Population Growth and the Development Problems of Africa~ Origins and Implied Solutions . c. Lwchungura .K/UlUlZOrtl Semot Lecturer, Departn"'1Zt of Statistics, University of Dot: es Salaam Utafiti Vol VIII No.1, 1!186,Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Oar es Salaam Introduction The human population in the current less-developed countries (LOCs) has grown since the Second World War at unprecedented rates. From less than 2 per cent pet annum to about 2.50/0 hi the 1960/708. Put in a more thematic -:ontext, or in alarming terms, this increase in rates has shortened the period I within which the population could double correspondingly, from more than 35 to 28 years and down to less than 23 years .. Rapid population growth has raised concern, therefore, of the danger, at first, of the characteristically young age structure consuming, investable resources, as demonstrated clearly by the Coale and Hoover simulation study of India, that subsequently influenCed'many development plans2; and then were I added fears of depletion of resources, desertifica.tion and an almost unending litany of negative effects of population growth.3iWhile it is not intended to imply that today's size and growth of population are not ~ probl~ ,as those who see vast areas of unoccupied land suggest, governments are facing a big challenge. of providing services to rapidly growing populations with meagre resources. My concern: and this is' niy point of departure on the population .debate, is that the population problem is being looked at from only one point or short period in time, rather than as an historical phenomenon. The latter course, as this paper will show, uncovers the origins, and so identifies key variables for any long term solution of the population problem. The essence of the problem is b~ically the imbalance of population size and growth over those of other resources. This paper traces the trends in the determinants of growth of the two variables; Le. population and resources. Though not intended a,.<: an historical analysis, the paper draws on work by oth~rs, particularly on Tanzania, to show that population and resources problems both originate from common causes, rather than population being the culprit, however much difficulty there is at one point in time, as today, of coping with increasing numbers. 4\ The core of the problem is the ecological collapse and. subsequent stagnation of technology at a' labour intensive level, caused by factors connected with over-exploitation of both human and other resources as, production is extended from producing for subsistence to that for exchange or commercial purposes. While resources decline, populations grow rapidly, thus . producing an imbalance ..51 Superficial analysis puts population growth .as the culprit; however, it will be shown that population itself has been a dependent variable driven by other factors also connected with the ecological collapse and stagnation of technology ..... The solutions to the population problem Wlll thus be shown to be Implied by the causes identified. Improvement of technology, it will be argued, offers the best avenue for overcoming both population growth and resource, problems. Origins of the population problem . A proper assessment of the origin of the population problem, which wa, identified above as essentially an imbalance between population and resource'" requires examination of the determinants of the two variables and the factors that have influenced their trends to the present state. Population growth Rapid population growth in LDCs arose out of an unprecedented;}-'I'T' deciinein mortality while fertility, rather than falling, as in developeC;!t;;oulltric:. persisted at a high level-a stage in the well known theory of de;lograpl1,"; transition.6 As it is a universally desirable trend for mortality to declke l.) a minimum level possible," it is the persistence of hi~h k-tility that is th.' i'"",u~.A concern. This, it will be argued, is connected with toe factors that have cau,.ed the under-develop1"ll:nt of resources. It is therefore instru;;tive to analyse ft-rt 1:ty trends after the resources problem has been dealt with. The under..cJeveJopment of resources The amount of resources available for both consumption and .investment depends on two factors: (a) the amount of goods and services that can be produced, and (b) if there is exchange, availability is also dependent on the term\ of exchange, Le. how much external goods, a unit of the internal goods can brin~ Under market exchange will be included the cost of government bureaucracy, This is because the modern system of government took over many household and community functions, for example education, security, communications. etc., supported by production by the population. The government factor is in- cluded because its cost has grown so much in recent years as to have a signifi- cant effect on development. The production process consists of an essential element, namely technology, which, as will be argued below, holds one if not the key to both the explanation and the solution to the population problem. Technology determines the productivity of the factors of production, hence the total output for a given level of factor inputs over a period of time. On the other side of the coin, but important to the understanding of the persistence of high fertility, technology determines how much labour (and other factors) is required to produce a given level of output. . The highest ievel of technology that seems to have been reached here ill Africa has largely been labour intensive. To mentiOn a few examples, in' agriculture, the main economic sector, the hoe and "bush knife are the principal. tools; in domestic activities, e.g. cooking, fetching water and firewood depend. on a lot of human labour time input; in transport, walking and bearing the load on the head or so are the main means. The pertinent question is why technology has stagnated at a labour intensive level. The answer to thk question will reveal the origin of the population/resource imba!ance and all other related problems outlined above. \ In the search fOf the cause of technological stagnation it is inftiuctive to look at historical events since communities started producing for exchange. 8 It was essentially the destruction of the ecological, hence economic base and subsequent stagnation of technology and the demographic effects of these phenomena that hindered growth in production. but at the same time 2 infh..enced fertility to stay at a high level. These factors are investigated below and form the body of this paper. The destruction of the economic base The term destruction presupposes the pre-existence of a "whole" self- sustaining economy. That this was the case, is well documented in Kjekshus and Iliffe in Thnzania9 Booming economies in both agricultural and manufactur- ing spheres can be found in the reports of European travellers (or explorers) be- fore the 1880's, showing that people did not only have full control of their environment, but, more importantly, lived in ecological balance with, and hence protected, natural resources. Some examples can be given; food bounty even in the now often drought-stricken central regions; production of textiles of a higher quality than imports; salt mining and processing works;. and, perhaps a more pertinent factor, the technological level the economy had reached in both agricul- ture and heavy industry. In agriculture, irrigation canals were in use; in indus- try, there had developed modern methods of smelting iron which archeological research has dated as far back as 500 B.C., but discovered only recently in Eu- rope in the late 19th century.lO Such accounts make an earlier question as to why technology stagnated, more relevant and urgent for the uncovering of the source of the population problem. , It was the nature of the establishment of links with the outside world, first through "long distance trade" and later colonial oc'cupation, that set in motion the processes of destruction and protracted stagnation of the local economy.lI There were two main {actors that destroyed the economic base; diseases and the process of colonial occupation. Foreign diseases, notoriously smallpox, jiggers (i.e. sand fleas) and venereal diseases-with an absence of either natural immunity or cures against them-decimated as much as one-third to half of the population in most areas,12thus destroying the labour factor of production. In addition, the (domestic) animal population was almost wiped out by rinderpest and trypaso1liomiasis, the latter spread by the tse-tse fly that infested land which had reverted to bush as the human and animal populations both ~ecreased in numbers and were concentrated into a few areas to facilitate colonial occupation.13 The decline of numbers meant manure was no longer available for proper agricultural husbandry. "(he process of establisl!ing and maintaining co!oniai occupation struck the final blow in the destruction of the -economic base, first by wars circa 1900 in Tanzania which involved, for example, burning of whole villages, then procurement of forced, cheap labour, spatial concentration of the population for effective control and creation of game reserves and settler plantations, and, lastly, forceful introduction of cash-cropping and other agricultural husbandry, but offering low prices for produce, a practice that has continued to the present indepen~enceperiod. 14 • These processes ~ithdrew male labOur from the indigeno~ economy, while low prices and wages did n~t comIX:nsate for the Withdrawn labour,. consequently leading to stagnatIOn, as discussed below. In other are!l8' cash crop production was prohibited, e.g. in Kenya an~ Southern Africa, ~n order to release labour to the mines and settler plantatIons, even though m these; areas, local farmers were out-competing the settler, as seen at agricultural shows. IS 3 Indigenous industry received similar treatment of prohibition; apart from the reason of labour procurement, it was also to make way for imports, rather than being purely the result of economic rationality of comparative advantage, inherent in the Hymer-Resnick model of development. 16 Stagnation of technology After incapacitation by the factors of "long-distance trade" and colonial occupation, the economy was kept from picking-up its original momentum by falling terms of trade and (in Tanzania) government bureaucratisation of society and its related high costs. The falling terms of trade can be summarised by falling commodity export, but rising import prices, with the oil crisis and international debt and servicing being the most disastrous factors of the .current period. The extent of growth of bureaucracy in Tanzania, of all internally generated factors, has become the most serious villain that has brought economic stagnation . .'7 Its effect is not only through the cost of its maintenance but also its bureaucratisation of society which interferes in all spheres of life of a person, a phenomenon that can hardly be attributed to the now common scapegoat in Tanzania; economic crisis. 18 Mukandala has documented the trends in the size of the Tanzania Civil Service. 19 Apart from the high, direct cost of its.maintenance: decline inTeal and relative incomes, due respectively to inflation and the policy for equality, has resulted in the embezzlement of milljons of shillings. The effects of these two factors have been a scarcity of both consumption and investment resources, as whatever little is produced is drained away in the bad terms of trade and maintenance of the bureaucratic machine. Lack of investmen~ has m~ant deterior.~tjW1_QU~hnol~ to h~gher, labour-intensive. levels (e.g. with the current scarcity of the hoe and bush knife in Tanzania). The result is diminishing returns to labour which, in effect, means one has to spend more labour to produce a given level of output. Such high demands for labour limits people to subsistence level production, as the case studies below will indicate. Relatedly, as no investment in land is made, the result is overworking it with consequences of soil erosion and exhaustion. This leads fui:th~r.intb diminishinll: returns demandirlJunore labour input-thus starting the VICIOUS cycle of poverty breeding poverty. Threats of recurrent famines and a degree of desertitlcation can be ~ttributed to such a scenario. Before one can point to any of the above factors as causing the population problem, a question still remains, however, as to the cause of the persistence of high fertility which was identified above as the variable of concern in rapid population growth. The persistence of high fertility The continued high level of fertility, at a complete family size of 6 to 7 children (for a woman over 45 years). in the demographic transition of LDCs with poor economic conditions both at national an~ individual levels, has posed one of the many paradoxes of development in these countries. It is indeed such a situation that has made for the rationale of the frontal approach 'of the modern family planning movement based on the assumption that people want to limlt ~heir fertility, but lack thf< kp.Qwledge and the means to do so. However, K~P (knowledge, attitude and practice of family planning) surveys, mostly by the people in the same movement, have shown that people know the 4 traditional methods, but do not practice family planning for fertility limitation. In this paper, careful investigation of the material conditions that people live in, shows that having a high number of children is crucial for survival. Evidence to that effect can be seen in study upon study of the value of children in LDCs. Notable ones have been, for example, in Africa, the Changing African Family Project directed by Caldwell that covered various countries, Nigeria in particular, in sub-Saharan Africa; in Asia, Cain on Bangladesh and White and Nag, White and Peet on Indonesia and Nepal. 2° One drawback is that, these studies, with the exception of White's, do not go beyond the static fact of high values of children to the investigation of the factors underlying the continued high value. This is another point of departure on the population debate. It will be seen to be stagnant labour intensive technology, a point22pioneered by Mamdani,21 and intensification of sexual division of labour, both casually connected with the factors of economic stagnation analysed above, that have made the high value of children motivate high levels of fertility. Stagnant technology and high fertility The rationale for linking high fertility to technology is labour demand, and children as the_best alternative source of supply. The stagnation of technology at a labour intensive lever and its exacerbation has been argued above. The pertinent point is the increasing high labour demand of the resulting diminishing returns to labour, to produce a constant level of output—mainly subsistence. These conditions are not mere theoretical suppositions, but are supported by micro-level small-holder farm studies in Africa, with labour shortage as one of the most significant observations. Notable examples are studies in various Anglophone African Countries put together, analysed by Cleave and amplified by Lele, and studies of annual and perennial cropping systems in Tanzania where farmers themselves have expressed shortage of labour as the most limiting factor to output.23^ , A crucial question for understanding high fertility as a response to labour demand is why people opt for children as the best alternative source of labour supply rather than using, for example, hired labour. It is because children can easily be controlled and their labour appropriated>24> Effective control is ensured by a life-cycle mechanism; the Older generation .own the means of livelihood (existence) on which the young depend till they produce their own, an argument that Caldwell has unconvincingly seen as tortuous.'2* It is not, however, such a mechanical system as it sounds; obedience, sense of dependency and gratitude are instilled by socialisation and legitimated and reified by ideology, ritual and myths. Far from being regarded by the young as exploitative, the system is kept relatively stable; hence its reproduction, it seems, by the fact of one day stepping into the shoes of the elders.'^5 Together with being socialised, the young would not like to ruin the system that guarantees upward movement. All these factors explain the hierarchical and authoritarian system and ancestor-worship, found in peasant societies in contrast to an egalitarian system and individual autonomy among hunters and gatherers, for example, the Hadzabe, pf north-central Tanzania, whose means of subsistence come virtually directly from nature.'% Sexual division of labour and fertility The processes that brought about the destruction and protracted stagnation of the economy, simultaneously intensified to a significant extent, the sexual division of labour. There are two pertinent factors for the persistence of high fertility; increased labour burden and creation of dependence of women on men. Increased wOllUln's work load . 'fl\e development of long-distance trade, cash-cropping and .labQur mIgratIOn, ?ntensified the sexual division of labour by withdrawing males from- the subsistence economy. The burden was tlius superimposed on to women~s already heavy labour demands of an increasingly backward }abo!lr-iqtensive techriology, apart from their child-bearing, rearing and domestic functions. 28 The rationale for this is given by men who function as spokesmen for the community and hunting, rather than the women who took up these new activities. 29 The increased labour burden for women has been documented in a pioneeriqg work on women and development by Boserup and in other studies. JOt In many parts of Tanzania at one time, due to trade and labour migration, villages composed entirely of women, children and old men could be observed ..3! Their demographic effects shown by gaps in the age structure are still evident. 32 Southern Aftiea today is a continuing glaring example of this sex imbalance. 33, Apart from taking over responsibility for subsistence production, women also work in cash-crop production, either on their husbands' plots or of their own, particularly in female-heade9 households.p4WQrking in both economies has been ovserved in Bukoba District, Tanzania,. where a woman becomes so tfed up, even with the help of children, that she has leisure time for only 2 to 3 hours (about 20 per cent) of the 14 hour daylight l:ime~S.Thisis not pure leisure as it is usually for taking meals, washing and rest after work. A similar impression is given for Kenya's Kikuyu women by Reining, those of Western Kenya, and it is known for the Chagga of Kilimanjaro. qnd Nyakyusa of South-Western Tanzania, all being coffee and/or tea cash cropping areas. 36 A reliable relief of the labour burden, as argued above, is having children, hence the high fertility strategy. Many case studies, some of which have b~n cited above, show children providing a significant labour contribution. The only drawback in most of them is that no explicit and systematic link has been made with a woman's workload to fertility. Some studies have come close; as saving substantial amounts of time, which they put into farming, by delegating some domestic activities to children.3] In Asia, contrasting results on the higher number of children as labour relief have been reported on Malaysia and the Philippines, but evaluated as tentative by Mueller. 38 Economic dependency One of the far-reaching effects of intensification of the sexual division of labour, parallel to the increased labour burden, has been the development of economIC, and.hence, gener~ dependency of women on men. The origin of the probl~ was loss of ec0!l0mlc autonomy; as they were relegated to subsistence productIOn only, and In the process also destroying their crafts by either 6 systematic government prohibition or competition from manufacturers, With monetarisation, women became increasingly dependent on men for goods obtained only by cash. Market women, West Africa especially, have retained their autonomy as they control a substantial amount of trade, both local and external.39 That women had economic autonomy in pre-modern times is shown, for example, in Africa in anthropological studies edited by Paulme, for Tanzania by Mbilinyi and studies on hunter gatherer communities edited by Leacock and Lee.40 The development of female economic dependency is more dramatic where an illiterate or low educated women is married to a more educated man with a white collar job, or when her (cash) income is insignificant compared to the standard of living her conjugal family leads. The situation is well put by Ware, although referring only to an educated wife. If she cannot find "...an employment which (Joes not lower her status or reflect poorly on her husband... she may well find that she has no money of her own. For such women their status can become a prison and their hold upon the modern world depends on 42 their husbands"41 This situation has been observed in Ghana by Oppong. The link between dependency and fertility comes about as a woman adopts a reproductive strategy to achieve economic security. Having children ensures security in two ways; first, "giving" children to her husband stabilises her relationship with him as she provides an economically and socially valuable item. Second, a stable relationship still has a degree of risk for he dan still divorce her or, if he dies, she does not inherit property. Therefore, having her own children provides a more secure source of economic security. Some evidence of the relationship between dependency and economic security exists. The usual inverted U-shape pattern of fertility with education, with women who have completed primary school showing the highest fertility indicates this effect.43 In a case study of Wasukuma of Mwanza region, a multiple classification, analysis with control on age shows women with lower education c«m occupation status than that of their husbands having higher fertility than when spouses are of equal status. H The above analysis also shows that fertility desires are not the same, not only at macro national levels where a decline is beneficial and micro household levels, but also, within the household as women have been shown to have extra need for children. Summary and conditions The demographic transition in underdeveloped countries was marked by a rapid decline in mortality while fertility persisted at a high level, resulting, therefore, in increasing population growth rates. This does not mean that the population then began overruning resources. Historical accounts and their analysis show that it was destruction of the original self-sustaining economic base, through the processes of long-distance trade and colonial occupation by introduction of foreign fatal diseases, procurement of cheap labour and low prices of commodities, that actually led, at first, to the decline of the population, and, together with recent high cost of bureaucracy, as in Tanzania, has denied the local economy investment resources,, resulting in stagnation of the economy, particularly technology at a labour intensive level. The results have been diminishing returns to land and labour with 7 consequences of recurrent famines and threats of desertification* it was, therefore, not from population growth that problems of development we, see today originated. Population growth could have received blame due to the persistence of high fertility. However, this has also been traced to the increasing high labour intensity of technology and diminishing returns, resulting from the above destruction and stagnation factors. This demands higher labour inputs to produce a given level of output. Case studies on small-holder farms have, in fact, shown serious shortages of labour. Having children, is the best alternative source of labour because children can be easily controlled and their product appropriated. The basis for control is the older generation's possession of the basic means of subsistence upon which the young depend. The need for children has been further intensified by the development of the sexual division Of labour, from the same process that led to the destruction of the economic base as it withdrew male labour 1from the indigenous economy, thus increasing the labour burden of women . Further, as women were relegated to subsistence production and money income was placed into male hands, women depended on the latter for goods obtained only by cash. Women are seen to adopt a reproductive strategy, whereby children help with the labour burden and assure economic security from dependency. The whole population problem, therefore, has been traced to economic, particularly technological stagnation at a labour intensive level. A solution to the pcoblem is therefore implied by the introduction of less labour intensive technology. This has far-reaching effects on both resource availability and possible decline in fertility, hence killing two, though related, birds with one stone. ImprovementJ in technology would enhance total output and thus raise the standard of living, a universally cherished desire. This technology would erode the high value of children in two ways; first by demanding less labour; second, it would raise the cost of children because the process of imparting that technology and general desire for modernisation would require modern education. Attendance at school would minimise the time children are available for work and would require parents to meet direct costs of uniforms, fees, etc. Under such conditions, there would be no reason why people would not limit their fertility using all possible avenues; postponement of marriage, contraception, whether traditional or modern, etc. Of course, there is a possiblity of fertility decline without significant economic growth (of resources) as in Kerala, although the increased costs 45 of children due to education has been one of the main factors for the decline. However, the introduction of education, with its effect on fertility as the only goal, without investing in other sectors would not only be morally unacceptable but, importantly, it would still have a high degree of uncertainty, mainly because the key variable of fertility, namely technology, would not be affected. The role of the labour intensity of technology in determining fertility has only been argued. It still needs empirical testing, hence the priority importance of research. There are also other, non-material values of children, like prestige, fulfilment etc., that should be examined. I tend, however, to view these as only expressing the underlying economic values. How and where to get resources to build up the new technology, is one question that has received increasing attention. For example, technology transfer and appropriate technology are important issues in the current development debate, but beyond the scope of this paper. NOTES 1. United Nations, 1974 Report on the World Social Situation s (New York: 1979) 2. A.J. Coale, and E.M. Hoover, Population Growth and Economic Development in Low Income Countries, (Pinceton: Princeton University Press, 1958). 3. The Coale-Hoover school has not stood. without controversial debate-It was in- deed the mainspring of the modern population debate. The main challenge came from the celebrated Ester Boserup (1965) thesis that contrastingly puts population growth andpressure on resources as the main push to invention. However, the diminishing returns to labour would lead to a developmental dead-end; the thesis is, therefore, untenable. In his article "Farm labour and the evolution of food production" in B. Spooner (ed.),Population Growth: Anthropological Implications (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1970), Bronson gives evidence from ancient China that provides contrasting evidence to Boserup. For other criticism of Boserup see R.C. Blitz's review of Easter Boserup in Journal of Political Economy, Yol. 75, (1987), pp. 212-213; arrd W.O. Jones' review of the same in American Economic Revies~ Yol. 57, 1967, p.679. 4. Current problems in providing services to increasing numbers seems to have clianged the attitude even of African countries. This was apparent at the virtually one-sided debate at the Second African Population Conference held in Arusha Tanzania from 9 to 13 January, 1984. Most African countries have long resisted the population villain thesis and stressed the need for socio-economic development first, as for ex- ample shown at the First World Population Conference in Bucharest, 1974. 5. There is an increasing number of demographers who recognise the destruction of natural resources through commercial exploitation as one of the major factors of current developmen tproblems. See, for example, R. Repetto, and J. Holmes, "The role of population in resource depletion in developing countries." Population and Development Review, Yol. 9 No.4, (1983), pp. 630-632. 6. United Nations, Determinants and Consequences of Population trends, (New York: 1973). 7. Although mortality has declined rapidly, since the 1950's, it has, however, deceler- ated and, in many cases, stabilised, while still at a relatively high level. See D.R. Gwatkm, "Indications of change in developing country mortality trends; the end of an era?" Population and Development Review, Yol. 8 No.3, (1982), pp. 567-688, as compared to now a further decline in developed countries as shown by trends in United States in E.M. Crimmins, "The changing pattern of American mortality decline, 1970-77, and its implications for the future." Ppulation and Development Review, Yol. 7 No.2, (1981), pp. 229-254. 8. The paper draws on the history of Tanzania to be found in the well-researched works by H. Kjekshus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African His- tory, (London Heinemann, 1977); and J. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, (London; Cambridge University Press, 19i\9); which are concisely synthesized by D.F. Brvceson, "Changes in peasant food production and food supply in relation to the historical development of commodity production in pre-colonial Tanganyi- ka." The Journal of Peasant Studies, Yol. 7 No.3, (1980), pp. 281-311. 9. This is by no means intended to glorify the past, but the statements' importance is the assessment of the origin of the population problem. 10. Thc writer has seen with his own eyes the by-pruducts of past iron smelting in his home village, Kigarama (Bukoba District). These are biack sponge-like stones that can be seen at Ngerero, now used for housebuilding. The writer has also met Dr. Peter Schmidt (June 27, 1984 at Buk9ba Airport), the 'lrcheologist who has unco- vered and dated the time the technique was in use (cited in IIiffe, op. cit.). 9 11. Kh~latbari has also traced the population problem to economic stagllation. See his article "Some aspects of overpopulation and underdevelopment in developing coun~rie.s," in U. Stolte-Heiskanen (ed.), Population and Underdevelopment, (helsmkl: IDS, 1977), pp. 724. 12. See Kjekshus, op. dt., and IIiffe, op. dt. 13. Ibid. 14. UnIted Republic of Tanzania, Price Policy Recommendations for 1981/82 Agricultural Price Review (Dar es Salaal1l.: Min. of Agriculture, Market Development Bureau, 1980); JBoesen, and A.T. Mohele: The ~'Success Story" of Peasant Tobacco Production in Tanzania: The Political Economy of a Commodity Producing Peasantry. (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Centre for Development Research Publication, No.2, 1979); Elis, F.; "Agricultural Price policy in Tanzania". World Development, Vol. 10 No.4, pp. 263-283. 15. In the ca~e of Kenva see A. Odhiambo. "The rise and decline of the Kenya peasants 1888-1882. "East African Journal, Vol.9, (1973),pp. 11-15;for South African case see C. Bur- :dy, "The Emergence and deeline of a South African peasantry." African Affairs, Vol. 71, (1972), pp. 369-388; and R. Palmer and N. Parson (eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, (Berkeley: University of Califonia Press, 1977), for the case of Central and Southern Africa. 16. S. Hymer, and S. Resnic, "A model of an agrarian economy with non-agricultural activities." American Economic Review Vol. 59 No.4, Part 1. (1969), pp. 493-500. 17. Z. Ergas, "The state and economic deterioration: The Tanzania case." Journal of Common wealth and Comparative Politics, '101. XX No.4, (1982) 18. S. Chodak, "PeaSants and Agriculturalchange," reviewof K.R.N. Anthony et. al and D. Leonard in Canadian Joumul of African Studies Vol. 14 No.3, (1980) pp. 529-533. 19. R. Mukandala, "Trends in civil service size and income in Tanzania, 1%7-1982." Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 2 No.2, (1983), pp. 253-263) 20. J.e. Caldwel (cd.), The Persistenceof High Fertility: Population Prospects in the Third World, (Canberra: ANU, 1977);M.T. Cain, "The economic activities of children in a village in Ban- gladesh." Population and Development Review, Vol. 3 No.3, (1977), pp. 201-227; M. Nag, RN.F. White, and R.C. Peet, "An Anthro-pological approach to the study of the economic value of children in Java and Nepal. Current Anthoropology, Vol. 19No.2, (1978),pp. 293-306. 21. M. Mamdani, The Myth of Population ControL' Family Caste and Class in an Indian Village, (New York: Monthly ReviewPress, 1972).Other case studies can be seen in K.L. Michaelson, (ed.), And the Poor Get Children: Radical Perspectives on Population Dynamics (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1981);B.N.F.White, "Child labour and population growth in rural Asia." Development and Change, Vol. 13 No.4, (1982), p. 587. 22. L. Beneria, and G. Sen: ''Accumulation, rcproduction and woman's role in economic develop- ment: Boserup revisited." Special issue on Development and the Sexual Division of Labour Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and SocieTY, Vol.7 No.2, (1981),pp. 279-298; N.H. Yous- sef, "The inter-relationship between the division of labour in the household, women's roles and their impact on fertility" in R. Anker et. al. (eds), Women's Role and Population Trends in the Third World, (London: Croom and Helm, 1982), pp. 173-201. 23. See J.H. Cleave, African Farmers: Labour USf in the Development of Smallholder Agriculture, (New York: praeger Publishers, J!974); .. U.J. Lele, The Design of Rural Development, (Baltimore: John Hopkms University Press, 1975); H. Ruthernbarg,. (ed.), Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania, (Londoni: C. Husst and CO.-l968): C.L. Kamuzora, ".ccnstraints to labour time availability in smallholder agnculture: the case of Bukoba District, Tanzania," Development and Change, Vol. 11, (1980) pp. 123-135. Existence of shortage of ,abour thus refutes the one-dme accepted classical generalisation of surplus labour (and leisure) .advanced, among ou;e: '-, t,; Vi.A. Lewis, in his "E':o'lomic development Wl!h un'llfilted ,uppltc, vI labour. The Manchester Sch<}ol, reprinted in A.:'J. Agar .....ala and S.P. SI!I£h (<:ds.). 10 The Economics of Underdevelopment (New York: ~UP, 1963), pp. ~9; and J.C.l-I. Fei and G. Ranis. "A th~ry of econ01iUc develo~ent.' American E'conomicRevlew. (1961);Pl'. 533-565. , 24. Mamdani, op. clt. An alterpative explanation for ,use of fmily lal?<>l!l' has ~n given by W.Barber. "Sor/l.e questions about labour force analysIS l~ agr~ eConomies withnarticular reference to Kenya." East African EconfJ!T'lcReview. vol. 2No. 1, (1966),1, pp. 23-37, who argues !hat households si11Iultan~lI;sly c1eU1.and labour at peak seasons. However, relative, returns must be th~ gUldmg factor hence Barber's explanation, is untenable. - 25. C. M~illassoux,' "FrOt11 reproduction to pr~uction: a Marxist approach t~ economic anthropology:" Economy and Society. Vol. t, (1972), p.p. 93:105, Meillwoux "The social ornnisation of the peasantry: the econ~c basIS of kinship." The Jf)Urnal of PeD$(lntStudies Vol. 1 No. 1, V?13~,PR.81-90; J:C. Caldwell nA theory of fertility: from high plateau to destabihsatlon. Populat1'Jn and Dev;lop nent Review, Vol. 4, No.4, (1978), pp. 553-577. 26. Cald~ell, "A theory offertility," op. clt. 27. In contrast, is also apparent loss" ,even abdication, of parental control on children, who have gone to school and have, therefore, alternative, independent emploYment opportunities in the modern sector. This.has been observed for example in south India by Caldwell. See' Caldwellttt., el•• "The causes of demographic change in rural India."populatiqn and Development. Review, Vol. 8 No.4, (1982), pp. 689-727. 28. A. .Seidman, "Women and the development of underdevelopment: the African e~pe.rieI1-ce."In R. Dauber and M.L. Cain (eds.), Women and Technological Change in Develaping Countries (Boulder, Col.; Westview Press, 1981), pp. 109- 126; M.J Mbilinyi, "The 'New Woman' and traditional nordts in Tanzania" The Journal of Modern Ajrican Studies Vol. 10No. 1, 1972,pp. 57-72. 29. S. Afonjo, "Changing modes of production and sexual division of labour an\ong the Yoruba." Special issue on Development and Sexual Division of Labour in. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 7 No.2, (1981), pp. 299- 313. 30. E. Boserup, Women's Role in Economic Development, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970). 31. Kjekshus, op. clt... Iliffe, op. clt., Bryceson, op. cit. 32. B. ijgero, "Migration and underdevelopment: A general discussion with exarilples from Africa and Tanzania," in Y. Stolte-Heiskanen led.). Populotionand Under- . development. (~elsinki:.Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, 1977), pp. 25-50 .. 33. R. Pal~er, and N. Parsons (eds.),.The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and ,Southern Africa, (perkeley:.University of Ca!ifornia p!ess 1977)... 34. Households .headed by fmales are mcreasmgly' sigmficant m number; In rural Kenya for exarilple, they were observed to be 24 percent in an ILO study. See ILO, Emp;oyment Problems of and Rural Women in Kenya, (Addis Abbaba; ILO/ JASPA,1981). -,5. Kamuzora, "Constraints to Labour," op. clt. 36. P. Kong1lted, and M. Monsted, Family Labour and Trade in Western Kenya, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1980); P.C. Reining, "Social factors and food production in an East African Society:, The Haya." in P. McLoughli~ (ed.): African Food Production Systems, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970),pp. 42-55. 37. Reining, "Social factors," op. clt. 38. E. Mueller, "The alloCation of women's tirile and its relation to fertility" in R. Anker et. al., (eds.), Women's and Population Trends in the Third. World, (Lonaon: Crown HeIm, 1982), pp. 55-86. Vlassof found no relation .between children's work and actual and desired fertility of dtales in India. However, his data is beset with methodological drawbacks; one of thetll is that in a society where everybody works, no relation will be found. See his "Ecpnorilic utility of children and fertility in rural India." Population Studies, Vol. 36 No; 1, (1982), pp. 45-59. 11 for lllher P(IilllS of criticism see B.N.F. White, (cd.), "Children Workers," Special issue of Del""Iopmentand Change, Vol. 13 No.4 (1982) 39. :\lona Etienne provides a good case study of the Baule (Ivory Coast) women and [heir strul!gles 10 keep autonomy. See her "WOInen and men, cloth and I coloni-. zation: the transformation of production-distribution relations among the Baule (Ivory Ccast)." Cashier ed'Elute Africaine, Vol. 65. 40. See D. Pauline (cd.), Jf'omen of Tropical Africa (London: Routlege, and Kemii:l Paul, 1963); Mbilinyi, op. cit., and E. Leakock, .arid R. Lee "Introductions," in Leakock and Lee (eds.), Politics and History in Band Societies, (London; Camhridge University Press, 1982). 41. Ibid., p. xv. 42. Ware, Women, Education and Modernisation, op. cit. 43 R.A. Henin, "Fertility differentials by marital condition education, religion lilnd o'ccupation.' in R.A. Henin (ed.), The Demographic Survey of Tanzania: An Analysis of the 1973 National demographic Survey of Tanzania, Vol. VI (Oar es Salaam: Bureau of Statistics, n.d.). 44. c.t. Kamuzora, "The process of fertility determination in Africa: a case study of pregnancyhistoryof rural and urban Wasukuma of Tanzania.' Research report. (Canberra: Department of Demography, ANU, 1983 .. 45. K.C. Zachariah, Anomaly of the Fertility Decline in Kerola ~ashington D.C: W6i'1d Bank, Health and Nutrition Department, Report 1,1983). 12