Commentary
The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Develop-
ment (LRAD) Sub-Programme: opportunity for or
constraint to land redistribution, rural economic
development and poverty alleviation?
Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
Introduction
Major challenges facing South African society today include growing
unemployment in the formal sector of the economy and deepening poverty.
They threaten to undermine democracy, social stability and the ability to
compete globally. Since 1994, after the first general democratic elections,
the ANC-led government has introduced a number of policies and
programmes to eradicate poverty, give a better life to all citizens through
provision of basic needs and creation of employment, stimulate economic
growth, and compete in the global economic markets as captured in its 1994
election manifesto entitled A better lifefor all — Working togetherfor jobs,
peace and freedom. Amongst the programmes identified as being crucial is
the rural development programme aimed at ending rural poverty through
the provision ofbasic services such as water, clinics, schools, and electricity,
and land reform.1 Thus, amongst its policies developed and introduced to
achieve its main objective is the 1997 White Paper on Land Policy. The
main objective of the white paper is to address the land question in South
Africa through the land reform programme consisting of three components
ie land restitution, land redistribution, and tenure reform. As stated in the
White Paper, the programme 'aims to contribute to economic development,
by giving households both the opportunity to engage in productive land use
and by increasing employment opportunities through encouraging greater
 investment' (see the White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997:7).
Most research conducted to evaluate the performance of the land reform
 TRANSFORMATIOM 52 (2003) ISSN 0258-7696                                      20


                        The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
programme under the 1997 land policy has however revealed only limited
progress made towards achieving objectives. Varying accounts, which will
be discussed in some detail in the next section, have been advanced to
explain this slow progress. Although slow progress was registered in all
three components of the land reform programme, the main focus of this
paper will be on the redistribution component. However, where relevant,
reference will be made to the other components of the programme, and in
particular to tenure reform in the former homelands.
   The choice to focus on the redistribution component is necessitated by
the recent policy shifts on redistribution under the new political leadership
in the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) orchestrated by Minister Thoko
Didiza following the 1999 election. This paper provides a critical assessment
ofthese shifts and their implications for delivery on redistribution obj ectives
as well as the likely impact that this would have on rural poverty alleviation
and economic development. The paper will start by first providing a review
of the background to the post-1994 land policy in SA. Here attention will
be paid to various perspectives and approaches proposed in the debates on
land reform for a post-apartheid SA. The subsequent influence, if any, that
these perspectives and approaches had in shaping the 1997 White Paper on
Land Policy in SA and its ability to deliver on land reform objectives, and
in particular on redistribution, is then discussed. This will be followed by
an analysis of the post-1999 revised policy on redistribution with a view to
determining whether or not it has drawn lessons from the experiences with
the previous one, and the implications thereof. The question then asked is:
is there a need for alternative strategies to speed up land redistribution
process and if so, what should those be? As will be noticed, my view is that
indeed there is a need for alternatives. Therefore discussion shifts towards
land in the former bantustans and its potential role to enhance the
achievement of land reform objectives. That also necessitates a review of
debates on the rural land tenure question which remains unresolved.
A background to post-apartheid land policy in South Africa
The land reform programme, as outlined in the 1997 White Paper on SA
LandPolicy, has three main components, namely redistribution, restitution,
and tenure. The redistribution component, with which this paper is
concerned, is comprised of further sub-programmes. These are agricultural
development (aimed to make land available to people for agricultural
purposes), settlement (aimed to provide land for settlement purposes), and
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Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
non-agricultural enterprises (which aims to provide people with land for
non-agricultural enterprises such as eco-tourism) (see the Executive
Summary on LRAD, http://land.pwv.gov.za/redistribution/Irad.htm). In
2001, the Ministry of Land Affairs under the leadership of Minister Thoko
Didiza, promulgated a revised policy on land redistribution known as the
Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) sub-programme
referring only to the agricultural development component of the broader
redistribution programme. Of the two sub-components of the agricultural
development component only the one that seeks to transfer land to
individuals or groups for agricultural purposes applies (LRAD Executive
Summary 2001:2).
    This revised policy seems to have been necessitated by the apparent slow
progress made in the delivery on land redistribution objectives since 1997
after the White Paper was promulgated, as well as the need to overcome
some of the challenges identified as facing the redistribution process. For
instance, in its 1999 Annual Report, the Department of Land Affairs
(DLA), acknowledges that while some significant implementation progress
has been made in the first few years of its existence in terms of the number
of registered projects that have advanced through various stages, major
challenges still lie ahead. According to the report, an amount of R79.8
million has been spent on registered projects that are in the post-transfer
stage and R104.2 million has been committed to designated but not yet
transferred projects. All this accounted for a total expenditure value of
R 184.1 million (see DLA Annual Report 1999:41). However, there is still
a major challenge presented by the project pipeline for operationalising a
capital expenditure on projects at implementable stage of almost double the
amount available for the next two years of the period under review,
estimated at R1.5 billion (DLA Annual Report 1999).
     Having identified the project pipeline as a major challenge, and in view
 of the emotive nature of land issues and the urgency with which land reform
 needs to be addressed, the DLA explored other ways to fast-track the
 redistribution process. A strategic transformation workshop was held in
 1998 from which a decision was taken to adopt a district-based land
 delivery approach, whereby a district would be prioritised as a vital point
 of delivery (Levin 2000:69). While Levin (a former chief director of
 implementation in DLA) agrees that a district-based land delivery approach
 sounds viable, he, however, cautioned against some of the obstacles which
 could inhibit progress towards the completion of the existing projects. One
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                        The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
 of the major challenges identified by Levin (2000) is that of the poor record
of, and often lack of popular participation in, district development plans
and project implementation. He attributes this to, on the one hand, the
highly prescriptive, complex, and disempowering procedures within the
planning processes and, on the other, the use of the term 'beneficiaries' of
land reform in describing those targeted for the land reform. The latter, he
argues, tends both to estrange the 'beneficiaries' from their project and
render them passive recipients of services delivered in a top-down fashion
by the government. Hence, for land reform delivery to be speeded up and
simultaneously to avoid the dangers of compounding the current situation
through products or projects that do not match the needs ofthe 'beneficiaries'
on the ground, the latter should become centrally involved in planning and
implementation. Linked to this is the need to create district offices. Levin
cautions that since the district office is planned to be modelled on the
current provincial offices, it could display bureaucratic tendencies which
may not resolve the lack of integration into district level planning and
development processes.
    It is worth noting, however, that what, in the eyes of Levin, the DLA's
Annual Report, and agrarian expert Ben Cousins (Mail & Guardian,
August 18-24,2000) was a sign of progress in land reform implementation
(ie both registered projects in post-transfer stage and those designated
projects but not yet transferred), was however dismissed and viewed by
other land analysts as a failure. Ditlhake (1998), for instance, has argued
that the slow pace ofthe land reform process signalled a crisis of delivery
marked by few success stories. Dithlake 's criticism was based on statistical
reports which showed that by 1999 only eight per cent ofthe targeted 30
per cent of total commercial land in South Africa had been redistributed
through the land reform programme. This essentially translates into a total
of 667,285 hectares of redistributed land to approximately 52,068
households (Walker 2000, Mayende 2000). Acknowledging this slow
pace, Cousins considered the first few years in which the land reform
policy has been in place as constituting a highly valuable period of
experience through which the DLA has learned painful lessons (Mail &
Guardian, August 18-24, 2000).
    Ditlhake placed the blame for slow delivery on land reform and, in
particular, land redistribution on, amongst other factors:
• the initial influence that the negotiated political transition, as well as
    external forces such as the World Bank, had over the policymaking
                                          23


Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
   process and resultant land reform policy. This, he argues, undermined
   the concerns raised by poor rural communities during the DLA's
    consultative process;
• the absence of developmental resources or support mechanisms for
   productive usage of the land once transferred to the historically
    disadvantaged;
• the lack of appropriate institutional arrangements and framework to
   enhance delivery and implementation. (Note: the district level strategy
   is aimed at overcoming this constraint);
• the inertia of the market (given the market-based approach to land
   redistribution), which Dithlake argues is inappropriate, given the income
   inequalities resulting from the apartheid system and the general increase
   in land price levels. Between 1994 and 1998, land prices increased by a
   total of six per cent and in the latter year, further annual average
   increases of two per cent were projected (Dithlake 1998:11).
   Dithlake's account of the failure of the land redistribution programme
to realise progress necessitates a revisiting of the land policy debates of the
early 1990s that formulated the background and framework within which
the 1997 land policy was developed. The land reform debates in SA prior
to the 1997 White Paper were characterised by ideological divisions
between those who advocated a free-market approach and those who
argued for a strong, active state interventionist approach to land reform.
Amongst those who upheld the neo-liberal market-based approach were de
Klerk (1990), the then National Party government in the form of its 1991
White Paper on Land Reform, the Development Bank of Southern Africa
through its 1991 documententitled'Agriculture and Redistribution: Growth
with Equity Approach', and the World Bank through its 1993 Report
entitled 'Options for Land Reform and Rural Restructuring in South
Africa'. The first grouping tended to believe that the market mechanism
must remain the primary tool for addressing the land question; in the repeal
of apartheid land legislation to promote equitable access to opportunities
and limited state intervention through affirmative action measures for the
historically disadvantaged, in the retention and protection of agrarian
property rights, in the promotion of black smallholders, in the deregulation
of commercial agriculture, in a basic housing grant for the rural poor which
could be extended by a matching grant to access land; and in a 'rural safety
net' programme for poor families who could not afford entry into small
                                       24


                       The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
farmer programmes (see de Klerk 1990, Levin and Weiner 1993, Walker
2000).
   Proponents of active state intervention like Budlender (1992), Bauman
(1992) and Levin and Weiner (1993) dismissed the market-based approach
as too conservative and not having the potential successfully to address the
land question. For Levin and Weiner (1993) two areas needing to be
prioritised by the land reform programme were property rights and the
transformation of core white agricultural land. In their critique, they
argued for a need to shift emphasis from concern with protecting the rights
of current property owners towards addressing and advancing the rights of
the property-less. As far as the core white agricultural land was concerned,
they argued for a need to identify and isolate land of high quality as a target
of redistribution. Levin and Weiner thus dismissed what they saw as the
neo-liberal populist advocacy for black small farm development outside
the core, which they argued would only serve to maintain the inherited
racially skewed agrarian relations and undermine transformative land
reform.
   Amidst these raging debates, the African National Congress released its
socio-economic policy discussion document in 1992 entitled 'Ready to
govern: ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa'. The
document's land policy section called for the national programme of land
reform and land redistribution through:
• the land claims court addressing issues related to land restoration and
   land rights, including ownership;
• affirmative action policy for the historically marginalised groups such
   as the landless, rural poor and women; and
• protection of property rights whereby compensation will be made for
   any expropriation of land, while taking into account the public interest
   and avoiding predominance of market forces (in Levin and Weiner
    1993:4).
   This discussion document came under strong criticism from those who
supported strong state intervention, according to whom the document was
riddled with contradictions and ambivalence. Note for instance Levin and
Weiner's concern that while the document raised the possibilities of land
expropriation, it could lead to the maintenance of the status quo since the
idea of a just compensation is often calculated through consideration of
market value criteria. The idea of public interest, they argued, could also
                                         25


Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
have multiple meanings that could result in the agrarian and urban
bourgeoisies benefiting, especially via legal interpretations made through
the courts (see Levin and Weiner 1993:4-5). This criticism was based on
the view of Bauman as quoted by Levin and Weiner (1993) that the courts'
interpretation of 'just' compensation is unpredictable and could be difficult
to reverse. Similarly, Budlender expressed reservations about the courts'
ability to adjudicate over disputes of conflicting priorities in the use of
society's resources, since such priorities are essentially political (in Levin
and Weiner 1993:11).
   Notwithstanding these criticisms, the ANC went on to develop further
its policy position on the post-apartheid land reform into the 1994
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) document, a document
itjointly formulated with its alliance partners, the SACP, COSATU, NECC
and SANCO, as a future national policy framework. As stated in the RDP
document, the process that led to its formulation was not restricted to the
alliance partners but also included other vital agencies within South
African society such as NGOs and research organisations (see RDP document
1994:1). The RDP's central objective was to eradicate the traces of
apartheid and build a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future. To this
end the land reform programme was considered vital. The RDP saw land
reform's role as serving rural development by prioritising the basic needs
of rural inhabitants and as well as addressing the past injustices of forced
removals, historical denial of access to land and ensuring security of
tenure. Thus, from the RDP perspective, access to land was vital for
providing rural populations with land for agricultural and residential
purposes. Hence, the land reform programme was designed to be demand-
driven (RDP 1994:19-20). As far as redistribution was concerned, the
RDP's position was that its objectives would be achieved through a
combination of market and non-market mechanisms where property rights
of current land occupiers would be strengthened. Where expropriation
would be used to achieve reform, compensation would be paid as provided
for by the constitution (RDP 1994:20-21).
    The increasing congruence in the ANC's later policy documents with the
neo-liberal, market-based approach signals both contradictions and shifts
in its post-1994 economic policy thinking. As Mather and Adelzadeh
(1998) point out, prior to 1994 the ANC's policy thinking was in line with
that upheld by the Macroeconomic Research Group (Merg), a research
body that had close links with both the ANC and the labour movement led
                                       26


                       The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
by the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Merg's policy proposals
called for fiscal expansion for social and physical infrastructural
development, a 'balanced' monetary policy, and active state intervention
in the economy (Mather and Adelzadeh 1998:25). This stood in sharp
contrast with the approach that was advocated by the old government in the
Normative Economic Model Report. That Report had called for fiscal
discipline, strict monetary control, and a free market environment.
   In 1996, the ANC-led government promulgated a national constitution
which has, as part of its main objectives a commitment to redressing past
injustices in access and ownership of land. However, it provides that for
any expropriation undertaken in the interest of the public, where public
interest refers to the nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms
for equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources, a just
compensation should be paid (see Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa 1996:11-12). Mather and Adelzadeh argue that a shift in approach
within the ANC had in fact become evident when, in that same year, it
released its macro-economic policy document: Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (Gear). Gear's main emphasis is on restrictive fiscal policy
and upholding the principles of free market.
   Guided by this macro-economic and constitutional framework, the
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) introduced its 1997 White Paper on
South African Land Policy as a cornerstone of reconstruction and
development, aiming to achieve the following objectives:
• redress of the injustices of racially based land dispossession of the past;
   the need for a more equitable distribution of land ownership;
• land reform to reduce poverty and contribute to economic growth;
• security of tenure for all; and
• a system of land management which will support sustainable land use
   patterns and rapid land release for development (see the White Paper on
   South African Land Policy 1997:7).
   The White Paper aims to achieve these objectives through the following
three major programmes:
• the land redistribution programme to provide the disadvantaged and the
   poor (in particular labour tenants, farm workers, women, and emergent
   farmers) with access to land for productive and residential purposes;
• the land restitution programme to address cases of forced removals since
    1913 under discriminatory laws;
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Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
• the land tenure reform programme for tenure security for all South
   Africans accommodating tenure diversity (White Paper on South African
   Land Policy 1997:7).
   Whilst land reform policy continued to seek to transform the inherited
apartheid agrarian social structure, the White Paper provides that it should
be based largely on the willing-buyer willing-seller arrangements with
expropriation serving only as a last resort where urgent land needs cannot
be met through voluntary market transactions (White Paper on South
African Land Policy 1997:38-39).
   It is clear from the above discussion that the post-apartheid land policy
has been largely influenced and shaped by the neo-liberal, free market
perspective. It was, however, also noted that the policy's approach to land
redistribution, informed by this perspective, has not yielded much in the
way of positive results. As Dithlake has pointed out, the slow progress of
the land redistribution programme is attributable to the inherent limits in
land reform based on market mechanisms. Dithlake's argument that ever-
increasing land prices are beyond the reach of the poor was confirmed by
recent research. For instance, Lahiff and Rugege (2002) argue that the size
of the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant, set at Rl 6,000, has proven to be
insufficient when compared to the cost of agricultural land. This has led to
desperate situations whereby attempts were made to expand the size of the
applicant groups in order to increase the combined value of the grant so as
to match the land prices. This, they argue, has given rise to problems such
as the formation of large and unwieldy groups with little internal cohesion
and also to cases whereby relatively coherent groups are split with some
receiving land and others not (Lahiff and Rugege 2002:64). Amongst the
problems associated with the market-based approach, as identified by
Lahiff and Rugege, are the following:
• the lengthy period (often one to two years) spent identifying available
   land; negotiating with the owner before funding for purchase has been
   approved; project planning cycle which includes feasibility studies,
   land valuations, and vetting by government officials. All this must be
   completed before any actual transactions and land transfers are finalised.
    This lengthy process and uncertainty as to whether funding would be
    available for purchase sometimes results in property owners withdrawing
    and transactions being abandoned;
• the system of finalising purchase towards the end of the project planning
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                       The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
   cycle also makes it impossible for applicants to take advantage of
   opportunities such as land auctions to buy land at a reasonable price;
• land beneficiaries being displaced from their homes, thus depriving
   them of access to basic services which could enhance improvement in
   their livelihoods and ability to use the acquired land productively, and
   also depriving them of close relations with the wider community; and
• the mismatch between the needs of beneficiaries (which are often
   diverse) and the projects with which they finally end up, complicated
   both by the reluctance of the owners to sell land on a piecemeal basis,
   considered as costly and time-consuming, and the non-availability of
   adequate working capital (beyond the initial acquisition grant) to use
   land productively.
   Based on this assessment and in view of the land invasions in Zimbabwe
as well as farm killings in South Africa, Dithlake (1998) has seen the only
option as speeding up delivery on land reform through actively acquiring
and redistributing land. This, he suggests, should be done through a
combination of methods such as nationalisation, forced land purchases at
below market prices, expropriation of un-utilised, under-utilised and
indebted farms; redistribution of state land, a land for the tiller programme
and institution of a land tax.
   It is within the context outlined above, characterised by slow progress
in redistribution, that the 2001 revised redistribution policy programme
was introduced. Its main objective is to 'provide grants to the previously
disadvantaged South African citizens to access land specifically for
agricultural purposes' with the view to achieving the following objectives:
• contributing towards the transfer of 30 per cent of agricultural land over
   15 years;
• improvement of nutrition and incomes of the rural poor who want to
   farm on any scale;
• decongesting overcrowded former homeland areas;
• overcoming the legacy of past racial and gender discrimination in farm
   land ownership;
• stimulating growth from agriculture;
• creating links between farm and off-farm income generating activities;
• expanding opportunities for young people in rural areas;
• empowering beneficiaries to improve their economic and social well
   being;
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Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
• enabling those with access to agricultural land in communal areas to
   make better productive use of their land; and
• promoting environmental sustainability of land and other natural
   resources (see the LRAD, Executive Summary 2001).
   To enhance the achievement of these objectives, the revised policy
requires that the underlying principles be observed and adhered to when
implementing land redistribution programme:
• the unified and basic nature of the programme which allows the
   beneficiaries to use it flexibly based on their objectives and resources;
• all beneficiaries are required to make a contribution either in cash or
   kind in order to access the grant which will vary in amounts;
• the demand-directed nature ofthe programme—meaning that beneficiaries
   define their proj ect type and size, and are not limited to certain prescribed
   products and in order to assist this, with implementation decentralised;
• quick and speedy approval process enhanced through 'ex post' audits
   and monitoring;
• maximum participation of beneficiaries in implementation (LRAD
   Executive Summary 2001).
   This revised approach to land redistribution has since triggered many
responses leading to an intense debate on whether or not the LRAD is an
appropriate policy to speed up the process of land redistribution in South
Africa. This paper seeks to make a contribution to those debates. Towards
this end, the next section will address the following set of questions: Does
the current revised policy mark any significant shift from the previous one?
Does it provide any realistic opportunities for effective redressing of the
past legacy of racially skewed land ownership as well as to improve, not
only delivery on the broader land reform objectives, but also the lives of the
historically marginalised and disadvantaged rural people as it purports to
do? Is there a consistency between its underlying principles, aims and
methods proposed to execute land redistribution? Has it drawn any lessons
from past experiences with the 1997 policy on redistribution? What are the
implications of all these for its ability to deliver on redistribution obj ectives?
The revised LRAD: a critical analysis.
The announcement of the LRAD was met with strong criticism from
various quarters including NGOs involved with the land reform in South
Africa to intellectuals with interest in land related questions and policies.
                                          30


                        The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
The criticism was heightened by concerns that these policy shifts have led
to the resignation from the DLA of disillusioned senior officials instrumental
in the formulation and implementation of the original 1997 land reform
policy. The spate of resignations was viewed seriously by Cousins, for
whom this constituted a loss of capacity which poses a threat to the
government's ability to deliver. This, argues Cousins, is particularly so as
the staff that has left had not only learned painful lessons from the failures
and successes of the land reform during its five years of existence but had
also accumulated invaluable experience which they were beginning to use
to correct past mistakes and re-direct the land reform process for speedy
and efficient delivery (see Mail & Guardian, August 18-24, 2000). This
criticism was countered by Gilingwe Mayende, the director-general in the
DLA, who views the departure of those discontented senior staff members
as a gain more than a loss. For Mayende, those in disagreement with the
new policy shifts could become obstacles to implementation and effective
delivery as they would not be loyal and committed to the new approach
(Mail & Guardian, August 25-31, 2000). Perhaps the question that needs
to be asked is whether or not, despite those resignations, the current staff
in the DLA responsible for redistribution have drawn insights from the
lessons learned previously and integrated these into the revised policy?
   Closer scrutiny of the revised programme shows that although it has
retained similar principles to the preceding programme, the objectives
have changed with some serious implications for delivery on land
redistribution objectives. Unlike the previous programme (which identified
farm workers, labour tenants, women, and emergent farmers as the main
target groups for redistribution) the revised programme tends to place
emphasis only on the emergent commercial farmers from the historically
disadvantaged communities. This canbe noticed from some ofthe conditions
set out in the policy for those interested in accessing land through the
redistribution programme. One such condition is the requirement that the
redistributed land should be used specifically for agricultural purposes.
This is clearly different from the previous programme whereby acquired
land could also be used for residential purposes. Another condition set out
in the policy is that beneficiaries should both prepare a land use plan and
make a contribution in kind or cash of a minimum of R5000 in order to
qualify forthe land purchase grantwhichrangesfromR20,000toR100,000.
   Such emphasis on the emergent black commercial farmers implies that
the most marginalised and poor members of rural communities are
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Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
automatically left out of the redistribution programme and its attendant
potential benefits. This concern was also raised by a group of rural land
NGOs in their joint rebuttal of the DLA's claims that the revised programme
has not abandoned the poorest of the poor. They pose the practical
question: 'How will contribution in kind be valued in monetary terms for
those rural households (the vast majority) without R5000 in cash to access
the grant?' They further point out that it is vital to note that for many rural
households R5000 in labour probably constitutes the equivalent of a year's
work. Hence they argue that this, together with the policy's requirement
that those accessing land through the grant should use it for commercial
farming undermines the practice of multiple income earning by the rural
people (see Hlatswayo et al 2000).
    The multiple income earning strategies, which entailed supplementing
the produce from subsistence farming in rural areas with migrant labour
remittances, will also be undermined by growing job losses in the formal
sectors of the economy. The growing unemployment in the formal economic
sector and the subsequent loss of cash income in the form of wages could
lead to the escalation of rural poverty as rural households find it difficult
to afford land available for redistribution on market prices. It would largely
be through formal sector employment, which is clearly in a declining
spiral, that most rural households could realistically be able to raise the
required R5000 contribution. Thus this aspect of the market-based approach
to land reform is inappropriate for efficient implementation of the land
redistribution programme. Moreover, progress is further undermined by
the demand that the acquired land be used strictly for agricultural purposes.
    The chances for the most marginalised and poor members of rural
communities to benefit from the land redistribution programme, especially
the unemployed and those dependent on social welfare grants for their
 livelihoods, will further be reduced by the provision in the revised policy
 that 'beneficiaries' can access the grants on a sliding scale, depending on
 their amount of contribution. Those who make a minimum contribution (ie
 R5000) will only qualify for a minimum grant (ie R20,000) and those who
 make a higher contribution will receive a higher grant (LRAD Executive
 Summary 2001). The danger with this provision is that it will entrench
 current inequalities and thus fail to bring any meaningful improvement to
 the lives of the poorest within rural communities. It undermines the DLA's
 claims in the Executive Summary of the LRAD that the new programme is
 highly flexible and offers 'beneficiaries' a wide range of products from
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                         The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
 which to choose as well as the opportunity to design projects that will suit
 their needs.
    The rural poor will be denied fair opportunities to become involved in
 medium to large-scale commercial farming activities. The inference one
 can draw from this provision is that it seems to be informed by the
 misleading assumption that those who cannot afford to access higher grants
 and therefore relatively larger farmland, are necessarily not interested in,
 nor have any ambitions to become involved with, commercial farming. I
 thus find it hard to disagree with land NGO's criticism that the process that
 culminated in the revised policy's promulgation was non-transparent and
non-consultative and thus resulted in the sidelining of the views and
interests of rural communities (Hlatswayo et al 2000). This flies in the face
of the district-based delivery strategy, to which the DLA is committed, and
its emphasis on the need to consult with the people on the ground in order
to determine their needs and work towards fulfilling those needs.
   While the revised policy's provision for minimum contribution may
seem like opening an opportunity into commercial farming for those who
can afford to raise the required contribution, past experiences, however,
(see Levin 2000, Lahiff and Rugege 2002), suggest that the grant made
available, ranging from R20,000 to Rl 00,000, may not be sufficient, as
reflected in the criticisms that projects often failed to match the needs and
capabilities of beneficiaries This becomes truer with constantly increasing
land prices. As Lahiff and Rugege (2002) have pointed out, such purchases
would need to be accompanied by capital investment to ensure that the
acquired lands' productive capacity is enhanced. Perhaps group applicants,
who could each be able to raise the maximum cash contribution to qualify
for the maximum grants, are the only ones who could stand to benefit from
the current policy provisions.
   The low level of the grant also highlights the inhibiting influence that
Gear, as the macro-economic policy in SA, is having over the land
redistribution programme and its ability to deliver. It is true that Gear, in
line with the World Bank's earlier proposals, supports the idea of the need
to promote small emerging farmers within the historically marginalised
communities. However, this is cancelled out by Gear's advocacy of
reduction in public expenditure, fiscal constraint, and budgetary reforms
whilst limiting the role of the state to that of a facilitator (Mather and
Adelzadeh 1998:29). Clearly, the grant is not sufficient to promote and
enhance medium to large-scale commercial farming amongst aspirant
                                           33


 Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
 black farmers where land purchases should be complemented with capital
 investment. This is compounded by the limited budget made available for
the land reform, which has resulted in the allocation of insufficient capital
budget for land acquisition at market prices and on the scale and within the
projected time frames (Walker 2000). In 2000, for instance, only
R408,457,000, which amounted to just 0.2 per cent of the national budget
of over R179 billion, was allocated to land reform (Walker 2000).
   Another aspect in the revised policy which requires attention is the
retention of the 30 per cent target in transfer of commercial land now set
to be achieved within a 15 year period. The 30 per cent target, originally
the World Bank's proposal, was at first abandoned in the 1997 White Paper
but has now resurfaced in the revised policy. While target setting is
necessary for measuring and evaluating progress, the 30 per cent target
raises some problems. This is especially so in the light of past experiences
and a barrage of criticisms that this target has come under. Central to that
criticism is the view that the target is simply rhetorical as it fails to specify
clearly where that amount of land would come from (see Hendricks
2001:295). If such land were to come from the state-owned land outside the
former reserves, Hendricks (2001) argues that this would fail dramatically
to meet the 30 per cent target which would require redistributing 2 5 million
hectares of land. Moreover much of state-owned land is currently being
used for a variety ofpurposes such as forestry, conservation, and correctional
services and is not really available for reform (Hendricks 2001:295-6). If
one added land acquired from bankrupt white commercial farmers heavily
indebted to the state, only perhaps 12.5 million more hectares would
become available.
   Given that hardly one per cent of farmland has so far been redistributed
and the national budget is essentially inspired by Gear (Dithlake 1998,
Walker 2000, Mayende 2000), questions need to be raised about the
appropriateness and viability of the current market-based approach to land
redistribution. This also suggests that the 30 per cent target remains
impractical under the prevailing policy environment in which public
expenditure is reduced and private property rights are protected by the
national constitution. It further suggests that the DLA has not learned
enough from past experiences.
   Given the current constraining factors, is there any other viable alternative
strategy that could be used to improve the livelihoods of the rural poor,
alleviate poverty and enhance rural economic development? While it is my
                                        34


                        The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
belief that it is imperative to develop innovative, creative and perhaps even
somewhat radical measures to overcome the current obstacles to effective
land redistribution, I do however think that equally creative measures
could be found to enhance the productive potential of land in the former
homelands. It is vital to recognise the critical role that land in these areas
has historically played in sustaining the lives of rural inhabitants. It served
as one of the key sources of livelihood and income through subsistence
farming activities such as livestock farming, staple and vegetable cultivation.
Migrant wage labour and livelihood sources constituted the multiple
income generating strategies for rural households. The productive capacity
of these farmlands is not being fully realised due to lack of resources and
state help. With increasing job losses in the formal economic sectors,
resulting in former migrants resettling back in the countryside, often
without any substantial means of livelihood or source of income except for
limited produce from land, it becomes imperative that productive potential
is unlocked and realised to improve the livelihoods of rural inhabitants.
This, therefore, constitutes a major challenge for the land reform policy
and the merged Departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture.
    To release this land's full potential, the department would have to
provide the rural communities with the necessary resources, the most
important of which is improved water supply, to ensure that production is
carried out throughout the year. Other forms of intervention should include
extension services, training programmes, and financial support to purchase
farming equipment. It should be noted that while the availing of such
resources and assistance by the government is essential, it would, however,
be inadequate if not further modified by government interventions aimed
at eliminating the historical legacy of urban bias within development
projects as well as to ensure comprehensive rural development. The
government's 2000 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy
(ISRDS) is a positive step towards this goal. Not only would these steps
help to eliminate the popular prejudice towards rural areas and enhance
their attractiveness as places with economic opportunities, they would also
help to slow down the rapid urbanisation process which, together with high
urban unemployment, have led to a boom in overcrowded informal
settlements marked by urban social instability as well as increase in social
ills such as high crime levels. They could also enhance productive economic
links between rural and urban economies. Furthermore, they would help to
add the missing developmental content to existing land reform projects.
                                          35


Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
   While the above interventions are essential to realise the objectives of
rural economic development, a major obstacle lies in the unresolved issue
of land tenure in the former homelands. Failure to resolve this issue has in
the recent past delayed the implementation of the land reform programme.
Amongst the central issues which require speedy attention are the insecurity
of tenure and the uncertainty about the role that rural people, traditional
authorities and local government structures should play in land ownership,
administration and management. Statutory efforts to resolve these issues in
the form of the 1997 draft Land Rights Bill and the 2000 Communal Land
Rights Administration Bill failed due mainly to vehement resistance from
traditional leaders (Ntsebeza 2001). As Ntsebeza asserts, the attempts by
the government to democratise and decentralise land ownership and
management through the creation of various institutions such as Land
Rights Boards under the provisions of the 1997 Bill as well as to reach some
compromise between democratic local government structures and
institutions of traditional leadership as was proposed by the 2000 Bill, were
eventually dropped in the face of strong resistance from traditional leaders.
In fact the seriousness of this issue has seen traditional leaders across the
country coming together into a strong organised force in the form of
Congress of Traditional Leaders in South Africa (Ntsebeza 2001).
   Traditional leaders have been particularly opposed to the creation of
local government structures in the form of elected municipalities and/or
local councils, and even demanded amendments to the national constitution
to allow them absolute power over land (Ntsebeza 2001:15-16). Under this
growing pressure from traditional leaders threatening to boycott the 2000
local government elections by advising residents in their communities not
to vote, the government, although refusing to amend the constitution, has
made concessions. The most serious of those concessions were amendments
to the Municipal Structures Act (2000) giving traditional authorities the
right to administer land allocation in communal areas. This, argues Ntsebeza,
the government did in spite of the overwhelming research evidence which
shows that traditional authorities are autocratic and unaccountable (2001 •
 13,18).
   In fact, traditional leaders themselves seem to admit, although reluctantly,
that their institutions are undemocratic. Note for instance, the statements
by Nkosi Patekile Holomisa, a traditional leader and the president of
 CONTRALESA, during his address to the 2001 National Land Tenure
 Conference in Durban. In his address he said, 'We are aware of the
                                        36


                        The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
 shortcomings of the traditional authorities as they now exist'; 'Even if the
 apartheid rulers formalised the institution of traditional leadership by
 creating traditional authorities, that does not meant that the structures are
 per se illegitimate'; and 'We agree that traditional authorities must be
 transformed and democratised to ensure that they are sensitive to the values
 of our time as encapsulated in the constitution' (Holomisa 2001:7-8).
    Following the failure of both the 1997 and 2000 Bills, and still concerned
 about the unresolved issue of land tenure in the former homelands, the
 government formulated and promulgated the 2002 Communal Land Rights
Bill. The 2002 Bill provides for the recognition of institutions of traditional
 leadership (but requires that they should be democratised) and their
 customary rules governing land tenures. It also gives recognition to
 democratic community-based structures. It provides that fundamental
human rights of equality, freedom of choice and participation of residents
in the reorganisation of tenure rights and systems should always be
observed when dealing with land tenure reform. It further provides for the
establishment of the Land Rights Boards that should be constituted of the
government representatives, members of both the House of Traditional
Leaders and the affected communities. The main function of the Boards
will be to administer and manage the tenure reform process as outlined in
the Bill (see the Communal Land Rights Bill, No. 23740, 2002:4,56,57).
    Perhaps the question that needs to be considered here is that of the
implications that this Bill has for the resolution of the land tenure issue and
economic development in the former bantustans. Can it help to bring about
a final solution to the disputed issue of land question there? It would seem
to me that the Bill is a clear reflection of the difficult situation in which the
present government finds itself. This is particularly so when considering
the strong resistance that it initially encountered from the organised
traditional leaders, deepening rural poverty and the democratic principles
and values to which it is committed as outlined in the national constitution.
This can clearly be seen from contradictory and ambiguous provisions
contained in the Bill on how the land tenure reform should be handled.
While the Bill recognises and empowers traditional authorities to administer
rural land in accordance with customary laws, it also provides that democratic
structures in the form of the Land Rights Boards should be established. The
Boards' primary role would be to serve as watchdogs ensuring that
residents' constitutional rights are not undermined in the process of land
tenure reform. It is still unclear as to whether or not the 'transformed and
                                          37


Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
democratised' traditional leadership system will be sensitive to the
constitutional rights of rural citizens, as was hinted at by Holomisa during
his address to the 2001 conference. The Bill, I would argue, fails to cede
unambiguous powers to a democratically elected structure that could work
with traditional authorities to execute the land tenure reform. This failure
could aggravate the existing tensions with institutions of traditional
leadership on how the tenure question should be handled.
    Such tensions could constitute a major stumbling block to both the
resolution of the land tenure question and development in areas governed
by traditional law. In fact, there is no guarantee that traditional leaders
would support the provision for establishment of Land Rights Boards or
any other democratically elected structure such as the local council. This
is particularly so as they previously have opposed such ideas when
provided for in the 1997 Land Rights Bill and seem to still be holding a
similar position. InHolomisa's address to the 2001 conference, he said'We
propose that traditional authorities must be made up of traditional leaders
and democratically elected leaders' (Holomisa 2001:8). What this implies
is that traditional leaders would not accept or recognise alternative
democratic structures with responsibility for rural development including
land administration. He went on to say 'Our advice to government is that
legal title to communal land be in the name of the relevant traditional
authority', 'We do not believe ... that shortcomings justify the divestment
of traditional authorities of their historical responsibility to control and
administer land', and even more emphatically that '...what will not be
accepted to traditional leaders is a system that will relegate them to
ordinary community members on matters of our ancestral lands' (Holomisa
2001).
    However, the 2002 Bill could present an opportunity for the amicable
 final resolution of the land tenure issue through its provisions, which seek
 to bring together the various interest groups into the Land Rights Boards.
 This could encourage them to find common ground and develop a jointly
 agreed approach onhow to execute the tenure reform process. Reconciliation
 may thus be found between customary legal principles and the principles
 enshrined in the national constitution to ensure a smooth process of tenure
 reform. Note, however, that this can only happen if traditional leaders
 accept the idea of the creation of alternative democratic structures such as
 the Land Rights Boards. So, in the final analysis, one could argue that the
 Bill presents potential for a settlement or for deeper conflict.
                                        38


                       The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Sub-programme
Conclusion
This paper has provided a critical assessment of the 2001 LRAD in order
to determine whether or not this revised policy could successfully deliver
on land redistribution, and thus enhance the achievement of the goals of
rural poverty alleviation and economic development. Based on the review
of the policy debates both prior and after the 1997 White Paper on Land
Policy in SA and an analysis of the post-1999 policy shifts towards the
2001 LRAD, I have argued that the LRAD is unlikely to have a significant
positive impact on delivery of the land redistribution objectives. This
argument is based on the examination of the LRAD provisions, which
revealed contradictions and inconsistency between its principles and
methods to achieve them, drastic shifts in objectives, as well as the failure
to draw adequately on lessons learned from the 1997 land redistribution
programme. It was noted that unlike the preceding redistribution programme,
which aimed to provide access to land for farm workers, labour tenants,
women, and aspirant commercial farmers to use for various purposes; the
LRAD's main aim is to promote black commercial farming only. This
could be seen from its provisions that land accessed through the programme
should strictly be used for agricultural purposes, that 'beneficiaries' should
make a minimum contribution of R5000 and submit a land use plan. The
market-based approach has not achieved much in the past and its
appropriateness is therefore questionable. Current economic circumstances
are moreover undermining the multiple income earning strategies of rural
families. It thus seems that the 30 per cent redistribution target was
unrealistic. The only existing potential for the LRAD to deliver on its
objective ofpromoting black commercial farming, is where there are group
applicants pulling together their contributions. While this would enable
applicants to purchase relatively large pieces of land, there is however a
danger that once that land has been purchased, they may run out of funds
for further investment in it to fully enhance its productive capacity. This
possibility could be exacerbated by the restrictive macro-economic
environment under Gear.
   In the light of the above analysis, I undertook to explore any other
possibly viable alternatives to enhance the achievement of those objectives
within the current restrictive macro-economic and constitutional
environment. It is my belief that the land in the former bantustans holds
some potential to address the problem of rural poverty and economic
stagnation. The ISRDS, although insufficient, is a step in the right direction
                                         39


Mokong Simon Mapadimeng
towards providing resources there and striking a balance between urban
and rural development. Notwithstanding this, it was noticed that the
unresolved issue of land tenure in the former bantustans may constitute a
major constraint to economic development and poverty eradication. It is
thus clear that the achievement of rural economic development and poverty
alleviation is mainly dependent on successfully resolving the land tenure
issue there.
Note
1. See 1994 elections manifesto booklet, by the ANC Department of Information
    and Publicity.
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