Article

Changing notions of human security in the Southern African region

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Introduction

During the years leading up to South Africa's first democratic election in 1994, and its acceptance as a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the same year, the Southern African region has received substantial scholarly attention. This has come from both within South Africa and further afield.[1] The key issues dealt with include the region's needs and expectations, South Africa's stated commitment, and the objectives of the SADC Treaty, or combinations of the three. The literature has dealt with the question of how and why to get from here to there in terms of regional security and development commitments, and (more recently) why the process has slowed down and gone awry. Increasingly, different analytical perspectives have been utilised, leading to a variety of proposals and recommendations. Surprisingly the 'new' security and development realities of the region bear a remarkable similarity in terms of state priorities, to those of the 1980s.

Our purpose in this article is to point out some challenges for critical human security approaches to the analysis of the political economy of the Southern African region. To this effect, we will contextualise critical approaches to security in International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE), point out the difference between new security and critical human security, and discuss some tensions between the two approaches which we think need to be debated.[2] We will then attempt to relate our critique to the developments surrounding the SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS).

In the area known as security studies (previously strategic studies) which falls within the fields of International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE), a number of broad areas of focus can be identified:

mainstream regional security analysis; 'new' security analysis; critical human security and development; regional integration/co-operation; and gendered approaches to security and development. The differences between these approaches relate to theoretical and methodological assumptions, but also, and more profoundly, to the purpose of theoretical analysis itself. There is at present a considerable amount of conscious territoriality with regard to broader security approaches, although at the same time an overwhelming consensus that realism and neo-realism remain the central conceptual (some might say ideological) framework within which most mainstream security analysts function.

On the 'broader' security front, there is, on the one hand, 'new security' approach as represented by Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School. This approach has gained much favour, not least amongst analysts in influential think-tanks close to government. On the other hand, the most coherent alternative is 'critical security studies' analysis, represented by the Aberystwyth School.[3] Those who follow the second approach have purposefully tried to define an agenda which prioritises descriptions and prescriptions which focus on the ways in which security can be enhanced at the societal level. The central assumption here is that states are not necessarily the best or necessary providers of such security.

In drawing the above distinction, we have found it useful to analyse how the distinctions between these two approaches have led to the appropriation of the 'critical security studies' academic discourse into 'new security studies' approaches (mostly by way of a discernible linguistic turn), and how this has led to the repackaging of old government priorities. We also raise the concern that it is perhaps the way in which some 'critical security studies' approaches have been framed which allows for this appropriation to take place. This is because some 'critical security studies' approaches turn on a 'state-society' nexus which assumes a strong state, or at least a state which has a policy stance which is felt by all 'citizens'. We argue that this is not necessarily the case in the Southern African context, as the crisis in the Congo illustrates.

Our guiding premise is encapsulated by Krause and Williams who argue that:

> We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation

of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather
than the outcome of timeless structures. (1997:50)

This quotation highlights both the need for the prioritisation of the
historically-grounded subject, as well as the need for critical reflexivity on
what we ourselves as 'critical security' academics are saying (as well as
who is listening and why). The second 'need' identified is crucial given that
broader issues of security (as well as the emancipatory dynamic of focusing
on societies) have been absorbed into the policies of SADC member states
at the level of policy statements. The same (old) policy practices continue,
nevertheless, cloaked in the veil of political 'correct-speak'. Before turning
to this discussion, we begin by giving a brief historical overview of
SADC's origin and development, to indicate how the organisation's security
agenda has (ostensibly) been broadened.

SADC: historical background

SADC's origins lie in its predecessor, the Southern African Development
and Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which was formed in 1980 with
the objective, inter alia, to lessen the region's economic dependence on
apartheid South Africa, but also on the industrialised states of the so-called
north. The original members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined
after independence in 1990, followed by South Africa in 1994. The most
recent members to join were Mauritius (1995), Seychelles and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1997). Until 1992, SADCC's
institutions were based on a *Memorandum of Understanding* (1981) between
the member states and it was therefore not a treaty-bound organisation.

The SADCC initiative originated from within the former Frontline
States (FLS) group. The latter was a political association, formed in the
early 1970s to co-ordinate policies, particularly those pertaining to the
liberation struggles against the white minority-regimes in the region.
Tanzania and Zambia were the original members, later joined by Angola,
Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The latter's independence
(as a more industrialised state) was seen as an opportunity to attract more
foreign donor aid to the region. Hence the idea to organise a Southern
African Aid Co-ordination Conference.

At a meeting of the FLS in 1979, Mozambique suggested that a mechanism
should be put in place for more formal co-operation around regional
development issues, and particularly, for the creation of a transport network
which would reduce dependence on South Africa. These factors, and the

need to draw newly-independent Zimbabwe into the fold, led to a declaration (*Southern Africa: towards economic liberation*) by the leaders of the FLS (which was also signed by Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) on April 1, 1980, and the formation of SADCC (Mandaza and Tostensen 1994:4-13).

The initial approach chosen to enhance economic co-operation between the member states was one of project co-operation and development co-ordination rather than market integration. The guidelines for the process designed to reduce economic dependence, establish links between member states to move towards regional integration, co-ordinate national and regional policies, and promote international involvement in the economic liberation of the region were contained within a *Programme of Action*, also adopted in 1980.

This functionalist approach was adopted to initiate increased co-operation and a move towards eventual integration. Member states were expected to submit nationally-based (within specific sectors) projects which would also contribute towards regional objectives. Pursuant to this, states were allocated sectors to co-ordinate in which they were perceived to have a particular national interest, thus giving them more of an incentive to effectively co-ordinate policies, strategies and priorities in the area for which they had regional responsibility. Individual states were assigned responsibility for funding and implemention while at the regional level, SADCC/SADC would ensure that projects conformed to regional objectives and criteria. It would also secure co-operation from international partners through its Annual Consultative Conferences (ACC) (Mandaza and Tostensen 1994:31-34).

The sectors and subsectors allocated to member states are at present energy (Angola); agricultural research and livestock (Botswana); production and animal disease control (Lesotho); environment and land management, as well as water (Malawi); inland fisheries, forestry and wildlife (Mauritius); tourism (Mozambique); culture and information, plus transport and communication (Namibia); human resource development (Swaziland); industry and trade (Tanzania); labour and employment, as well as mining (Zambia); food, agriculture and natural resources (Zimbabwe). South Africa (after joining in 1994) was allocated the finance and investment sector. Member states are required to fulfil their regional sectoral responsibilities through nationally-based Sector Co-ordinating Units (SCU's) (Bertelsmann 1998:183-4).

Because the initial project approach resulted in projects more in the national interest of member states than that of the region, steps were taken in 1987 to ensure more efficient co-ordination between the sectoral policies of the member states which would, in turn, enhance regional trade. The political changes initiated in South Africa in 1990, as well as the increasing stress on trade competitiveness within the global political economy, led to SADCC shifting its emphasis from development co-operation to trade (and development) integration. This was the motive of the theme document *SADCC: Toward Economic Integration*, and was given effect to by *The Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community*, signed on August 17, 1992.

The principles underlying the treaty are: co-ordination of member state policies to attain 'sustainable development', sovereign equality of member states, solidarity, peace and security, human rights, democracy and rule of law, equity, balance and mutual benefit.

Article 5 of the treaty sets out the following objectives:

- achieving development and economic growth, alleviating poverty, enhancing the standard and quality of life of the peoples of the region and supporting the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- evolving common political values, systems and institutions;
- promoting and defending peace and security;
- promoting self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the inter-dependence of member states;
- achieving complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
- promoting and maximising the productive employment and utilisation of the region's resources;
- achieving the sustainable utilisation of natural resources and the effective protection of the environment; and
- strengthening and consolidating the longstanding historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.

To achieve these objectives, *Article 22(1)* of the treaty made provision for the conclusion of a number of protocols to 'spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for co-operation and integration'. To become operational, such protocols must obtain the approval of both the Summit and the Council of Ministers, as well as ratification by two-thirds of member states.

Protocols accepted to date by the Summit have dealt with: Immunities and Privileges; Shared Water Systems; Energy; Combat of Illicit Drug Trafficking; Transport, Communications and Meteorology; Trade; Education and Training; and Mining. Of these, all but South Africa, Mauritius and the DRC have ratified the Immunities and Privileges Protocol. In fact, South Africa has ratified only the Shared Water Systems Protocol. The Protocol on Trade, which aims to establish a free trade area in the region within eight years of ratification and was signed at the June 1996 summit meeting in Gaborone, has only been ratified by Botswana, Mauritius and Tanzania. (Botswana is actually the only member to have ratified all protocols.)[5]

The Gaborone summit also recommended the separate institutionalisation of the controversial SADC OPDS to replace the defunct FLS. Currently, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) is the main operational arm of the Organ. The committee consists of a ministerial council and officials from the traditional security establishments of member states (defence, security and intelligence) and is chaired on a rotational basis by the ministers of defence of member states. It is, therefore, strongly influenced by 'old' security practitioners (Malan and Cilliers 1997:2).

The Organ's principles, however, do allow for a broader or 'new' conceptualisation of security which includes, inter alia, the peaceful settlement of disputes, military intervention only when all other means have been exhausted, the attainment of regional peace, solidarity and security, and the promotion of regional economic development which takes into consideration equity, balance and mutual benefit. One of the objectives states that the Organ aims to 'promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security'.

On the face of it, SADC's revised development and security objectives and principles, as reflected in the Treaty, appear progressive. The extent to which these changes have been informed by shifts in academic discourses internationally and regionally is explored below, as well as the extent to which the revised initiatives themselves have affected regional development and security dynamics.

Critical thinking on security in International Relations

Many repetitive meta-theoretical analyses of the IR discipline and its weaknesses have been undertaken. Its most obvious characteristic has been the dominance of one perspective, realism (and its more economically-orientated variant, neorealism). The end of the Cold War seemed to presage

a theoretical opening, but a decade later it is unclear as to whether this has done much to change the nature of the dominant meta-narratives in IR/IPE.

One area where there has been an attempt to develop new thinking has been security studies. Buzan's (1983, 1992) attempts to expand notions of security horizontally to include aspects other than simply the political and military security of states triggered a post-Cold War wave of 'new' and critical human security thinking which has attempted to extend this conceptualisation vertically to embrace communitarian aspects. This involves conceptualising security across borders and from the 'bottom-up', especially within the 'developing' world context. To this extent, previously hidden insecurities (of marginalised groups within and between states) have emerged more clearly. As pointed out in the introduction, however, 'new' security approaches need to be seen as distinct from 'critical security' studies, even though both profess to have an 'emancipatory' dynamic.

These developments in academic discourse, and the adoption of 'new security-speak' by practitioners, have had a limited impact in terms of addressing regional insecurities. We argue that this is, to a large extent, the result of the fact that the (regional) security agenda continues to be dominated by traditional (neorealist) security issues. It is, however, also related to the ways in which emancipatory critical security thinking is structured, as well as the generality of its content, which has tended to allow some of its aspects to be appropriated into policy discourses. This has been made even easier by the 'new security' approaches which have retained the state as the legitimate locus of security provision and which ascribe to some of the same 'emancipatory' principles as 'critical security' studies, such as a focus on human security. This has of course, been very convenient for policy-makers, as the following discussion makes clear.

Besides the distinction between 'new security studies' on the one hand, and 'critical security' on the other, there are also a range of approaches within the latter. The major debate revolves between those who ascribe to a universalistic conceptualisation of epistemology (Habermasian Critical Theory; with a capital 'C' and 'T') and those who embrace diversity (postmodernism and critical approaches with a small 'c'). Jean-Francois Lyotard (1993) has gone so far as to say that to be truly postmodern, we should do away with the search for universal explanatory meta-narratives and concentrate instead on localised narratives. This is seen by postmodernists, and some strands of feminism, as the only way to get

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around the phenomena of academics speaking on 'behalf of' societies about which they know little or nothing in terms of empirical research.

While the need for more rigorous empirical work cannot be discounted, critical feminist approaches which, amongst others, have begun to explore the potential of postmodern approaches, have also pointed out the drawbacks of dealing solely with localised narratives, the call for which is a kind of meta-narrative of its own. Another relevant critique levelled at post-modernism is the lack of cognisance by Lyotard and others, of (inter)national structural influences on the content of localised narratives. The linkage between larger legitimating meta-narratives and localised narratives, we would argue, is central to properly contextualising and understanding them. It is within this context that the term 'developing' has been conditioned and disciplined by a dominant knowledge discourse, the standard of which is set by those societies described as 'developed'.

Within IR/IPE, the notion of a dominant international knowledge (ideology) structure has been derived from Gramsci (1978). His conceptualisation of hegemonic knowledge, or what is called here dominant meta-narratives, is located within the nation-state. Cox (1981, 1987), Gill (1991), Gill and Law (1988, 1989) and Strange (1988, 1991) have extended this concept to the international sphere. Gramsci's original argument was that traditional intellectuals (that is those with a high degree of formal education in the natural and social sciences) acted as 'functionaries' of the superstructure of the state, and exercised 'subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government' (Gramsci 1978:12).

The focus on knowledge as a conceptual base for the contextualisation of the critique of dominant perspectives on security and development in the Southern African region allows for an emphasis on how dominant ideas affect and constrain understandings of social relations. It is clear that in the realm of security, the dominant metanarrative of neorealism, derived largely from the international knowledge structure, continues to dominate at both academic and policy level. While new security thinking and critical security language (note language, not approach) have permeated the policy-making discourse, this has simply occurred in ways that legitimise state authority and its monopoly on force and violence.

In this regard, and in the interests of critical reflexivity, some important questions need to be revisited and the directions which they may presuppose highlighted. What does security mean and for whom? What form should it take globally and within the region? These questions are particularly

problematical: the latter presupposes that a common vision of a community, or communities, can be arrived at, as well as a path to get there, while the former presupposes that security which focuses on subjects can be defined both generally and specifically (across class and ethnic lines for example, as well as across boundaries, perhaps even continents).

'New Security' and 'Critical Human Security' approaches to regional analysis

To recap: the major difference between 'new security thinking' and 'critical human security' is that the former expands the security agenda to include non-traditional issues,[6] while the latter does the same but includes the notion of transformation and emancipation in ways which privilege the subjects of security across borders (both analytical and territorial) rather than states. Secondly, while 'new security thinking' emphasises the inclusion of more dimensions of insecurity, it concludes that the state is ultimately responsible for addressing these 'new' threats. Both approaches stress that humans should be the ultimate focus of security and not necessarily states which are often the source of human insecurity.

Buzan's (1983, 1992) expansion of security to include an economic, environmental and societal dimension (in addition to the more traditional military and political dimensions) has been steadily incorporated into theory, to such an extent that Solomon (1998) describes it as having evolved from a marginalised to a dominant discourse. It has also been accepted (on paper) by practitioners. It is quite clear, to take our regional example, that the principles of the OPDS reflect new security thinking. A major South African security think tank, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), also endorses and promulgates the premises of new security thinking. Its mission statement emphasises that it aims 'to enhance human security in Africa'. It also accepts the vertical extension of security in that it seeks to 'inform decisions on critical areas of individual, national, regional and international security'. On the surface, this seems quite an achievement when one considers that many of the Institute's staffers are former South African Defence Force (SADF) officers. Research output, therefore, includes looking at non-traditional issues such as crime, drug-trafficking, water and migration in the region.

'Critical human security' analysis applied to the Southern African region is reflected in the work of Booth (1994), Vale (1996, 1997), and Booth and Vale (1995, 1997) who have drawn on the changes in IR discourse to re-examine security issues in the post-Cold War system of the

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1990s. They would probably agree that there is nothing new about 'new' security. Societal security has long been underplayed in the IR discipline which has, as stated earlier, been dominated by the realist/neorealist discourse. It seems that academic discourse has followed world events. The focus on 'non-traditional' issues can largely be attributed to the global changes we have witnessed during the course of the 1990s, for instance, the end of bipolarity and the constraints put on state autonomy by the demands of the global market.

A broader conceptualisation of security, therefore, which examines security dilemmas which extend beyond the borders of the state, within a regional or global context must be taken to mean something more than '...the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile' (Buzan 1992:207). Booth, for example, highlights the importance of the communitarian (but non-state centred) aspect of this way of thinking:

> ...the referent object of 'security' should no longer be almost exclusively the state...but should also encompass the individual human being at the lowest level and world society at the highest. The traditional strategic studies notion of security should become broader and synonymous with the peace research concept of positive peace. (1991:341)

This conceptualisation enables us to focus on the issue of societal security in developing countries. A point which is also emphasised by Bryant within the context of Southern Africa who argues that: '...one cannot uncouple security policies from those of development' (1988:9).

Booth also stresses that the military, economic, political, societal and environmental aspects of (in)security overlap in the developing world:

> Burdened by debt, environmental problems, ineffective administrative structures, ethnic divisions and weak economies, the systems of many Third World countries are overloaded. The future threatens to be one of yet further poverty, economic and political instability, social dislocation, and the ever present possibility of internal violence. (1991:9)

Recent events in Southern Africa and the Great Lakes region seem to bear testimony to this description of a multi-dimensional and interlocking security matrix.

These expanded notions of security have been welcomed by policy makers in the region, even if the non-traditional issues (economic, societal, and environmental) have not always been prioritised.[7] Critical security

analysts, will, in the light of the points raised thus far, have to confront two problems. The first is the appropriation of 'new security thinking' and 'critical security' language into the 'mainstream narrative'. As has been noted above, this is reflected by the shifts within mainstream security analysis in South Africa. The second central problem which critical theorists face (and sometimes try to sidestep) is the problem of war. While Walker has stated that '...the principle of state sovereignty denies both the possibility and the desirability of talking about humanity as such' (1990:12), it is undeniable that talking about humanity as such does not allow us to escape from the brute realities of wars such as the conflict in the Great Lakes region.

Gendered critical approaches also highlight the extent to which democracy, openness, and/or legitimate authority apply differently to different groups inside the state (showing the normative and gendered aspect of interpretations of justice clearly). Peterson stresses that:

> the state is...a 'bearer of gender' by reference to male domination of the top personnel of states and to the cult of masculinity among these personnel... The state is complicit 'directly' through its selective sanctioning of non-state violence, particularly in its policy of 'nonintervention' in domestic violence. It is complicit 'indirectly' through its promotion of masculinist, heterosexist and classist ideologies – expressed, for example, in public education models, media images, the militarism of culture, welfare policies and patriarchal law. (1992:31-64)

In Southern Africa, this is evident among women (although women who are on the margins of power socio-spatially as well as structurally are arguably at the margins of the margins) but also among a good proportion of men too. Socialisation and the masculinist nature of state politics weakens the grass-roots movement's ability to exercise relational power to change this discourse. At the level of the meta-narrative, the presumptions of realism portray a state-centric view of political/military security, this then predominates as the most important referent by which governments should measure their legitimacy as states, and their status as states in the region.

(Critical) reflections on 'Critical Security Thinking' on the State

As critical human security analysts, we (correctly) problematise the state as a source of insecurity in Southern Africa. But when we prescribe solutions which require us to move beyond the borders of the state we must be sensitive to context and history. The question that one needs to start with

is: why are states in the region (and the rest of Africa) sources of insecurity? Are they sources of insecurity because they do not have the capacity to govern their societies? In this case, the answer would be to prescribe policies which strengthen the autonomy and the predominance of the state vis-à-vis society in the region. Such a state-centric solution is, however, one of the major problems which the critical security school has with new security thinking.

Another possible answer is that states in the region are sources of insecurity because they are 'predator' states who, through their control over their societies, have managed to extract wealth for the personal gain of state incumbents. This would lead us towards an argument which prescribes better and decentralised governance and more inclusiveness. In other words, it would imply strengthening the role of 'civil society' (regionally) and reducing the role of the state. In the parlance of 'critical security', this means moving toward a situation where the state is 'taken out' and societal networks are focused on to enhance human security.

Providing the answers to these questions requires that we start with context and history, and then move on to analyse the possibilities of change and transformation, ending up with feasible prescriptions. This approach is illustrated in the work of Cox (1981, 1987) as a method of studying change in the global political economy. First, a synchronic 'snapshot' is taken which attempts to provide a contextual and in-depth description/ explanation of the state/society/world order matrix at a given point in time. Once this exercise is completed, the diachronic method requires us to focus on change, and the potential for change: 'This diachronic moment seeks out the contradictions and conflicts inherent in a social structure and contemplates the characteristics of emerging social forces and the nature and extent of structural change that is feasible' (Sinclair 1996:8).

Whether the state in Southern Africa is the major source of human insecurity, or whether it is other societal actors, and what strategies people use to address threats to their security are questions which will lead to different answers. For instance, some states in Africa have already, for all intents and purposes, been 'taken out' and are on the periphery of direct threats to security. In some cases, we find juridical sovereign states, which, in terms of other aspects of 'statehood', exercise very limited or no societal control whatsoever. Here we find that people use strategies of disengagement and engagement towards state actors to satisfy material and non-material security needs. What emerges here is the 'shadow state', a term used by

Reno (1995) in a study on the state and corruption in Sierra Leone to illustrate alternative networks which play themselves out in, for instance, informal markets. The state ends up being one among many contenders who want to exercise societal control and who offer to address the material and non-material security needs of society. Migdal (1988) describes this 'snapshot' as being one characterised by a weak state and a strong society.

This seems to be the pattern in many African states today. Cornwell (1999), drawing on the work of Clapham (1996), points out that changes in the global political economy (for instance, the end of the Cold War and the integrative market dynamics of globalisation) have made it more difficult for state incumbents in Africa to use external support to maintain their grip on power. The events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo seem to fit this mould. There are other cases where the answers are different and which illustrate the importance of using the synchronic and diachronic method. For instance, in a comparative analysis of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, Du Toit (1995) concludes that Botswana is a strong state with a strong society. Leaving aside the question of whether it would enhance the human security of the Batswana if we prescribed a 'stateless' solution, the point is that in many cases (Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) the 'state' is whoever is in charge of the capital. Perhaps we should be willing to consider in critical human security that the problem is not necessarily the state, but rather the form or type of state.

The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS)

The initial enthusiasm of critical security writing on the need for human security in the region has begun to evaporate somewhat in the face of regional wars. This is somewhat perplexing for those emphasising emancipation because it leads everyone right back to neorealism's central focus, viz the political-military security of the state (or more correctly, its incumbents). How have regional dynamics responded to shifts in the security metanarratives and narratives discussed earlier? Initially the signs looked good, as SADCC became the SADC, and shifted goals towards 'development integration' and other forms of security, primarily socio-economic, which were included as part of the organisation's objectives and principles.

With the transformation of SADCC into SADC, it was felt that the FLS needed to be replaced with something more appropriate to the post-apartheid region. Initially, an Association of Southern African States

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(ASAS) was proposed. Finally, after much deliberation the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) officially replaced the FLS. The Organ's role, function and objectives were originally intended to go beyond traditional security issues (see above), so the potential of the new institution to undermine SADCs original developmental role was not readily grasped by many South African analysts and policy makers.

Despite South Africa's pronouncements on the need for a more human rights-based foreign policy and an equitable regional approach, discussion documents published by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) showed clearly that they, and related departments (eg Defence and Trade and Industry), retain a strong national-interest orientation. The proposed Organ was in fact, first mooted by South Africa. In the DFA's first discussion document (*Draft Discussion Document on a Framework for Cooperation with the Countries of the Southern African Region* 1996:12) includes the following on the Organ:

> Although it is not foreseen that South Africa will be coordinating the Organ, its participation in the Organ will necessitate strong leadership and guidance in the process...the Department of Foreign Affairs will play a coordinating role between the other concerned line-function departments in the design, establishment and running of the Organ, especially with regard to the translation of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee to become one of the institutions of the Organ.

The documents, as well as the public discussions which followed, clearly underlined the hegemonic aspirations of South Africa's foreign policy, although the attempt to couch this 'diplomatically' is evident from an analysis of the proposed policy framework. The Draft Document referred to above also has a second section in which a new 'National External Security Strategy' (NESS) is proposed. Here, it is abundantly clear that South African state departments remain caught in a state-centric understanding of security. For example, the section entitled *Protecting and Promoting South Africa's National Interests in a Competitive World* (DFA 1996:17) states:

> South Africa's diplomatic, intelligence, and defence capabilities are among a spectrum of instruments available to protect and promote its national security. Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy must therefore be used to create a favourable international environment for the active promotion and protection of South Africa's security interests.

The prioritisation of a political/military horizontal approach to security, even in its supposedly 'transformed' context, is transparent. The Organ and

its attached more military-orientated institutional operational arm (the ISDSC) have provided an outlet and opportunity for the more traditional South African security practitioners (the new incumbents as well as those from the apartheid state). According to South Africa's initial proposal, the foreign affairs ministers of member states would accept responsibility for the steering of the Organ. In other words, it was to have a base at the Council of Ministers level within SADC and defer to the Summit when necessary. However, a second (parallel) Council of Ministers is against the rules of the SADC Treaty. The Organ, therefore, functions at the summit (heads of state) level. As a result SADC has two summits and, ostensibly, two main goals – political and economic development and integration. Currently, political and military security issues dominate the regional agenda, in spite of SADC's broadened security objectives.

While the former FLS and SADCC managed to present a common regional front, the new SADC, incorporating the more heavyweight OPDS, has tended to unravel fragile allegiances. Zimbabwe's President Mugabe has shown that he is prepared to sacrifice any semblance of regional coherence when it comes to political/military issues. Zimbabwe (and other SADC member states) did not support former South African President Mandela's position on Nigerian human rights violations in 1996. This rift in SADC has again been exposed in the crisis in the Great Lakes region. The events since August 1998 to the present show how regional leadership rivalries preclude the sort of borderless community of which critical theorists have spoken so much.

A narrative account of the DRC conflict and its effect on SADC

The rivalry between former South African President Mandela and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe ensured that the ODPS became embroiled in regional conflict in a manner which was not initially foreseen. Rather than acting as an institutional mechanism to facilitate conflict resolution, the SADC Organ has been used by Mugabe to legitimise armed intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The tensions began surfacing towards the end of 1997 when Mandela sent a tersely worded letter to Mugabe in his capacity as Chair of the Organ to the effect that if the dual summit issue was not resolved satisfactorily, South Africa would feel it necessary to relinquish the SADC chair. The debate (ostensibly) revolved around a leadership rivalry within SADC, but the root-cause was undoubtedly a perception by other member states that South Africa was attempting to forge a hegemonic political role in the region and should be prevented from doing so.

Mandela did not carry out his threat, but since August 1998 the threat posed to the DRC's Laurent Kabila by a rebellion supported by neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda brought the rivalry between Mandela and Mugabe out into the open again. Mugabe snubbed Mandela's efforts to resolve the conflict through negotiations and sent troops into the DRC to support Kabila. This action divided SADC over the question of whether military interference in a member state could be justified in terms of SADC's objectives and principles. Namibia and Angola assumed interventionist stances and also supplied troops to aid Kabila. Other SADC states either remained neutral or avoided taking sides against South Africa's attempts to forge a peaceful solution.

Almost from the time of the successful takeover of power by Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) in May 1997, the DRC had harboured the possibility of becoming a regional flashpoint. The takeover was supported by Rwanda's Tutsi-led government which had come to power in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Kabila's democratic track record subsequent to his coming to power was dubious. He came under severe criticism for interfering with the UN investigation into the massacre of Hutus by Tutsis in eastern Zaire. A Tutsi-led rebellion was suppressed in February 1998, but in August of the same year the Alliance for Congolese Democracy (or the Congolese Democratic Movement) mounted a 'second rebellion' against Kabila's government. The rebels initial advance was rapid and they captured the key towns of Goma, Bukavu, the Banana naval base and Muhanda port. Analysts were predicting that it would only be a matter of weeks before Kabila was ousted. It was the intervention of Zimbabwean, Angolan and Namibian troops which halted the advance on Kinshasa itself (Mills http://www.bday.co.za/98/0818/comment/e1.html).

The intervention and the manner by which the decision to send in troops was made a bone of contention between the chair of SADC (Mandela) and the chair of the Organ (Mugabe). Mandela, after the decision to intervene militarily had been made at a meeting of SADC Defence ministers in Harare (August 18, 1998), criticised Mugabe openly and called for a ceasefire, followed by negotiations at a SADC emergency summit on August 23, 1998. Ten days later, Mandela announced that the military intervention had the support of all SADC member states. Furthermore, at the 18th SADC Summit Meeting (Mauritius, September 13-14, 1998) the final communiqué approved of the intervention and commended Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia for their actions (Malan 1998:6-7).

South Africa's attempt to launch a twin-track (but dialectical) peace process was initially treated with scorn and ridicule by Mugabe. He refused to attend the meeting which had been organised by South Africa's Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki. In a terse statement, Mugabe maintained that 'SADC met and took a decision through its defence ministers (last week in Harare) and that decision is being implemented so we cannot go back on that decision'. Prior to the meeting, Mugabe is reported as having said '... those who want to keep out, fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help' (August 21, 1998). During the same week, Mandela's official pronouncement was 'our attitude is clear in regard to this problem. It is not to worsen the position by sending in a military force' (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/19980822.html).

While Mandela, Mbeki and Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo continued to try to broker a peaceful settlement, it soon become clear that the move by Mugabe (as chair of the Organ) to intervene had paid off. Mandela's open endorsement of the military intervention initiative during the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Conference hosted by South Africa (August 29 – September 3) and the fact that no mention was made of the DRC crisis in any NAM communique or resolution affirmed this.

Nonetheless, Mandela and Mugabe remained at loggerheads. SADC member states appeared to be moving towards a more unified approach to negotiations in late October 1998, but this was followed after the fall of Kindu by contradictory statements from Mandela and Mugabe. Mugabe pledged his support to Kabila by stating that the war needed to be taken east (towards Uganda) so as to support the 'sovereignty' of the DRC. During the same week, Mandela announced a renewed peace initiative.

The reasons for the rebellion and the consequent armed intervention are contested by analysts. Some characterise the rebellion as a 'Rwandan invasion' (the Zimbabwean viewpoint), while others point to the complexities of the overlapping ethnic and political animosities interlaced with the vestiges of contradictory colonial and neocolonial authority structures which characterise the Great Lakes region (Mamdani in *Sunday Independent*, August 30, 1998). The interventions by Zimbabwe and Angola have been variously attributed to attempts to buttress the power of state incumbents, as well as to Zimbabwean financial and commercial interests in the DRC. In Angola's case, its need to protect the oil producing enclave of Cabinda, and the neutralisation of Unita bases inside the DRC, have been cited.

The crisis has dragged on now for years despite numerous initiatives by various actors to resolve the conflict. These include a draft cease-fire agreement arrived at in Lusaka in July 1999. It made provision for the cessation of hostilities (24 hours after signing), the deployment of a peacekeeping force by the United Nations in collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity, the formation of a Joint Military Commission (made up from all the belligerents) to keep the peace until the UN force arrives, and the start of a process of dialogue between the DRC and the two main rebel groups. It has not been fully implemented and the war has dragged on into the new millennium.

These failed attempts have served to emphasise the fragility of Southern Africa's political coherence and have underlined the manner by which 'national interest' differences and personal rivalries have been played out through the Organ. Originally intended to broaden the notion of security, it has instead been used to justify a military intervention which does not pass the test of the United Nations Charter. The latter, according to Malan (1998:9), clearly states that no regional grouping 'may...undertake any military enforcement action without the specific authorisation of the Security Council'. South Africa's initial refusal to endorse the decision made by the SADC Defence Ministers in Harare was undermined by Mandela's volte face, and its own subsequent military intervention (with the belated aid of Botswana) in Lesotho under SADC auspices. This has led to speculation that the real reason for South Africa's non-interference stance was its tacit support for Rwanda and Uganda's involvement in the DRC conflict.

Conclusion

The heads of government of the SADC member states have institutionalised and attempted to reshape the security objectives of the region through the SADC Treaty of 1992 and its subsequent protocols. The DRC crisis illustrates that, while ostensibly 'broadening' the security narrative, the SADC's objectives and principles have been used to further the narrowly defined interests of state and non-state actors.

The institutionalisation of the OPDS in 1996 was, in effect, the harbinger of the separation between security (broadly defined) and development. While paying lip service to a wider notion of security in its stated principles, the Organ institutionalised the separation of political/military from economic/security factors – effectively displacing the importance of emphasising the connection between them in the region. While some

mention was made of broadening notions of security horizontally, this has clearly failed in practice.

While neorealist and neoliberal metanarratives underpin and dominate the theory and practice of the regional political economy, member states of SADC have little incentive actively to engage with and strengthen civil society. Yet, it is precisely within the marginalised social groups in the region (commercial and non-commercial peasants, the urban unemployed) that the potential for transformation lies. The irony of the situation is that in the end the legitimacy of governments in the region no longer depends on an externally-conceptualised notion of state sovereignty or legitimacy, but will depend on whether the human security needs of the region's marginalised groups are addressed. To this effect, critical human security analysis should focus more on how these groups interact with the state, within the region, and how they perceive the region's 'regionness'. This could lead to practical suggestions as to how human emancipation can be achieved in a region where (weak) states and non-state actors pursue their own interests under the SADC mantle.

What also emerges from this analysis is that while critical human security analysts stress the need for a borderless, prosperous region and some sort of Kantian regional communitarianism on the theoretical level, in practice state leaders remain concerned with reaffirming territorial borders. On the ground, regional human security has not been influenced by the critical academic discourse, possibly because such analyses have reflected ivory-tower visions rather than the actual social dynamics of the region. This is not the equivalent of an admonition to ourselves to go out and find the 'truth' but rather to say that the disjuncture between theory and praxis is acute. Critical human security theory will have to build a high degree of reflexivity into its examination of the ways in which state structures, and the social forces which mediate its power, function within the region. It will also have to show that analysts have more to offer than their armchair dreams.

Notes
1. See for instance, Booth (1994), Booth and Vale (1995 and 1997), Carim (1995), Cilliers (1996), Davies (1992, 1994, and 1997), Du Pisani (1992), Hull (1996), Keet (1994), Lieberman (1997), Leysens (1998), Maasdorp (1994), Malan (1998), Malan and Cilliers (1997), Mandaza and Tostensen (1994), Schoeman (1998), Solomon and Van Aardt (1998), Solomon and Schoeman (1998), Swatuk (1997), Thompson (1991, 1995, 1997), Tsie (1996), Vale and

Daniel (1995), Vale (1996 and 1997), Van Aardt (1993, 1995, 1997, 1998), and Van Nieuwkerk (1995). This is by no means an exhaustive list, but it does reflect some of the various approaches which have been used in Southern
· African regional analysis.

2. Our analysis is directed from an encompassing critical perspective. This approach recognises that there is room for engagement between postmodernism, Habermasian Critical Theory, Coxian Critical Theory, and feminist readings of security and development.

3. We do not think it useful to further 'divide up' the security and development debate and so deliberately do not draw further territorial boundaries between critical security studies approaches of, for example, the York Centre for International and Strategic Studies (YCISS) in Toronto (to which Krause and Williams pay homage for the development of their ideas in their edited book on Critical Security Studies). Our distinction between critical and "new" security thinking thus hinges on two key analytical divisions: the extent to which the state remains privileged as ultimately the legitimate provider of security (new security); and the extent to which the subjects of security are contextually and historically privileged as the locus for the emancipatory project (critical security studies).

4. The ACC's provide a forum where the member states and the 'international co-operating partners' meet to evaluate performance and to chart out the course ahead based 'on the principal of mutual benefit' (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:83). Traditionally, these partners have been the European Union, the Nordic countries, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations.

5. This is possibly facilitated by the fact that only presidential and cabinet approval is required, whereas in South Africa the process also requires parliamentary approval (Mills 1998:9).

6. This is most clearly demonstrated in the work of Ken Booth. In an excellent overview of critical international relations theory, Devetak (1996:166) points out that in Booth's understanding of emancipation the emphasis 'is on dislodging those impediments or impositions which unnecessarily curtail individual or collective freedom'.

7. There are various 'new' security issue lists which are proffered. See for instance, Hudson (1998:26) who includes poverty, global inequality, social injustice, human rights, oppression, and ecological degradation. To these one could add migration, refugees, drug-trafficking, AIDS, population growth, water scarcity, food scarcity, drought, and unemployment.

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