Article Indians, Islam and the meaning of South Africancitizenship—A question ofidentities’ Goolam Vahed Durban’s Indian Muslimsare heirs to Islamic traditions and practices in India that became firmly established in South Africa. During the past decade they experienced rapid and dramatic changes. These reflect adjustmentsto the political changes that have taken place in South Africa, as well as the increasingly invasive role of global material culture in everydaylife. This has caused unease and concern amongst many Muslims. This is not unique to Muslims or even to South Africa. Crawford Young has pointed out that there is no justification for clinging to the belief that modernisation leads ‘ineluctably to deepening levels of attachmentto the nation defined bythe state of residence orto the erosion of cultural ethnos, race or religion separate from the nation-state unit’. On the contrary, social change tends to produce‘stronger communal identities. In addition, the cultural segments themselves are subject to evolution and change in the crucible of social process and political competition’ (Young 1998:3). This paper examines developments among Durban’s Indian Muslims, especially after 1994. In particular it examines how they have reacted to these forces. There is a tendency on the part of many observers and commentators to lump them together with the Western Cape based Muslim group, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad). For example, Chiara Carfer warnedthat: South Africa’s Muslim community is influenced by events abroad and a romanticisation of the international Islamic struggle.... Radical Islam has foundfertile ground in the power vacuum.... Uneaseat the growth of American cultural and economic dominance, admiration for Libya and theearly theocracyin Iran, and the formation ofmilitias to fight in the Bosnian civil war have influencedlocalpolitics. This fuels youthful idealism, which,ifnot channelled constructively, might pose a problem to the state. (Mail and Guardian, February 5-11, 1999) TRANSFORMATION43 (2000) ISSN 0258-7696 Goolam Vahed Such sweeping claims raise important questions. Are Durban’s Muslims inclined to establish militias to mete out ‘just’ punishmentsorto take to the streets to protect Islamic values? Are they challenging the post-1994 state in the same way that Pagad seems to be doing? To what extent are their actions in conflict with ‘loyalty’ to the state in the ordinary sense of the word? Is Islam a political,militant identity amongst Indian Muslims in Durban? More broadly, how does the new South African state, faced with internal cleavages based onrace, class, language, religion and ethnicity, accommodate difference in the context of the transnationalisation of economic and cultural processes, and fragmenting tensions from within? While it seems paradoxical to focus on the integrity of nation-states at the sametime as we speak of transnationalism, as Baschet al pointout, nation- states, as ‘hegemonic representations of ... spatial identity remain primary in an ‘increasingly postmodern world’ (1994:8). Conceptual Framework According to Hall, identities are formed and transformed continuously in the ‘interaction’ between individual and society (1992:275). Identities are seen as relational, socially produced, situational, multiple and complex. Identity positions should consequently not be taken as given butinterrogated and questioned (Phoenix 1998:9). Further, identities are conceived of as non-essentialist because individuals, who on the faceofit, fitinto categories such as Muslim, Indian, South African and so on are differentiated by ethnicity, language, race, gender, social class, etc. Identities are thus differently experienced by individual members (Phoenix 1998:9). This is not to suggestthat each subject position has equalsaliency for individuals and thatin different contexts different identities do not become hegemonic. Individuals attain and sustain a continuous senseofselfthrough constructing integrated and coherent autobiographical narratives in which the past is reconstructed in ways that help them to understand the present (Hall 1992:279). The new identities being constructed are not core identities waiting to be recognised but are constructed historically, politically and culturally from particular perspectives for particular purposes (Phoenix 1998:10). Collective identities rest on the interaction ofvarious forces with one another in processesof collective self-definition. For Hall, while there are no fixed origins to which people can return ‘it is no mere phantasm either. It is something — not a mere trick of the imagination. It has its histories — and histories have their real, material and symboliceffects’ (in Loomba 1998:182). The past continues to speak to us. But it no longer Indian Isiam and meaning of SAcitizenship addresses us as a simple, factual ‘past’, since our relation to it, ‘like the child’s to the mother, is always-already “after the break”? (Loomba 1998:182). Almost all theoretical traditions had advocated the demise of cultural localism and its replacement with a modern collective consciousness. Not only has this not happened but the politics of particularism, of local difference within global uniformity, has revived. Baumann suggests that the postmodern age is the age of ‘neo-tribes’: ‘Postmodernity, the age of contingency fur sich, of self-conscious contingency, is also the age of community: of the lust for community, search for community, invention of community, imagining community’ (1991:246). For Baumann the desire to belong is largely a response to the disruption and disintegration of a familiar way of life. Religion is particularly attractive in such situations because it ‘resides in the realm of hope’ (Baumann 1991:249). Religious diversity involves ‘for the faithful a comprehensive Weltanschauung, which can invest difference with sacred meanings’ (Young 1998:7). For Mol,‘religiouspractices give special underpinningto particular conceptions of order and viewsofreality within a culture making the security of the individual less precarious’. Rituals, rites ofpassage, emotional commitment to a particular system of meaning, the repeated narration of myths and the sense of the transcendent‘sacrilise’ religious identity. Certain patterns acquire a ‘stable, eternal, taken-for-granted quality’ and serve to position and reinforcethe identities ofa group, especially one in a minority situation (Mol 1976:5-9). This study is concerned with the way in which Islam provides meaning for Indian Muslims in Durban.It will argue that their identities are being reconstituted and that Islam is playing a key tole in defining this shift. Thirty semi-structured interviews were conducted between May and September 1999, from which an attempt was madeto extract meanings held by Muslims. The core respondents were broadly representative of the gender, language, regiohal, age and class background of Indian Muslims in Durban. Core respondentsvaried in age between 18 and 63. There were 16 males and 14 females. Seven of the women were in formal employment. Though English wasthefirst languageofall, in terms of second language, 14 were from an Urdu-speaking background,nine from a Gujarati-speaking background and seven from a Memon-speaking background.In terms of class, amongst the males six were from a working-class background,five from professional backgrounds and five owned businesses. Qualitative 27 Goolam Vahed methods were used to avoid a clinical approach to issues of religion and identity. The questions focused mainly on how the respondents viewed political change, what impact change was having ontheirlives, the role of womenin the new South Africa, meanings of nationhood andcitizenship, and so on. Discussions were also held with religious leaders across the varioustraditions to gain insight into their aspirations for Muslims. Durban’s Indian Muslims Islam is a minority religion in South Africa. According to the 1996 Population Census (hereafter census) there were 553,585 Muslimsout of a total population of 40 million. Indian Muslims make up one of the two largest sub-groups,the other being ‘Malay’ .? There are 246,433 Malay and 236,315 Indian Muslims. The majority of Indian Muslimsare confined to KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, while most Malay Muslims live in the Western Cape. There is thus very little contact and interaction between them; indeed there are deep differences of history, culture, class and tradition. There are 79,630 Indian, 3117 African, 3497 coloured and 269 white Muslims in Durban. The concentration of Muslimsin specific areas has created a feeling of population density and numerical strength not reflected in census figures. Given the overwhelming numerical advantage of Indian Muslims and the impactof racial segregation, there is minimal contact between Indian and non-Indian Muslims. Indian Muslimsare third and fourth generation, and far removed from the migration experience of their forefathers. An indication of the break with their cultural past is that 93 per cent consider English to be their first language. Around 59 percent are from an Urdu-speaking background, 28 per cent are either Gujarati or Memonspeakers, and there are a small number of Tamil and Kokney- speaking Muslims.’ Language distinctions coincide with class divisions. Indian Muslimsarrived in Natal in two streams. Between 1860 and 1911, around 10,000 indentured workers arrived from India (Bhana 1991:7). They were followed by Gujarati and Memon-speaking traders from Gujarat on the west coast of India who began arriving in Natal from the mid- 1870s. Descendants of indentured Muslims, mainly Urdu-speaking, have made enormous economic progressas a result of opportunities seized by Indians generally since the 1950s and the class gap between them and Gujarati/ Memonshasclosed. As result of linguistic, regional, and social class differences, there is somevariation in belief and practice amongst Indian Muslims. There are three broad traditions: Deobandi/Tablighi, Barelwi and Reformist. The 28 Indian Islam and meaning of SA citizenship Deobandischool, established in India from the 1860s, is closely allied to Gujarati trading classes, and places emphasis on the central role of Ulama (religious leaders) in defining the correct practice of Islam. Closely allied is the Tabligh Jamaat, founded in India by Mawlana MuhammadIlyas (1885-1944), whose followers go from mosque to mosque and Muslim houseto houseto preach ‘purified’ form of Islam. The movementinitially made inroads amongst Gujarati traders but later attracted support from Memonand Urdu-speakers (Moosa 1997:33). Institutionally this tradition is represented by the Jamiatul Ulama (hereafter Jamiat), which was established in 1955 to provide religious knowledgeon all matters affecting Muslims. The Barelwi school, founded in India by Ahmad Raza Khan (1856- 1922), found expression in Natal through Soofie Sahib whodied in 1910 (Dangor1995). Its primary support base is amongst Urdu-speaking Muslims. This populist form of Islam involves the public celebration of occasions such asthe birthday of the Prophet, the recitation of communalsalutations, the use of Pirs (Guides) as intercessors between individuals and God, and visitation of shrines. The most popular shrine in Durbanis that of Badsha Pir who cameto Natal as an indentured labourerin the 1860s. Deobandis, in contrast, consider these practices bid’ ah (innovation). These differences aroused deeppassionsthat flared into open conflict during the 1980s. This tradition was given organisational expression through the Sunni Jamiatul Ulamaof South Africa, established in 1978 (Mahida 1993). There also exists what can be broadly called a ‘reformist’ tradition that drawsinspiration from Mawlana Maududi, Sayyed Qutb and the Iranian Revolution. This tradition assumed institutional expression through the Muslim Youth Movement which was founded in 1970 (Tayob 1995). Generally, those who embracethis traditionare not part of the conventional Ulama, they acknowledge modernity and practice ‘ijtihad’ (reasoning) in the religiousfield. Muslims and Pre-Apartheid Politics, 1894-1994 Before 1994 Indian Muslimswereofficially classified ‘Asian’ and existed underthis overarching identity. Although Islam has always been the centre of their life, exclusion from the political state compelled them to operate as Indians in protest politics and they made commoncause with other excluded groups. After self-government in 1893, Natal’s whites came to view town planning, public health, and trade arrangements in terms of racial distinctions (Swanson 1983:421). Indian merchants formed the 29 Goolam Vahed chise and 1894 to protect their trade, fran Natal Indian Congress (NIC) in ed Indians were ). Merchants and indentur residence rights (Swan 1985 eda patt ern of stratification drawn together because the government promot communalli fe expe riences. This in which race shaped individual and for ceda ‘made- religion and, poli tica lly, neutralised the impact of class and along lines of , they were divided in-Natal’ Indian consciousness. Socially e, marriage across these uage. For exampl caste, class, ancestry, and lang rs wou ld oppose the Memon-speake lines of stratification was opposed. akers would akers, Gujarati-spe marriage of their children to Gujarati-spe peakers and so on.* However,as not want their children to marry Urdu-s they [Muslims] display ship that Habib points out,‘this conflictual relation . is not ext ended to thepolitical realm. to other categories of Muslims.. to manifest , rather are content They do not demand political identity but ). this identity in their own personallives’ (1995:54 gress in 1923 by merchants The formation ofthe South African Indian Con vel. Every activity that had extendedthis elite collaboration to a nationalle du Indi ans was denounced. At a the potential to divide Muslim and Hin nde nce Day in 1943 , AI Kajee, a Muslim, meeting to mark Indian Indepe stians and commented that they ‘were not assembled as Hindus, Chri a have not been Muslims but as Indians. The religious politics of Indi e Indians alone imported into South Africa. Indians in this country mustb y 30, 1946). But and not Mussulmans and Hindus’ (The Leader, Januar fun ded Jinn ah in his attempt to create Muslim merchants like Kajee also Pakistan (The Leader, Janu ary 5, 1946 ). Suc h affi nity also extended to working class Indians. Recalling life in 1940s Durban, Harry Sewlall has n written that ‘what was remarkable was the camaraderie that existed betwee Muslims and Hindus, who lived cheek-by- jow ] with one anot her.I wasno t aware of any differences between us. In my family, we referred to our elderly Muslim neighbours as “mausi” (aunt) and “mausa” (uncle)’ (Sunday Times Extra, December 12, 1999). Indians were drawn together because they had the same legal status and the threat of repatriation hung overall until 1961. The upward mobility of ex-indentured workers from the 1950s reduced tensions between them and merchants (Freund 1995). Whenthe National Party (NP) came to power in 1948 it was determined to entrench racial identities through its policy of apartheid. The NIC carried out joint campaigns with the African National Congress (ANC) during the 1950s against this policy, but the banning of the ANC in 1960 andsilencing of NIC leaders ended an important link between Indians and Africans. The alliance between the NIC and ANChadfailed to effect a transition to non- 30 Indian islam and meaning of SA citizenship racial politics at the level of the masses. In fact, the tendency of the NIC to mobilise Indians on issues that were race-specific perpetuated racial divisions of resistance and reinforced racial identities (Singh and Vawda 1987). Apartheid had ambiguous consequencesfor Indians. There wasa relative advantagein being Indianascertainrestrictions, such as the pass laws and influx control, only applied to Africans. Further, the restructuring of urban space from the 1950s resulted in the provision of mass housing in two large culturally separate and geographically disparate Indian townships, Chatsworth and Phoenix, while areas like Reservoir Hills and Westville were made available for middle class housing (Davies 1991:79-83). As a result, boundaries between Indians and Africans became morefixed. The legal position of Indians changed in 1961 when they were granted status of permanent residents. The government attempted to incorporate Indians politically by creating advisory bodies that divided Indians from Africans and coloureds. A South African Indian Council was inaugurated in 1968 while Local Affairs Committees were established to advise local authorities on Indian matters (Pachai 1971:272-6). Considerable upward mobility after 1960 was due in large measure to expansion in secondary education, enlargement of ML Sultan Technical College, and establishment of the University ofDurban- Westville (UD-W)(Naidoo 1989: 120-3). In addition to the rise of the professional and artisan classes, working class Indians benefited from the emergenceofa substantial numberofIndian industrialists in the garment industry. With their higher standard of education and commandof English, Indians dominated semi-skilled positions in industry. They becameless radical and concentrated on improving their economic position (Freund 1995). Thus, by 1991, the average household income of Indians was R2476; three times that of Africans (South African Institute of Race Relations 1993:192), while the 1996 census revealed that 70 per cent of employed Indians earned more than R1500 per month while only 23 per cent of Africans did likewise. The dominanceofpolitics by Indian moderates was challenged from the mid 1970s as extra-parliamentary opposition bodies werere-established on several fronts. These included the Black Consciousness Movement, Congress of South African Trade Unions (1985), the United Democratic Front (1983) and a host of community organisations that concentrated on issues from housing and rent to transport and health. The protest of the majority of Indians, however, continued to centre on racially exclusive issues underthe bannerofthe NIC (Singh and Vawda 1987). The programme 31 Goolam Vahed and discourse ofthe NIC reinforced exclusive Indianidentities and countered attempts to construct Black and non-racialidentities. The release of Nelson Mandelain February 1990, the unbanning ofpolitical organisations, multi- party negotiations and, ultimately, South Africa’s first democratically elected governmentin 1994created uncertainty,fear and insecurity amongst manySouth Africans. As Robert Thornton pointed outat the time, this was to be expected because South Africa was a country and not a nation. Indians, Africans, coloureds and whites were divided by the multiplicity of boundaries created by apartheid and South Africa found itself in a ‘characteristically postmodern predicament,... There is no fundamental identity that any South African clings to in common withall, or even most other South Africans.... The logic of difference and differentiation itself should persist after the demise of Apartheid’ (Thornton 1996:150). Re-Traditionalising Islam Underapartheid, Indian Muslimshadlived in predominantly Indianareas. While some Muslims have adapted moreeasily to the new environment, it becamevery apparent during the course of my interviews that manyothers are challenged as theytry to find a place for themselves in the midst of a numberof religious, racial and ethnic groups in an environmentthat does not support an Islamic worldview. Essentially, respondents voiced three concerns. First, they pointed out that although the NP governmenthad been secular, its strict Calvinist morality was consonant with many of their values. The behaviour and morality of individuals is no longer the responsibility of the new secular democracy but that of individuals. Most respondents found state acceptance of abortion, prostitution, pornography and so on unacceptable and expressed fears about ‘appropriate’ moral standards being maintained under an ANC government. Second, some respondents pointedto the threat posed by the changing global environment, particularly the communications revolution whichis conceived as a further obstacle to their attempts to preserve Islamic values. Third, respondents also voiced a concern aboutthe implications of affirmative action and the attempt to marry the renewal of South Africa to an African Renaissancefor their culture and identity. While Farid Essack is critical of a Muslim morality that confined itself to sex, abortion, and is silent on issues of hunger and exploitation’ (Essack 1999: 166), the picture that emerged from the interviews is that this narrow moral-ethical worldview is shaping the behaviour of Muslims. This turn to Islam by Muslimsis not taking place in a void. The rapid social, economic andpolitical changesofthe past decade 32 Indian Islam and meaning of SA citizenship provide the social context in which change must be viewed. This changeis apparent in a numberof areasin the lives of Muslims, some of which will be discussed below. Dress The most obvious manifestation of changeis in the staggering increase in the number of women whoare fully veiled, that is, their dress covers their entire body including the face. The veil has spawned a wide body of literature, with very divergent views on whatit signifies. For critics, the veil is the most tangible symbol of women’s oppressionin Islamic societies while proponents of the veil view it as the ultimate sign of the rebirth of Islam. Islam requires womento covertheir entire body, including the hair, but the requirement to cover the face is contested within local Islamic tradition.’ The significant thing is that until about five or six years agoit wasrare to find a womancovering her face. Muslim womenin Durban have traditionally covered their heads, and sometimes the shoulders, with a headscarf. According to a local Mawlanathe prescription for women to covertheir faces has to do with changinglifestyles. He pointed outthat ‘our mothersdid not go to gym, university, shopping malls, beachfront, discos and so on. They remained at home’. When the Ulamareferto the ‘veil’ they mean that womenshould only venture outside their homesin the event of an unavoidable need. As Peter Clarke has pointed out, in the contemporary period the family is ‘Islam’s most powerful weapon inits fight against Jahiliyya. The Muslim woman’s spaceis on this battleground,in the home, for this is the only Islamic spaceavailable to herin Jahiliyya or the modern westernised world. It is the arena in which women canfulfil their divinely ordained role’ (Clarke 1998:24). In practice, there are clear contradictions betweenthe ideal and reality. For many women the veil hasliberated them. Muslim women venture far more in public spaces than their predecessors of a generation ago. Mrs FD even commentedon the contradiction ofveiled womenappearing in places where nudity andother un-Islamic practices are the norm. Theveil is therefore seen by the Ulamaasa significantpart of the drive to prevent transgression of gender norms, given that Muslimsare more visible in public spaces like shopping malls and restaurants. Public Worship Reform is also clear in the area of public religious spaces, which are increasingly being opened to women. Until recently mosques were closed to Muslim women in Durban. Most mosques now make provision for womenthoughthere is seclusion between them and men. Womenalso have 33 Goolam Vahed n) classes held c knowle dge through taleem (adult educatio access to Islami mosques to listen to lectures or weekly in private homes, and attendance at to the Prophet). The result ofthis take part in dhikr (communal salutation the trend in the gender norms wi'l be a reversal of drive to re-establish d re ed uc at io n and went out im womenacqui 1970s and 1980s whereby Musl to work. Dietary Concerns gious ter concern with observing reli Another area where there is grea indi vidu al umption.® Until a few years ago, ‘regulations’ concerns food cons veri fied numberof Islamic bodies Muslims, local mawlanas, as well as a products as halaal randomly . At one stag e there were 17 certifying authori the 1999). This changed in 1996 with (Sunday Tribune, December 19, onal Halaal Association (SANHA), formation of the South African Nati ) Sunni Jamiat. According to M which included both the Jamiat and SAN HA g to Mawl ana spok: esman, > was formed because Navlakhi, SANHA’s theological and rtheid South Africa the deregulation ofthe meatindustry in post-apa ain ated greater vigilance Ses me wider variety of food products necessit day ‘Musli sun Tribune, December 19, 1999). SANHA’s view is that abli shme nts’ and shou ld ‘pro du th should only eat at Muslim-ownedest ng indu stry ’(Al om own proc essi sources of Halaal ingredients in the food pr ~Jam iat, ificates to eating August 1999). SANHA does notissue cert owned by Muslims unless there is proper supervision at critic 1point vot on the fe Phatihe the franchise. McDonalds provides a goodillustrati of al and wh that the issuing of certificates, and the very notion of whatis hala in localI sla mic trad itio n. Whe n SAN HA ref vinatis not, is conteste d with ined a certificate nase e‘0Isla certify McDonalds as halaal, the latter obta together with the c mic (ICSA) which, Council of South Africa SANH ape-based Coun cil (MJC ), is not part of SANHA. Muslim Judicial by distributing pamphlets publDec icising that it had not certifi an resp onaonde ldsd hala al (Sun day Trib une, ember 19, 1999). The led McD as rity of the d that they abided by what cao respondents in Durban indicate . restofprohibiteditems appears includes diverse products like (Adecreed published on the Ja Pas and ice cream and is that muat 8 onite webs d _ Th; e‘Vem iat Jami also published a Notice on June 22, 1999 atala SANHA | eat food served at State hospitals (Jamiat Website, Jul T00) emark 50 that, would be theonte to get the word ‘halaal’ declared a trad es. H ver given the vest ai organisa tion empoweredto issue such notic s ed interest of the MJC and ICSAitis unlikely that SANHE 34 Indian Islam and meaning of SAcitizenship will succeed. Hajj (Pilgrimage) The numbers of Muslims going annually to Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage has also increased significantly. Whereas around 4,000 Muslims went annually for Hajj, a compulsory pilgrimage, at the beginning of the 1990s just fewer than 7,000 Muslims wentin 1996 and 8,758 in 1998. The same applies to Umrah, a voluntary pilgrimage. The numberincreased from an average of 5,000 in the early 1990s to 15,000 in 1998.’ As result of this increase a South African Hajj and Umrah Council (SAHUC)was formed in 1995 to coordinate the pilgrimage. This bodyis part of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is recognised by the Ministry of Hajj in Saudi Arabia. Hajj visas are only issued by Saudi Arabia if accompanied by SAHUCidentity cards (SAHUC Pamphlet, December 14, 1998). The upward economic mobility of Muslims and the cheapercostoftravel in relative terms have contributed to this increase. But many Muslims who traditionally went to India, England or North America for vacations now go to the ‘Holy Lands’ instead of the West to strengthen religious vigour. Those respondents who have madeseveraltrips to Makkah also commented onthe role ofthe pilgrimagein increasingcultural and religious homogeneity amongst Muslims from different parts of the world. Several respondents, however,felt that the nature of the pilgrimage has changedandthatit has becomea ‘holiday’ for many pilgrims more interested in shopping and other non-spiritualactivities. Anothercriticism by working class respondents was that once rich Muslims had completed the pilgrimage, instead of revisiting Saudi Arabia regularly, they should use this moneytosee to the needs of the poorer membersof the community. Media The destruction of television sets is a very symbolic milestone in the lives of Muslims. There has been a concerted effort on the part of religious leaders to root out televisions from Muslim homes. According to several respondents, when the Ulama beganpreaching against the negative impact of television, they gradually limited what they watched. Initially, they restricted their viewing to news broadcasts and sports programmes. However, as the Ulamaintensified their campaign through lectures and pamphlets, and emphasised the negative impact that the music, singing, and dancing on television was having on Muslims families, many more Muslimshavebeen gettingrid oftheir television sets. Respondents did not sell the sets but destroyed them, as a symbolic gesture of conquering 35 Goolam Vahed worldly desires and becausethey did not wantto passonthe ‘vice’ to others by selling their set. While this is a very defiant attempt to keep out the encroaching influencesof the global environment, its long-term successis debatable given the plethora of avenues through which outside influences penetrate people’s lives. Several of the affluent respondents and their families, for example, had access to internet in their homes even though they had gotrid of their television sets. Education Education is another area where changein striking. From the 1960s large numbers of Muslim children attended government secular schools as education became free and compulsory. According to the 1996 census a total of 7419 Muslim males and 6811 females have completed matric. This includes 2521 males and 2105 females who have a higher qualification. These numbersindicate that girls were given relatively equal opportunity. The attitude towards secular schools has changed. Aspart of the gender counter-revolution, many parents no longer considerit necessary forgirls to receive secular education. Parents also expressed the fear that because of the explosion of knowledge and ideas, their children will only remain virtuousif they are taught in an environmentthat has a strong element of religious training. Several parents opposedthe inclusion of sex education, Aids, etc in the school syllabus and argued that the need for these would cease if children were taught correct morals from young. Parents also want to minimise contact with non-Muslim children, believing that by being with children who are not Muslim, Muslim children adopt un-Islamic practices to fit in with their peers. They also feared that the increased powers of governing bodies at individual schools might result in less tolerance for the needs of Muslim children, such as permission to pray on Fridays and for girls to wear head scarves. The result of these changing attitudes is an explosion in the growth ofMuslim schools since 1994. These schools provide ancillary subjects in Islamic Studies and Arabic as well as secular subjects offered at governmentschools. The first Muslim private school in Durban was the Lockhat Islamia College, opened in 1985 with 130 pupils (Sheik 1990:16). There are currently 21 schools in Natal, nine in Durban, with a total student population of 5590. They have been organised into an ‘Association of Muslim Schools’ whichis in the process of standardising and Islamising the syllabus.* Islamic schools are also increasing in popularity. These are different to Muslims schools in that the bulk of the syllabus consists of Islamic knowledge. Children cannot 36 Indian Islam and meaning of SA citizenship transfer to secular schools from Islamic schools.’ There are three Islamic schools in Overport, a suburb in Durban, for example, which cater for grades one to three, grades four to ten and older girls respectively. Together, they have an enrolment of approximately 250 andcater forgirls only. Secular and Muslim schools are supplemented by madrassahs. Until the 1980s untrained women conducted madrassahsin private households. This was supplementedbythe input of mothersin an extended family situation wherethe elderly helped shape religious knowledge. As larger numbersof women entered the workforce and the extended family declined, there was greater concern with establishing formal madrassahs. Madrassahs consequently became much more organised and followed standard syllabuses. They are conducted by constituted bodies in state schools, mosques or especially built madrassahs. The Durban Islamic Educational Society was founded in 1985 to provide a unified madrassah system. By 1992 2386 pupils were attending its schools (Mahida 1993:141). Standardisation ofthe syllabus has meantthat bodies controlling madrassahs are able to disseminate a rigorous knowledge ofIslamicrituals, beliefs, values and practices to children from a young age. As a result of these changes in school and madrassah education, class will probably play a more importantrole in shaping Islamic identities than was the case in the past. It is the affluent members of the community who can afford to send their children to Islamic and Muslim schools, and whose children have access to more systematic and better-organised madrassahs andthis is boundto inflect Muslim identities. Leadership An important factor shaping Islamic identity in Durban is the growing influence of religious leadership (Ulama). Until the 1970s most of the Ulama were Indian nationals. The first Darul Uloom, a ‘theological’ institute, was opened in Newcastle in 1973. Subsequently the Darul Uloom Aleemia Razvia in Chatsworth, Madrasah Ta’leemuddin in Isipingo and Madrasah In’aamiya in Camperdownhave been opened (Mahida 1993:125). The focus of Darul Uloomsis on jurisprudence. Islamic Lawis taughtinits totality since it coversall aspects of a Muslim’s existence, including family relationships, economics, worship,ritual and, generally, the minutiae of everydaylife. Islamic tradition is mediated throughIndianhistory, culture and languages since the Ulamaat these institutions have mostly been trained in India and continue to have very stronglinks with the Indian sub- 37 Goolam Vahed continent. In addition, a large numberof Imamsin Durbanare from India, all arrivals in the post-1994 period. Darul Ulooms do not focus on developing an Islamic view to respond to the problems facing Muslims. Thereis, instead, a deep-seated belief that the current problems of Muslims lie squarely in their failure to follow the proper Islamic teachings and that once Muslims gain access to ‘correct’? knowledge through the Ulama, Muslim civilisation would be uplifted. The new Islamic lifestyle is largely behavioural in perspective as it is based on conduct and social action. Where Muslims do notpractice aspectsoftheir religion it is mostly because they see themselves as ‘weak’. As one respondent, MrFB, explained, ‘If you follow all the rules you will be OK’. Anotherstated that abiding by the rules ‘makes me avoid bad things like drugs and alcohol and I dress modestly. It influences how I behave towards andtreat others’. Mrs ZM felt that ‘ifIslamic law is implementedit will stop crime, AIDS, child abuse and manyotherills of our society’. The influence of the Ulamais growing. One of the ways in which a common message is disseminated is through mosques. According to the Jamiat it provides speakers to 22 mosques for the Friday Jumuah lecture, who address a common theme whenever possible. For example, on the Friday preceding ‘Women’s Day’ the theme was ‘Islamic perspective on Women’, to counter the images projected by Western media. The Jamiat provides a summary ofpertinent points around which speakers base their talk. There is an almost complete lack of theological debate. ‘Truth’ is synonymous with the Ulama and to question the Ulama meansquestioningthe truth. Respondents clearly saw the Quran as timeless and unchangeable and unquestioningly accepted key tenets, even though there is diversity in practice andbelief. Sufism Another conspicuous feature of the new Islam is the focus on self- reformation. The trend whereby individuals become attached to Shaykhs (Spiritual Mentors) is becoming extremely popular. Shaykhs are considered to have special spiritual qualities and trace a line of succession going back 14 centuries to the Prophet. Each Shaykh appoints one or more ofhis Mureeds (disciples) as a Khalifah (guide). Until the last few years, this practice wasrare in Durban, being practiced only by a few descendants of the family of Soofie Saheb. It was certainly absent from Deobandi Islam. There has been an upsurge in the numbers of Muslims becoming Mureeds amongst both Deobandis and Barelwis. Many respondents felt that a Shaykh wasindispensable in coping with contemporary problems. Mr FB Indian tslam and meaning of SA citizenship related an exampleto illustrates this. An Islamic newspaper, Majlis, has ruled that Muslims cannot drink Coca-Cola, the Jamiat ruled that it was permissible to drink Coke while several other Ulama ruled that it was ‘doubtful’. In such situation an individual would refer the matter to his/ her Shaykh andabide by the ruling. A respondent compared a Shaykh to a specialist physician. According to Mrs SM, just as one would go to a heart specialist for a heart defect, a Shaykh treats a ‘spiritually diseased heart’. Spiritual diseases include ‘greed, lust, pride, arrogance, jealousy, passion, etc’. Respondents explained that making bay’at!® made life easier for Muslims: ‘It is so easy. You hand yourself over to the Shaykh andgetall direction from him. If he makes a mistake then it is his responsibility’. Respondents seek the advice of the Shaykh onall individual and social matters, including choice of marriage partner, opening of a business, purchase ofa car, etc and accept the advice irrespective of whetherit is to their liking. The pledge is a formal Agreement in which the Mureed reaffirmsfaith in God,repentsfor past sins, and vowsnotto sin intentionally in future. Part of this programmeofa pacific and introspective Islam is dhikr (remembrance of God), a word heavily freighted with devotional meanings, and which is seen as a meansof rooting Islam in the hearts and mindsofindividuals. A very large number of mosques in Durban now hold aregular dhikr session on Thursday evenings. According to Mr MV: ‘I find the sessionspiritually uplifting. You take God’s nameall the time and you feel it in your body. I feel better and lighter at the end ofit. I feel clean. I cannotdoit alone. In the mosque there are many people. They all do the same thing. We feel as one, in one cause’. Dhikr includesrecitation of verses from ‘Mathnawi-e-Rumi’, a famous masterpiece from Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi, which comprises of 28,000 versesof poetry, which focus on characteristics like modesty, honesty, sincerity, and generosity, and are considered absolutely essential to create ‘healthy love’ of God. The turn to mysticism is not self-conscious as many respondentsdid notrealise that these practices are part of Sufism. Like other aspects of the Islamic revival, these practices are a source of tension because some Ulamafeel that they were not carried out by the Prophet and should therefore have no place in Islamic tradition. There are tangible changes in many other areas as well. For example, Muslimsare marrying younger, Mawlanas emphasise that lavish ceremonies are remnants from past Hindu culture andagainstthe ethosof Islam. Hence, many Muslim marriage ceremonieshave been simplified and oftenlastjust 39 Goolam Vahed a few minutes. There is a de-westernisation ofdress and return to ‘authentic’ Islamic dress amongst many men whohavetaken to wearing Arab garb, short hair, shaved moustache and long beards. Many Muslims have given up all formsof insurance, including personal and car insurance, medical aid and haveturned to Islamic banks such as the Al-Baraka Bank. A number of Muslimsare also using the offices of the Jamiat to resolve disputes instead of these matters being resolved in secular courts. Changeis thus evident in manyareas in the lives of Muslims in contemporary Durban, running the gamutfrom adapting the school system to Islam, campaigning againstpleasure activities like the television and cinema, following dietary regulations rigidly and attempting to incorporate aspectsof sharia into law. It must be emphasised that while most Muslims, across the classes, expressed a desire to embrace change,it is the more affluent Muslims who are in a position to implement change. Thisrelated particularly to pilgrimage, education, domestication of women, embracing the veil, and Islamic banking. The nextpart of the paperwill focus on the consequences of this, whatOlivier Royrefers to as an attempt to ‘create an authentically Muslim microsociety within the society at large’ (1996:80-81), on relations amongst Muslims, between Muslims and non-Muslims, and Muslimsandthestate. New Boundaries It is clear from the discourse and changesin habits and practices, that the identities of Indian Muslims are being reconstructed. Islam is being revived and reformed,andis the basis of this new identity becauseit is seen as having historical continuity. Muslimsare seeking theological authenticity with a past “golden age’ as if nothing exists in-between. In the process of redefining who they are, Muslims are constructing boundaries around various points of contact. These boundaries include contact between men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims, Muslimsandthestate, Islam and secularism, and so on. At the same time boundaries related to ethnicity, language, and Islamic practices are becoming permeable amongst Muslims. Thedefinition of the salient community is widening as traditional loyalties are declining. In marriage, for example, the criterion for suitable partners has widened. Most respondents opined that they did not care about ethnic, class and language considerations as long as the spouse was Muslim. Language, a very concrete building block of boundary,haslost significance as a factor in boundary construction since English is the first language of the overwhelming majority of Indian Muslims. Most respondents believed that 40 indian Islam and meaning of SAcitizenship instead of reviving individual ethnic tongues, institutions should focus on makingsure that children have access to Arabic whichis seen as the lingua sacra becauseit is the language of the Quran andprayer,it will be the language of Paradise according to Islamic belief, and every Muslim learns at least part of the Quran by rote. Arabic is taught at Muslim schools and is emphasised as crucial for youth. This shifting identity is both progressive and conservative. It is progressive because there is an attempt to break downidentities based on caste and ancestry. Onthe other hand,the basis of the new identity, Islam, is far more watertight. When identity was based on language, caste and race, Muslim children wentto the same schools as non-Muslims and mixed more freely with non-Muslim Indians. Under those circumstances there wasgreater opportunity for integration, albeit mainly with other Indians. Theironyis that as South African society is becoming individualistic, and many ofthe barriers that had hindered integration are breaking down,the opposite is happening in the case of many Indian Muslims. Thelikelihood of contact with Muslims across race grounds is virtually non-existent becauseof the small numberof non-Indian Muslimsandhistoricalbarriers. The construction ofIndian identity historically involved ignoring class and caste lines. These lines had a material existence that is comingto the fore in light of changes in South African society. This has created tension and brittleness in the broad category ‘Indian’. The construction of an imagined Muslim community based on belief and practice is a way to counter this. While many Muslim intellectuals and professionals are concerned about the new conservatism, ordinary respondents seem to welcome the new group belonging to which they have access, and whichis the result mainly of personaldesire to belong. With the disintegration of traditional family, globalisation andgreater individuality, many respondents saw the nascent ‘Islamic Family’ as a ‘shelter’ against hostile, impersonal world. It is seen as providing them with a sense of community. The sanctity of marriage, the virtue of women,and respect for elders are emphasisedin this patriarchal ‘family’. Several features of this nascent Islamic identity are apparent from the narratives. Respondents tend to think of themselves increasingly in the collective. This emerged during interviews where many responses began with ‘We Muslims...’ or ‘We are...’. Respondents saw themselvesaspart of a positively defined collective. Further, there wasa great dealof ‘pride’, ‘satisfaction’, and ‘happiness’ in being Muslim. There was a tendency 41 Goolam Vahed . amongst respondentsto focusonthe distant past and consciously ignore the quagmire in which Muslims have been stuck since the decline of the ) Ottoman Empire from the nineteenth century. Little emphasis is placed on the political and economicfailures of Muslim societies, particularly since World WarII. Muslimsare seen as having been a leading intellectual and military civilisation and there was a firm conviction among respondents that this civilisation can be regenerated. A strong positive group description also emergedin the course of the interviews. Muslimsare seen as being the ‘chosen people’ and the only group destined for Paradise. Respondents readily compared themselves positively with non-Muslims: materialism/ spiritualism, aggressor/victim, and immorality/morality. The attempt to forge a ‘Muslim identity’ is difficult and contested because of deep differencesof tradition. In fact, there is visible tension in this process of revival over manyissues, such as the covering ofthe face, dietary regulations, womenattending mosques,sufi practices like dhikr, education, and so on. It would therefore be incorrect to suggest that a homogeneous Islam is emerging. But there is greater tolerance for the perspectives of others. A numberof respondents emphasised that there was no alternative given that the threat of ‘the other’, the commonthreat of secularism, was greater. The violent altercations that were a feature of relations between Barelwis and Deobandisin the 1980s have subsided. Manyofthe respondents seemed to accept that their interpretations of Islam could not be imposed on others and that they should give voice to shared values and concerns. Many practices remain disputed butthe rise of Sufi Islam is one example where middle ground has been found. This search for a ‘Muslim’ identity has taken definite organisational form. In 1994 a number of organisations formed the United Ulama Council of South Africa (UUCSA)to ‘provide unified and competent leadership that will address the contemporary problemsfacing Muslimsat all levels in South Africa’. UUCSAincludes the Muslim Judicial Council of the Cape, the Natal and Transvaal Jamiatul Ulama, which represents the Deobandi School, as well as the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama, and Sunni Ulama Council, which represent the Barelwi School (UUCSA Pamphlet, 1998). The importance of this organisation is largely symbolic because it has not achieved anything concrete. Its importancelay in its sending a signal that Muslims are willing to work togetherin spite of deep differences. Several Mawlanasalso indicated that there is informal contact between themselves and Ulama from other traditions. 42 Indian Isiam and meaning of SA citizenship Muslims andthe South African State When questioned, most respondents considered themselves adamantly ‘Muslim’: ‘I am a Muslim first, then an Indian, then a South African’."! ‘But this is my country. I have never been to India or Pakistan and never want to go’. ‘I was born here and alwayslived here — I have nowhereelse to go’. While there is acceptance of being South African citizens, this means, for most, that South Africa is the place where they were born and wheretheylive. It did not entail a deep affective allegiance to the country andits institutions. The concept of ‘nation’ is not very clearly understood. Respondents used the word loosely to refer to ‘Muslims’, ‘Hindus’, ‘Africans’, ‘whites’, etc, rather than a broadercollectivity embracing all South Africans. In fact, very few respondents have given thought to what it meansto be living as a minority in a plural democracy. This is not to imply that Muslims display animosity andhostility to the state. Respondents werenotunpatriotic but mainly indifferent. An absence ofpatriotism,after all, is impossible because, at this stage, the ‘nation’ is diffused through Muslim life through the law, economy, welfare system, health system and so on. In fact, very few issues have mobilised Indian Muslimspolitically in post-apartheid South Africa. While Christian lobby groups, for example, have protested against abortion, Muslims have beensilent on this and many other policies that respondents considered to be fundamentally against their beliefs. This lack of mobilisation is despite the fact that there was a degree of worry and anxiety among respondentsthat the ANC-government is discriminating against non-Africans, including Muslims, and general disillusionment that levels of unemployment, crime and corruption have rocketed out of control. However, Indian Muslimsarerelatively better off than the majority population, and the effects of affirmative action and neo- liberal economicpolicies have not yet diminished standardsofliving to unacceptable levels. Further, redistribution mechanisms amongst Muslims ensure minimum survival standards for most working class Muslims.” This differs from the,Cape where Muslimshaverallied in large numbers around issues of crime, drugs, the US bombing ofIraq, and the visit by Tony Blair. Attempts by Pagad to form a chapter in Durban under Rashid Sulaman failed to muster support amongst Muslims. While there some initial support for Pagad amongst Durban’s Muslims, as the violence associated with Pagad and gangsincreased its support base began shrinking among the respondents in Durban. According to Mr MV: Wemustnot use violence. We will get a bad name.Instead, we must get involved in the existing parties and work our wayto the top. Once 43 e Goolam Vahed we havepeople in power we musttry to use our influence to change the laws.... Pagad is not good in the Cape. We don’t want bombing and fighting. We want peaceto live our lives as good Muslims. Most Muslimsacceptthat they cannot establish an Islamic state in South Africa. Two Islamic parties contested the 1994 election, the Cape-based Islamic Party under Abdullah Gamieldien and the Africa Muslim Party underImtiaz Sooliman.Both failed to gain a seat. In 1999 the Africa Moral Party contested the election without success (A/-Qalam, May 1999). For Farid Essack, the formation of these parties was a ‘negative response to fears of the unknown.... This position shows no understanding of the complexities of the problems facing our country, nor any appreciation of how Islam translates into tangible and practical policies for governing a modern state’ (Essack 1999:165-166). Prior to the 1999 election the Islamic Unity Conference (IUC) under Achmat Cassiem, who claimed to represent 600 Muslim organisations, called on Muslims to boycott the election (Al-Qalam, May 1999). The IUC argued that to vote for an un- Islamic state would mean that Muslims would be partners to legalised abortion, gay rights, prostitution, and other practices that were contrary to Islam (The Daily News, May 20,1999). However, the IUC was unable to namethe organisations that it represented and remaineda peripheralfactor. On the contrary, widely supported organisations such as the Jamiat, Muslim Judicial Council and Muslim Youth Movement urged Muslimsto vote (Al-Qalam, May 1999). Overthrowing the state was not a priority amongst respondents. While they did not display affection and patriotism to the state, there was a degree of relative contentmentand satisfaction among respondentsat living in an environmentthatis nothostile to them. They focused on the advantages of living in South Africa, where they could live according to Islamic norms, as opposedto the negatives. Respondents recognised that they enjoyedfull respect in South Africa as citizens and were not marginalisedas is the case with Muslim minorities in places like France and Germany. According to Mr SH Muslimscould not demand minorityrights in a secular ‘kufr’ state. They had to be positive and offer Islam as a solution to the country’s problems. According to Mrs RH since Muslimsareliving in a secularstate that guarantees their right to worship, there was no needto ‘challenge’ the government: ‘Only when weare prevented from practicing Islam, we'll make demands. We should concentrate on becoming true Muslims. Otherwise, if we get the state, what will we have? A corrupt Islamic country like so many in the world’. Mr FB responded: ‘We haveto see to our own 44 Indian islam and meaning ofSAcitizenship strength andcapabilities, especially our moralandspiritual health. We do not have the numbers. Butif we get our character right and set an example to others, who knows what might happen.... We don’t know our “A, B, and C’s” and we want X, Y, Z. We should use our rights given by the Constitution and propagateto the masses’. Oliver Roy refers to this process as the creationof‘liberated zones’, that is, forming spaces wherethe ideals of a future society can prevail. Unlike ‘liberated zones’, he adds, ‘no counterpoweris established, no counterstate’. Instead, there prevails the ‘idea of later spreading the principles on whichit is founded to the whole of society’ (1996:80). Respondents pointed out that a motto like ‘Islamic State’ was meaningless given that Muslims are a demographic minority. Muslim identity is thus being asserted and reconstructed along conservative lines and there is a noticeable absence of a political agenda. For the moment, the reconstituted identity of Indian Muslims does not involve violence or revolution. Many Muslimsare shunning active involvementin secular civil society and, especially, alignment with particular parties. When Mawlana Rashid Omarwrote that Muslims owed allegiance to Africa, the riposte was swift (Sunday Independent, January 24, 1999). A Patel wrote that the only allegiance of Muslimswas‘to Allah’; the views of Omar‘served the vested interests of the ANC’. Omar had become ‘President Mandela’s fifth column’ who‘stoopedso low asto prostitute Islam to further the aims and objectives ofpolitical ideology’ (Sunday Independent, January 31, 1999). For E Suliman intellectuals were not ‘representatives of the religious community.... Islam and Muslims [cannot] be sacrificed at the altar of a newly created political order’ (Sunday Independent, February 7, 1999). While Muslimshavenot displayed allegiance to the newstate, this has not brought to the fore a counter-revolutionary force. Few Muslims in Durban can be termed‘radicals’ in the sense that they constitute a threat to the state even though the press has attempted to link Muslims to international terrorism.'* Muslims, Mr AKfelt, needed to move beyondliving under the shadow of secularism andthe protection of the Bill of Rights, and develop a consistent political strategy on issues such as the concept of democracy as the basis of society, the meaning of Darul Islam (Islamic State), the validity of using violence in a democratically elected state, areas in civil society where Muslims can contribute, and the most effective way for Muslimsto participate in government. A coherentposition will overcome the present tendency where some Muslimsseek to wage warto get out of the morass while others seek refuge in mosques. 45 Goolam Vahed Muslimsare Muslim intellectuals and professionals are concerned that lves from the state and the Africa n majorit y. Two distancing themse this issue. In April conferences were organized during 1999 to address ence hosted a sympo sium in 1999 the Organisation of the Islamic Confer ‘Musli ms and Politic al Develo pmenti n Sandton, Johannesburg, to discuss brough t togethe r academ ics, profess ionals and Southern Africa’, which there were the Ulama. While many constructive suggestions were tabled, silence . With one two problems. First, the Ulama were conspicuousby their of the formal public lectures, or two exceptions, they did not present any in discus sions that follow ed formal nor did they actively participate , the timing of the confer ence just prior to South presentations. Second democr atic electio n and the manneri n which Preside nt- Africa’s second were feted, with elect Thabo Mbekiandtherestofthe top brass of the ANC Mbeki guest speaker at the banquet, suggests that the conference had political undertones. There was a clear message to Muslims that they t should participate in the election, while the message to the ANC wastha South Africa n Muslim s and the Arab world were behind the govern ment, r whatever the public posturing of Pagad. This was followed by anothe conference at UD-W in July 1999, organi sed by ‘Musli m Vision 2020: working towards an exemplary community’. The Committee of Ten that organised the conference comprised of academics, professionals and membersof welfare organisations but not a single memberof the Ulama.'* Together, these conferences emphasisedthat participating in the wider society will advancerather than retard Islam. Muslims should interact with non-Muslims who might embrace Islam from the example set them by Muslims. Negative stereotypes(terrorists, racists, etc) of Muslimscanonly be challenged through involvementin the wider society. Withdrawalinto a laager will marginalise Muslims whose needs will be ignored if they alienate the majority African population. Onthe contrary, Islamic tradition demanded that Muslims embrace social movementsandcivil society and becomepart of the struggle to reclaim the position of South Africans from globalisation. Muslims had to assist in reducing poverty, tackling environmentalissues, achieving reconstruction and reconciliation. Ebrahim Rasool, keynote speaker at UD-W, criticised the Islam practiced by most Muslims who believed that following rituals was sufficient, and relied on slogans and emotionalism.Instead, he argued, Muslimshadto ‘intellectually engage with issues’. In similar vein Farid Essack has written that Muslims should be ‘interventionist’; they should go around ‘determinedly and consistently contributing to the creation of anew world.... In the garden of 46 Indian Islam and meaning of SA citizenship humanity there are really no spectators; even the neutral onesare players...’ (Essack 1999:100). The problem with intellectuals is one of relevance to the wider Muslim community. Few of the respondents were aware of the conference, and none wasparticularly concerned with the outcome. The reality is that the shapers ofMuslim opinion amongst the majority of Indian Muslims in Durban remain formally trained Ulama. As long as the Ulama are notanintegral part of discussions, proposals emanating from conferences will have parochial relevancein the lives ofordinary Muslims. Intellectuals need to engage Ulamain constructive dialogue to convince them of the need for a paradigm shift. The influence of intellectuals is marginal because they are confined outside mosques. The Ulama andintellectuals inhabit different worlds. They do not engage constructively; exchanges usually end in polemics and are polemical. Writing of his exchange with a traditional scholar Farid Essack commented: ‘We were speaking different languages. I simply could not deal with their questions because they came from a mindset from which I feel completely alienated. Postmodern Islam was talking, not conversing, with traditional Islam’ (Essack 1999:123). At Sandton, Y Dadoo commentedthat the problem wasthat the Ulama were not prepared to contextualise the socio-economic problems of Muslims, while intellectuals lacked a proper knowledge of theology. He argued that this fragmentedtradition inhibited creative and constructive interaction that could make up for the deficiencies of each. Conclusion Globalisation and modernity have translated into uncertain configurations in the new South Africa. This study has focused on how Durban’s Indian Muslimsare grappling with the questions posed by modernity, social diversity and the destruction of old and respected traditions. It has shown that while many South African Muslims have beenrepositioning themselves, or feel the need to do so, in the context of an ANC-ruled democratic South Africa that has placed itself firmly on a secular foundation, they have been repositioning themselves in different ways. There is not one Muslim communitybut several. There are varying degrees of ‘fundamentalisms’ or ‘conservatisms’ among them. Apart from sharing Pagad’s unease aboutthe growing influence of American cultural and economic influence, Durban’s Muslimsarenotinclinedto establish militias to mete out ‘just’ punishments or to take to the streets to protect Islamic values. They are reluctant to challengethe post-1994state in the same way that Pagad seemsto be doing. As Hall (1992) has pointed out, identities are formed and transformed continuously in the ‘interaction’ between individual and society. The 47 Goolam Vahed . While identities of Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa are shifting a wide range of identiti es in the New South Africa, most they have accessto respond ents are turningno stalgic ally to an invente d past ofperfe ct Islamic is sociality. The perception of being Muslim is strengthening and Islam becoming an important componentin self-des cription . Many Muslimsa re retreating to an Islamic identity that is perceived to be fixed and unchanging. For respondents this permanence allows them to belong to a social collectivity or ‘community’. Many Muslims have also cometo believe that public institutions, educational, cultural, and political, cannot safeguard Islamic values and that they should take the preservation ofthese into their own hands. The new Islam does not have a proselytising aspecttoit. It is based largely on self-reformation while contact and integration with non- Indian African, white and coloured Muslims is largely non-existent. In seeking to introduce newandtighter Islamic codes in the public and private domains, Indian Muslims in Durbanare not necessarily seeking to undermine the state. Indeed, they are using the new freedomsof a secular state to create space for themselvesand are thereby redefining for themselves the kind of Muslims they want to be. An inward-looking Indian Muslim community is developing, with an understandingthat the constitution can be used to struggle for specific needs and rights. While respondents, generally, did not display nationalpride or affection for the new state, this does not signify disloyalty either. The natureofthe state wasnot questioned, signifying de-politicisation. This phenomenonis not unique to Muslims. Cultural pluralism is a natural attribute of political societies (Young 1998:5), and nation-states all over are struggling to assert authority over their citizens. This is especially true of South Africa whosespecific history has engendered deep differences of education, race, ethnicity, value orientations, individual needs and so on. The new South Africanstate is in a difficult position. It has to balance the specific needs and demands of Muslims, Afrikaners, coloureds and other minorities, against the need to redress deep-seated inequalities, maintain public safety and order and create respect for humanrights. As far as the demandsof minorities are concerned, as Young reminds us, ‘while the premise of a culturally homogenous national identity is flawed, neither does the state have an obligation to promote and enforce difference’ (Young 1998:3). The new state is following a secular programme, and may or may not continue to tolerate Islamic institutions. This may loosen the loyalties of Muslims to the state in the future. 48 Indian Islam and meaning of SA citizenship Notes 1. The financia! assistance of the National Research Foundation towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this paper and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the National Research Foundation According to Jeppie (1987) there is no such thing as a ‘Malay’ community. While this term may not have a foundation in social science it is used here becauseit has been widely internalised by most South Africans to refer to the coloured Muslimsof the Cape. This also explains use of the word coloured. Population Census, 1996. This was calculated by examining ‘second language’ statistics. An indication of the depth of caste feeling is that the trust deed of the Grey Street Mosqueprovides for nine trustees based onsectarian lines: five Memons, two Gujarati’s, one Kokney and one colonial-born. The trust deed defines a ‘colonial-born’ as an urdu-speaking descendantof indentured labourers. The Jamiat, for example, ruled that ‘due to the immorality of the times ... it is compulsory for a female to cover her face which is the focus of her beauty’. This would accord a womana ‘degree of respect, honour and dignity and of being in charge of her body’. The Sunni Jamiat, on the other hand, whose support base is amongst working-class Muslims, does not compel womento covertheir faces. Muslims cannot consumepork or alcohol while other animals have to be slaughtered in a prescribed manner. Figures supplied by Mr Farid Choonara, Chariman, Hajj and Umrah Council, August 19, 1999. Figures supplied by S Ebrahim, Regional Director, Association of Muslim Schools, KZN. While this is contrary to the law regarding compulsory education the government has not clamped down. . Ordinary individuals makea pledge to the Shaykh. This is referred to as Bay’ at. The word ‘Bay’ meansto sell. By bay’at a mureed‘sells’ himself to his Shaykh and thus to God. . Given the contextual natureof identities, the seriousness of these claims have to be investigated. Were they for the benefit of the questioner? Would respondents have said something else at another time or to someoneelse? Perhaps they would have. But these claimsand identities must be understood against the backdrop of material realities which can be assessed. My own impressionis that respondents wereserious and sincere about these assertions. . Many respondents were keen to emphasisethat all the non-A fricans who were killed in detention by the apartheid government were Muslim. They include 49 Goolam Vahed Imam Haroun, Ahmed Timol and DrHaffejee. Ahmed Kathrada wasimprisoned with Nelson Mandela while Yusuf Dadoo held important leadership positions within the ANC and CP. 13. Muslims are compelled to pay an annual tax amounting to 2.5 per cent oftheir wealth. Called Zakaat,this is a pillar of their faith andis redistributed to needy Muslims. 14. 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