations of parliamentary democracy. That is, no less than 68 per cent of respondents in the 1994 survey were of the view that their political party should consult with them on all issues, and when the party made decisions in parliament that affected its supporters it should report back to them each time (1998:40). Meanwhile, whereas fully 94 per cent of workers were of the

opinion that workers would always need trade unions, a bare majority (51 per cent) were of the opinion that they could not rely on parties to protect their interests. Even so, 60 per cent regarded parliament as the best forum for workers to pursue their own interests, with 79 per cent agreeing that the best way to ensure that political parties look after worker interests was to have former trade unionists amongst their parliamentary representatives.

Maree goes on to examine how what he terms this 'limited understanding of parliamentary democracy' apparently led on to some disappointment of worker expectations after 1994, citing further data about popular perceptions of the ANC's poor delivery record. In considerable measure he finds a basis for these disappointments in the nature of the new electoral system, which via adoption of proportional representation had substituted party lists for constituency-based representatives, depriving voters of 'their' particular MPs who could be rendered accountable. He then goes on to explain how COSATU attempted to deal with the emergent problems of accountability by adopting a three-pronged strategy, it resolved to (i) build its capacity to influence and lobby the ANC; (ii) support the ANC component of the GNU; and (iii) resist government decisions that challenged its interest (1998:44). Thereafter, in pursuance of these aims, COSATU came to stress how it intended to 'fortify' its alliance with the ANC by engaging in a dual strategy of mass struggle outside parliament as a complement to struggles internal to parliament and the Alliance. An example was the Labour Relations Act campaign. As explained by one senior official: 'We took it to the streets, but we all knew that it's not going to end up in the streets, because at the end you need a law' (1998:44).

Thereafter, COSATU interacted with the state principally via the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and its improved interaction with parliament. By April 1997, notes Maree, although NEDLAC fell far short of COSATU's expectations, it had reached 21 agreements, including the highly contested negotiations between the state, labour and business over the LRA. Meanwhile, to firm up its relationships with the ANC in parliament, COSATU had opened up a parliamentary office late in 1995, so that it could have a constant pressuring presence in those hallowed quarters. Again, the results of this move were uneven, but by the end of 1996, the parliamentary office was judged as having achieved a number of strategic gains for workers, including the entrenchment of workers' rights in the new constitution, as well having made a host of submissions to parliamentary committees on different issues. But these triumphs were not

merely the result of elite endeavour, for COSATU corporatist and parliamentary initiatives had been backed up by key instances of mass mobilisation: around the LRA, around the constitution, and in 1997 around the Basic Conditions of Employment Bill. These successes did not prevent the later stresses between COSATU and the ANC over GEAR (which Habib and Taylor make their sole focus), but importantly, Maree also goes on to cite Shilowa's refutation of the idea that COSATU should withdraw from the Alliance. The Alliance, according to Shilowa, is not only the main force for transformation and democratisation available to COSATU, but COSATU also has no intention of handing over the ANC to conservative forces

All in all, Maree concludes that 'COSATU has made significant strides in defending and advancing workers' rights and interests in parliament', even though it has not done so in the participatory democratic manner envisaged by the rank and file. In contrast, it has recognised that 'the political terrain is more complex, and that more sophisticated strategies are required' (1998:50).

In sum, Habib and Taylor can be faulted, amongst other reasons, for (i) grossly simplifying the strategic options available to COSATU; (ii) simply dismissing all the different gains achieved by COSATU since 1994 under the formula that the labour movement has been coming under increasing pressure to abandon its progressive commitments; and, as we shall proceed to show (iii) failing to found their arguments upon any reference whatever to the current political attitudes of COSATU workers.

### **COSATU Worker Attitudes in the Run Up to the Forthcoming Election**

A follow up to the 1994 COSATU worker survey was undertaken in late 1998.<sup>2</sup> What is interesting from our immediate perspective is how limited a basis current worker attitudes would appear to offer to the idea of COSATU fracturing the Tripartite Alliance and moving into opposition. The findings that we would like to highlight are as follows:

- The mode of respondents (54 per cent) felt that workers could not rely on political parties to protect their interests. Most workers felt that, whatever the desirability of the Alliance, it was not advisable to place their entire trust in any particular political party. By implication therefore, they were saying that COSATU should retain its distinct identity. Similarly, 93 per cent of respondents said that workers would always need trade unions to protect their interests. However:

- The mode of respondents (57 per cent) also felt that parliament was ultimately the most desirable forum for workers to pursue their interests. In short, they seem to agree with Maree that COSATU's engagement with the first democratic parliament has delivered considerable benefits. At the same time, some 70 per cent indicated the need for workers to maintain strong pressure upon their trade union representatives in parliament. In turn, this belief in the need to render such MPs accountable clearly flows from workers' continued adherence to the shop-floor based notion of participatory democracy. Worker MPs continue to be conceived of as mandated delegates, rather than representatives.
- In accordance with their belief in the efficacy of parliamentary action, approximately 67 per cent of respondents agreed that COSATU's decision to nominate 20 of its leaders to parliament in 1994 (via their placement in electable positions on the ANC national election list) was the correct one. Even so, workers were most certainly divided as to what these former unionists had achieved. The mode (33 per cent) felt that they had managed to represent workers interests, whereas the majority were unsure – although they tended to agree that *inter alia* they had gained useful experience, and worked for redistribution and improved industrial relations. Very few felt that they had achieved little or nothing.
- The overwhelming majority of respondents (72 per cent) agreed that the political party they supported should consult with its constituency on all issues. In contrast, only 59 per cent of respondents said that their shop steward should consult with them every time s/he acted on their behalf. In other words, workers were more inclined to trust their shop stewards than their parliamentary representatives. This would seem to reflect the fact that shop floor democracy is more immediately visible, with well established structures for recall. However, notwithstanding their belief in the efficacy of parliamentary action, it would also seem to reflect workers' wariness about leaving their representatives on too loose a rein. Again, 66 per cent of respondents stated that when a party makes decisions in parliament that affect its supporters, it should report back every time. In contrast, only 59 per cent of respondents felt that when their shop stewards made decisions on their behalf, they should be required to report back. Correspondingly, 77 per cent of respondents felt that if a party did not do what its supporters desired, it should be removed from office, just as 93 per cent claimed the right to dismiss an errant shop

steward should s/he similarly stray. Interestingly, therefore, it seems that whereas workers feel that shop stewards should be granted more immediate local autonomy, this is highly dependent upon their unambiguously pursuing worker interests. The apparent paradox of workers wanting their unionist MPs to report back more intensively than their shop stewards is perhaps indicative of a growing appreciation of the often practical problems of exacting political accountability.

- Alongside their demands for political accountability, the mode of respondents (66 per cent) said that when they voted for a party, their decision was based both on the composition of the leadership and the party's practical policies. Only 11 per cent said that their choice was guided by the leadership alone. Furthermore, over 80 per cent believed that the political party they supported had worker interests at heart. In short, although workers' choice of political party seems to be inextricably bound up with personality (the 'Mandela factor' if you will), trade union members do place a particular importance on their party's perceived ability to adequately represent their specific interests.
- In this context, it is important to note that although the former trade unionists nominated for political office by COSATU have since 1994 been no longer directly accountable to the federation, the Tripartite Alliance remains overwhelmingly popular. Over 70 per cent of respondents said that the Alliance represents the most effective mechanism for safeguarding worker interests in parliament. In contrast, only 13 per cent felt that COSATU should not be politically aligned. Again, as in 1994, there was negligible support (a mere three per cent) for the view that worker interests would be best represented by the SACP on its own. There was similarly little support for the notion of an independent workers' party. Indeed:
- Almost two-thirds of respondents felt that the Alliance should continue and contest the 2004 elections, and only ten per cent of respondents felt that COSATU should form an independent workers' party. Even fewer (four per cent) believed that COSATU should be in alliance with the SACP alone. In short, despite increasing ties between the SACP and COSATU in recent years, the former is not seen as a serious political option by the latter's rank and file.
- Given the above, it therefore does not come as a surprise – despite the conventional wisdom widely expounded about popular attitudes by the mainstream media – that most respondents felt that the ANC government

had delivered in a wide range of areas since the 1994 elections. Indeed, it was only with regard to real wages that a near majority (49 per cent) of respondents felt there had been no improvement since 1994. Otherwise, respondents felt that there had been particularly noticeable improvements in the areas of electricity provision, water reticulation and with regard to access to telephones (in all three areas, well over 80 per cent). Sixty-three per cent stated that they had enjoyed improved access to health care since 1994. Furthermore, over 71 per cent felt that working conditions had become cleaner and safer since the transition, in part probably due to beefed up health and safety legislation. And most respondents ascribed these improvements to the ANC government's actions at either national or provincial levels. To be sure, fully 41 per cent of workers were doubtful whether GEAR had indeed achieved its objectives of 'growth, employment and redistribution', yet only 26 per cent of workers were prepared to condemn it as an outright failure. For the moment at least, COSATU workers are prepared to wait and see, and to give the ANC government the benefit of the doubt.

- Finally, it has to be stressed that, although the loyalty of the majority of COSATU workers to the Alliance and to the ANC is clearly not in doubt, very few respondents indicated that they would be inactive were the government to fail to deliver in the future. In line with established COSATU strategy, overwhelming majorities favoured resorting to mass action in such an event (77 per cent), and/or to putting pressure on union MPs in parliament (89 per cent). There was very little interest in voting for parties other than the ANC, and as already indicated, virtually no support for the idea of the creation of a specialist workers' party.

Where, in sum, does this take us? Space considerations do not allow a more detailed analysis of the survey.<sup>3</sup> However, from our particular perspective, we believe that this preliminary plunge into the 1998 findings indicates that the current COSATU leadership's energetic backing of the ANC in the current election campaign is much more closely in touch with rank and file feelings than those who argue for breaking with the Tripartite Alliance. These findings suggest to us that COSATU workers have an increasingly nuanced and sophisticated set of political attitudes. Many of them do not presume to have a detailed knowledge of the higher institutions and eddies of policy, and many of them clearly harbour doubts about the macro direction of policy under GEAR. Even so, they clearly hold to the opinion that the best deal they are going to get in South Africa is if the ANC

is in power and if COSATU continues to struggle for influence within the Tripartite Alliance. Yet they are not so naive as to believe that the ANC will deliver unless it is continuously rendered accountable. And, no doubt, COSATU workers survey the party political scene in South Africa and reckon that for the workers' movement to cut its links with the ruling party would be to risk the threat of marginalisation.

### **Fracturing the Alliance: Consolidating Democracy or Marginalising COSATU?**

It remains to examine the curious logic which underpins the entire thesis put forward by Habib and Taylor. Our suggestion is that they confuse two quite different arguments.

Let us recap. Habib and Taylor argue that the dominant party system requires the establishment of a strong opposition if 'people's preferences' are to be taken on board by the ruling party. We have no argument with that. However, we do object strongly to their *non sequitur* that because COSATU and the SACP together are (at present) the only faintly viable force which could form such an opposition, that therefore they should break with the Tripartite Alliance in order to allow for the consolidation of democracy. For a start, we have already dealt with their misleading suggestion that COSATU has not had any significant influence on government since 1994. We have also indicated that, quite clearly, COSATU workers themselves do feel very strongly that they have benefitted from the ANC being in power. But going beyond all that, Habib and Taylor are – extremely dangerously in our view – proffering a prescription not for greater influence for COSATU and for the consolidation of democracy, but for the splitting and marginalisation of the South African labour movement. Let us look at some of the principal reasons.

First and foremost, there is a naivety in any suggestion that if the Tripartite Alliance split and if COSATU and the SACP moved into opposition, that they would do so in a coherent fashion. It is scarcely necessary to remind ourselves that the history of the international left is littered with damaging internal splits, where more energy is spent by activists fighting each other than any class or political enemy. In short, if COSATU were to break from the Alliance, it is extremely unlikely (i) that it could take all its cadres with it; or (ii) that it could take even the bulk of the rank and file out of the ANC camp. What we would probably have, instead, is some combination of a split within COSATU and within its

individual affiliates, bitter struggles for ownership of union assets in extremely expensive court room battles, formation by the ANC of a rival union federation, and so on. The very prospect makes one shudder, so much would be thrown away – as reactionary forces would meanwhile move in to exploit (and fund) divisions, reverse labour friendly legislation, and so on. (Note that the United Democratic Movement (UDM) is already talking about forming its own union movement to counter COSATU). And whilst Habib and Taylor would doubtless argue that any such break away would have to be fully debated, and launched upon the basis of a social-movement union-style coalition with other popular forces, let it be remembered that what would go for the labour movement would go for popular movements as well. The ANC would inevitably play the populist card, accuse COSATU of ignoring the plight of the unemployed, accuse it of betraying the liberation struggle, and so on.

Second, whilst we cannot agree with the argument that, at present, the ANC's competitors give little indication that they can forge a viable opposition, it is a misreading to suggest that they view their electoral strategies through a 'racial prism'. Of course, 'race thinking' colours many of their strategies and actions, but simple reference to the New(?) National Party increasingly turning to 'Coloureds' for support, and the launch of the UDM as a party designed to span the chasm between different communities indicates that, whatever their historical and political constraints, the opposition parties are – unevenly, haltingly – realising the need to come out of the laager if they are to effectively confront the ANC. That they fail to do so may be less because they view politics through a 'racial prism' than because of the short-term electoral advantages they see in exploiting the 'politics of identity' (Southall 1998). Of course, this does not mean that the existing parties will claw their way to what progressive opinion would regard as a legitimate non-racialism. Nor does it mean that they will see their way to forging a really effective opposition – in the form of an alternative government – in the foreseeable future. We do not disagree that will constitute a major project for the next millennium. Yet that is scarcely a good reason for recommending that the labour movement should sacrifice its present relatively advantageous position in the political spectrum in order to 'consolidate democracy'.

Third, there must be no doubting that Habib and Taylor underestimate the practical difficulties which would be attached to the launching of a labour-based popular party to counter the ANC. A 'dominant party' is more

than simply a party which wins recurrent elections. Rather, it keeps on winning those elections because it dominates the political economy, the national agenda and so on, as well as the electoral system. And success attracts the financial support needed to win elections. Let's remember that elections are extremely expensive. Indeed, relatively speaking the election in 1994 was, rand per voter, one of the more expensive that the democratic world has yet seen (Southall and Wood 1998). This is not to say that any democratic forces should be discouraged from opposing authoritarianism and championing liberty, democracy and human rights. There is more to the struggle for democracy than the search for financial sponsors. Yet it would be verging on the suicidal for any forces seeking to break away from the Alliance not to take such mundane matters into consideration.

In short, it would only be in exceptional – and probably crisis-ridden – circumstances that COSATU could break from the Tripartite Alliance and form the backbone of a popularly based opposition party which could have a real chance of power. It would seem instead that the present COSATU leadership has got it right: whatever the present limitations on COSATU's influence over policy, the way forward for extending worker rights and pro-poor policies is by remaining within the Alliance, using a combination of mass action and parliamentary lobbying, and forming coalitions with other progressive forces to render the ANC in government accountable.

This is not to say that, at some point in Habib and Taylor's next millennium, that there will not be real strains in the Alliance, and that, at some point, COSATU might have to take drastic action to counter a new authoritarianism. But for the moment, speculation around such a scenario is artificial, dangerous and premature. Habib and Taylor seem to have forgotten one of the most basic rules of the trade union game: Unity is Strength. Rather than wondering how, why and when COSATU should break the Alliance, we should concentrate instead upon how the labour movement can struggle to keep the ANC on track to deliver to its popular constituencies.

## Notes

1. As if 40 years of hegemony by the National Party was not enough to qualify for this epithet. As one of the present writers (Southall 1994) has suggested, it is far more sound to describe a pre-existing dominant party system as having been 'remade'.

2. The survey was funded by the Centre for Science Development. The research team included David Ginsberg (University of Natal), Glen Adler, Christine Psoulise (University of the Witwatersrand), Janet Cherry (University of Port Elizabeth) and Conrad Jardine and Vishwas Satgar (NALEDI) as well as the present writers. Neither the CSD nor the other members of the research team hold any responsibility for the views we are expressing in this article.
3. Refer to Christine Psoulise's (1999) recent article in the *South African Labour Bulletin* for such an analysis.

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