

RESISTANCE AND COLLABORATION OR THE STRUGGLE AND
UNITY OF OPPOSITES: THE DILEMMA OF THE COMPRADOR
CLASS AT SANCUL 1750-1850

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It used to be argued until very recently that in discussing African response to colonial conquest and domination collaborators stood on the opposite extreme of the resisters. Such was the wisdom of the protest movement in African historiography during the euphoria for independence that resistance came to be linked with nationalism and collaboration with treason, a betrayal of African dignity and independence.¹

Whatever direction that the debate may now be taking it is still doubtful if the equation will be reversed to the extent that we seek national heroes not in the leaders of the resistance movements but also from among the collaborators as well. But for this to be done negative connotations about collaboration will have to be erased and this implicitly means a reinterpretation of the whole equation of African response to colonial domination. One of the weaknesses in the Ranger hypothesis is that in his studies on resistances, he was too much concerned with the forms rather than the content.² In fact the strawman in his argument which his critics have lashed at is the view that "the main problem with these risings is not so much why they happened as how they happened."³

The assumption behind such a view is that the causes of resistance are too obvious to require further analysis. "The people rose in arms against foreign rule" has been the argument. Who the people were, however, has tended to be again assumed as too obvious. If foreign domination was the issue then there must have been something sociologically wrong in those areas where not the entire "people" rose up in arms against foreign domination. And what of those who chose to collaborate with the colonial forces of occupation?

These and many other questions can only be answered if contradictions within each situation are identified and analysed for in certain circumstances the foreign/local contradiction was antagonistic. Where this was the case collaboration between the two sides of the equation was pre-

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ferred response. In northern Mozambique for example the relations between the littoral Makua, the so-called Swahili and the plateau Makua vasculated between outright hostility to calculated tolerance. Relations were especially strained during the second half of the eighteenth century when armed by French slave traders, the littoral Makua preyed the plateau raiding for slaves. When in 1753 the Portuguese mounted a large campaign against Makua chiefs, they were joined by the forces mobilized by the Sheikhs of Quitangonha and Sancul.⁵

At issue was the refusal of the Murimuno and other Makua chiefs on the plateau to cooperate with the coastal slave dealers on what was regarded as the latter's terms. It was alleged by Portuguese authorities that the Murimuno, one of the important Makua chiefs on the plateau was providing asylum for runaway slaves as well as confiscating goods traded on the mainland by agents of the Portuguese moradores. Despite the fact that the Murimuno had never been conquered, the Portuguese accused him of flouting trade regulations which had been reserved to Portuguese merchants and the Portuguese administration the monopoly of trade in venetian beads, cloth, guns and ammunition.⁶ In this campaign inappropriately called a Portuguese campaign against the Makua, the Portuguese forces never exceeded one hundred, but the Sheikhs of Quintangonha and Sancul supplied ten times the number.⁷ This was true in almost every situation where the so called colonial forces confronted African resistances.⁸ With very few personnel colonial regimes were established over vast territories either with the support or passivity of some groups within African societies.⁹

It is sometimes argued that the forces of occupation were called European armies because they were captained by European militarymen in the colonial service. In the case of Northern Mozambique, the Portuguese administration seems to have lacked capable military commanders. There is reason to believe that what Pereira do Lago described in 1776 would have been a fair description of the 1753 scene.

"Without people, without munitions
neither much assistance from Divine
Providence. A ship on the route to
India, does not call at this port
nor does it bring provisions from
Portugal. This land lacks everything.¹⁰

In the 1753 campaign, the Portuguese forces appear to have been commanded by the Sheikh of Quitangonha.¹¹ It was the Sheikh of Quitangonha who ordered a detachment commanded by the Sheikh of Sancul to attack once the Makua forces came into sight. The detachment hesitated and fell back. A Portuguese infantry captain Diogo-Martins became unduly excited in the pandemonium which followed, moved to the frontline shouting "death to the traitor" and killed the Sheikh of Sancul.¹²

The sheikh, a collaborator with the Portuguese was here accused of collaboration with Murimuno by default. Diogo Martin's action spelt danger for this alliance. Portuguese authorities, realizing the danger that would ensue if Sancul, the closest island of the Sheikhdoms pulled out of the alliance, began to pour praise on the deceased Sheikh. The governor of Mozambique described him as a person of great veneration and respect while his hesitation was interpreted as a tactical move in face of extraordinary danger.¹³ After their Sheikh had been killed, the forces from Sancul turned out against the Portuguese only to be saved from total annihilation by the mediation of the Sheikh of Quitangonha.

The 1753 episode illustrates the point that sometimes the position of a collaborator was not a permanent one. From that time the Portuguese could not take Sancul's alliance for granted and did force the Portuguese administrators to reconcile their interests with those of the dominant classes in Sancul. When for instance the Portuguese were engaged in further campaigns against Makua chiefs in Utioulo in 1776 and 1783, the Sheikh of Sancul preferred to remain neutral.¹⁵ The Portuguese authorities in Mozambique were forced to rely on their resources thus imposing upon themselves the extra financial burden they had hitherto shared with the littoral Makua.¹⁶ A decade later, relations between the Portuguese administration and Quitangonha, began to sour placing the Portuguese in an even graver crisis. In 1797 the Governor of Mozambique tried to mend fences by courting friendship with the Sheikh of Sancul who was well disposed to carry out military obligations to the state.¹⁷ The governor invited the Sheikh; still bitter about the 1753 episode the Sheikh refused not only to render his obligatory military service to the state in a campaign against Quitangonha but also refused to meet the governor at Mozambique because, argued the Sheikh, although it had been his wish to do so, the illness of both his brother Hassan Raja the sargento-mor and himself prevented it.¹⁸ And this was not the only inci-

dence when chiefs from both Makua and the littoral were to feign disease as a pretext for refusing to meet the newly arrived governors. Meeting the governors at Mozambique was a symbolic gesture of submission to the Portuguese authorities.

A critique of the Ranger hypothesis therefore has to go beyond a mere denial of the existence of a connection between primary and secondary resistances but rather to show the nature of the contradictions involved. If as argues Depelchin the early confrontation between colonizer and colonized African communities centred on expropriation of land, then it would appear to me, the main issue was not foreign rule or domination. The issue as Depelchin puts it was that of control over the means of production.¹⁹ There is however no concrete evidence to prove that this was always the case. Examples from West Africa show that the earliest confrontation between colonial forces of occupation and African communities were not always triggered off by land expropriation.²⁰ Neither can it be said that in East Africa, the earliest resistances against the Deutch Ostafrika Company, the coastal resistance led by Abushiri and the Hehe wars led by Mkwawa were triggered off by land expropriation.²¹ It is only during the second phase of the struggle that expropriation of land or labour become main issues in the anti-colonial uprisings as is exemplified by the Maji Maji war, of 1905-1907.²³ Central Africa provides a contrast to this general pattern. The earliest struggles in Zimbabwe centred on land expropriation and the column which was recruited from South Africa at the initiative had been promised vast stretches of land after they had won the war against the Ndebele.²³

The distinction between primary and secondary resistances has tended to be based on either timing, scale or organisation. While appreciating the significance of these factors it would be more rewarding to deal with the problem by examining the nature of the contradictions involved. There were two phases in the process of colonial conquest. The initial phase was the attempt to conquer African community and to transfer the locus of power from the local ruling classes to the colonial administration. This provoked the first phase of "Afro-European" confrontation, the primary resistances. The second phase was that of consolidation of power and an attempt to make the colonial exercise pay. This process took various forms ranging from forced labour, taxation and land alienation. Resistance during this phase was of the secondary

type generally. In all these phases, that is throughout the process of colonization, imperialist forces came up against stiff opposition of groups within the African societies which felt their interests threatened. Similarly there were those who thought that their interests would be served better through an alliance with the new power brokers. The imperialist element was not the only determinant in shaping the character of African response to colonial-conquest. This is why one cannot but agree with Anil Seal on India that "the history of any colonial system is a series of permutations between the government and different sets of allies and enemies", primarily for self interest.²⁴ In Pre-colonial Africa, as was in India, there was already competitive elements in society that breed the phenomenon of collaboration and resistance.²⁵ The colonial situation in Africa had a twofold effect. It steepened the existing traditional cleavages by disrupting the traditional status quo of domination and hierarchy or by fermenting rivalry and competition between groups. But the colonial impact was also unevenly felt within and between region.²⁶

Historical studies must not begin with the "hows" of African responses but rather look at the causes and conditions which led to the particular responses. In other words such studies must go beyond what Eric Stokes calls sociological generalizations so little analyzed that they constitute primitive images lurking in the background of historical consciousness rather than a formed system of ideas.²⁷ If such a task is to be accomplished a new methodology is required which enables social scientists to ask basic questions about the nature of African responses within the context of imperialism. Rather than focus our attention at the production of national heroes through the fetishization of the historical past and find connexions between that past and contemporary epoch, is it not more rewarding to re-examine the nature of the connexions? To what extent were all resisters nationalists and the collaborators traitors or puppets of the colonial forces of occupation? If it is true African response to imperial penetration was determined by self-interest, to what extent were the interests of the resisters representative of the interests of the large society?

Such differences can only be understood if we take cognizance of the fact that on the eve of colonial conquest, Africa was a differentiated society and that rarely did such societies act as a homogenous entity.

The colonial situation exasperated intra-African rivalry and took advantage of conflicting interests which produced the phenomenon of collaboration. The plight of the historian of African resistance is not made difficult by the fact that alliances kept changing, but rather by the fact that we are too concerned with generations which obscure the reality in each situation. This is clearly the problem in Ranger's argument.

"A historian has indeed a difficult task in deciding whether a specific society should be described as resistant or collaborative over any given period of time. Many societies made some attempt to find a basis on which to collaborate with the European's..."(28)

In those societies where resistance was the characteristic response, it may be argued the dominant classes found out that their interests could not be realised within the colonial context. Agitation started as they mobilized their forces to resist conquest. In other societies, where collaboration was the visible form of response, it may be that the form of colonial encroachment was such that its full impact was not fully felt in the initial stages. But sometimes collaboration with colonial powers was seen as a lesser evil than entering into an alliance with traditional adversaries within African communities. It is this complex physiology of African societies on the eve of colonization which produced the phenomenon of collaboration.

The use of such broad categories like "society", "people" or "states", however, obscures the reality in the discussion of African response to colonialism. It was not whole societies which reacted against colonial conquest in one way or other. It was groups of people who felt their interest, either individually or as a group, threatened at particular points in colonial history. As Dachs has argued each protest had its own nature, movement, cause and its own aims.

"Each protest had some counterpoise in groups who either remained aloof from protest or who participated against revolt sometimes turning the scales in favour of the colonial administration". 29

and on the same points, Robin Palmer argued that in arguing against colonial historiography, nationalist historians have moved to the other extreme. A colonial myth is replaced by a nationalist myth.

"Indeed we hear a great deal these days about African reactions, initiative and resistance. But the picture which emerges is often very one dimensional for African reactions are all too frequently studied in a vacuum, and very little attempt is made to analyse the structure of the colonial societies in which they take place or enquire how such societies actually functioned. The swing against colonial history has gone so far that it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain precisely what the Africans are reacting against".(30)

In each situation were to be found rebels as well as neutrals and collaborators. Sometimes neutrals took sides in a new situation or when circumstances which have forced them into a passive role changed. Similarly with their rebels and collaborators who sometimes changed position as the relations between the Portuguese administration and the Sheikdoms of Sancul and Quitangonha show. Sometimes the decision to change positions or the choice of a response was conditioned by tactical considerations. The option of collaboration was motivated by either or a combination of the following factors:- a) to protect ones group against encroachment by an historical enemy; b) to enable a segment of the political elite to regain or reinforce its privileged political position; c) to increase ones economic status within the new colonial order.³¹ And Atieno Othiambo argues that among the variety of motives for collaboration were the wish to keep a position of importance or the hope of gaining such a position, or the habit of working for any regime, however unattractive.³²

Although it would appear the "Malawi School" is trying to make a case for collaboration, many of the various forms of collaboration appear, to have been propelled by what may be called a mercenary principle. Before we create more heroes out of collaboration, it would be worthwhile to study each situation in detail so as to distinguish a tactical move from one which was strategic blunder. This is even more important in view of the current situation in southern Africa which in its complexity provides fertile ground for the re-surfacing of collaboration in the guise of internal settlements. On the eve of colonial conquest, the enemy had not yet been correctly perceived. Very often a particular African response was seen as a reaction against foreign rule or the excesses of foreign domination. As long as the traditional

leadership was incorporated into the colonial machinery, then the word "foreign" lost its meaning leaving agitation to focus on abuses of the system. To pose the question of African responses in such a nationalist problematic implies that these early struggles were a consequence of a conflict of two cultural systems which could be resolved through a process of education and assimilation. But secondly, and even more significant perhaps, is the implication that resistance died off after the end of formal colonial rule.

A reinterpretation of the historiography on patterns of African response to colonial rule has to take cognizance of and must begin from the premise that pre-colonial Africa already contained contradictions. The onset of colonial rule compounded the situation by adding another dimension of contradictions. At that point, it becomes necessary to distinguish the contradictions between the people and the enemy and those among the people themselves. This distinction allows us to appreciate each of the responses made in a particular situation. This is not to suggest that participants in the early anti-colonial protest movements ought to be judged by post-independence criteria. To do so would be not only to telescope the present into the historical past but also would be a negation of the dialectical development of any revolutionary situation. At each stage of the struggle, the situation acquires a new qualitative existence; the enemy is redefined as well as the means of struggle.

What has been called African response, initiative or reaction is nothing more than an attempt to resolve contradictions within African societies and those brought about by the colonial situation. Whether by collaboration or resistance these forms of responses were meant to resolve particular contradictions in society. The concept of contradictions implies that there are opposites, involved in constant struggle but also unity. Mao puts it thus:-

"Between the opposites in a given contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this which impels things to move and change. Contradictions exist everywhere, but they differ in accordance with the different nature of things".³³

The determining relationship between opposites is however that of struggle. The relationship between the colonizer and the colonized people, the exploiter and the exploited, fall under the category of the relationship

between opposites. In this situation, the determining relationship is one of struggle. In the course of this struggle, there are however moments when there is a temporary unity between opposites. However, the unity of opposites is almost invariably a conditional and transitory situation. The alliance between the Portuguese colonial administration and the comprador class on the northern Mozambique littoral illustrates this vividly.

II

On November 7th, 1838 following the independence of Brazil, and the liberal revolution in Portugal, the Overseas Council extended civil and political rights to all persons born in her overseas territories. This gesture of goodwill may have been politically motivated in order to prevent the large and disfranchised moradores and half-castes from declaring their respective colonies independent in the example of Brazil.³⁴ Portugal lacking the means to impose its will had to exploit every opportunity which would create favourable conditions for collaboration. Both the Portuguese and dominant classes on the littoral mainly centred around the Sheikdoms of Sancul and Quitangonha and the sultanates of Angoche and Sangage has interests in the slave trade. In this they both considered the plateau Makua upon whom they preyed as the obstacles to their prosperity. Under these conditions, prospects for collaboration were high and the Portuguese made the necessary concessions to sustain this temporary alliance.

Religious differences which had been a burning issue in the relationship between christians and moslems were set aside and replaced by a class ideology which cut across religious and racial boundaries.³⁵

Banian merchants and swahili speaking peoples forged new bonds of friendship with the Portuguese under the new identity of homens do chapau (men of the hat). From about 1760, Portuguese sources are replete with applications for acceptance to the status of homens do chapau.³⁶ The Portuguese policies of discrimination and state monopoly over cloth, beads and the sale of guns and ammunition had forced many of the well-to-do Banian merchants out of Mozambique during the 1770s. Many of these went to Sancul where in alliance with the littoral Makua they formed a formidable challenge to Portuguese monopoly. The Swahili of Quitangonha at certain periods forged strong ties with French slave dealers thus threatening Portuguese presence on the coast of northern

Mozambique.³⁷ The extension of civil and political rights as well as the decision to allow freedom of commerce were gestures aimed at consolidation of the Portuguese otherwise tenuous position on the coast. Very often the initiative far from being African was Portuguese and it was they who determined when to terminate any such alliance albeit with determined African resistance.

The Sancul homens do chapéu had made up about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the electorate in Mozambique district prior to 1844. In that year the Overseas Council decided to exclude the Swahili speaking littoral Makua as well as the Banian merchants from the voters roll.³⁸ The decision to regulate the size of the electorate came in the wake of the international campaign against the slave trade and after the Portuguese decree against the export of slaves issued in 1836. Until about 1820s, the Swahili speaking littoral Makua appear to have been on better terms with the Portuguese moradores and administrators than were the Banian merchants. They were readily accepted in the Portuguese colonial labour force as interpreters, sargent-mores or even as capitao-moré das terras-firnes.³⁹ Because of their cultural ties with the plateau Makua they were used as go between in negotiations involving Portuguese officials and Makua chiefs. Those who performed these functions were known as Maconde - emisaries.⁴⁰

This relationship between the Portuguese and Swahili speaking Makua lasted until about 1820. Thereafter the struggle against Banian merchants was beginning to lose its appeal as they held on tenaciously into the whole sale and credit market. The development and further expansion of contraband slave trade along the coast reduced many Portuguese merchants to the level of middlemen, a role formerly played by the Swahili, and demanding active protection by the administration against the ever hovering possibility of impoverishment. It is not surprising therefore; that the marriage of convenience between the Portuguese and Swahili should have soured at a time when the export of slaves from Mozambique had been outlawed. Between 1820 and 1830 there was a decline in slave traffic from Mozambique which probably explains the heightened bad will between the two groups. But by the beginning of the fourth decade of 19th century and especially between 1843 and 1847, the slave trade was beginning to pick up once again. The 1844 election was therefore crucial for the slave trade interests with each of the contending

groups struggling to have a favourable voice in the Chamber of Deputies in Lisbon. This, so went the calculations, would help in protecting them from attacks and hostile legislation while negotiating for favourable terms of the transition from slave trading to "legitimate trade". The decision of the Governing Council that both the Swahili-Makua and the Banian merchants - the non Portuguese *homens do chapéu* - should be disenfranchised was intended to eliminate commercial rivals from a state institution considered an abode of slave traders.⁴¹ This is not to suggest that the Banian and Swahili traders was less of slave traders than the Portuguese.

The controversy over the electorate in the 1844 election provides another elaboration on the nature and operation of merchant capital. Its competitive character and internal fractionalization, as well as the role of the slave trade in furthering its horizontal expansion and operation. In this particular controversy, the small slave dealers lost to powerful fractions of the merchant community in Mozambique. The opposition against the 1838 extension of civil and political rights to Swahili and Banian homens do Chapeu was led by one Celestino Feliciano de Menezes, a Portuguese morador, and one of the leading Portuguese slave traders. It was his brother Duarte Aurelio de Menes who was elected as one of the deputies. Banian merchants elected Nizamodin Lombaty another reputed slave dealer resident at Mozambique and incumbent at the office of state interpreter.⁴²

Although Sancul had been one of the most important political constituents in northern Mozambique before 1844, it had however unlike Mossuril, Cabeceiras or Mozambique island, remained the abode of the small trader since the 1790s. The reasons for this are to be traced in the administrations customs and tariff policies which tended to drive business out of Mozambique island.⁴³ Except for the 1753 incidence, the people of Sancul had been considered dependable allies of the Portuguese. Despite occasional incidences of tension, and friction, they were still praised for their fidelity in the service of the Portuguese Crown even as late as 1856.

"The Swahili at Sancul had been subject to the Crown with Sheikh in power by nomination of the governor, loyally serving the king. Never have I been informed of their having rebelled or joined the forces of the enemies we were combating".(44)

1

Much of the contents of this memorandum are incorrect which goes far in showing how even people on the scene saw things differently. Sancul was undoubtedly a more pliant ally than Quitangonha, partly because of the former's proximity to the Portuguese centre of Power at the island. As long as there were no undue sacrifices demanded, Sancul complied with the demands of the Portuguese administration. As observes Hafkin, while superficially more loyal than the Sheikhs of Quitangonha, the Sheikhs of Sancul often employed more subtle tactics than the direct opposition frequently manifested at Quitangonha.⁴⁵

This relationship was further strengthened by the Portuguese dependency on food supplies from the mainland. A gentleman's agreement between the two was struck in which the ruling elite at Sancul acted with some measures of freedom in matter of trade than could have been possible otherwise. With Portuguese indifference to the complaints of those who suffered the brunt of her excess, Sancul acquired an unenviable reputation in the manner she dealt with competitors in the trade carried out on the mainland as well as in the Mozambique. This — was not because the Portuguese administration was unaware of the abuses perpetrated by the Sancul commercial elite for as early as 1727, a Swahili trader from Ampaz, Ahmed Suahi requested permission from the Captain general of Mozambique to trade on the mainland, hoping that he would not be harassed by the Sheikh of Sancul or any of his lieutenants.⁴⁶

Sometimes, the Portuguese administration were forced to make concessions which amounted to an admission of inability to act to the contrary. In 1808, a leading trader and a member of the alternate ruling lineages at Sancul was accused of aligning with the Sheikh of Quitangonha in the presence of the captao-mor-das terras firmes and plotting with the Sheikh to attack the Portuguese. The captao-mor Jose Antonio Caldas had jailed him at Mossuril and warned the governor about Othman Maulid's infidelity and independent mind.⁴⁷ Caldas further pointed out that Othman Maulid had incurred the enmity of several Makua chiefs including the Maurusa of Uticulo, and were demanding his immediate replacement.⁴⁸

The Portuguese administration instead questioned the legality of Caldas action since this violated the statute of Reformation which required that no person could be jailed without trial for more than eight days, for which he countered that he had acted in defence of the interest of the state:-

"Seeing that the peace of the state and public depends on his fidelity, if you free this Maconde, it may result in future damage to the state and public tranquility".(49)

Maulid was released and later replaced by the candidate preferred by the Maurusa, Jocquim da Encarnacao.⁵⁰ In fact this would appear to have been at Othman's request for he had written that his captivity had been prompted by personal differences between himself and the captao-mor and asked therefore to be relieved of his duties as Maconde.⁵¹ Whatever differences that may have existed between the two personalities, there was no love lost between Sancul and the Portuguese administration. Nevertheless Othman Maulid turned into a rebel against the Portuguese administration because of the indignities he had suffered at the hands of Caldas. When in fact the incumbent Sheikh died in 1809 Antonio Manoel de Castro de Mendooa who had taken over from Frois as the new governor of Mozambique, appointed Maulid Othman as the new Sheikh of Sancul in November 1810, "as a strong man upon whom the Portuguese could count for help and in view of the fact that he had already been appointed to that office by the Swahili at Sancul."⁵² At that time both Sancul and Lumbo were threatened by the Makua.⁵³

Under these circumstances the Portuguese administration was compelled to pay a blind eye on Maulid Othman's records, in order to have a stronger alliance against a more formidable enemy alliance. It shows that not only was collaboration mutual but also opportunistic. Collaborators were sometimes able to achieve cherished ambitions or protect their interests in this way. At stake however was not the question of sovereignty but participation which allowed them to share the spoils. Although Maulid rendered small favours to the Portuguese, he did not abandon his earlier abuses which had led him into jail. Between 1810 and 1811, Maulid attacked several Indian merchants. In 1811, he together with a Banian merchant Juma Charmande were accused of plotting to steal material for a ship Kanji Rangas was having built at Angoche. As major competitors,

for trade on the mainland, it was understandable that Banians should be direct victims of Swahili intimidation.⁵⁴ As functionaries in the Portuguese administration, the comprador class at Sancul led by the Sheikhs were in favourable position to eliminate and intimidate Banian competitors with impunity. Under the pretext of carrying out Portuguese orders against Contraband trade, they chose powerful Banian merchants as targets confiscating and appropriating the goods for themselves as their due allowances for which they were entitled. Occasionally Portuguese authorities would sound a warning against such practices but very often these went unheeded.⁵⁵

That these warnings were not meant to be taken seriously is shown by an incidence which involved Maulid's capitao-mor and a Banian merchant. In 1810, Jadogy Motichand, a leading Banian merchant at Mozambique charged that Makusudi Ali Mohamed Raja, the capitao-mor, had seized him at Mokambo Bay and threatened to imprison him for selling contraband. Motichand alleged that in order to ransom himself he surrendered his goods which included a female slave and some jewellery to Makusudi. The Portuguese took no further action apart from summoning Makusudi to Mozambique for questioning. Makusudi in fact emerged the winner for in 1822, he succeeded Maulid Othman as the new Sheikh of Sancul.⁵⁶

Despite complaints to the contrary, the Swahili aristocracy enjoyed a measure of success in their collaborative effort. As "faithfull vassals" of the Portuguese administration they wrote in 1820, "were deeply shocked by an attempt at the life of Governor Joao da Costa de Brito Sanches" whom they regarded as "father, protector of commerce and paredigm".⁵⁷ True, Governor de Brito Sanches was from the point of view of the Swahili aristocracy all these rolled into one. Francisco da Costa Meudes had described him as "impudent and dishonest" and was actually deposed and imprisoned the following year in the aftermath of the Portuguese liberal revolution of 1820.⁵⁸

When Makusudi Ali Mohamed succeeded Maulid Othman as Sheikh of Sancul, relations continued as previously. In fact in 1824, the Mozambique residents who feared a combined Arab-Swahili attack from the Indian Ocean pleaded with the President of the Senate and the commandante of the mainland that they should maintain "a harmonious and intelligent correspondence with the Sheikh of Quitangonha and

Sancul in spite of whatever small sacrifice demanded". This was probably necessary to prevent the formation of a broader Arab-Swahili alliance which would have overwhelmed Portuguese forces.⁵⁹ That it was necessary to remind the President of the Senate about the necessity of caution in handling Luso-Arab relations along the coast goes further to show that the relationship between them and that between the Portuguese and Swahili speaking littoral Makua could not be taken for granted at this time. Secure in his position, Makusudi was proving unmanageable. He turned down an invitation to Mozambique extended to him by Governor Sebastiao Xavier Botelho to commemorate the accession of Dom Miguel I to the throne of Portugal on the pretext of stomachache.⁶⁰ He however continued to send his people to Mozambique island with vegetables, coffee and sugar cane for marketing.⁶¹

Portuguese inaction was partly due to the fact that the slave trade had declined substantially during the 1820s and 1830s. Once the trade bounced back in the eighteen forties, violation of Portuguese commercial regulations by the Sancul based merchants became a burning issue and affected relations between Sancul and Mozambique island. There was considerable conflict between the Sheikh of Sancul and the governors of Mozambique over the question of the export of slaves from Makambo in the Sancul district. On several occasions, Governor Paulo Jose Miguel de Brito who was governor from 1829 to 1832, received reports that small coastal vessels known as pangaios were landing at Mokambo and that slaves were being exported from that point to the Comoros. He warned Makusudi Ali Mohamed that the unloading of food or the loading of slaves was illegal except when this was done at Mozambique and with the payment of appropriate customs duties.⁶² Makusudi's denials were not all that convincing. He was forced to make a veiled admission coupled with a threat not to allow "whale fishing" in Mokambo Bay by Portuguese or Brazilian ships.⁶³ It appears that "whale fishing" and "woodcutting" were code names for slave trading which the Portuguese used especially after the legal abolition of the export of slaves from Mozambique in 1835. He pleaded for special exemption to allow the unloading of food supplies especially that meant for feeding slaves known as Sambo.⁶⁴

When Makusudi's request was refused, he retaliated by enforcing his earlier veiled threat. He refused free passage to Portuguese

authorized ships on the pretext that he could not be certain about the mode of payment for his food supplies.⁶⁵ The governor was forced to plead with Makusudi to allow the ships to pass.⁶⁵ Makusudi's intransigency continued until the governor was forced to make yet another concession that slaves ships could load and unload their cargo in Mokambo Bay on condition that the requisite customs duties were paid at the customs house at Mozambique. Both Makusudi and the governor were interested parties in the clandestine trade for de Brito had written to the Sheikh at the end of October inviting him to Mozambique because "I have royal business to transact with you. Please come to the palace."⁶⁸ de Brito was a well known personality in the clandestine slave trade himself.⁶⁹ It would appear a new deal was in the offing. Makusudi was not opposed to the payment of customs duties to the Portuguese customs house at Mozambique as long as he was the customs collector himself. But to allow him to play the role of customs collector would have operated against the Portuguese policy of centralization of foreign trade under the control of the Portuguese administration at Mozambique and other designated ports. Makusudi's terms were refused. Sancul continued to flout Portuguese tariffs until de Brito's death in 1832.⁷⁰ The situation did not improve thereafter as Makusudi continued to flout Portuguese regulations with impunity. The only open cause of action for the interim government was to warn once again Sheikh Makusudi and to advise him "to take all caution in observing shipping regulations lest he be held responsible for any transgression of the orders".⁷¹ It is not stated what steps would be taken against the Sheikh if he failed to comply. It does appear however the threat worked for by the time of his death Sheikh Makusudi was referring even the most minute matters to the Portuguese for arbitration including family problems.⁷²

A few months before he died on August 10, 1832, Sheikh Makusudi Mohamed referred to the Governing Council an event which concerned his niece Amina. Amina was with her husband on a pangaio sailing off from Mozambique to probably the Comoros. The couple had come for a short visit to relatives but Amina's mother wanted them to stay a little bit longer. On such a purely family affair Sheikh Makusudi asked the intervention of the Governing Council because he did not know how to

settle the matter.⁷³ Such was the plight of a calculating collaborator and that, the extent of his initiative!

III

The plight of Maulid Othman and Makusudi Mohamed together with the 1844 election controversy serve to underline the transitory nature of the alliance between the colonizer and the colonized. Their interests coincided in the slave trade at a time when Banian merchants were considered an immediate threat to both Portuguese and Swahili merchant's prosperity. It was however an alliance between unequal partners for what actually happened was that the Swahili could only realize their aspirations by working within the Portuguese administrative structure. They did not seek to overthrow the system but rather to be part of it. They managed to secure some concessions in certain areas but on those demands which would have required fundamental changes, they met still opposition from the Portuguese administration.

The deteriorating situation in 1840s, was partly due to the increasing competition for quick profits from a trade that had been condemned as illegal. The uncertainty over its duration and the insecurity involved led to high prices and hence higher profit margins. The duration of the transition period however depended on the existence of a powerful lobbying group in the legislature. It was this which split the former alliance and led to the disenfranchisement of both the Swahili and Banian merchants.

The argument presented by both sides in the 1844 controversy are very interesting from the point of view of contemporary struggles against imperialism. Before 1830s, the Sheikhs of Sancul had been lavished with praise as the symbol of the voice of reason in northern Mozambique unlike the hard-liners in Uticulo and Matibana. That they were considered vassals of the Portuguese crown there is no doubt. Sheikhs were not appointed by the Portuguese administration but they had to be confirmed into that office by the Governor.⁷⁴ In 1844, Celestino Feleciano de Menezes' argument which won the debate over the exclusion of the Swahili and Banians from the voters roll ran as follows:-

"Sancul was ruled by a Sheikh with absolute power over the lives and property of his subjects, a power which represented a conflict with Portuguese sovereignty and for this matter residents of Sancul could not be considered Portuguese authorities because they succeeded each other in regular hereditary fashion".(75)

Where commercial interests were concerned, the Portuguese had no respect for facts. They knew very well that the Sheikhs of Sancul were on the pay-roll of the Portuguese administration in Mozambique and that Menezes' interpretation of the 1838 decision of the Overseas Council was far at variance with the political practice in Mozambique. Sancul was considered part of the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.

On the other hand those who argued the case for the Swahili emphasized the provisions stipulated in the 1838 resolution. The major arguments were as follows:-

"Employees and citizens of the Portuguese Crown protest against disenfranchisement. They are citizens by birth and for centuries had been sons of the Portuguese fathers". That either by economic status, or possession of requisite taxable income are stipulated in law or by virtue of being servants on the Portuguese payroll or by the fact that they were subject to a Portuguese authority nominated by the government they were entitled to a vote".

Conditions in 1844 had changed making it necessary to reinterpret the decision of the council taken in 1838. The compradores lost to powerful slave dealers. Such are the dilemmas of a comprador class operating as a pawn in the game of International relations.

FOOTNOTES :-

1. The old view is represented by such authors as J.S. Coleman "What is African Nationalism?" R.O. Collins (ed) Problems in the History of Colonial Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970), R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, "Romantic reactionaries versus sophisticated collaborators" in Collins *op. cit.* G.C.K. Gwassa "German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania" Kimambo and Temu (eds) A History of Tanzania (Nairobi 1969).

2. A.J. Dachs, Atieno Odhiambo and Bonaventure Swai are representatives of a new generation of scholars who are throwing new light on the problem of African responses to colonial rule in general and the phenomenon of collaboration in particular.
3. J. Depelchin "Towards a Problematic History of Africa" in Tanzania Zamani 18 (Jan. 1976), 5 Swai, "Collaboration Versus Resistance and Beyond" Mimeo Dar es Salaam, 1976.
4. Nancy J. Hafkin, "Trade, Society and Politics in Northern Mozambique 1753-1913" Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University 1973.
5. "Breve Noticia da Infelicidade" 107.
6. A.H.U. Moz. Maco, 38 Francisco Mello e Castro to Sebastiao Jose de Carvalho e Mello Moz. 28/12/1753.
7. "Relacao de Ignacio Caetano Xavier" 184; Texeira Botelho Historia Militar e Politica dos Portugueses em Mocambique 2 Vols. (Lisbon 1936) Vol. I, 437.
8. Michael Crowder, West African Resistances (N.Y. 1971) T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897 (London, 1967).
9. Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge 1968), Es. Atieno-Odhiambo, "The Paradox of Collaboration: The Uganda Case" East African Journal IX, 10 (October 1972) 19, -25.
10. A.H.U. Cx 15, Pereira do Lago to Secretary Moc., 23/8/1776.
11. Hafkin, op. cit., 165.
12. A.H.U. Moc. Maco 38, Francisco de Mello e Castro to Sebastiao Jose de Carvalho e Mello Moz. 28/12/1753.
13. "Relacoes do Ataque as Terras de Macuana" In Arquivos das Colonias III-IV (1920) 55-58.
14. A.H.U. Moz. Moco 38, *ibid.*, *ibidem*.
15. J. Boleo, A campanha de 1783 contra o Utigulo (Lourenco Marques, 1964), 24.

16. Alexander Lobato, "Notas a Henry Salt" Mozambique (March, 1944), 33.
17. A.H.U. Moz. CXA 34, Fransisco Guedes de Carvalho e Menezes da Costa to Rodigo da Souza Coutinho Moz. 24/11/1797.
18. Hafkin, op. cit., 168.
19. Depelchin, op. cit.
20. Crowder, op. cit.
21. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (eds) A History of Tanzania (Nairobi, 1969).
22. J. Iliffe and G.C.K. Gwassa (eds) Records of the Maji Maji War Part I (Nairobi, 1968).
23. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia.
24. Seal, op. cit.
25. Odhiambo, op. cit.
26. Ibid., 19.
27. Eric Stokes "The First Century of British Colonial Rule in India: Social Revolution or Social Stagnation": In Past and Present 58 (1973), 136.
28. Ranger, "African reaction to the imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa". In L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan (eds) Colonialism in Africa Vol. I (Cambridge, 1969), 304.
29. Anthony Dachs "The Politics of Collaboration Imperialism in Practice". In Bridglah Pachai (ed) The Early History of Malawi (London 1972), 283.
30. Robin Palmer, "Johnston and Jameson: A Comparative Study in the imposition of colonial rule". Pachai op. cit., 293.
31. Allan Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique Anti-Colonial Activity in the Zambezi Valley 1850-1921 (London, 1976) 189.
32. Odhiambo, op. cit., 19.
33. Mao Tse Tung, On the Correct Handling of Contra-

dictions Among the People. (Peking, 1966), 13.

34. Alcantara Guerriero, Quadro da Historia de Mozambique (Lourenco Marques, 1954), I, 400.
35. A.H.U. Moz. Cod. 1320, Irmaos da Santa Casa de Misericordia to King. Mozambique 2/1/1759.
36. See Petition of Ponja Velgy (Punja Virji) for recognition as homon do chapeu on account of his wealth and service to the Portuguese administration in both Mozambique and Diu with recommendations of Governor Saldanha de Albuquerque A.H.U. Moz. Cxa 11 Albuquerque to Overseas Council Moz. 29/11/1762.
37. A.A. Alpers, "The French Slave Trade in East Africa 1721-1810" Cahiers d'Estudes Africaines Vol. X, 37 (1970), 80-124.
38. A.H.U. Moz. Primeira Reparticao, Pasta 8, Petition of Hassan Mussa, Sheikh of Sancul, Maulid Chamakana Capitao mor and Eleven other to Queens of Portugal Sancul, 9/3/1846. Enclosure in Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State, Moz. 7/3/1846.
39. Hafkin, op. cit. 168, 170.
40. Ibid., 171.
41. Texugo, Letters, 43.
42. A.H.U. Moz. Pasta and Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State, Moz. 7/3/1846; Texugo Letter, 44.
43. Abdul Sheriff "The Rise of" III.
44. Memorandum on Portuguese East Africa addressed to Crown 28/4/1856 cited in Hafking op. cit., 164.
45. Hafkin, op. cit., 169.
46. A.H.U. Moz. Maco 5 Captain General Antonio Cardim Frois to Crown, Moz. 10/3/1727.
47. A.H.U. Moz. Cxa. 50 Jose Antonio Caldas to Interim Governors of Mozambique. Mossuril. 13/6/1808.
48. Ibid.
49. A.H.U. Moz. Cxa 50 Caldas to Governors. Mossuril. 13 June, 1808.
50. A.H.U. Moz. Cxa 52 Requerimento of Dalama Majuncual 23 September 1809.

51. A.H.U. Moz. Cxa 50 Requerimento of Molidi Uthman, Mossuril 22 August, 1809.
52. Henry Salt, Voyages to Abyssinia, 40.
53. A.H.U. Moz. Cxa 53, Joao Vicente de Cardenas e Mira to Mendonca, Mossuril 12 December, 1810.
54. Hafkin, op. cit., 173.
55. A.H.U. Codice 1425, Interim Governing Council to Sheikh of Sancul, Moz. 12 April, 1838.
56. A.H.U. Moz. Cxa 54 Requerimento of Jadogy Motichand, Moz., 27 June, 1810.
57. A.H.U. Moz. Maco 38 Molidi Uthman Makusudi, Ali Mohamedi, Burahimu Isufu and Twenty six others, to Crown, 1820.
58. Jose I. Texeira Botelho, "Subsidio para um catalogo dos Governadores de Mocambique Arquivo das colonias, II (1918), 54. A.H.U., Moz. Cxa 70, Santana, Documentacao II, Introduction.
59. A.H.U. Moz. Cxa 54 Adolfo Pinto de Magalhais and 16 others to President of Senate and Commandante of Terras-Firmes, Mozambique 2 February. 1824.
60. A.H.U. Codice 1413 Sebastiao Xavier Botelho to the Sheikh of Sancul Mozambique 10 July, 1829. B.N.L., F.G., Codice 8470 Sheikh Makusedi Ali Mohamed to Botelho Sancul, July, 1829.
61. Hafkin, op. cit., 178.
62. A.H.U. Codice 1425, de Brito to Makusedi Ali Mohamed, Moz. 28 February, 1831, 26/7/1831, 3/8/1831, 13/8/1831, 15/8/1831, 30/9/1831.
63. A.H.U. Moz. Maco 21, Makusedi Mohamed to de Brito, Mokambo Bay, 28/7/1831.
64. A.H.U. Moz. Maco 22. Makusedi to de Brito Mokambo Bay, 10/8/1831.
65. A.H.U. Codice 1425 de Brito to Makusedi Mohamed Moz. 5/10/1830.
66. Ibid.
67. A.H.U. Codice 1425 de Brito to Makusedi Mohamed Moz. 30/10/1831; A.H.U. Moz. Maco 30 de Brito to Manoel Alves da Silva Moz. 3/11/1831, 4/11/1831.
68. A.H.U. Codice 1425 de Brito to Makusedi Mohamed, Moz. 31/10/1831.

- 69.A.H.U. Moz. Maco 14, Vasconcelos e Cirne to Conde de Basto,
Quelimane 13/10/1820, Santana Documentacao II, 334.
- 70.Costa Mendes, Catalogo, 65.
- 71.A.H.U. Codice 1425, Interim Governing Council to Makusedi,
Moz., 1 March, 1832.
- 72.Hafkin, op. cit., 184.
- 73.Loc. cit., B.N.L. Codice 8470, Makusedi to Governing Council
Sancul, 27 May, 1832.
- 74.Hafkin, op. cit. 184, B.N.L. Codice 8470 Burehimu Usufu to
Governors of Mozambique, Sancul, 26 August, 1832.
- 75.A.H.U. Moz. Pasta 8 Proceedings of the Camara Recurso
Enclosed in Abreu de Lima to Secretary of State Moz.
7 March, 1846.