TRANSFORMATION 7 (1988)                                                 ARTICLE
  <A BLACK COUP' - INKATHA AND
  THE SALE OF ILANGA
                                                           Alison Gillwald
                      With content analysis by Cyril Madlala
  INTRODUCTION
      In April 1987 Ilanga became the only commercial publication in South
 Africa to be owned directly by a political party. It was bought from the giant
  publishing house, Argus, by Mandla Matla, an Inkatha-owned company
 under the directorship of its secretary- general, Oscar Dhlomo. All 21
 editorial staffers refused to work as a result, demanding a reversal of the sale
 or transfers to other Argus publications. They were ordered to leave the
 building to make way for replacements. Describing the acquisition of Ilanga
 as a 'black coup' (Natal Mercury, 22.04.87), president of Inkatha,
 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, asked why black journalists were willing to work for
 newspapers owned by powerful white capitalist interests which were
 substantially controlled by white political parties, but not for an authentic
 newspaper for the black nation.
     The journalists responded with an advertisement in local
 English-language newspapers, after Ilanga refused to run it, explaining that
 it would be compromising to work for a single black political party in the
 current political situation in Natal. The need to be seen as independent in
 strife-torn areas of Natal is not merely a journalistic homily, but a
 safety-device. Ilanga journalists said the sale made them 'walking targets' in
 recurrent township violence. At the time three Ilanga journalists were in
hiding after writing a series of articles about land transfers by Inkatha-linked
town councillors {Daily News, 16.04.87).
     This context of township dissent, reflected in the journalists' dispute with
management, is the background against which the take-over of Ilanga by
Inkatha should be understood. Its first unofficial sortee into mass media had
been with The Nation, distributed in Inkatha's stronghold, the rural areas
and which, after state harassment and financial problems, closed down
'indefinitely' in 1980 (Mare and Hamilton, 1987:175; Tomaselli et al,
1987:51). With 58% of Durban Africans sampled reading Ilanga and 45% of
Africans sampled in Pietermaritzburg, one might surmise that the take-over
oi Ilanga is part of Inkatha attempts to develop or secure its contested urban
base.
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GILLWALD                                                        TRANSFORMATION
WHY DID NATAL NEWSPAPERS SELL?
    This fails to explain how Inkatha was able to acquire the largest
vernacular newspaper in the country, with a small but consistent profit which
serviced the only audience with growth potential - the African market. It had
a solid circulation of over 105 000 and, with readership statistics of over 1.2
million, it was the third most widely read paper in the country (Weekly Mail,
16.04.87). Why did Natal Newspapers (NN), an Argus company formed in
1985 to incorporate the formerly Morning Group Natal Mercury into its Natal
stable, consisting of iheDaily News and Ilanga, sell to Inkatha?
    In his statement to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly about Inkatha's
purchase of Ilanga? Buthelezi expressed gratitude to Natal Newspapers who
he said:
        were not anxious sellers taking the best offer they could get be-
        cause they needed to sell Ilanga or wanted to sell it. I pay trib-
        ute to Natal Newspapers for their genuine interest in the
        development of the Press in South Africa. They saw the
        tremendous advantages which had accrued to Ilanga once we
        had taken over ownership of it. And they sold Ilanga to us be-
        cause they believed that was the right thing to do for all Ilan-
        ga. Natal Newspapers must go down in the history of this
        country as the first newspaper company to give content to the
        concept of the quality (sic) of opportunity in SA.
    While it would be nice to think Argus had acted benevolently, its record
as a highly successful publishing company has been marked by often ruthless
decisions motivated by profits. David Niddrie (1987) has suggested that the
sale is part of a trend by the major press groups (Argus, Times Media Ltd,
Nasionale Pers and Perskor) away from newspapers, to other media (M-Net)
and non-media investments and cites a rise to 32% in Argus income from
non-newspaper activities from 1985 to 1986.
    Certainly, since the introduction of television in the mid-1970s newspaper
houses have felt the struggle for advertising to be uneven and have felt
compelled to diversify. But coinciding with this trend has been the expansion
of a black market with rising incomes and educational levels, which is not
nearly as saturated as is its white counterpart. It has had relatively little access
to television, making black newspaper advertising very viable. The
introduction of the 'Extra' and 'Africa' editions of the major dailies in the
1970s and the efforts by managements in the 1980s to divert these into
profitable area-specific knock-and-drops (advertising news-sheets),
demonstrates a decade-long struggle to reach target black markets without
having profits eroded by costly legal and state actions arising from
provocative editorial content.
    But advertisers prefer credible commercial publications with Audit
Bureau of Circulation listings and are prepared to pay more for space in
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  TRANSFORMATION                                                       GILLWALD
  them. The scramble for the anti-government City Press in 1984 when it was
  up for sale and the somewhat anomalous and costly purchase of it by the
 pro-government Nasionale Pers are testimony to the belief that black
  editions are where profits can be extracted, despite the risk of government
 action. Although the management of City Press has on occasion issued
 reprimands and policy statements on content to journalists, these have
 largely been ignored and management seems to tolerate the radical editorial
 position while circulation figures and, hence, advertising revenue rise.
     The second reason Niddrie suggests for the sale was a trade-off, like the
 probably-unspoken deal which led to the closure of the Rand Daily Mail and
 the government granting the major newspaper groups a license to operate
 M-Net. Ilanga was sold to Inkatha and the state kept hands off77ic Sowetan.
 Such a deal suggests a degree of collusion between the state and Inkatha far
 beyond police turning a blind eye to vigilante activities. The disputes over
 editorial content before the sale were with Inkatha largely, not the state, and
 one would think the powers that be might find this pleasantly divisive. Also,
 if Argus needed to jettison problematic black publications, The Sowetan, one
 of the major victims of the emergency press regulations, would seem to be
 the obvious choice. Ilanga, which was started in 1903 as one of the first
 independent black publications and remained so for nearly 30 years before
 being taken over by Bantu World, which was bought out entirely by Argus in
 1963, was one of Argus' publications which did bring in profits and stayed
within the bounds of the ever-increasing law.
     Problems with Ilanga were rather internally focused and in 1985 a number
of editorial members went on strike to protest the Ilanga news editor's
 handling of copy which they felt would make the publication appear
pro-Inkatha. But this, even together with the speculation that NN may have
feared becoming a boycott victim of Inkatha/UDF rivalry, seems an unlikely
explanation for the sale. Besides, given the inclusion of the Natal Mercury
into NN, there would have been no alternative commercial news source to
resort to during a boycott.
     Niddrie seems to come closest to a likely explanation of why NN sold
when he alludes to the rumoured low price and the depth of sympathy for
Inkatha both from Natal-based capital and the media, as indicators that
Argus did not just want to sell Ilanga but was keen to pass it on to Inkatha.
But why were Natal-based capital and the press sympathetic to Inkatha? Had
they always been? In numerous public addresses Buthelezi and Oscar
Dhlomo have accused the local and international press of adopting 'a
deliberate and sophisticated strategy of stereotyping Inkatha as a violent,
authoritarian and tribal movement'.
     The answer, if not directly the Indaba, is, then, the climate set by the
Indaba. The forerunners to the Indaba, the 1980 Buthelezi Commission and
the Lombard Plan, came and went with little attention from the commercial
                                      29


  GILLWALD                                                      TRANSFORMATION
  press but the Indaba is the issue around which the Natal press has attempted
  to mobilise readership. The Indaba has topped its political agenda in an
  unprecedented way while the other two proposals barely made their way onto
 it. The Indaba has cemented together senior editorial and newspaper
 managements and Natal capital in an indomitable band of consensus. Indeed
 the relationship between the Indaba and Inkatha has become so intertwined
 that Buthelezi explained opposition to the sale oillanga as indicative of the
 'extent to which divisiveness in Black politics is fostered by those opposed to
 the Indaba', not Inkatha, although the implication was clearly there.
     This explanation of the sale also takes care of the contention by media
 analysts6 in the commercial press at the time, that the sale of Ilanga was
 determined by business interests and not political objectives and that such
 deals need to be understood in terms of Argus' commitment to profits.
 Explanations such as these fall into the liberal trap of seeing these areas as
 mutually exclusive. Commercial decisions are of course motivated by
 business interests, often long-term ones, which in turn are linked to political
 objectives.
 WHY DID INKATHA BUY ILANGA?
     The rumoured low price of between R400 000 and R800 0007 is not in
 itself an explanation for Inkatha's purchase of Ilanga, especially if one
 accepted the popular belief that it was pro-Inkatha anyway. NN managing
 director Ed Booth, for example, said he failed to see what was controversial
 about the sale because Ilanga had by and large supported Inkatha (Daily
 News, 16.04.87). Buthelezi, though, did not share these sentiments. He said
 the UDFwas 'squirming' over the sale because they would not easily be able
 to use the newspaper for political ends, as was the case with the previous
 owners. A content analysis of the period prior to the takeover, together with
 the documented harassment and assault of Ilanga staffers by pro-Inkatha
vigilantes, indicates the paper had not been neatly sewn up and helps explains
 the otherwise illogical purchase. The price is also not the give-away it might
initially seem because the printing and distributing remain under NN. What
Inkatha was buying, besides a dilapidated building, was 'goodwill'
 (readership).
     While refusing to divulge the sale figure but adding that Inkatha had made
 an offer they could not refuse, Ed Booth, managing director of NN said that
while Ilanga was a healthy paper, the company realised it would be vulnerable
to any rival Zulu publication established by Inkatha. Dhlomo followed this
up by explaining that Inkatha had chosen to buy Ilanga rather than start a
new publication which would have crippled the existing paper, and
jeopardised the work opportunities of the staff (Natal Witness, 16.04.87).
     If the benefits of purchasing an established publication with a readership
of over a million and a tradition stretching back over 80 years to Dr John
                                         30


  TRANSFORMATION                                                          GILLWALD
  Dube, as opposed to the risks involved in the launching of a new publication
  in a floundering media market, were lost on others, they were not on
  Buthelezi. In an address announcing the take-over, pointedly entitled 'You
  Have Come Home Ilanga', he rooted the purchase in the early history of
  Ilanga, with its formation by the first president of the ANC, 'our John Dube',
  and the struggle over the decades against white ownership. With this insight,
  he challenged those opposed to the sale to start a publication in competition
  with Ilanga. 'If it is rejected in the marketplace, we will hear the voice of the
  people'.
      If the rumoured price is correct it would have been a small price for
  Inkatha to develop a secure urban base or for urbanised Africans to be
  primed for an Indaba referendum. Inkatha has a strong rural base organised
  through a multiplicity of crosscutting constituencies (women, youth,
  teachers, farmers, inspectors, social workers) each with their own specific
  objectives but all with a common allegiance to Inkatha. In both his last
  annual addresses to the Youth Brigade and the Women's Brigade, the two
 largest components of his Inkatha, he called on members to 'harvest the
 democratic gains made by the Indaba' by making the proposals 'household
 words'.10 The canvassing likely to arise from this together with the costly
 Indaba rural information campaign launched last year is likely to mean that
 the rural areas have been taken care of while in many urban areas, where
 Inkatha operates in opposition to other worker, community and youth
 organisations, they have been unable to gain control.
     Whether the purchase of Ilanga was conceived of as directly part of the
 Indaba Work Group's information campaign or not, a content analysis of
Ilanga for the six months after the sale, indicates they are fulfilling this role.
 Beside Indaba articles appearing nearly three times more often than in the
 months before the sale, the depth of coverage is far greater. Many of the
 articles are explanatory as opposed to news stories, including diagrams and
 lengthy documents produced in full and Indaba co-convenor, Dhlomo and
executive director, Professor Dawid van Wyk, are given lengthy opinion
space.12
     Why Inkatha bought Ilanga is more clear than how it was able to do so,
as Mandla Matla has refused to divulge their backers and a loan was
apparently not taken out from a fmancial institution.13 It is possible the
funding came from the KwaZulu government, though having already
co-financed the the eight month long Indaba negotiation process, special
budgets must have been somewhat depleted, or through Indaba connections.
     The benefits of a relatively high-credibility, established publication such
as Ilanga, taking a supportive line in a sustained way, as compared with the
limited persuasive ability of even the best glossy information pamphlets,
would have been obvious to communication experts with far less expertise
that those flown in from the US to handle the promotion of the Indaba.
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 GILLWALD                                                          TRANSFORMATION
 THE ROLE OF ILANGA
     The enviable position of being in control of such a publication was
 expressed by PFP media spokesman Dave Dalling, who said his party would
 love to own a newspaper and endorsed the sale by saying it was a democratic
 right (Sunday Tribune, 19.04.87). The importance of his 'bold initiative' was
 clear to Buthelezi too: 'In these turbulent times in which we live in South
 Africa, political battle in the hearts and minds is raging, and as the intensity
 of this battle increases, so does the need of the people for informed reporting
 increase'. What these statements imply is that the media affect certain
 definitions of reality or determine what the Bureau of Information called,
 the 'battle of perceptions'.
     But why these people are happy to admit their involvement in this process
 is because of the way they view the reality-defining role of the media. From
 the liberal-pluralist position they adopt, the media constitute a free
 marketplace of ideas, where a number of differing positions vie equally for
 public acceptance. A recent Ilanga editorial, for example, described the
 alternative press as 'the alternative truth', but with the rider that it had a
 democratic right to exist and the market place should decide on its viablity
 (Daily News, 02.10.87).
     More critically, Ilanga's role can be regarded as that of creating a
 definition of social reality in the interests of the class by which it is controlled.
As Gurevitch et al (1977) explain:
         although the media play a role in the formation of conscious-
         ness, they do so not in an abstract or mystical way but rather in
         a wholly concrete and discernible fashion as a set of material
         products which reflect the determinate processes of produc-
         tion in which they are manufactured.... The media are not apart
         from social reality, passively reflecting and giving back to the
         world its self-image; they are a part of social reality, contribut-
         ing to its contours and to the logic and direction of its devel-
         opment via the socially articulated way in which they shape our
         perceptions of the world.
     By examining various levels of media practice one can conceptualise the
reality-defining role of Ilanga. Most obviously there is its propaganda
function which serves to popularise particular political views - those of
Inkatha - in the pursuit of political objectives - currently those of the Indaba.
Buthelezi, Inkatha and KwaZulu have long received extensive coverage in
Ilanga, but since the takeover stories are devoid of criticism and there is a
new emphasis on Zulu royalty. In June the Inkatha Central Committee
resolved to do everything in its power 'to gain massive black support for the
Indaba' (Indaba News, July 1987:2). But the process had begun some months
before on the pages of the newly acquired Ilanga. In the four months before
the take-over there was not a single major story or editorial about the Indaba.
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  TRANSFORMATION                                                         GILLWALD
  Out of six editions from the month after the take-over (April 20 to May 20)
  there were three editorials and three major stories, including one lead,
 promoting the Indaba.
     Ilanga also has to be understood as part of a much larger propaganda
 machinery. The KwaZulu government's Bureau of Communication has
 highly experienced journalists who produce an ongoing series of press
 releases and two publications intended for local and international
 distribution.15 The slick, informative, glossy Clarion Call has an international
 mailing list of 10 000 alone and is distributed in business, diplomatic and
 university circles in the US, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
 Switzerland, Brazil, Spain, West Germany to name just a few countries.
 Umxoxi, is an in-house government publication whose function is to act as a
 forum for civil servants and as a training vehicle. Journalists from this bureau
 were responsible for bringing out Ilanga after the staff walked out in protest
 (Daily News, 21.04.87).
     Besides the functions of this department and the promotion of Inkatha
being fused, with the launch of the Indaba information campaign, which
 includes the monthly Indaba News and several glossy pamphlets, the
 marketing of Inkatha and the Indaba have become one, Ilanga's role being
to secure the black urban market.
      Another level of media practice is the way in which they present the
behaviour and activity of various groups as the actions of outsiders. Ilanga
seems to have implicitly adopted the Inkatha line on the African National
Congress as the 'mission-in- exile' which has assumed unsanctioned
leadership, while internally Inkatha, with Buthelezi at the helm, is the bearer
of the true principles of the ANC. In regard to the Indaba, those who failed
to join their voice in support of the venture are branded self-interested
enemies of the people. The activities of many organisations, such as
COSATU, appear simply to be ignored in the post-sale period.
     Thirdly, we can look at the extent to which the culture of consensus
politics provides the dominant framework against which Ilanga presents
events. This is a particularly interesting aspect in the light of Buthelezi
claiming to have returned the people's mouthpiece to them. Although
superficially the content of Ilanga might differ in that it focuses more on
Inkatha and 'black' news, the values it promotes are no different to the
mainstay values of the English language commercial press. They are
pro-capitalist, in favour of non-violence but believe in law and order by
coercion if necessary, pro-federal democracy, and anti-disinvestment.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
    The key to Ilanga's success under Inkatha is that it has, as promised, not
become a 'party political rag'. The changes have been subtle shifts in
                                        33


GILLWALD                                                        TRANSFORMATION
emphasis, depth of coverage, introductions of comment, exclusions from the
newspages.
    If circulation is any measure of credibility, those who predicted Ilanga's
downfall under Inkatha must be smarting. Cirulation figures rose to over 140
000 in November, according to Mandla Matla managing director, Arthur
Konigkramer (Daily News, 25.11.87). He said he had received an interim
Audit Bureau of Circulation certificate for July to September of 117 120.
Although the ABC figures for January to June 1987 show Ilanga to have a
circulation of 105 657 which was down -0.01 on the previous six months and
-6.1 on the same period of the previous year, the latest circulation figures for
July to December 1987 show a massive increase to 119 244. Any growth could
be explained partially by Ilanga competitions with massive prizes such as a
R50 000 house in Umlazi or R10 000 worth of furniture. Perhaps this is more
an indictment on the old management, than the new. As Dingiswayo, a
comment column which used to be written by former editor Obed Kunene
and which was reintroduced anonymously after the take over, suggests:
Ilanga never used to have these competitions because the previous owners
used the company money to promote white newspapers.
     The point is that, contrary to expectations, or threats, Ilanga has growing
support. Konigkramer has drawn attention to the insatiable rural demand
for the publication that cannot be met because distribution costs make it
unfeasible. In response to an advertisement in the paper calling for recruits,
following the protest-resignation of staffers, the paper claimed to have been
inundated by hundreds of applications, many of whom were taken in for
 training (Daily News, 30.07.87). (This was followed up with an editorial
 pointing out that besides the paper's popularity this was a statement on the
 effect of disinvestment). The threatened advertising boycott did also not
 materialise and instead an advertising drive launched in July has brought in
 a flood of colour advertising from national advertisers such as South African
 Breweries, Mills Tabacco and OK Bazaars. Advertisers were assured that
 the board of directors of Mandla Matla had 'taken specific steps to combat
 activism or advocacy in journalism'.
 CONCLUSIONS
     The purchase of Ilanga is part of an effort by Inkatha to establish regional
 hegemony. Buthelezi's statements of intent regarding the media alone
 suggest this is only one step towards a much longer term aim of national
 hegemony. At present Inkatha seems to have incorporated insufficient
 national-popular elements for this to be feasible. Even if one uses Ilanga
 readership distribution as a small indicator, only 2% of Africans on the Reef
 read it and even fewer do in Pretoria, Vaal, and Cape.18 Hence the need for
 an extensive news network. Explaining Inkatha's purchase of Ilanga,
 Buthelezi said: 'We will produce great newspapers in this country,
                                        34


 TRANSFORMATION                                                        GILLWALD
 newspapers which will become known across the length and breadth of the
 face of Africa and beyond. ...and true journalistic professionalism roots
 newspapers in the hearts and minds of the people'.
     But this objective is probably not new in Inkatha. What is significant is
 how it has been possible to set it in motion now. The sale of Ilanga has to be
 seen as a product of a process of regional reorganisation by the state and
 capital in the wake of the hegemonic crisis expressed in the states of
 emergency. Changes in state perception have made feasible Inkatha's
 ownership of a major publication, whereas less than a decade ago The Nation,
 Inkatha's rurally-based commercial mouthpiece and thelnkatha Bulletin
 were banned often enough for them to become unviable (Mare and
 Hamilton, 1987:175). The sale of Ilanga to Inkatha, as far as capital is
 concerned, needs to be seen as a regional outcome of ongoing attempts
 nationally, such as now out of vogue visits to the ANC and the development
 of massive social responsibility programmes, to secure a strategic place in a
 future South Africa.
 NOTES
 1. Buthelezi, Statement to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly about the Op-
position of Black Journalists to Inkatha's Purchase of Ilanga. April 21,1987.
Inkatha Institute.
2. All Media and Products Survey, May 1985 to March 1986. Although the
samples claim to be representative of the populations, they would be work-
ing on the underestimated official population figures. It is also not made clear
if the sample is of the literate or adult population only.
3. Buthelezi, op cit. p8.
4. Dhlomo, Why is Inkatha's Public Image Always Deliberately Distorted.
Inkatha Institute. p8.
See also: Buthelezi, SABA conference, October 15,1982.
New York Times Luncheon, February 13,1985.
Newspaper Union of SA Congress, October 4,1983.
Fma/Jc/a/Ma/YInternational Conference, October 13,1987. Inkatha Institute.
(References from Shireen Hassim.)
5. Buthelezi, Statement to KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, op cit. pi.
6. Sunday Tribune, April 19,1987 interview with Prof Gavin Stewart, head of
Journalism at Rhodes University.
7. Niddrie suggests this is a bargain-price as the market price of a publica-
tion can usually be worked out through a formula of R10 per copy sold. Using
this formula, he saysllanga was worth over Rl-million. However such a price
per copy would usually include the printing and distribution assets that were
absent from this sale agreement.
8. Buthelezi, op cit p9.
                                        35


GILLWALD                                                    TRANSFORMATION
9. See Dhlomo, Multinational Corporations and Rural Development in SA,
p4. Inkatha Institute.
10. Buthelezi, Address to Annual General Conference of the Women's Bri-
gade, October 10,1987.
11. Dhlomo, KwaZulu Natal Indaba - Prospects and Challenges. Address to
the German Chamber of Industries, p4. August 28,1987. Inkatha Institute.
12. Content analysis by Cyril Madlala of available issues of Ilanga from
January 1987 to November 1987.
13. In an interview with Arthur Konigkramer on January 15,1988 he said the
price was a confidential matter and would not have to be revealed in either
Argus nor Mandla Matla's annual financial statements at the end of Fe-
bruary.
14. Buthelezi, Statement to KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, op cit. p5.
15. Interview with Suzanne Vos, editor of Clarion Call, January 12,1987.
16. Interview with Konigkramer, op cit.
17. AMPS op cit.
18. AMPS ibid.
19. Buthelezi, Statement to KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, op cit p5.
REFERENCES
Gurevitch, M et al (1977) - Media and Society (London: Open University
Press)
Mare, G & G Hamilton (1987) -An Appetite for Power (Johannesburg: Ravan
Press)
Niddrie, D (1987) - 'Selling Up or Selling Out', in Work in Progress 48
Tomaselli, K et al (1987) - Narrating the Crisis (Johannesburg: Richard Lyon
and Co)
                                      36