

Debate

Calling the glass half full: a response to Berger's 'Towards an analysis of the South African media and transformation, 1994-1999'

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Introduction

In issue 38 of *Transformation*, Guy Berger (1999) raises many interesting issues regarding transformation of the South African media from 1994 to 1999, highlighting numerous key developments in the field since the first fully-democratic elections. The article comes at a time when the South African media industry is changing at a rapid pace, and is therefore a helpful reference for current media studies. Berger examines various facets of South African media which show signs of transformation, from legalities to reception analysis, the last of which ties in with audience related issues. Throughout this exercise, he identifies many significant changes within post-apartheid media; however, we believe Berger's article misses the mark on several key points. By engaging his work on these points, we also hope to 'stimulate debate as well as further research', as Berger (1999:114) himself advocates.

Berger's article is essentially three articles in one, each of which deserves attention. The first is an attempt to outline the dominant perspectives – both theoretical and political – used by analysts to determine if and to what extent the South African media has transformed itself since 1994. The middle section is a lengthy and detailed description of recent developments in media, which informs more than it clarifies. Finally, Berger's conclusion turns to a surprising and unsubstantiated attack on 'left-wing commentators' who 'have taken a dismissive view of media transformation' (1999:112).

Berger moves through specific issue areas which he names as essential to a thorough analysis of transformation or lack thereof in post-apartheid South African media – the legal environment, media ownership, representativity, content and conceptions of media role, and audiences. Apart from being critical issues of the media generally, these were also issues of concern prior to South Africa's democratic era. During apartheid, South African media were indeed largely concentrated in a few white hands who used it to represent their interests and aspirations. Even the legal framework within which the media operated was based on the pursuit of these interests. Media content was drawn along racial lines as evidenced by ethnically-oriented radio stations and television channels which consolidated this division. It is important to note, however, that these issues are all interlinked. From ownership to content, members of the black majority were essentially not represented. They were perceived as the 'other' upon whom decisions were made. The demise of apartheid in 1994 provided opportunities for black South Africans no longer to appear as just an audience, but as media owners as well. This is what Berger refers to as transformation.

Understanding transformation

As much as we appreciate these important changes, we take issue with Berger's simplistic understanding of transformation. To us, transformation is not *only* about replacement of colours in mass media (although these matter), which seems to be Berger's focus and therefore his rallying point. This is perhaps the most important point to stimulate debate surrounding transformation in the South African media and within South Africa as a whole: each commentator comes to the issue with his or her own, often unspoken, idea about exactly what transformation would or should look like. It should come as little surprise, then, that the resulting analyses are often far apart in their conclusions. For the record, then, we define the successful transformation of South African media as being achieved when it reflects, in its ownership, staffing, *and* product, the society within which it operates, not only in terms of race, but also socio-economic status, gender, religion, sexual orientation, region, language, etc. This is only possible if access is opened – again in ownership, staffing, and product – not only to the emerging black elite, but also to grassroots communities of all colours.

Berger attempts to deal with these varying definitions of transformation in at least two ways: first, he examines several crucial issues (eg, policy,

ownership, representativity, etc) rather than exclusively focusing on just one. Second, his introduction attempts to provide the theoretical framework through which to understand the following analysis. Unfortunately, the four political perspectives he identifies in this introduction resemble strawmen created for destruction more than any actual stance taken in the ongoing debates around transformation. This is complicated by the fact that the perspectives he identifies are a mix of normative and analytical positions, which causes him to identify them by their *conclusions* regarding transformation rather than by the *presuppositions* which lead to those conclusions.

This approach makes rough going for any analytic framework, particularly in this case when Berger emphasises the question of historical continuity in his conclusion. Because a commentator identifies historical continuity of political and/or economic interests within mass media ownership in South Africa does not mean that commentator views such continuity as the inevitable determinant in transformation or its absence. Likewise, recognising historical watersheds in mass media should not mean previous history disappears from the picture. A sophisticated analysis of mass media therefore needs to rely on more fundamental assumptions to identify the different perspectives most common in analysing transformation of the media, rather than on the final verdict they yield.

After setting up these strawmen political perspectives, Berger claims to approach the specific issues in the middle section of his paper as they 'emerge from a paradigm counterposed to the general perspectives discussed above' (1999: 89). Here the analysis falters because Berger never identifies this counterposed paradigm, but instead takes it as a given that it will arise from his detailed descriptions. The result is a paradigm which remains unnamed, yet filters Berger's analysis of each of the areas he examines, thus taking on the cloak of objectivity through its invisibility.

We see in this article a liberal perspective which we presume to have been gained at least in part from the recent collaboration between Berger's department at Rhodes University and Independent Newspapers. This conforms to Jacques Lacan's (1977) claim that all of us write with certain preconceptions influenced by our history as part of our experience. Unfortunately or not, this experience does not disappear completely as it keeps returning to us in unconscious forms through writing, dreams, laughter and so forth. This experience is carried along to our various work places. For example, the ongoing conflict between black and white

journalists in the newsroom, which according to Berger is more fierce than ever before, is part and parcel of this experience which has not changed, but instead been carried along to the workplace. Berger's liberalism is visible in his acceptance of the industry's claims of transformation at face value and his accompanying focus on anecdotal and impressionistic evidence of change. This is a distortion of the highest degree, for it fails to provide a deeper analysis of what transformation could and should look like.

Is the glass half-full or half-empty?

The question of transformation in all sectors of South African society, including the media, remains to some extent one of the age-old adage of the half-full glass. Partial, uneven, and at times contradictory is the only possible result of any reasonable analysis of transformation since 1994 in South Africa, and an analysis of the media is no exception. On this point we agree with Berger, who uses this same metaphor referring to post-apartheid media ownership (1999:102).

Indeed, the first two sections of Berger's article explore the contradictions and inconsistencies in media transformation with some success, correctly emphasising that 'the media' is far from a singular homogenous entity. Throughout his analysis, he points to issues where some media have actually lost ground since 1994, and it is this detail which makes his article such a valuable resource. However, this attention to detail makes his attack on those who dare to question the completeness of the transformation all the more disturbing. This attack exposes his bottom-line aim of valorising the changes that have taken place within South African media while minimising the failures and setbacks on the road to transformation.

The metaphor of the half-full glass runs the risk of trivialising the issues at stake by portraying them as mere semantics. More importantly, the metaphor hides the very real issue of context, complicated by the issue of temporality in the South African case. In other words, whether transformation is viewed as half-successful or half-unsuccessful depends heavily on the context in which the analyst operates and the time frame to which the current state of media is being compared.

Berger (1999:88-89) takes as a given that 'there are limits to democratisation and socio-economic transformation in post-1994 South Africa as a negotiated polity with a capitalist economy located in a global network of relations after the Cold War', which is a reasonable assessment of the current context of South African media. Nonetheless, recognising this

context and accepting it as a concrete, unchangeable circumstance which thereby lowers our expectations of what transformation should look like are two very different things; while we recognise the former, we do not accept the latter. The issue recalls the dilemmas of living under apartheid, and the extent to which one accepted the apartheid context in order to function within it, versus questioning the fundamental assumptions of the context itself.

Likewise, the time frame which Berger has chosen heavily informs his conclusions. Again regarding media ownership, Berger tells us that whether half-full or half-empty, the glass 'indisputably contains a lot more liquid than it did before 1994' (1999:102). We are unaware of any serious scholar who claims that changes, mostly for the better, have not taken place in South African media since 1994. The question is not whether changes have taken place, but rather to what extent they have taken place and whether they thereby qualify as 'transformation'. In other words, we should certainly hope that South African media has improved since the end of apartheid; the question is to what degree media has made substantive – transformative – changes, rather than superficial changes geared toward maintaining privilege among an elite instead of redistributing privilege.

These differences lead us to draw different conclusions regarding transformation of South African media than those drawn by Berger (1999:89):

Thus while media in such a society [as contemporary South Africa] is unlikely really to provide the access or appropriate information resources for grassroots participation in governance, it could play a range of other democratic functions. One of these was the potential to contribute to representative (if not participative) democracy by enhancing the informed choices of citizens at least at voting times. Another was the possibility of acting as a greater or lesser pluralistic forum (at least for elites), and as a relatively-independent watchdog (or, rather, as a guard-dog of various interests) that scrutinises government, promoted [sic] transparency and enhanced [sic] accountability.

Whereas Berger describes the above as 'transformative roles' (1999:89) for the media in the name of a practical acceptance of the liberal-capitalist context of 1999 South Africa, we view the qualifications ('if not participative...at least at voting times...at least for elites...of various interests') as fatal flaws which expose most of the changes within the industry as necessary but grossly insufficient for authentic transformation.

Berger's analysis

We find Berger's overemphasis on superficial indicators of change most evident in his discussion of media ownership. For him, the appearance of integration provides the baseline for transformation. He writes (1999:98):

From the vantage point of pluralism as a factor in democracy, these changes can be heralded for further promoting competition and for bringing new and previously excluded players into the media business. Not only black ownership of media came into play, but owner stakes by unions, women's groups and even a development trust entered the picture.

While it may indeed be true that media ownership has partially changed colour, have we considered the underlying problems relating to these changes which are an integral part of transformation? Failure to bring these issues into the discussion makes our studies of transformation inaccurate. While Berger acknowledges that many of these new owners were highly geared to the financial institutions, he still considers this a profound change that can be heralded as transformation. His claim 'that they now have formal title is still significant when compared to the racist and purely corporate concentration pre-1994' (1999: 98) reverts back to transformation in terms of racial tokenism rather than a true transformation of media power.

Let's take Johnnic as an example. Its debt arising from the loans it incurred was far beyond its ability to sustain. At one stage, the lending institutions intended to repossess the company from black ownership as Johnnic failed to pay them back. Only with the arrival of Paul Edwards in mid-1999 did these institutions extend their loan period. Whereas the company belonged to black South Africans on paper, it did not in real terms. Hence they are given the formal titles which Berger accepts at face value as transformation. Berger gives only passing mention to the fact that Dynamo Investment sold back its *City Press* shares to Naspers, and fails to mention that Perskor went on to merge with Caxton despite Kagiso's disapproval. Important questions arise: what conclusion should be drawn, knowing that Kagiso was supposedly a joint controller? These incidents are only a few among many which call into question the authenticity of the deals called transformation among great fanfare.

The trade union-linked Midi consortium is also treated with simplicity in Berger's article as union-owned and therefore evidence of transformation. Only a few months after the consortium was given its licence, the station

was facing extreme financial constraints due to the minority shareholders' inability to pay for their shares. The 15 million rand monthly expenditure could not be met by the seven million rand generated from advertising. This situation exposes the shortcomings of trade unions' involvement in big business, a point which Berger ignores. Over the years, escalating unemployment has affected the trade unions' membership immensely, causing a shortage of cash flow to which the failure of trade unions to sustain their investments can be attributed. If profit is not immediately generated, as in the case of Johnnic and Midi, it becomes extraordinarily difficult for the trade unions to maintain their position.

Moreover, Berger provides no evidence that trade union money invested in these media companies has had any impact on either the financial or the production directions taken by those companies. Without going into detail here, it is worth noting that Keyan Tomaselli's (1997) article on changing ownership within post-apartheid print media – the very article which comes under attack in Berger's conclusion – convincingly addresses the contradictions implied in union investments in large-scale media corporations. These contradictions present a serious challenge to Berger's argument, as his article claims a movement away from 'purely corporate concentration' of media capital toward unions, women's groups, etc. Yet Berger fails to show that the fundamental nature of the media corporations – and they certainly do remain corporations – is in any way transformed, particularly given the often limited access the unions and others have to what Tomaselli (1997) describes as allocative and/or operational control.

The extent to which these corporations have failed to reflect their new-found union financing is made painfully apparent by Cosatu's current attempts to 'reign in' their own investment companies (*Sunday Independent* February 13, 2000). According to Cosatu's general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, the union-affiliated investors have 'become a law unto themselves' and 'are pursuing profit and forgetting they are supposed to be making an impact on job creation' (*Sunday Independent* February 13, 2000). With such a strong critique from the central leadership of the unions, how can the partial financing of media companies by unions be accurately described as transformation?

The exceptions to this critique are the many small-scale developments which have taken place in the post-apartheid media. Berger rightly sees these developments, such as the *Phutuma* scheme initiated by M-Net to release 20 per cent of its shares to small-scale black investors, the emphasis

placed on community radio stations by the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), and the creation of new NGO web publishers like WomensNet, as hopeful movements in the right direction. Yet Berger avoids naming the immense constraints and minuscule scale within which these projects continue to operate.

The *Phutuma* plan is able to boast 'more direct black shareholders than any other "empowerment" exercise' (Berger 1999:99) only because these shareholders are so widely dispersed as to carry very little power as a bloc when it comes to allocative and operational control of M-Net. Likewise, Berger (1999:108) blames community radio stations for their lack of skill in journalism and their reliance on music and talk shows, without recognising such issues as reflecting part of the larger problems confronting all black businesses with limited capital. Most of the staff at these radio stations are students in the community, who even bring their own CDs and tapes to the station. Employing experienced staff is far beyond the financial capacity of these stations, keeping them by definition small-scale with a very limited market share.

We also take issue with Berger's approach to cross-ownership and international purchasing of South African media. As much as these changes may have increased economies of scale and guaranteed survival for some new media owners, as he claims, we do not celebrate it for it creates the same conglomerates and moguls that we destroyed a few years ago, most notably Argus. Likewise, Johnnic is today one of the largest companies in market capitalisation country-wide. Berger explains these as positive developments in terms of competition, with only a brief addendum that this result 'was only at the higher end of the market' (1999:97).

Finally, we question the positive conclusions Berger draws from anecdotal and impressionistic evidence regarding both staffing and content of post-apartheid South African media. Berger claims that 'The period under review saw significant transformation in race as regards staffing' (1999:102). Yet the evidence he presents of this transformation is a list of highly placed black journalists, editors and managers (largely cherry-picked from the alternative media of the 1980s) and the observation that 'community radio stations based in the townships were staffed largely by black youth and the newly privatised or licenced commercial stations also saw significant black staffing' (1999:103).

The naming of a handful of black editors and managers belies the evidence of the UNESCO-funded research on affirmative action in the

media conducted by Farhana Goga (2000) of the University of Natal which shows that both black and female South Africans are still under-represented, particularly in the top levels of the media industry. For instance, Goga found that white men still hold 76 per cent of the top and senior management positions and 49 per cent of middle management positions in the media industry, with only 22 and 24 per cent of these positions (respectively) held by people of colour. Furthermore, where black and female managers are present, they receive two to 12 per cent less compensation for their work than do their white male counterparts. The only significant category in which the salary results are reversed, for both race and gender, are in the junior management position created to meet affirmative action goals; yet white men (holding 44 per cent of junior management positions – almost a fifth more than any other category) are disproportionately represented even in this category (Goga 2000).

These results lead Goga to conclude that while improvements since 1994 indicate the partial success of affirmative action policies, the industry as a whole remains a long distance from both proportional representation and pay equity, particularly in positions of power (Goga 2000). The amateur staffing of the by-definition small-scale community radio sector by black South Africans cannot be held in the same light as these major commercial or public media institutions. In spite of these inequities, Berger (1999:104) accuses former President Mandela and the ANC of playing 'the race card ... despite the political equality for all races'. Yet the results of Goga's study clearly indicate that political equality does not automatically translate into other forms of equality.

In addition, formal positions do not necessarily represent transformation; one must also examine relationships and the kinds of informal power distribution within media organisations. Although such relationships are difficult to quantify, the recent split between black and white editors over the Human Rights Commission inquiry into racism in the media indicates, at the very least, that even those who have benefited most from the formal changes regarding race are dissatisfied with the media's progress on deeper issues surrounding transformation (see, for example, *Saturday Argus* March 11-12, 2000).

Berger's evidence of changes in media content is equally shaky, particularly his description of the famous photo of the dead AWB vigilantes in Bophuthatswana as 'the most visible turning point' in transforming content of print media. Why he decided to single out the AWB vigilantes

as a change in print journalism remains a mystery to us. It is surprising that of all the pre-elections incidents covered by the media, this alone deserved mention. For example, what about the confrontation between the ANC and IFP supporters at Shell House in Johannesburg, which left many black South Africans dead? To use the AWB picture as an example and claim that it signals the dead end of white South Africans' period as newsmakers is outrageous and completely unsupported by the evidence. Even brief, informal studies of content show – though perhaps less extreme than five years ago – a continuation of disproportionate representation of white South Africans in mass media (see, for example, *Mail and Guardian* January 18, 2000).

Berger's attack on critiques of transformation

Lastly, we turn to Berger's attack on left-wing critiques of transformation as incarnated by Tomaselli (1997) and Sandile Memele (1999). We find it problematic that, after claiming to seek a more nuanced and detailed account of transformation in South Africa media, Berger (1999:113) rather unexpectedly decides to spend the last two pages of a thirty-two page article unfairly caricaturing an analysis of class as a 'methodological straitjacket'. While we agree with Berger (1999:113) that varied ownership forms deserve to have 'their potential assessed rather than rejected as nothing more than racial substitution or class continuity', we strongly disagree that such an analysis is absent in left-wing critiques of media (including the Tomaselli article which he criticises), or that Berger's article presents substantial evidence to support his claims that these changes in ownership represent meaningful change for anyone besides those directly enriched by the financial transactions themselves.

Putting the Tomaselli and the Memele articles in the same melting pot is analytically inaccurate. Memele is hurled into the argument simply because of his view of the current transformation as a device by the bourgeoisie to ensure and continue exploitation. First, Memele's views should be considered in their proper context by trying to understand the questions with which he is dealing. We understand Memele as trying to answer a very simple question which many people in South Africa evade, namely, what does transformation mean to ordinary men and women in the street. Taking as an example all the references of transformation that Berger alluded to in this article, do they mean anything to the unemployed and underemployed in the country? In other words, at a time when unemployment is frighteningly high and rising, does shareholding, changing

the faces of editors and media managers, and similar changes mean anything to the vast majority of South Africans? These changes are all taking place above the heads of the people with whom Memele is concerned. Take black economic empowerment as a presumed sign of transformation: who does it benefit except people who were already better off than much of the community during apartheid? Memele's argument gains power from a recent study which shows that, while the richest ten per cent of black South Africans increased their annual income by 17 per cent between 1991 and 1996 (the latest year for which comprehensive statistics are available), the poorest 40 per cent of black South African households lost 21 per cent of their income (*Mail and Guardian* January 28, 2000).

Tomaselli is also being read out of context. His statement on Africanisation,² for which Berger (1999:112) takes him to task, is in fact a quotation from the Council of African Thought which Tomaselli also questions as essentialist, thereby implying that Berger's criticism is directed at the wrong target. Likewise, Tomaselli's article should be understood in the context of the fanfare the various media deals and so-called black empowerment schemes received as changing the face of South African media.

When NAIL bought the *Sowetan* from Argus, the step was claimed to show the changing face of South African media ownership. When Cyril Ramaphosa left parliament to join NAIL, the move was commended by political and business sectors alike. Cosatu, for instance, viewed this as a step towards real black economic empowerment, and not the tokenism which had been happening with many white conglomerates (*Sowetan Business* 1996:11). The *Sowetan* (1996:11) further commented that Ramaphosa's entry into NAIL was a historic move and a sensational coup for black empowerment. From these comments, one sees a hope for a kind of interconnection between business and society and economic and political power. In other words, it is believed that since Ramaphosa has been actively involved in the struggle against poverty caused by apartheid he will be able to influence and direct business towards serving the black majority. The Northern Sotho proverb *Mmetla shapo la tlala o betla a lebisitse gagabo*, translated as 'he who goes out to hunt always thinks about his family back home', also captures the hope that black ownership would translate into business that would practice communalism, which deals with the equal distribution of resources to the larger population. Unfortunately, the market realities dictated terms to Ramaphosa and the other beneficiaries of black empowerment schemes, hence many of them were forced to

restructure continuously in an attempt to be in line with the market, rather than pursue a more equitable society.

It is within this context that Tomaselli's statements have to be placed. Berger (1999:112) denounces Tomaselli for declaring that 'racial substitution in the media will not automatically provide increased popular access of opinion in the media' and then concluding that the result may well 'replicate the current class structure, albeit in a more inclusive way' (Tomaselli 1997:66). Yet Tomaselli's position is well-argued throughout the article, and at no point does he assume that replication of class structures as inevitable, but rather provides evidence for its empirical likelihood. Ironically, Berger and Tomaselli agree that racial substitution does not guarantee changes in the media (Berger 1999:112; Tomaselli 1997:66); the difference in their positions is that Berger sees such substitution as evidence of transformation in and of itself, whereas Tomaselli questions the transformative impact of such changes.

Berger (1999:112) criticises both Tomaselli and Memele for 'concentrating on class in a rather rigid way'. Both Memele and Tomaselli do address the issue of class – provoked by things like the Economic Empowerment Initiative, which continues to create a new class of capitalists – from a Marxist perspective. But is there anything rigid in either of their arguments? This approach is only rigid if one sees Marxism's concept of class through concave lenses which refuse to recognise class issues through a solitary emphasis on race. Berger's attack thereby implies that *any* analysis of class is misguided and inappropriate.

Even as Berger (1999:113) admits that Tomaselli's analysis is 'far more sophisticated' than his four strawmen, he still claims it 'remains in the end as politically-driven as they do'. Berger's own political drives remain unnamed and thereby concealed in a disingenuous admission that 'apolitical analysis (especially of the media)' is not possible. Yet the politics of Berger's article become clear in his dismissal of critiques which point out the limits of the changes which have taken place. His claim that transformation has been significant even as he recognises 'there was, however, little if anything in the way of thorough-going socio-economic transformation as regards local economic empowerment' (1999:97) exposes his political predisposition to look away from the grassroots of South African media in his analysis. Berger (1999:99) also heralds the financial transactions as 'breaking the white capitalist stranglehold on the print media'. Perhaps the *stranglehold* has been broken, but South African print

media remain largely in the hands of white capitalists. Is this transformation? We can only conclude that it is Berger who, in trying to fit thoughtful left-wing critiques into his analytic framework, is politically driven to reduce them into simplistic claims of historical continuity and methodological and theoretical rigidity.

Conclusion

Berger's (1999:113) claim that 'There has been mammoth change in South African media in the first five years of the country's democracy; in legal context, ownership and staffing, in race, and even gender and class' depends more on the deplorable state of media under apartheid than the current state of true transformation. As we have argued above, we view transformation as a more intensive process than that which Berger describes in his article. This process requires greater integration, not just of race, but of a variety of both people and issues that move beyond the bits and pieces shown in Berger's discussion. For this process to be complete, all the facets need attention; while Berger successfully identifies a wide variety of issues which need to be examined to determine the extent of transformation, he treats each with a superficial analysis which is too eager to accept face value changes in title and name, without delving into whether actual practice or media products have been transformed.

Let us not ignore the fact that the changes in the media industry were not spontaneous, but were largely enforced by the government through affirmative action, the employment equity act and black economic empowerment policy. Government intervention impacted heavily on the nature of the changes that took place, which calls into question the depth to which such changes have taken root in the industry itself (see, for example, *Mail and Guardian* December 2, 1998). Hence we do not think it is appropriate to call these changes transformation; rather the changes have been an exercise in changing faces. Many companies, because of their unwillingness to transform, may have changed these faces only to impress the government with no commitment to honest or substantive transformation.³

Shareholding, which has been a central focus in Berger's discussion of these changing faces, continues to take place beyond most people's reach. How does one expect newspaper circulation to rise when the potential readership still cannot access it due to poverty and illiteracy? How does one expect M-Net subscriptions to increase when people are without the money to pay for it? These issues contributed to the media market crash in 1998.

The fact that many families were unable to afford their children's school fees due to unemployment put more burden on the government, which then had to cut its educational materials expenditure, crippling Kagiso and leading to retrenchments.⁴ The shareholding transactions that are discussed in Berger's article will not be enough to achieve transformation as long as they do not address the unemployment issue or the daily experiences of the majority of the population.

The media cannot be understood in isolation of these trends, for it is but one part within complex societal networks. By singling it out without investigating how other networks impact on it and how it also impacts on them is inappropriate; even worse is the attempt to understand changes in the higher end of the market without understanding the impact of those changes on the lower end of the market and on those excluded from the market altogether. Unless we see transformation in its entirety by bringing in these issues, we will remain off target. A truly nuanced and sophisticated analysis of the South African media would look for substantive, not just formal, transformation, not only in the different issues raised by Berger, but also regarding all aspects of South African society, including the inter-related nature of *both race and class* with other forms of oppression.

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Notes

1. For many South African newspapers, this was a depiction of cruelty irrespective of the dead bodies that the AWBs left behind. We consider this a general problem of media, whereby the death of a hundred black South Africans is another normal event defined by apartheid media as black on black violence, but when a handful of white South Africans are killed it becomes a seminal event in media history.
2. The statement refers to the ways in which African values and traditions will be mobilised and channelled to bear on public life, and become influential in moulding and changing mass behaviour and thinking.
3. Like most other industries, media companies' operations are regulated by the government, hence they have to have their licences renewed. Failure to comply with the government rules may result in their business licence being withdrawn.
4. The government's cut of educational materials impacted heavily on Kagiso publishers, a cut which resulted in rationalisation.

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