Debate Responseto Boloka and Krabill Guy Berger Rhetoric can render a debate more robust, but it can also be a symptom of a weak argument. Thelatter is the case with Boloka and Krabill. The pair are quick to accuse meof‘distortion of the highest degree’ and of making a claim that is ‘outrageous and completely unsupported’. They lash outat ‘anecdotal and impressionistic evidence’ — while not hesitating themselves to discern my‘liberal perspective’ which they presumeto originate in part from ‘the recent collaboration between Berger’s department at Rhodes University and Independent Newspapers’. I am, they say, evidence of Jacques Lacan’s claim that we are influenced by our history. Well, well. Thereis a political basis to the use of such strong languageandsimplistic branding. It arises, it appears, because I described the changes in South Africa’s media with the word ‘transformation’. For Boloka and Krabill, the term should be reserved exclusively for when the media reflects ‘in its ownership,staffing, and product, the society within whichit operates, not only in terms of race, but also socio-economic status, gender, religion, sexualorientation, region, language, etc’. This, presumably, is what they mean whentheytalk in their article about ‘true transformation’. If the debate were only about semantics, we could end here, and perhaps in the year 2050, my two critics may find themselvesa little closer to their Golden Fleece of a class-correlated, regionally equitable, etc media landscape. For mypart, my article merely examined changes since 1994 — assessing how far we have come since the bad old days. Has there been transformation,or has there not? It depends of course on how you define the term, and clearly we have different criteria here. Yet, the debate between myself and Boloka-Krabill has a deeper significance than an academic matter of who opts for whatcriteria. It is also a more than a matter of whether we measure ourlocation in relation to where we come from (myarticle), as opposed to where we are going to TRANSFORMATION43 (2000) ISSN 0258-7696 Response to Boloka and Krabill (their argument). It is aboutpolitics, appropriate tools of analysis, and about what empowerspolitical intervention. To start with the politics, Boloka and Krabill say that ‘transformation is not only about replacement of colours in mass media (although these matter)’. Herein lies a major component of the debate - how much does colour matter? In their eyes, it seems, not much. Butis this so? Froma racist society where blackness was negated, is it not an advance to register changesin colourin media ownership, staffing and product? I would have thought the majority of South Africans would have seen changes in the racial aspect of power relations as being rather significant. Boloka and Krabill rhetorically ask what the changes ‘meanto the unemployed and underemployed in the country’. Again, I would have thought that quite a few people in thesestrata, especially those working in a community radio station, or seeing black faces on TVorin print, would take some pleasure and pride in such victories over apartheid. An anecdotal speculation? Consider the bigger point I am making: class conditionsare surely not the only significant measure of change (but moreonthis later). I have, according to mycritics, a political predisposition to look away from the grassroots in my analysis. They say I have tried to ‘understand changes in the higher end of the market without understanding the impact of those changeson the lowerend of the market and on those excluded from the market altogether’. This criticism is misplaced. A major thrust on my article considered democratisation, and it is surely self-evident that all disadvantaged South Africansarepolitical beneficiaries (however unevenly) of what my article described: ie the free and far more dense, competitive and racially representative media environment since 1994. You don’t need to own or edit or even read Sunday World or the Sunday Timesto benefit indirectly from their exposés (by black journalists) of private and public sector corruption, or to celebrate that these black-owned publications can use the Bill of Rights and the Bojosi defamation judgement to fend off forces that would curtail coverage. However, Boloka and Krabill seem to believe that gains in racial justice and political democracyare just superstructural irrelevancies in the face of the economic base being — allegedly — unchanged. The changesso far are ‘necessary, but grossly insufficient for authentic transformation’. Yet in their commendable haste to deepen transformation, the pair lose sight of the significance of what changes (including economic ones) have taken place (about which more below). Theyare right in saying that to recognise 91 Guy Berger the limiting circumstances of capitalism and globalisation should not mean that we lower our expectations ofwhattransformation should look like. But if you do not havea nuanced analysis of what has been happening,and what trendsit reveals, it is unlikely that your expectations will be anything more than pipedreams. Transformation in the Boloka-Krabill lies in the misty future, to be awaited until utopia arrives. Short of this, nothing — in effect — really counts. By focusingon the issue in an absolutist way, the two writers keep their heads in the clouds, rather than identifying contemporary opportunities on the ground. Boloka and Krabill say that I overstress the changes; they prefer to point to continuities between the old and the new. Ananalysis does need to take accountof both, but arguablyit is what is changing which should attract the most attention and whichcan define the potential, notjust the limits, for one’s expectations at a given point in time. To paraphrase Gramsci, we need optimism ofthe intellect, as much as a sober pessimism of the will. My two critics seem to be afflicted by a pessimism of both, because there is no way the changesthat have happened meetthe standards of their longterm benchmark. Their logic is all or nothing, and thereis no conceptionof the milestones in-between. Accordingly, Boloka and Krabill have noreal tools of analysis to inform interventions. Thefact of the matteris that changes in race and form of ownership and control of media (including SABC, the momentous changesin which they tend to ignore) have led to significant changes in staffing and content. Boloka-Krabill dismiss my argument by saying that I reduce transformation of ownership to ‘racial tokenism’ rather than ‘a true transformation of miedia power’. According to them, Johnnic only belongsto black South Africans on paper; Midi has faced extremefinancial constraints. Thisis not the placeto go into detailed assessment (although Boloka and Krabill seem, erroneously to assume that Midi’s minority shareholders were all trade unions). If, however, one looks at the entire spectrum of ‘black empowerment’ ownership in media — including, incidentally, community radio (which has confounded doomsdayexpectations) — whatis strikingis that almost every case to date has held out, and often against very difficult odds. Even Nail has hung onto its media interests, despite being compelled to unbundle many other businesses. The survival of black ownershipis far from a tokenistic development. Contrary to what Boloka-Krabill represent as my position, I have not claimed that ownership changes at racial level have changed whattheycall the ‘fundamental nature of the media corporations’. But I do disagree with 92 Response to Boloka and Krabill them, and the source they cite, ie Tomaselli (1997) — who says the new ownershavelimited access to allocative and/or operational control. One of the most evident effects of changed ownershiphas beenin staffing,andthis impacts directly on control. My twocritics say I use anecdotal evidence here. Theysay that, in spite of continuing inequities revealed by Goga’s research (2000), I wrongly criticise Nelson Mandela (during his presidency) for playing the race card regarding media staffing changes. (Mandela had argued that critical black journalists were trying to please their white bosses.) That Goga’s research was published long after myoriginalarticle is not acknowledged by Boloka-Krabill. Further, that her work deals with media enterprises as a whole — rather than newsroomsspecifically — is also not recognised. Whather research does not reveal(as it did not set out to) is the significance of black leadership in the editorial sections of South Africa’s media. Boloka and Krabill try to support their case by citing the frustrations tabled byfive African editors at the Human Rights Commission inquiry into racism in the media during March/April 2000. They do not mention evidenceat the same inquiry by three African, Indian and coloured editors who said that they do not feel powerless, nor arguments by Afrikaner editors that African editors do in fact wield substantial power. Clearly, further research would be valuable here, but even Boloka and Krabill would have to acknowledgethat there is a prominent lobby ofblack editors who do not hesitateto use their positions to inject strong perspectives into public debate. It has been the changes in ownership and control since 1994 that haveput these individuals into positions of authority to speak and be heard. At an estimate, white editors or deputy editors in nine of South Africa’s papers were replaced between 1994 and 2000 (see Berger 2000:10); and the process has been far deeper in broadcasting. (There have been occasional reverses, but on the whole it has been two steps forward for every one step back.) Does it not mirror racism to suggest that these new incumbents are powerless pawns, dependent on white patronage for promotion, and acting as simple mouthpieces for white interests? Boloka and Krabill might consider speaking to senior African journalist Lizeka Mda,who sued the ANCin April 2000 for suggesting that a white editor had ghostwritten her criticism of that organisation. As for one major aspectof operational control, one of the victories since 1994 has been the novel introduction of editorial independence by new owners. Tony O’Reilly might be a friend of Nelson Mandela, but his companystill appointed as editor Kaizer Nyatsumba — whoat the time was explicitly out of favour with the then president. Cyril Ramaphosa, black 93 uy Berger chairperson of TML,criticised the 1999 electoral endorsement made by Peter Bruce, white editor ofFinancial Mail, but pointedly did notfire him. y Would Boloka, Krabill and Tomaselli like to see the new ownersinterfere with editorial independence,(orlike their white predecessors appoint only } those staffers who share their political outlook)? Boloka and Krabill severely underestimate changes in staffing and control. They also dismiss changes in media content. They react rather violently to my modest suggestion that publication of a newsphotographof dead AWB men(killed while trying to prop up Bophuthatswana) was a visible turning point. All I said was, and I quote, that ‘henceforth, the photograph seemed to signal, whites had had their day, and the active newsmakers were black South Africans’. That was not suggesting that overnight there was a total transformation in representation. I wassingling out a defining moment wherereality intruded into representation in a very powerful way, bringing home the point that white domination was now history. Subsequent changesin real life underscored this as a watershed event, and naturally there were echoesat the level of media content. Any cursory, impressionistic content analysis ofnewsphotographstodayclearly showsa shift away from the old apartheid notion that whites wield power, that whites alone are image-worthy. To support their position, Boloka-Krabill say that there has been a continuation ofthe disproportionate representation ofwhite South Africans in the media. They do not say what the correct proportion should be ~ which begs a big question. White representation is indeed disproportionate in relation to population numbers as a whole. Butit probably reflects pretty accurately the powerpositions of whites in the total society. In short, the | proportion of classic newsmakers amongst whites is still higher than in ; other race groups, because a legacy of power, wealth,status, accessibility, linguistic-advantage, etc, sustains this. For similar class and geographical f reasons, news — by standard convention internationally — is almost never . representative of an entire society, no matter which society. The question Boloka and Krabill should ask is whether black people in general arestill neglected relative to whites, but whetherspecifically black newsmakers are still neglected relative to their proportionsin social life. An even more interesting issue, but unfortunately ignored by Boloka-Krabill, is whether there has been any transformation in the conventional paradigm of news — changes whereby a transforming South Africa also subverts international assumptions about what makes a ‘newsmaker’ — ie whether new newsvalues Response to Boloka and Krabill have emerged since 1994, which wouldinsert atypical categories ofpeople into media (rank andfile, rural, female, youth etc) More onthis pointlater. At the heart of my twocritics’ case is a concern with class. Butit is one that operates with a crude model indeed. Theyphrase their concern as being whether the changes so far have been superficial and ‘ geared toward maintaining privilege amonganelite instead ofredistributing privilege’. In defence of Tomaselli (1997) whom criticised, they say that he gives evidence thatracial substitution is merely replicating class structure. The issue here is whether one remains in a paradigm thatthe only change in capitalist class structure that is worth noting is the elimination of class structure per se. I believe there are significant variations longbefore this issue hoves into view. What I traced was a move from oligopolised capitalism towards one where capital ownership andcontrol has changed radically. There is in South Africa today foreign ownership, cross-media ownership, pyramid style ownership, broad-based shareholder ownership, development trust ownership, trade-union ownership, political party (Inkatha) ownership, community-organisation ownership, public (as opposed to government) ownership. Mostofthese arestill capitalist forms of ownership,just as Singapore, Brazil, Zambia, the USA and Sweden can all still be called capitalist. But sometimes, as with these countries, the differences are arguably greater than the points in common. The very particular form of capitalist class structure of a country has major implications for privilege, economic growth, political pluralism, and individual or ethnic class mobility. This is glossed over by Boloka-Krabill. Butit is not especially useful to generalise and talk about South Africa as capitalist, when the more salient political question is: what kind of capitalism? To answerthis question, one needs to assess issues like: what does the newcompetition mean for growing the media market beyond an elite? Whatdoes it mean to have black Cyril Ramaphosa and black woman Irene Charnley — rather than their white predecessor, Pat Retief — running Johnnic? Rather than explore what the new black boss bringsto the table (major negotiating skills, political savvy, connections, sensitivity to the condition of the majority, strong commitment to training, democratic credentials), he is dismissed by Boloka-Krabill as simply having to act in line with the market. That, underhis leadership, Johnnic has been revamped from a holding company into a get-ahead integrated media company, editorial independence been respected, a major educational thrust launched 95 Guy Berger | by the Sunday Times (and a southern African edition of the paperstarted), the new Sunday World beenset up, etc, is left unrecognised. In the end, Boloka and Krabill leave us with nothing except to say what the current situation is not. But there is another telling lacuna in their argument.It is a real pity that Boloka and Krabill skim over my discussion aboutthe political role of media post-1994, and merely assert (rather than ) argue)that I have set up strawmen onthis point. The four perspectives that ’ I outlined point towards the key question of the ‘politics of transformation’ — which in my view is more important than any other aspect. The key question here is: contrary to the particular normative and analytical assumptions in the four perspectives I distinguished, what does transformation since 1994 — in a more nuanced analysis — mean for the political role of the media? If, for instance, the SABC faces competition from e.tv, what pressures are put on it to come up with credible news ’ coverage? More generally, will the transforming media becomea more-or- less monolithic part of a new establishment,or are there new contradictions that will create rifts, ructions and a separation of powers? Myoriginal article covered the legal environment, ownership, content, conceptions of media role, and audiences. Much of my aim wasto assess the extent to which racial change impacts on, or implies, other changes — especially the politics of media. Notwithstanding their flaws, what Boloka- Krabill have helped highlight is an underlying themein myanalysis, which wasnot explicitly arguedin the original article. This is the question of what gets ‘bundled’ with the media transformation that has taken place thus far, and especially what implications this might have for the role of media in the social distribution of power in post-apartheid South Africa. South African liberation orthodoxy used to hold that, in Joe Slovo’s words, there was ‘No Middle Road’. The argument wasthat getting rid of apartheid necessarily entailed socialism. There was no substantial black middle class to becomethe new bourgeoisie — instead, this grouping would haveto rely on the workers if apartheid was to go. The mobilisation ofthe working class majority, Slovo argued, would carry the revolution against white capitalists straight through to the secondstage ofnational liberation: socialism. Of course, times and conditions have changed radically since such theorisation, and many would now say that ANC policy entails the strange phenomenonofa capitalist road to socialism (or maybe just a capitalist road to capitalism!). The bundling together oferadicating apartheid with establishing socialism is no longer there. Thus today the question 96 Response to Boloka and Krabill instead is: what kind of capitalism, and therefore what kind of ‘bundling’ history has bequeathed us. Relating this to the media, we need to ask what gets associated with racial categories and racial identities in South Africa today. It is of course the case that race is just one facet of identity, and that class, gender, age, region, language, family status, etc, also play significant (and similarly shifting) roles. But the past of this country structured so many experiences along racial lines, and the enduring economic, psychological, spatial, etc legacy still sustains powerful racial identity. We know well the baggage that many whites (and white journalists) still carry with them. But if transformation brings black workers into capital ownership and control, and black petty bourgeois people into senior media positions,is there likely to be residual meaning in their racial (and class) identities? Does the experience by mostblacks of oppression and suppression have a bearing on their attitudes to democracy, developmentand the role of the media? Further questions are prompted. Does past involvementin struggle (internally or in exile) affect a journalist’s outlook regarding former comrades nowin governmentorto issues like debates on economicpolicy? Whatare the inherited cultural, traditional, gendered, and even tribal components of identity that might impact? With the new patterns of ownershipand control, will the values and normsofjournalism itself stay the same asblack peopleareincreasingly calling the shots and doing the job? And should the globally dominant paradigm of journalism stay the same — or can our historical experiences be ‘leveraged’ into the presentin a transformative mannerfor the practice of journalism itself? These are, at root, political questions, related to political identity andits implication with journalists’ pasts and their continuingracialised presents. Boloka and Krabill take us no closer to engaging with this, but media workers themselves are wrestling precisely with the challenges. And that, after all, is what media transformation is really all about. References Berger, G (2000)‘Deracialisation, democracy and development: transformation of the South African media 1994-2000’. Paper prepared for the Political Economy of the Media in Southern African seminar, Durban, April 24-29. Goga, F (2000) Towards Affirmative Action: issues of race and gender in media organisations. Durban: UNESCO and Graduate Programme in Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal. Tomaselli, KG (1997) ‘Ownership and control in the South African print media: black empowerment after apartheid, 1990-1997’, Equid Novi 18(1). 97