

TANZANIA AND THE UNITED NATION

Dr. K. Mathews**

INTRODUCTION

In October 1980 the United Nations (U.N.) has completed thirty-five years of its existence as a unique forum for international debate and dialogue and a world-wide diplomatic organization besides being a global economic, social and humanitarian organization. Created on the eve of the Second World War "to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war";¹ this organization symbolizes the world community and the right of all nations, big and small, to have a voice in the affairs of the world community. In fact, it is the small and weak nations which most need the U.N. The purpose of this paper is to explain and evaluate Tanzania's role and relations in the United Nations. An attempt is also made to analyse the underlying philosophical view which the Tanzanian leaders have held towards the U.N. and its role in world affairs.

Tanzania has always given the U.N. a place of prominence in her foreign policy priorities, because she believes that her own survival is greatly bound up with that of the U.N. The general policy of Tanzania towards the U.N. and its Specialized Agencies has been largely guided by the broad objectives of African diplomacy² expressly formulated by the O.A.U. Council of Ministers in September 1967 with emphasis on two benefits:

- (a) to obtain maximum benefit in quantity and quality from the U.N. and the U.N. Specialized Agencies for individual African States, and whenever required, for regional and continental African projects;
- (b) to ensure that African views are unitedly and effectively presented within the organs of the U.N. and the U.N. Specialized Agencies; and to contribute wisely and effectively to the solution of international problems.³

Tanzania's attitude and policy towards the United Nations was more clearly stated in President Nyerere's maiden speech to the U.N. General Assembly on 14 December, 1961, the day Tanzania (then Tanganyika) was admitted to the U.N.⁴ He stated:

The first principle of a government's foreign policy is, therefore, a recognition of the fundamental importance of the United Nations.... This international organization has great purpose and still greater potentiality.... Within this Assembly every nation is equal, and we believe that in this lies the unique character of the United Nations and its greatest asset.... The importance of the United Nations can and will grow, dependent only upon the determination of all of us to make it work.... Tanganyika will look at everyone of its policy decisions in the light of its recognition of the fundamental importance of the United Nations.⁵

Tanzania's conception of the U.N.'s role was highlighted by Ambassador Salim A. Salim, the country's former Permanent Representative to the U.N. when he said: It is now almost a truism that even if you don't have the U.N. given the present situation of international relations you would have to invent an institution like this. The U.N. is a

** Dr. K. Mathews — Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam.

unique institution in promoting international understanding, international co-operation and the preservation of peace and security. The U.N. today is engaged in a number of projects and fields; cultural, economic, social and technical. Unfortunately not much is talked about them.⁶ But as a matter of fact the value and the very survival of the United Nations has been a result of its role in facilitating national diplomacy and interests of member states rather than its ability to promote the interests of the "world community", for, to a large extent, the latter depends on the former. Undoubtedly, a large number of transactions among states go through bilateral channels associated with traditional diplomacy. But bilateral relations between states, pervasive as they are, by no means constitute the totality of channels of international transactions. An important complementary development, which is historically more recent, has been the numerous opportunities for multi-lateral interaction among states or communities of nations provided by international organizations, and their impact on the development of diplomacy has, in fact, become pronounced since the end of the Second World War. The United Nations system, with its Specialized Agencies, has become the major diplomatic arena for interaction between diverse political groups!⁷

In short, national diplomacy in the context of increasing international interdependence and interactions demands a synthesis of the bilateral and multilateral approaches. The U.N., as an international organization with its present membership of 155 embracing almost all countries of the world,⁸ provides the best mechanism for such a synthesis. Moreover, without the U.N. it would have been difficult for new nations, powerless and impoverished, to break into the closely knit diplomatic circles of the older and powerful states. The privilege of using this forum derives solely from the membership in the U.N. and does not depend on the size of power of the nation. For a poor country like Tanzania, maintaining an effective diplomatic mission at the U.N. achieves wide global diplomatic contacts at much less cost than the huge expenses involved in establishing expensive diplomatic missions in many foreign capitals. In this connection it is interesting to note that Tanzania's Mission to the U.N. in New York was one of the first three diplomatic missions established in 1961, the other two being in London and New Delhi.⁹

The priority given to the establishment of a permanent mission at the U.N. is based on two perceived advantages. First, the U.N. serves as the nerve-centre of international diplomacy in the classical sense of the term. Second, it serves as the forum for what is known as "Parliamentary diplomacy". The personal contacts of representatives of over 150 countries within the environment of one building in the lobbies, bars, committee rooms, dining rooms and lounges make the style of diplomacy at the U.N. more informal and more intense than in the various national capitals. This indeed makes the U.N. "the greatest single diplomatic cross-road in the world",¹⁰ providing the opportunity for conducting one's own business as well as for finding out the business of others, for ascertaining what governments are doing and particularly what the great powers are planning. An alert and active national delegation has immense opportunities to influence opinion on world issues or on issues vital to its national interest through diplomacy at the U.N. Though not legally binding, decisions of the U.N. particularly the General Assembly resolutions represent "collective legitimacy" which carry great political weight.

Parliamentary diplomacy at the U.N., then, represents a collective legitimization process. Even raising an issue in the U.N. is a highly calculated move which requires diplomatic skills. If, in a bilateral dispute, one is not in a good bargaining position, one may raise it in the world body to secure negotiated settlement or put the adversary on the defensive. But more important than merely raising the issue is steering the move through the various processes and stages leading to the adoption of a resolution, which calls for great skill and experience in parliamentary diplomacy, and a clear understanding of the situation.¹¹

In the light of the above general observation, it would be useful to examine how the Tanzanian delegates to the U.N. handled various situations in the world body. However, before we embark on this task, we shall first examine the special historical links between Tanzania and the World Organization and then briefly analyse President Nyerere's perception of the role of U.N. in world affairs.

Historical links

Tanzania's relations with the world organization dates back to the colonial days.¹² Following the First World War which ended the period of German colonialism, Tanganyika came under Great Britain as part of the new colonial device created by the victors in the war, namely the 'Mandates System' under the League of Nations. Britain as the "Administering Authority" was charged with the international duty "to promote the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants". The question of independence of the territory was never considered at the time and the covenant of the League of Nations merely referred to "the well-being of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves".¹³

Britain was required to submit annual reports to the League of Nations through its Permanent Mandates Commission (P.M.C.) In practice, however, this made little difference in government between Tanganyika and Britain's other colonies and protectorates, as successive British governors continued to administer the country like any other colony. During the whole period of the mandates system (1920-1945) no political participation was extended to Tanzanians on the pretext that "none could speak English"!

However, following the Second World War, the transition from the Mandate System to the Trusteeship System of the U.N.¹⁴ brought about some changes. The Charter of the U.N. and the Trusteeship Agreements were in particular more specific concerning political advance than the Covenant of the League and the mandates agreements. At least in theory, the U.N. system provided machinery for closer international watch on the manner in which Britain and other imperialist powers carried out their "trusts".

Tanganyika, as a United Nations Trust territory, did benefit from the effects of world opinion on the Administering Authority. Under the Tanganyika Trusteeship Agreement, the Administering Authority was to promote the development of free and suitable political institutions in the territory. To this end the inhabitants were to be assured of a progressively increasing share in the administration and other services. Britain was also to "develop participation of the inhabitants of Tanganyika in advisory

and legislative bodies and in the government of the territory". Moreover, the U.N. Charter specifically proclaimed "self-government or independence" as the aim of the trust territories.¹⁵ Both procedurally and functionally the Trusteeship Council was more directly concerned with the problems of the trustee territories.¹⁶ The Trusteeship Council despatched Visiting Missions to Tanganyika every three years.¹⁷ These gave the Council access not only to documents and officials, but also directly to the people. Equally important, they gave the people a chance to know the Council's work and gain greater awareness of their rights under the Trusteeship agreement.

The first United Nations Visiting Mission to Tanganyika was in 1948, at a time of great political effervescence among its African population which encouraged the growth of political consciousness in the territory. Many local problems were brought before the Visiting Mission. In 1951, the Meru, acting through their leader, Japhet Kirilo, appealed to the United Nations against the colonial government's confiscation of their land. That year the colonial government had evicted 3,000 Wameru from the Engare-Nanyuki area in order to provide land for European settlement.¹⁸ In fact, Kirilo's effort, though unsuccessful at the time, gave such an impetus to nationalist activities that a Second Visiting Mission in 1954 was compelled to recommend independence for Tanganyika in twenty to twenty-five years.

The report of the 1954 United Nations Visiting Mission also recommended that a time table should be drawn up for independence. They suggested this could be achieved within twenty to twenty-five years. This suggestion was, however, rejected by Britain, the Administering Authority. Thereupon the newly created Party, TANU, which had given evidence to the Visiting Mission, decided to send its President, Julius Nyerere, to the U.N. to give further evidence when the Report was being considered by the Trusteeship Council of the U.N. At the 15th Session of the Trusteeship Council on 7 March 1955 Nyerere argued:

.... When, therefore, the Visiting Mission made the recommendation that Tanganyika should become self-governing in a period of twenty or twenty-five years, we did not expect that either the Council or the Administering Authority would express violent opposition to that proposal, for, although we have never stated a date when we should be self-governing, we had expected that, with your help and with the help of the Administering Authority, we would be governing ourselves long before twenty or twenty-five years.¹⁹

At the end of 1956 Nyerere went to the United Nations again to argue his country's case for constitutional development and independence. On 20th December, 1956; at the Meeting of the Fourth Committee (Trusteeship Committee) Nyerere pleaded with the Committee to prevail upon the Administering Authority to grant three requests:

- (a) To declare that Tanganyika shall be developed to become eventually a democratic state; and since 98 per cent of the population is African, this means that Tanganyika shall eventually become a self-governing African state;
- (b) To change the constitution so as to give equal representation as between the Africans and non-African officials. This is not a democracy, but we ask it as a symbol of the intention to develop the country as a democratic state;
- (c) To introduce elections on common roll for all representative members on universal adult franchise.²⁰

Whereas the P.M.C. of the League of Nations had been in greater agreement with the colonial powers on broad policy matters, a majority of the Trusteeship Council allied itself with TANU against the "Administering Authority". The existence of the nationalist party meant that the anti-colonial forces in the Council had access to specific details of popular discontent, making their criticisms more incisive.

Further, it was constant pressure from the Trusteeship Council which gave the whole policy of multi-racialism a different interpretation in Tanganyika from that in Kenya or Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and was consequently responsible for the more rapid constitutional advance of Tanganyika. In the same way, there can be little doubt that Tanganyika's special status prevented the growth in East Africa of a settler dominated political association on the lines of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Besides, the publicity given to the views of TANU through the various media of the U.N. meant that African aspirations in Tanganyika were more widely heard than those of nationalists in other colonies. Even more important, the sympathetic hearing which the nationalist movement was able to obtain through the U.N. added considerably to its self-confidence and strength. Nyerere acknowledged this special role of the U.N. Trusteeship system while delivering his maiden address to the General Assembly. He said:

We feel a special gratitude and loyalty to the United Nations because we are conscious of the debt we owe to the Trusteeship Council and of course, to this General Assembly... I would not be honest if I did not admit openly and graciously that the fact that we have been a Trust Territory under the British administration has greatly helped us to achieve our independence in the way in which we have achieved it.²¹

Having outlined the special historical links between Tanganyika and the world organization we may now turn to a brief analysis of President Nyerere's perception of the role of the U.N. in world affairs.

The Impact of Nyerere

Tanzania's active support for the U.N. springs mainly from President Nyerere's belief that it is the only organization capable of regulating interstate relations and thereby promoting world peace and justice. For example, the most fundamental ground for Nyerere's opposition to colonial rule has been the denial of equality and human dignity. While arguing the nationalists' case for independence, Nyerere referred more to the indignity and humiliation of being ruled by others than to any specific failings or injustices of colonial regimes. For instance, in December 1959, while addressing the legislative Council as the leader of TANU Nyerere stated;

Our struggle has been, and still is and always will be a struggle for human rights. As a matter of principle we are opposed, and I hope, we shall always be opposed, to one country ordering the affairs of another country against the wishes of the people of that country.²²

Nyerere's commitment to human equality, democracy and anti-colonialism are basic to his political philosophy. In his first post-independence address to the United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1961 Nyerere reiterated his ideas and stressed the need for world peace, a recognition of human rights and the importance of African Unity:

The basic of our actions, internal and external, will be an attempt, an honest attempt to honour the dignity of man..... We believe that it is evil for any people to ill-treat others on grounds of race..... We shall try to use the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a basic for both our external and internal policies..... We are all concerned, first and foremost, with the establishment of world peace..... We believe that.....ultimately the problem of world peace depends upon the achievement of a state in the world where you have a world government. But that state of affairs does not exist at present. We realize that the United Nations itself is not a world government, but it is a practical acknowledgement of the need for world peace.....

“We believe that the importance of the United Nations can and will grow depending only upon the determination of all of us to make it work. We can only say that for our own part, we will do what little we can to enhance the status of this organization and assist in the execution of its policies. We believe that because action through it avoids any fear of domination by another state, it can do much to contribute to the peace that we all desire. Tanganyika would look at every one of its policy decisions in the light of its recognition of the fundamental importance of the United Nations”.²³

Later in October 1967, speaking on “Policy on Foreign Affairs” in Mwanza, Nyerere reiterated Tanzania’s adherence to the policy of non-alignment and support for the United Nations in its search for peace and justice. Despite the failure of the U.N. to resolve important international conflicts such as Vietnam, Middle East, Tanzania would not lose faith in the U.N. or reduce her support for it:

The United Nations is weak when powerful states wish to ignore it. Its servants can only act when the sovereign and independent member nations agree that they shall do so. But these limitations must be treated as a challenge to us, and as reasons for Tanzania to give the United Nations all the support and all the strength, which it is within our power to do so. For there is no other instrument for international peace even as effective as this. Rather than abandon the United Nations we must work steadfastly and persistently towards strengthening it and increasing its powers. This will not be easy. For, big powers can live with the illusion of self-sufficiency, even now it is possible for them to imagine that the rest of the world is unimportant to them. They are, therefore, anxious to limit the powers of an international body. But, we small powers can have no such illusions. Only in an organization such as the United Nations can we hope to make our voice heard on international issues, and only through the implementation of the principles upon which it is based can we hope to survive and grow in peace.²⁴

For Nyerere, support to the U.N. was an essential concomitant of the country’s policy of non-alignment. One of the most common methods that Tanzania adopted in conformity with its policy of non-alignment was active participation in the non-aligned movement which champions national independence, justice in interstate relations, world peace, and the use of the United Nations as the dominant instrument for conflict resolution in world politics.²⁵ Nyerere believes that East-West ideological incompatibility and the cold war is a danger to world peace, and that in order to avoid exacerbating this conflict, new states should keep out of existing ideological camps. By doing so they can contribute to world peace because “the man who has nothing to gain on either side in a dispute, but everything to lose if there is war, can talk to the contending representatives.”²⁶ Further,

the aspirations and assumptions of non-alignment came closer to the principles of the U.N. As Nyerere states at the Preparatory Conference of Non-aligned Nations in Dar es Salaam on 13 April 1970:

By non-alignment we are saying to the big powers that we also belong to this planet. We are asserting the right of small and militarily weaker nations to determine their own policies in their own interests and to have an influence on world affairs which accords with the right of all peoples to live on this earth as human beings. And we are asserting the right of all peoples to freedom and self-determination; and therefore expressing an outright opposition to colonialism and international domination of one people by another.²⁷

Nyerere is convinced that this non-aligned role can best be defended through the U.N. He consistently emphasizes the need and importance of economic self-reliance and economic co-operation among the non-aligned countries. He reiterates the vital need for effective action against colonialism and racialism and Tanzania's mission at the U.N. has spearheaded this struggle in various diplomatic circles. In September 1971, while addressing the TANU National Conference in Dar es Salaam, Nyerere stated: "In fact it is fair to say that Tanzania has been playing a very full part in the spread and the development of the concept of non-alignment, and that we have also participated actively in many international conferences designed to secure united action by poor nations of the world in the defence of their own interests. We have often given a lead in such conferences, as well as taking a clear stand on all issues relating to human equality, colonialism, and Third World Progress at the United Nations".²⁸

Tanzania's championing of the cause of liberation, decolonization and the struggle for the establishment of a new international economic order through the United Nations clearly reflects her quest for the pursuit of justice in international life. In recent years, President Nyerere has been one of the most outspoken leaders championing the cause of the Third World struggle for a new economic order. While inaugurating the "Group of 77" conference in Arusha on 12 February 1979, Nyerere clearly articulated his ideas on the subject:

The present system has been developed by the industrialized states to serve their purposes. This is a matter of historical fact, not a moral judgement! The result is that the group of industrialized nations — which do act as a group when dealing with outsiders — control the levers of international exchange and finance, and also control the wealth accumulated through centuries of colonialism, gunboat diplomacy, and an initial advantage in mass production techniques..... For we, the Third World, are now demanding that the systems which make the rich richer and the poor poorer must be changed to keep pace with other changes in the world — the ending of colonialism, the advance of technology and mankind's new consciousness of human equality and human dignity.²⁹

That it can be seen that Tanzania's support for the U.N. and its ideals arose out of Nyerere's belief that the U.N. is of great significance to the World in many ways. We may now turn to a brief survey of the interaction between Tanzania and the U.N. in the post-independence period.

Political Issues at the U.N.

In conformity with her desire to bring about justice and peace in international life

through the U.N. Tanzania has been playing a key role in political and other questions and in the resolution of interstate conflicts. For example, though unsuccessfully, Tanzania sought to mediate the Sino-Indian border conflict, the dispute between Indonesia and Holland on the future of New Guinea and the Kenya-Somalia dispute. Both India and China rejected Tanzania's offer of mediation in their border dispute. India was angry that Tanzania failed to identify China as the aggressor and China argued that the problem could only be solved through direct negotiations between the two protagonists. Tanzania's attempt to mediate between Indonesia and Holland by suggesting that New Guinea be surrendered to U.N. control until a plebiscite, lost its relevance when the Dutch agreed to cede the territory to Indonesia. In the case of the Kenya-Somalia and Somalia-Ethiopia disputes, the OAU took over the mediation.²⁰

Tanzania vigorously opposed the British proposal in 1965 for a Commonwealth mediation of the Vietnam war because of its obvious and inherent partiality arising from Britain's unflinching support of American policies in Indo-China. Tanzania clearly made her stand in the Congo crisis (1960-64) and berated Belgium and the United States for their imperialist policies. Tanzania also attempted to reconcile the conflicting interests in the Arab-Israel conflict by accepting the U.N. partition of Palestine, recognizing the state of Israel and dealing with it, while insisting that the Palestinian refugees be adequately treated by the world community.²¹ It was not until the end of the Six-Day war in 1967 that this basic friendly attitude towards Israel was changed to that of hostility. Speaking at the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on the Middle East Question, the Tanzanian delegate to the U.N. stated the country's position in the following words:

Tanzania's views on this crisis is firm and even and is based on the assessment of the facts of the developments in the area over a period of time. Tanzania has always endeavoured to maintain friendly relations with all the states in the region. It was in the light of this spirit of good will to all that Tanzania had recognized Israel and, at the same time, Tanzania vigorously pursued and maintained fraternal and cordial relations with the Arab states..... Since its creation, Israel has undertaken one after another a series of acts designed to suppress the consolidation of the independence of the people of the Middle East. Israel, faithful to the interests of international imperialism, has time and again menaced the security of its neighbours. It has refused to implement the various resolutions on the armistice. It has refused even to honour its minimum human responsibility towards the refugees. It has also accustomed itself to the use of military adventures as an instrument of territorial expansion.²²

The continued expansion of Israel territory through conquest, exacerbated the Palestinian refugee problem and further violated Palestinian honour, as well as the national honour of the neighbouring Arab states. This has led Tanzania to accept the Arab charge of Israel expansionism and aggression and to suggest resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.²³

Tanzania also played a key role in championing admission of China to the U.N. Speaking in the U.N. General Assembly on 15 October, 1970, Nyerere stated:

The territory and people of mainland China — that is, about 3¼ million square miles, and now about 700 million persons — have been under the effective control

of the Government of the People's Republic of China in Peking since 1949, for 21 years. Yet they are still represented in our councils by a so-called Government of China, which in fact controls only Formosa island of approximately 13,900 square miles in area, and a population of about 15 million people. And even this control continues only because of the intervention of an external power..... How much longer does the General Assembly propose to allow this absurd state of affairs to continue? For it cannot go on indefinitely. I would like to suggest that an appropriate way of celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Organization would be the admission of the Peoples Republic of China to its seat here. Only by such an action shall we end the situation whereby we pretend to decide questions of peace or war in the absence of the most populous nation on earth.⁵⁴

Tanzania continued to advocate China's admission to her rightful place in the United Nations until this objective was finally achieved in October 1971. Tanzania which maintained close relations with China during the period,⁵⁵ continued her efforts to persuade the Western countries that whether or not they like or approve of the Government of the People's Republic of China, its existence must be accepted.

Tanzania has also been an active advocate of the revision of the U.N. Charter to reflect the changed realities of the international situation. At the time when the Charter came into effect in 1945 there were only fifty-one members of the U.N. and the Charter provided for an eleven-member Security Council of which five were to be permanent members with the power of veto. The election of the six non-permanent members with due regard to an equitable geographical distribution was to be based on a gentleman's agreement that allocated two seats to Latin America and one seat each to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Middle East and British Commonwealth. Africa as such was left out. Tanzania in conformity with the general African policy at the U.N., has directed world attention to the absence of any specific representation of Africa in certain United Nations agencies, and Africa's marked under representation in all the major and subsidiary bodies of the U.N. Since early days, an important goal of Tanzanian diplomacy at the U.N. has been to strengthen their representation in the principal organs of the U.N., particularly in the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat. The African States rightly perceived that equitable representation in all these bodies was a necessary condition for meaningful and effective participation in the shaping of world order. Thus Tanzania, along with other African states, spearheaded the campaign for the Charter to be amended at the 1963 session of the General Assembly.⁵⁶

The first amendment in December 1963 increased the membership of the Security Council from 10 to 15 and the Economic and Social Council from 17 to 27. The geographical distribution of the present non-permanent seats on the Security Council is as follows: two for Latin America; five for Africa and Asia, one for Eastern Europe and two for Western Europe and other states. This amendment to Articles 23 and 61 of the U.N. Charter came into force in December 1965. A later amendment to Article 61 adopted in 1971 further increased the membership of the Economic and Social Council from 27 to 54. Behind these campaigns for greater say in the decision-making bodies of the U.N. is the clear message that the U.N. does not operate as a crypto-colonial link

between Africa and the rest of the world.

Another important area of the United Nations involvement concerns the field of disarmament to which Tanzania has also attached great importance. Like many non-aligned nations, Tanzania believes that the U.N. was created first and foremost to prevent war and to that end to disarm the world and create conditions of peace, security and prosperity. On the question of disarmament the general thrust of Tanzanian diplomacy has been to support the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (CENDC) in Geneva in its effort to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control; to urge the U.N. to declare Africa as a denuclearized zone, (which was precisely what the General Assembly did in Resolution 1652 (XVI)), and to recognize the special responsibility of the super powers in the field of disarmament. However, while supporting general and complete disarmament, Tanzania has been critical of the absolute lack of progress in the past in achieving meaningful disarmament through the U.N. The record of agreements on disarmament was impressive, but for the most part they were declarations of intent. Tanzania refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) as a matter of principle. As President Nyerere explained:

We have opposed this treaty not because we want to reserve our right to make or receive nuclear weapons. We have neither the ability nor the wish to do so. We have opposed it because it is an unequal treaty, which cannot even contribute to the cause of peace. A monopoly of weapons cannot produce real peace. It could only produce so-called peace, like *Pax Romana* or *Pax Britannica*.³⁷¹

A clear illustration of shortcomings in disarmament endeavours was the question of nuclear-weapon-free-zones. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa had not been respected. Some western countries which had supported the Declaration had at the same time either engaged in or encouraged active collaboration with the *apartheid* regime in South Africa. Tanzania wanted to see its continent free of nuclear weapons; and external domination.

The question of establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was of utmost importance and Tanzania had expressed opposition to the presence of great powers there, condemning attempts by them to transfer their rivalry to the region. Speaking at the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (23 May to 30 June 1978), the then Tanzania Foreign Minister, Benjamin Mkapa, clearly stated Tanzania's position on Disarmament:

What was needed today was a commitment to disarm. Each nuclear power should renounce the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and declare that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons anywhere. With that commitment and assurance, it would follow that no nation would ever use nuclear weapons against another.

The crucial and decisive move was prohibition of production, stock-piling and development of nuclear weapons. That prohibition should be followed up by destruction of such existing weapons. Only by moves of that kind could realization of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament be ensured.

Partial agreements were no substitute for complete disarmament: they should not be an excuse for stalling over-all action on disarmament. The challenge of disarmament was an unprecedented and noble one, for it was a challenge to ensure that what man had so gloriously created, no man would destroy.³⁹

Another area of increasing U.N. concern has been in the matter of peace-keeping operations. Even though Tanzania has not physically participated in any of the various peace-keeping operations undertaken by the U.N., she has broadly supported the idea and advocated the adoption of a reliable method for financing such operations. A useful proposal supported by many African delegations including Tanzania was that the General Assembly establish a permanent fund for peace-keeping operations that would be under the control of the Security Council.

Tanzania has also been playing a significant role in the attempts at developing international law through the United Nations. The increasing complexity of international relations requires that these rules be constantly developed and expanded. Tanzania, like many other Third World Countries, attaches particular importance to the work of the U.N. in the development of modern international law and has actively participated in it ever since she joined the organisation in 1961. Tanzania believes that the regulating power of international law must play a central part in international relations. Thus, since 1973 Tanzania has been actively participating in the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS-III) and has championed the cause of the African and Third World countries.

Liberation and Human Rights

The Central piece in Tanzania's foreign as well as domestic policies has been her deep concern for liberation.⁴⁰ The problems of colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination have been at the top of Tanzania's foreign policy priorities. Even before independence, TANU had recognized that international alliance and solidarity was essential for the fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism. Tanzania attempted to achieve this objective through different levels of involvement and alliances in sub-regional, continental, Third World and global organizations.

At the sub-regional level this co-operation for liberation has manifested itself in the formation of the Pan-African Freedom Movement in Eastern and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in September, 1958. The purpose of PAFMECA (later PAFMECSA, including Southern Africa) was to provide solidarity for all liberation movements in the area.⁴¹ At the continental level Tanzania has been playing a crucial role in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and as a member of the Frontline States (F.L.S.) in the liberation of Southern Africa. Tanzania has also been a leading member of various Third World movements such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the "Group of 77"

Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 new states have attained political independence. The adoption of the historic U.N. Declaration on Decolonization in 1960;⁴¹ and the establishment in 1961 of the "Special Committee on Decolonization" (the U.N. Committee of 24) marked an important step in the road

toward decolonization. Since 1961, Tanzania delegates at the U.N. have consistently and vigorously opposed colonialism and racial minority rule in Southern Africa and elsewhere. Tanzania has adopted a most militant and vocal stand on the question of racism and colonialism particularly in Southern Africa. In his maiden speech to the U.N. General Assembly Nyerere stated unequivocally that opposition to colonial and racial injustice in Africa was the most basic principle of its foreign policy.⁴¹

Tanzania employed two major interrelated strategies to achieve its goal of liberation and decolonization in Africa. The first strategy has been intense diplomatic pressure to isolate the colonialist and racist regimes, and the second to mobilise world opinion against these regimes using the various fora of the U.N. Addressing the General Assembly on 15 October 1970, Nyerere put the case of the oppressed in Southern Africa in a very clear perspective:

The issue of Southern Africa has been discussed so often that some Members of the United Nations express boredom, and ask why the matter is raised yet again. But the people of Southern Africa are not bored by their oppression; they are suffering from it. They are not tired of repeating that they are oppressed, because their repetition is a cry for help... The issue in Southern Africa is one of principles. It does not allow for compromise, because compromise on a matter of human rights is a denial of those rights. We are none of us perfect. Certainly I do not claim that Tanzania is faultless, or that offences against human rights never take place in my country. But it is one thing to try and to fail, and to try again. It is an entirely different matter to base the whole structure of your society on a denial of human rights. With a society of that kind, we compromise at our peril. For, ultimately, humanity will not be denied.⁴²

As the Chairman of the Frontline states and host to the O.A.U. Liberation Committee, Tanzania successfully spearheaded a campaign to implement the O.A.U. and U.N. policy of economic warfare against the racist regimes in Southern Africa and to assist the liberation movements in a variety of ways. It is also important to note here that Tanzania has been a member of the U.N. Decolonization Committee ever since its inception in 1962. The Chairmanship of that Committee went to Tanzania in 1966/67 and continuously between 1971-1980.⁴³ Tanzania has been particularly articulate in discussions of colonialism and racism in the Committee of 24 as well as other groupings at the U.N. such as the African Caucusing Group and the Afro-Asian Caucusing Group.

The Specialised U.N. Agencies

Links between Tanzania and the various Specialized Agencies of the U.N. have also been close. In recent years some of U.N. agencies have emerged as a major source of external aid for Tanzania. For example, in 1975-76 the World Bank (I.B.R.D.) and I.D.A. assistance accounted for nearly 26 per cent of the total capital assistance to Tanzania. The increased reliance on these agencies for aid has been part of Tanzania's strategy of diversification of sources of aid, preferring multilateral to bilateral aid which has more political strings. Although the United States and its allies wield a preponderant influence in the U.N. aid because of its dominant power in that organization, particularly in the World Bank Group, the effect of that influence is much less than that resulting from bilateral aid from the United States. The U.N. can provide multilateral

aid when political considerations would prevent other states from initiating an aid programme because of its international nature. Therefore, Tanzania's increasing reliance on multilateral (particularly U.N.) aid creates opportunities for possible extension of the margin of national independence.

Various U.N. Special Programmes, such as the U.N.D.P., U.N.I.C.E.F., and numerous specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.), the World Health Organization (W.H.O.), the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O.), the International Labour Organization (I.L.O.) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (U.N.I.D.O.) have assisted Tanzania in various development projects.⁴⁵

The Case of the World Bank

The World Bank operations in Tanzania began as early as 1963 and ever since it has been increasing its lending and other activities. Since 1967 there has been an increase in the number and amount of loans and credits by the World Bank to Tanzania for financing various projects.⁴⁶

In 1965, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) helped the country to implement its decision to leave the East African Currency Board and establish its own national Bank. Again in 1969, the World Bank offered a loan of Shs. 107 million for the Iyayi-Morogoro section of the Tanzam Highway, while its affiliate, the I.D.A. offered Shs. 100 million for the expansion of the Tanzania Secondary School System. In January 1971 the World Bank offered a hard loan of T.Shs. 132.5 million for work on the electric power station at Kidatu on the great Ruaha River, and in February the I.D.A. gave Tanzania a credit of Shs. 23.1 million to finance the expansion of facilities for agricultural training including the construction and expansion of nine rural training centres for farmers and four institutes for training personnel as field officers in agricultural extension services. As the World Bank Reports would indicate this trend has been growing over the years.

The recent conflict between the World Bank and Tanzania, however, indicates certain interesting aspects of its operation in the Third World. After the 1978/79 Uganda-Tanzania war which vastly ravaged the already crisis-ridden economy of the country, Tanzania appealed for a World Bank loan of Shs. 1,600 million. The I.M.F. imposed five conditions for the granting of the credit facility: It called for a substantial devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling; an increase in the bank interest rate to borrowers; (in effect a credit squeeze); reduction in government expenditure; restriction of government subsidies to the most basic necessities, and a lower profile for the Price Commission. President Nyerere refused to compromise saying:

people who think Tanzania will change her cherished policy of *ujamaa* and self-reliance because of the current economic difficulties are wasting their time.

We shall never change.⁴⁷

Nyerere believed that the acceptance of the I.M.F. conditions would precipitate an economic and social crisis in Tanzania. As Professor Malima has correctly pointed out:

When one examines the policy package of I.M.F., there is no doubt that it is aimed at destroying the very basis of socialist egalitarian economy.... A country that is

aspiring toward building an independent, egalitarian and socialist society cannot accept such recommendations without abandoning most of its fundamental objectives..... It is not one of I.M.F. role to assist poor countries to build independent, self-reliant and socialist economies. On the contrary, since its inception I.M.F.'s role has been to make the developing (poor) countries safe for multinationals in particular and the anti-socialist forces in general" ⁴⁸

In January 1980, the World Bank President, Robert MacNamara visited Tanzania and allegedly tried to manipulate Tanzania to neutralize her socialist policies including abolishing price controls in order to encourage private capital. It is interesting to note here that Tanzania has recently received a standby Credit of roughly 2,090 million shillings for 1980 — 1982 from the I.M.F.⁴⁹ The refusal of I.M.F. funds would have brought the Tanzanian economy to the brink of chaos and Tanzania's leadership apparently has decided that I.M.F. imposed strictures are an inevitable necessity if the country's economy is to survive!!

It is clear then, that the role of the World Bank in Tanzania, as elsewhere in the Third World⁵⁰ has been qualitatively different from that of other specialized agencies of the United Nations. Officially the Bank is a specialized agency of the U.N. within the meaning of Article 57 and 63 of the U.N. Charter. But, at the same time, the agreement signed between the World Bank and the U.N. maintain that "by reason of the nature of its international responsibilities and the terms of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank is required to function as an independent international organization"⁵¹ The U.N. on its part recognizes that "the action to be taken by the Bank on any loan is a matter to be determined by the independent exercise of the Bank's own judgement⁵² and that it would be a sound policy (for the U.N.) to refrain from making recommendations to the Bank with respect to particular loans or terms of conditions of financing by the Bank.⁵³

It is instructive to note here that the World Bank was officially established during the latter part of the Second World War as an international intergovernmental organ under the leadership of the U.S. to provide a "safe bridge" over which private capital could move into the international field, and make the Third World "safe" for multinational corporations and imperialism. Article 1 section (II) of the Bank's Articles of Agreement states the main objective of the Bank:

to promote private foreign investment by participating in private loans and other investments and when private capital is not available private investment from its own resources.⁵⁴

Besides, by Article 10 of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement, each member state must take necessary steps for the purposes of making the agreement effective in terms of its own laws. In pursuance of this Article Tanzania enacted the Bretton Woods Agreement Act in 1962. Tanzania is bound by the terms and conditions included in the Articles of Agreement which regulate the relationship between the Bank and its Member countries.

Conclusions

Briefly, Tanzania places great hope in the U.N. as a forum for conducting national diplomacy and as a channel for development assistance. Tanzanian diplomacy at the

U.N. has sought to restore human dignity consistently struggling against colonialism and racial humiliation. Tanzania has attached special importance to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.) and has been playing a leading role in the various U.N.C.T.A.D. conferences particularly the fourth U.N.C.T. in Nairobi in 1976 and the fifth U.N.C.T.A.D. in Manila in 1979. It was in recognition of this role that the "Group of 77" meeting which preceded the Manila meeting was held in Arusha in February 1979 and Tanzania was elected Chairman of the "Group of 77." Tanzania has also taken a leading role in the ongoing struggle for the establishment of a new international economic order through the United Nations.

Tanzania has received considerable support through the activities of the various U.N. specialized agencies. Tanzania is fully aware of the fact that until her own financial resources are adequate, she will have to rely on the participation of external capital in her development plans. In keeping with her policy of non-alignment, Tanzania has preferred to obtain this capital through the U.N. agencies including the World Bank, rather than from individual countries through bilateral agreements. In fact, in recent years, the World Bank has become the major single source of aid for Tanzania, despite the controversial terms and conditions that accompany such aid. In short, despite the abuses of international organizations by the imperialist powers, Tanzania has not lost confidence in the United Nations. Whether or not this confidence and faith in the organization will be maintained depends on various factors including whether meaningful solutions are found to some of the pressing problems of peace, security and economic development through the United Nations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.
2. For details see, R.A. Akindele, "Reflections on the preoccupations and conduct of African Diplomacy", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4 1976, pp. 557 — 76.
3. Ibid. p. 558.
4. Tanganyika was a member of the United Nations from 14 December 1961 and Zanzibar was another member from 16 December 1963. But following the Union between the two in April 1964, the United Republic of Tanzania continued as a single member of the U.N.
5. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, O.U.P. London, 1966, pp. 144 — 45.
6. Ambassador Salim A. Salim (interviewed), Sunday News, Dar es Salaam 17 February 1980. p. 5.
7. For details see K.P. Saksena, "India and Diplomacy in the United Nations", *International Studies*, (New Delhi) Vol. 17 Nos. 3-4; 1978, pp. 802 — 3.
8. For details of the growth of the U.N. Membership see, Appendix I.
9. Today Tanzania is represented at the Ambassadorial level in over sixty countries of the world.
10. See Chadwick F. Alger, *United States Representation in the United Nations*, New York, 1961, p. 5.
11. For details see, Inis Claude, Jr., *The Changing United Nations* New York, 1967, pp. 73 — 95.
12. For details see, John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge University Press, 1979.
13. See Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
14. See Chapters XII and XIII of the U.N. Charters, Articles 75 to 91. The following were the eleven territories originally placed under the Trusteeship System of the U.N.

Naru	Somaliland
New Guinea (Papua New Guinea)	Western Samoa, Tanganyika
Ruanda-Urundi	and the Pacific Islands.
Cameroons (French)	
Cameroons (British)	
Togoland (French)	
Togoland (British)	

All except Western Samoa and the Pacific Islands are now independent states.
15. Article 76 (b) of the U.N. Charter.
16. For details see, B.G. Chidzero, *Tanganyika and the International Trusteeship*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961
17. For details see, The United Nations Trusteeship Council, *United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa, Report on Tanganyika Together with Related Documents*, 5 vols. 1948; 1951; 1954; and 1960.
18. For details of the case see, Ibid. *Report on Tanganyika Together with Related Documents*, 1954, New York, 1955.
19. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, n. 5, p. 36.
20. Ibid., 43 — 44
21. Ibid., pp. 144 — 45.
22. Ibid., pp. 75 — 76.
23. Ibid., 145, 150.
24. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, O.U.P. London, 1968 pp. 372 — 73.
25. For details see, O. Nnoli, *Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania*, N.O.K. Publishers, London, 1978, p. 9.
26. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, O.U.P. London, 1973, p. 204
27. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, n. 5, p. 278.
28. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, n. 26, p. 324

29. *Daily News* (Tanzania) 13 February 1979.
30. See, O. Nnoli, n. 25, p. 75.
31. For details see, K. Mathews "Tanzania, the Middle East and Afro-Arab Co-operation". *TAAMULI*, A Political Science Forum. Dar es Salaam, Vol. 9. No. 1. 1979.
32. U.N. Doc. A/PV 1530, 21 June 1967.
33. Since 1967 Tanzania has consistently supported the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, particularly Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 on the Arab-Israeli issue.
34. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, n. 26, pp. 205 — 206
35. For details see, George T. Yu, *China and Tanzania: A Study in Co-operative Interaction*, Berkeley, 1975
36. See David. A. Kay, *The New Nations and the United Nations*, New York, 1970, pp. 136 — 42.
37. U.N. Doc. A/C. I/31/84. 36 17 November 1976
38. U.N. Doc. A/5 — 10/PV. 13, 1 June 1978.
39. For details see, K. Mathews, "Tanzania as a Frontline State in the Liberation of Southern Africa", in K. Mathews and S.S. Mushi (eds.) *Foreign Policy of Tanzania A Reader*, T.P.H. 1981 (forthcoming)
40. For details see, Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1963.
41. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960
42. See General Assembly Official Records (G.A.O.R.) 16th Session, Plenary Meeting, 14 December 1961.
43. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, n. n. 26. p. 212
44. The Chairmanship of the U.N. Committee of 24 since 1962 has been as follows:

1962—62	C.S. Jha (India)
1963—65	Son Coulibly (Mali)
1965—66	G.B.D. Collier (Sierra Leone)
1967—68	J. Malecela (Tanzania)
1969—70	M. Mestirri (Tunisia)
1970—71	D. Nicol (Sierra Leone)
1971—72	G. Nava (Venezuela)
1972—80	Salim A. Salim (Tanzania)
1980—	Frank Owen Abdulah (Trinidad & Tobago).
45. Examples include the major Adult Literacy Pilot Project ~~and~~ programmes, such as MTUU under UNESCO/ UNICEF; Refugee programmes under the UNCHR; food agricultural programmes under FAO/WFP; rice and dairy programmes under EAO/UNDP/IDA; vocational and management training programmes under ILO, to mention only a few... For details of UNICEF Aid to Tanzania, see Ruth Meena, *UNICEF and the Tanzania Child*, M.A. Dissertation in Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, June, 1979.
46. For details see, H. Sinare, *A Historical General Assessment of the World Bank Globally with Special Reference to Brazil and Tanzania*, LL.M Dissertation, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, June 1979, ch. 4. See also A.Z. Kiondo, *Impact of World Bank on the Peasantry in Tanganyika*, M.A. Political Science Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, July 1980.
47. *New African*, January 1980, pp. 33 — 34. -
48. See Kighoma Malima, "Tanzania and the IFM", *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam) 26 — 27, March, 1980.
49. *Daily News* (Tanzania) August 10, 1980
50. See Payer, C., *The Debt Trap; IFM and the Third World Penguin*, 1976
51. *The World Bank, Policies and Operations*, Sept. 1974, p. 14
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*
54. IBRD, *Articles of Agreement*, (effective 1945).

GROWTH OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP: 1945—1966

Year	Member States	Original Member	
1945	51	Argentina Bolivia Canada Columbia Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic Ethiopia Guatemala Iran Lebanon Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Poland Syria USSR Uruguay	Australia Brazil Chile Costa Rica Denmark Ecuador France Haiti Iraq Liberia Netherlands Norway Peru Saudi Arabia Turkey United Kingdom Venezuela
			Belgium Byelorussia China Cuba El Salvador Egypt Greece Honduras India Luxemburg New Zealand Panama Philippines South Africa Ukraine USA Yugoslavia
			<u>New Members</u>
1946	55	Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, Thailand,	
1947	57	Pakistan, Yemen	
1948	58	Burma	
1949	59	Israel	
1950	60	Indonesia	
1955	76	Albania Cambodia, Ireland Laos 2 Portugal Sri Lanka	Austria Finland Italy Libya Romania
1956	80	Japan Tunisia	Morocco
1957	82	Ghana,	
1958	83	Guinea	Malaysia
1960	100	Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Ivory Coast Niger Somalia Upper Volta	Cyprus, Madagascar Nigeria Togo Zaire
1961	104	Mauritania, United Republic of Tanzania (14—12—1961)3	Mongolia
1962	110	Algeria, Rwanda Uganda	Burundi Trinidad & Tobago
1963	112	Kenya,	
1964	115	Malawi	Kuwait Malta
1965	118	Gambia	Maldives
1966	122	Barbados Lesotho,	Botswana
1967	123	Democratic Yemen	
1968	126	Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland	
			Gabon, Mali, Senegal Cameroon
			Sierra Leone
			Jamaica
			Zanzibar ¹ Zambia Singapore Guyana
			Mauritius