Debate Calling the glass half full: a response to Berger’s ‘Towards an analysis of the South African media and transformation, 1994- 1999’ Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabill Introduction In issue 38 of Transformation, Guy Berger (1999) raises manyinteresting issues regarding transformation of the South African media from 1994 to 1999, highlighting numerous key developments in the field since thefirst fully-democratic elections. The article comes at a time when the South African media industry is changing at a rapid pace, and is therefore a helpful reference for current media studies. Berger examinesvarious facets of South African media which showsignsoftransformation, from legalities to reception analysis, the last of whichties in with audiencerelated issues. Throughoutthis exercise, he identifies many significant changes within post-apartheid media; however, we believe Berger’s article misses the mark on several key points. By engaging his work on these points, we also hopeto ‘stimulate debate as well as further research’, as Berger (1999:114) himself advocates. Berger’s article is essentially three articles in one, each of which deservesattention. The first is an attemptto outline the dominantperspectives — both theoretical and political — used by analysts to determine if and to whatextent the South African media has transformeditself since 1994, The middle sectionis a lengthy and detailed description ofrecent developments in media, which informs morethanit clarifies. Finally, Berger’s conclusion turnsto a surprising and unsubstantiated attack on ‘left-wing commentators’ who ‘have taken a dismissive view of media transformation’ (1999:112). TRANSFORMATION43 (2000) ISSN 0258-7696 Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabill Berger moves throughspecific issue areas which he namesasessential to a thorough analysis of transformation or lack thereof in post-apartheid South African media — the legal environment, media ownership, representativity, content and conceptions of mediarole, and audiences. Apart from beingcritical issues of the media generally, these were also issues of concern prior to South Africa’s democratic era. During apartheid, South African media wereindeed largely concentrated in a few white hands whoused it to represent their interests and aspirations. Even the legal framework within which the media operated was based on the pursuit of these interests. Media content was drawnalong racial lines as evidenced by ethnically-oriented radio stations andtelevision channels which consolidated this division. It is important to note, however, that these issues are all interlinked. From ownership to content, members of the black majority wereessentially not represented. They were perceived as the ‘other’ upon whom decisions were made. The demise of apartheid in 1994 provided opportunities for black South Africans no longer to appear as just an audience, but as media owners as well. This is what Berger refers to as transformation. Understanding.transformation As much as we appreciate these important changes, we take issue with Berger’s simplistic understandingof transformation.Tous, transformation is not only about replacement of colours in mass media (although these matter), which seemsto be Berger’s focus and thereforehis rallying point. This is perhaps the most important point to stimulate debate surrounding transformation in the South African media and within South Africa as a whole: each commentator comes to the issue with his or her own, often unspoken, idea about exactly what transformation would or should look like. It should comeaslittle surprise, then, that the resulting analyses are often far apart in their conclusions. For the record, then, we define the successful transformation of South African media as being achieved when it reflects, in its ownership,staffing, and product, the society within which it operates, not only in terms of race, but also socio-economic status, gender, religion, sexual orientation, region, language, etc. This is only possible if access is opened — again in ownership, staffing, and product — not only to the emerging blackelite, but also to grassroots communities of all colours. Berger attempts to deal with these varying definitions of transformation in at least two ways: first, he examines severalcrucial issues (eg, policy, Calling the glass half full ownership, representativity, etc) rather than exclusively focusing on just one. Second, his introduction attempts to provide the theoret ical framework through which to understand the following analysis. Unfort unately, the four political perspectives he identifies in this introduction resemble strawmencreated for destruction more than anyactualstancetakeni n the ongoing debates around transformation. This is complicated by the fact that the perspectives he identifies are-a mix of normative and analytical positions, which causes him to identify them by their conclusions regarding transformation rather than by the presuppositions which lead to those conclusions. This approach makesrough goingfor any analytic framework,particularly in this case when Berger emphasises the question ofhistorical continui ty in his conclusion. Because a commentatoridentifies historical continui ty of political and/or economic interests within mass media ownership in South Africa does not mean that commentator views such continuity as the inevitable determinant in transformation or its absence. Likewis e, recognising historical watersheds in mass media should not mean previous history disappears from the picture. A sophisticated analysis ofmass media _ therefore needs to rely on more fundamental assumptions to identify the different perspectives most commonin analysing transformation of the media, rather than on the final verdict they yield. After setting up these strawmenpolitical perspectives, Berger claims to approach the specific issues in the middle section of his paper as they ‘emerge froma paradigm counterposedto the generalperspectives discussed above’ (1999: 89). Here the analysis falters because Berger neveridentifies this counterposed paradigm,butinstead takesit as a given thatit will arise from his detailed descriptions. The result is a paradigm which remains unnamed,yetfilters Berger’s analysis of each of the areas he examines, thus taking on the cloak of objectivity through its invisibility. Weseein this article a liberal perspective which we presume to have been gainedatleastin part from the recent collaboration between Berger’s department at Rhodes University and Independent Newspapers. This conforms to Jacques Lacan’s (1977) claim that all of us write with certain preconceptions influenced by our history as part of our experience. Unfortunately or not, this experience does not disappear completely asit keeps retuming to us in unconscious forms through writing, dreams, laughter and so forth. This experience is carried along to our various work places. For example, the ongoing conflict between black and white 77 Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabill journalists in the newsroom, which according to Berger is morefierce than everbefore,is part and parcelofthis experience which hasnot changed, but instead been carried along to the workplace. Berger’s liberalism is visible in his acceptanceof the industry’s claims of transformation at face value and his accompanying focus on anecdotal and impressionistic evidence of change. This is a distortion of the highest degree, for it fails to provide a deeper analysis of what transformation could and should looklike. Is the glass half-full or half-empty? The question of transformation in all sectors of South African society, including the media, remains to some extent one of the age-old adageof the half-full glass. Partial, uneven, and at times contradictory is the only possible result of any reasonable analysis of transformation since 1994 in South Africa, and an analysisof the media is no exception. On this point we agree with Berger, who usesthis same metaphor referring to post-apartheid media ownership (1999:102). Indeed,thefirst two sections ofBerger’s article explore the contradictions and inconsistencies in media transformation with some success, correctly emphasising that ‘the media’ is far from a singular homogenous entity. Throughouthis analysis, he points to issues where some media have actually lost ground since 1994, anditis this detail which makes his article such a valuable resource. However, this attention to detail makeshis attack on those who dareto question the completeness of the transformation all the more disturbing. This attack exposes his bottom-line aim ofvalorising the changes that have taken place within South African media while minimising the failures and setbacks on the road to transformation. The metaphorofthe half-full glass runs therisk oftrivialising the issues at stake by portraying them as mere semantics. More importantly, the metaphorhides the very real issue of context, complicated by the issue of temporality in the South African case. In other words, whether transformation is viewed as half-successful or half-unsuccessful depends heavily on the context in which the analyst operates andthe time frameto which the current state of media is being compared. Berger (1999:88-89) takes as a giventhat‘there are limits to democratisa- tion and socio-economic transformation in post-1994 South Africa as a negotiated polity with a capitalist economy located in a global network of relations after the Cold War’, which is a reasonable assessment of the current context of South African media. Nonetheless, recognising this 78 Calling the glass halffull context and accepting it as a concrete, unchangeable circum stance which thereby lowers our expectations of what transformation should look like are two very different things; while we recognise the former, we do not acceptthe latter. The issue recalls the dilemmas of living underap artheid, and the extent to which one accepted the apartheid context in order to function within it, versus questioning the fundamental assumpt ionsof the contextitself. Likewise, the time frame which Berger has chosen heavily informsh is conclusions. Again regarding media ownership, Bergertells us that whether half-full or half-empty, the glass ‘indisputably contains a lot more liquid thanit did before 1994’ (1999:102). We are unaware of any serious scholar who claims that changes, mostly for the better, have not taken place in South African media since 1994, The questionis not whether changes have taken place, but rather to what extent they have taken place and whether they therebyqualify as ‘transformation’. In other words, we should certainly hopethat South A frican media has improvedsince the end of apartheid; the question is to what degree media has made substantive — transformative — changes, ratherthan superficial changes geared toward maintainingprivilege among an elite instead of redistributing privilege. These differences lead us to draw different conclusions regarding transformation of South African media than those drawn by Berger (1999:89): Thus while media in such a society [as contemporary South Africa] is unlikely really to provide the access or appropriate information resourcesfor grassroots participation in governance, it could play a range of other democratic functions. One of these was the potential to contribute to representative (if not participative) democracy by enhancing the informed choices of citizens at least at voting times. Another wasthe possibility of acting as a greaterorlesser pluralistic forum (at least for elites), and as a relatively-independent watchdog (or, rather, as a guard-dog of various interests) that scrutinises government, promoted [sic] transparency and enhanced [sic] accountability. Whereas Berger describes the above as ‘transformative roles’ (1999:89) for the media in the nameof a practical acceptance ofthe liberal-capitalist context of 1999 South Africa, we view the qualifications (‘if not participative...at least at voting times...at least for elites...of various interests’) as fatal flaws which expose most of the changes within the industry as necessary but grossly insufficient for authentic transformation. 79 Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabiil Berger’s analysis Wefind Berger’s overemphasis on superficial indicators of change most evident in his discussion of media ownership. For him, the appearance of integration provides the baseline for transformation. He writes (1999:98): From the vantagepoint of pluralism as a factor in democracy, these changescan be heralded for further promoting competition and for bringing new and previously excludedplayers into the media business. Not only black ownership of media came into play, but owner stakes by unions, women’s groups and even a developmenttrust entered the picture. While it may indeed be true that media ownership has partially changed colour, have we considered the underlying problems relating to these changes whichare an integralpart of transformation? Failureto bring these issues into the discussion makesour studies of transformation inaccurate. While Berger acknowledges that many of these new owners were highly gearedto the financialinstitutions, he still considers this a profound change that can be heralded as transformation. His claim ‘that they now have formal title is still significant when compared to the racist and purely corporate concentration pre- 1994’ (1999: 98) reverts back to transformation in terms of racial tokenism rather than a true transformation of media power. Let’s take Johnnic as an example. Its debt arising from the loansit incurred was far beyondits ability to sustain. At one stage, the lending institutions intended to repossess the company from black ownership as Johnnic failed to pay them back. Only with the arrival of Paul Edwardsin mid-1999 did these institutions extend their loan period. Whereas the company belonged to black South Africans on paper, it did not in real terms. Hencethey are given the formaltitles which Berger acceptsat face value as transformation. Berger gives only passing mentionto the fact that , Dynamo Investmentsold back its City Press shares to Naspers, andfails to mention that Perskor went on to merge with Caxton despite Kagiso’s disapproval. Important questions arise: what conclusion should be drawn, knowing that Kagiso was supposedly a joint controller? These incidentsare only a few among many which call into question the authenticity of the deals called transformation among great fanfare. Thetrade union-linked Midi consortium is also treated with simplicity in Berger’s article as union-ownedandtherefore evidenceoftransformation. Only a few monthsafter the consortium wasgivenits licence, the station Calling the glass half full wasfacing extremefinancial constraints due to the minority shareholders’ inability to pay for their shares. The 15 million rand monthly expenditure could not be metbythe seven million rand generated from advertising. This situation exposes the shortcomings of trade unions’ involvement in big business, a point which Berger ignores. Over the years, escalating unemployment has affected the trade unions’ membership immensely, causing a shortage of cash flow to which the failure of trade unions to sustain their investments can beattributed. If profit is not immediately generated, as in the case of Johnnic and Midi, it becomesextraordinarily difficult for the trade unions to maintain their position. Moreover, Bergerprovides no evidencethat trade union moneyinvested in these media companies has had any impact oneitherthe financial orthe production directions taken by those companies. Without going into detail here, it is worth noting that Keyan Tomaselli’s (1997) article on changing ownership within post-apartheid print media — the very article which comes under attack in Berger’s conclusion — convincingly addresses the contradictions implied in union investments in large-scale media corporations. These contradictions present a serious challenge to Berger’s argument,as his article claims a movement away from ‘purely corporate concentration’ of media capital toward unions, women’s groups, etc. Yet Bergerfails to show that the fundamental nature of the media corporations — and they certainly do remain corporations — is in any way transformed, particularly given the often limited access the unions and others have to what Tomaselli (1997) describes as allocative and/or operational control. The extent to which these corporations havefailed to reflect their new- found union financing is made painfully apparent by Cosatu’s current attempts to ‘reign in’ their own investment companies (Sunday Independent February 13, 2000). According to Cosatu’s general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, the union-affiliated investors have ‘become a law unto themselves’ and ‘are pursuing profit and forgetting they are supposed to be making an impact on job creation’ (Sunday Independent February 13, 2000). With such strong critique from the central leadership of the unions, how can the partial financing of media companies by unions be accurately described as transformation? The exceptionsto this critique are the many small-scale developments which have taken place in the post-apartheid media. Berger rightly sees these developments, such as the Phutuma schemeinitiated by M-Net to release 20 per centofits shares to small-scale black investors, the emphasis 81 Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabill placed on community radio stations by the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), and the creation of new NGO web publishers like WomensNet, as hopeful movements in the right direction. Yet Berger avoids naming the immenseconstraints and minuscule scale within which these projects continue to operate. The Phutumaplan is able to boast ‘more direct black shareholders than any other “empowerment”exercise’ (Berger 1999:99) only because these shareholders are so widely dispersed as to carry very little power as a bloc when it comesto allocative and operational control of M-Net. Likewise, Berger (1999:108) blames community radio stations for their lack of skill injournalism andtheir reliance on music and talk shows, without recognising such issues as reflecting part of the larger problems confronting all black businesses with limited capital. Mostof the staff at these radio stations are students in the community, who even bring their own CDs andtapes to the station. Employing experiencedstaff is far beyondthe financial capacity of these stations, keeping them by definition small-scale with a very limited market share. Wealso take issue with Berger’s approach to cross-ownership and international purchasing of South African media. As muchas these changes may have increased economies of scale and guaranteed survival for some , new media owners, as he claims, we do not celebrate it for it creates the same conglomerates and moguls that we destroyed a few years ago, most notably Argus. Likewise, Johnnic is today one of the largest companies in market capitalisation country-wide. Berger explains these as positive developmentsin terms of competition, with only a brief addendumthatthis result ‘was only at the higher end of the market’ (1999:97). Finally, we question the positive conclusions Berger draws from anecdotal and impressionistic evidence regarding both staffing and contentof post- apartheid South African media. Berger claims that ‘The period under review saw significant transformation in race as regardsstaffing’ (1999:102). Yet the evidence he presents of this transformationis a list of highly placed black journalists, editors and managers (largely cherry-picked from the alternative media of the 1980s) and the observation that ‘community radio stations based in the townships werestaffed largely by black youth and the newly privatised or licenced commercialstations also saw significant black staffing’ (1999:103). The naming of a handful of black editors and managers belies the evidence of the UNESCO-funded research on affirmative action in the 82 Calling the glass half full media conducted by Farhana Goga (2000)of the University of Natal which showsthat both black and female South Africansarestill under-represented, particularly in the top levels of the media industry. For instance, Goga found that white menstill hold 76 per cent ofthe top and senior management positions and 49 per cent of middle managementpositions in the media industry, with only 22 and 24 percentofthesepositions (respectively) held by people of colour. Furthermore, where black and female managers are present, they receive two to 12 per cent less compensation for their work than do their white male counterparts. The only significant category in whichthe salary results are reversed, for both race and gender,are in the junior managementposition created to meet affirmative action goals; yet white men (holding 44 per cent of junior managementpositions — almost a fifth more than any other category) are disproportionately represented even in this category (Goga 2000). Theseresults lead Goga to concludethat while improvements since 1994 indicate the partial success of affirmative action policies, the industry as a whole remains a long distance from both proportional representation and pay equity, particularly in positions of power (Goga 2000). The amateur staffing of the by-definition small-scale community radio sector by black South Africans cannotbe held in the samelight as these major commercial or public mediainstitutions. In spite of these inequities, Berger (1999:104) accuses former President Mandela and the ANCofplaying ‘the race card ... despite the political equality for all races’. Yet the results of Goga’s study clearly indicate that political equality does not automatically translate into other formsof equality. In addition, formalpositions do not necessarily represent transformation; one must also examinerelationships and the kinds of informal power distribution within media organisations. Although such relationships are difficult to quantify, the recent split between black and white editors over the Human Rights Commission inquiry into racism in the mediaindicates, at the very least, that even those who have benefited most from the formal changes regardingrace are dissatisfied with the media’s progress on deeper issues surrounding transformation (see, for example, Saturday Argus March 11-12, 2000). Berger’s evidence of changes in media content is equally shaky, particularly his description ofthe famousphoto ofthe dead AWB vigilantes in Bophuthatswana as ‘the most visible turning point’ in transforming content of print media. Why he decided to single out the AWBvigilantes Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabill as a changein print journalism remains a mystery to us. It is surprising that ofall the pre-elections incidents covered by the media, this alone deserved mention. For example, what about the confrontation between the ANC and IFP supporters at Shell House in Johannesburg, which left many black South Africans dead?! To use the AWBpicture as an example and claim thatit signals the dead end of white South Africans’ period as newsmakers is outrageous and completely unsupported by the evidence. Evenbrief, informal studies of content show — though perhaps less extreme than five years ago — a continuation of disproportionate representation of white South Africans in mass media (see, for example, Mail and Guardian January 18, 2000). Berger’s attack on critiques of transformation Lastly, we turn to Berger’s attack on left-wing critiques of transformation as incarnated by Tomaselli (1997) and Sandile Memele (1999). Wefindit problematic that, after claiming to seek a more nuanced and detailed accountoftransformation in South Africa media, Berger (1999:113) rather unexpectedly decides to spend the last two pages of a thirty-two page article unfairly caricaturing an analysis of class as a ‘methodological straitjacket’. While we agree with Berger (1999:113) that varied ownership forms deserve to have ‘their potential assessed rather than rejected as nothing more than racial substitution or class continuity’, we strongly disagree that such an analysis is absent in left-wing critiques of media (including the Tomaselli article which hecriticises), or that Berger’s article presents substantial evidence to support his claims that these changesin ownership represent meaningful change for anyone besides those directly enriched by the financial transactions themselves. Putting the Tomaselli and the Memelearticles in the same melting pot is analytically inaccurate. Memele is hurled into the argument simply because of his view of the current transformation as a device by the bourgeoisie to ensure and continue exploitation. First, Memele’s views should be considered in their proper context by trying to understand the questions with which he is dealing. We understand Memele astrying to answera very simple question which manypeople in South Africa evade, namely, what does transformation mean to ordinary men and womenin the street. Taking as an example all the references of transformation that Bergeralludedto in this article, do they mean anything to the unemployed and underemployed in the country? In other words, at a time when unemploymentisfrighteningly high and rising, does shareholding, changing 84 Calling the glass halffull the faces of editors and media managers, and similar changes mean anything to the vast majority of South Africans? These changesareall taking place abovethe headsof the people with whom Memeleis concerned. Take black economic empowermentasa presumed sign of transformation: whodoesit benefit except people who were already better off than much of the community during apartheid? Memele’s argument gains power from a recent study which showsthat, while the richest ten per cent of black South Africans increasedtheir annual income by 17 per cent between 1991 and 1996 (the latest year for which comprehensivestatistics are available), the poorest40 per cent of black South African householdslost 21 per cent of their income (Mail and Guardian January 28, 2000). Tomaselli is also being read out of context. His statement on Africanisation,’ for which Berger (1999:112) takes him totask,is in fact a quotation from the Council of African Thought which Tomaselli also questionsasessentialist, thereby implying that Berger’s criticism is directed at the wrong target. Likewise, Tomaselli’s article should be understood in the context of the fanfare the various media deals and so-called black empowerment schemes received as changing the face of South African media. When NAIL bought the Sowetan from Argus, the step was claimed to show the changing face of South African media ownership. When Cyril Ramaphosa left parliament to join NAIL, the move was commended by political and business sectors alike. Cosatu, for instance, viewed this as a step towards real black economic empowerment, and not the tokenism which had been happening with many white conglomerates (Sowetan Business 1996:11). The Sowetan (1996:11) further commented that Ramaphosa’s entry into NAIL was a historic move and a sensational coup for black empowerment. From these comments, one sees a hopefor a kind of interconnection between business and society and economic andpolitical power. In other words, it is believed that since Ramaphosa has been actively involved in the struggle against poverty caused by apartheid he will be able to influence and direct business towards serving the black majority. The Northern Sotho proverb Mmetla shapo la tlala o betla a lebisitse gagabo, translated as ‘he who goesout to hunt always thinks about his family back home’, also captures the hopethat black ownership would translate into business that would practice communalism, which deals with the equal distribution of resources to the larger population. Unfortunately, the marketrealities dictated terms to Ramaphosa andthe other beneficiaries of black empowerment schemes, hence many of them were forced to 85 Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabill restructure continuously in an attempt to be in line with the market, rather than pursue a more equitable society. It is within this context that Tomaselli’s statements have to be placed. Berger (1999:112) denounces Tomaselli for declaring that ‘racial substitution in the media will not automatically provide increased popular accessof opinion in the media’ and then concludingthat the result may well ‘replicate the current class structure, albeit in a more inclusive way’ (Tomaselli 1997:66). Yet Tomaselli’s position is well-argued throughout the article, and at no point does he assume that replication of class Structures as inevitable, but rather provides evidence for its empirical likelihood. Ironically, Berger and Tomaselli agree that racial substitution does not guarantee changes in the media (Berger 1999:112; Tomaselli 1997:66);the differencein their positionsis that Berger sees such substitution as evidenceoftransformationin andof itself, whereas Tomaselli questions the transformative impact of such changes. Berger (1999:112) criticises both Tomaselli and Memele for ‘concentratingon class in a rather rigid way’. Both Memele and Tomaselli do address the issue of class — provoked by things like the Economic EmpowermentInitiative, which continues to create anew classofcapitalists — from a Marxist perspective. But is there anything rigid in either of their arguments? This approachis only rigid if one sees Marxism’s concept of class through concavelenses which refuse to recogniseclass issues through a solitary emphasis on race. Berger’s attack thereby implies that any analysis of class is misguided and inappropriate. Even as Berger (1999:113) admits that Tomaselli’s analysis is ‘far more sophisticated’ than his four strawmen,hestill claimsit ‘remains in the end as politically-driven as they do’. Berger’s own political drives remain unnamedand thereby concealedin a disingenuous admissionthat ‘apolitical analysis (especially of the media)’ is not possible. Yet the politics of Berger’s article becomeclearin his dismissal of critiques which pointout the limits of the changes which have taken place. His claim that transformation has been significant even as he recognises ‘there was, however,little if anything in the way of thorough-going socio-economic transformation as regards local economic empowerment’ (1999:97) exposes his political predisposition to look away from the grassroots of South African media in his analysis. Berger (1999:99) also heralds the financial transactions as ‘breaking the white capitalist stranglehold on the print media’. Perhaps the Stranglehold has been broken,but South Africanprint Calling the glasshaif full media remainlargely in the handsof whitecapitalists. Is this transformation? Wecan only concludethatit is Berger who, in trying to fit thoughtfulleft- wingcritiques into his analytic framework,is politically driven to reduce them into simplistic claimsofhistorical continuity and methodological and theoretical rigidity. Conclusion Berger’s (1999:113) claim that ‘There has been mammoth changein South African media in thefirst five years of the country’s democracy; in legal context, ownership and staffing, in race, and even gender and class’ depends more onthe deplorable state of media underapartheid than the current state of true transformation. As we have argued above, we view transformation as a moreintensive processthan that which Berger describes in his article. This process requires greater integration, not just of race, but of a variety of both people and issues that move beyondthebits and pieces shownin Berger’s discussion. For this process to be complete, all the facets need attention; while Berger successfully identifies a wide variety of issues which need to be examinedto determinethe extent of transformation, he treats each with a superficial analysis which is too eager tc accept face value changes in title and name, without delving into whether actual practice or media products have been transformed. Let us notignore the fact that the changes in the media industry were not spontaneous, but were largely enforced by the government through affirmative action, the employment equity act and black economic empowermentpolicy. Governmentintervention impacted heavily on the nature of the changes that took place, which calls into question the depth to which such changes have taken root irf the industry itself (see, for example, Mail and Guardian December 2, 1998). Hence we do not think it is appropriate to call these changes transformation; rather the changes have been an exercise in changing faces. Many companies, becauseoftheir unwillingness to transform, may have changedthese faces only to impress the government with no commitment to honest or substantive transformation.’ Shareholding, which has been a central focus in Berger’s discussion of these changing faces, continues to take place beyond most people’s reach. How does one expect newspapercirculation to rise when the potential readership still cannot access it due to poverty andilliteracy? How does one expect M-Net subscriptionsto increase when peopleare without the money to pay for it? These issues contributed to the media market crash in 1998. 87 Gibson Mashilo Boloka and Ron Krabill , The fact that many families were unable to afford their children’s school fees due to unemploymentput more burden on the government, which then } had to cut its educational materials expenditure, crippling Kagiso and leading to retrenchments.‘ The shareholdingtransactionsthat are discussed in Berger’s article will not be enoughto achieve transformation aslong as they do not address the unemploymentissue or the daily experiences of the majority of the population. The media cannotbe understoodin isolation of these trends, forit is but one part within complex societal networks. By singling it out without investigating how other networks impacton it and howit also impacts on them is inappropriate; even worseis the attempt to understand changesin the higher end of the market without understanding the impact of those changes on the lower end of the market and on those excluded from the market altogether. Unless we see transformation in its entirety by bringing in these issues, we will remain off target. A truly nuanced and sophisticated analysis of the South African media would look for substantive, not just formal, transformation, not only in the different issues raised by Berger, but also regarding all aspects of South African society, including the inter- related nature of both race and class with other forms of oppression. Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank the students and staff of the Graduate Programme in Cultural and Media Studiesat the University of Natal for their insights into this article and the topic with whichit deals. Notes 1. Formany South African newspapers,this was adepiction of cruelty irrespective of the dead bodies that the AWBsleft behind. We consider this a general problem of media, whereby the death of a hundred black South Africans is another normal event defined by apartheid media as black on black violence, but when a handful of white South Africans are killed it becomes a seminal event in media history. 2. The statementrefers to the ways in which African values andtraditions will be : mobilised and channelled to bear on public life, and become influential in moulding and changing mass behaviour and thinking. 3. Like most other industries, media companies’ operations are regulated by the government,hence they have to have their licences renewed. Failure to comply with the governmentrules mayresult in their business licence being withdrawn. 4. The government’s cut of educational materials impacted heavily on Kagiso publishers, a cut which resulted in rationalisation. Calling the glasshalffull References Berger, G (1999) ‘Towards an analysis of the South African media and transformation, 1994-1999’, Transformation 38. Goga,F (2000) Towards Affirmative Action:issues ofrace and genderin the South African media. Durban: University ofNatal. Lacan, J (1977) Ecrits: a selection. New York: Norton. Memele, S (1999) ‘The naked truth about transformation’, Rhodes Journalism Review 17. Tomaselli, K (1997) ‘Ownership and control in the South African print media: black empowermentafter apartheid, 1990-1997’, Equid Novi 18(1). 89