Colonial and Neocolonial Urban Planning: Three Generations of Master Plans for Dar es Salaam Tanzania Allen Armstrong, Senior Lecturer Department of Geography, University of Dares Salaam. Utafiti Vol VIII No. 1, 1986, Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Dar es Salaam Introduction Tanzania's urban history has been brief, effectively dating.back little more than a century during which period, Dar es Salaam initially asserted and has subsequently, maintained its position as the country's leading urban centre. One consequence of this short lifespan has been that, compared with the much length- ier and unregulated urbanisation undergone in many other (including Third World) nations, Dar es Salaam's growth has occurred parallel to, and been strong- ly influenced by, the wider development of urban planning as a modern practis- ing discipline. Although not a planned town in the modern sense, Dar es Salaam has received the benefit of planning in some form from its establishment, beginning with the first planning scheme drawn up in 1S91 by the German colonial authori- ties, who were transferring the capital down the coast from Bagamoyo. More recent master plans published in 1949.1968 and 1979, respectively, have attempted subsequently to guide the city's rapid post war growth. The publication of each of these master plans has coincided with impor- tant, transitional or watershed phases in Tanzania's broader post war develop- ment; 1949 at the beginning of the final colonial period on a different constitutional basis and in which the first territory wide development programme was launched; 1968 - immediately following the major ambitious policy shift of the Arusha Declaration and on the eve of its detailed application in the Se- cond Five Year Plan; and 1979 in the post villagisation arid administrative de- centralisation phase and in the midst of steadily growing economic crisis and the damaging war with'Uganda. In addition, throughout this 37 year period, urban-related national policy, with its explicit and implicit impacts for Dar es Salaam, was undergoing continuous evolution while conditions in the city it- self, particularly population increase, showed dramatic changes from the publi- cation of one plan to the next. Against a rapidly transforming political, economic and social background therefore, these plans provide a continuous thread of urban management from the city's inception and, with the three more recent master plans in particular, a link between early post-war colonial times and recent faltering post- independence efforts. Indeed, with the exception of a Master Plan for the in- tended groundnut port of Mtwara produced in 1948, the first two Dar Master Plans long remained the only strategic and comprehensive urban planning exer- cise undertaken in Tanzania, until the 1970's ushered in a programme of foreign aided and executed master planning for many regional towns. The 'series' which these three master plans now constitute, therefore, provides a unique insight into 43 not only changing conditions in the city and official responses to these, but also the wider ide~ and approaches prevailing on how rapid urban growth should be managed. The additional disproportionate significance of these plans stems from Dar es Salaam's primacy within Tanzania's urban hierarchy; now eight times larger than the second city and comprising 34llJo of the country's total urban population. A distinguishing feature of all three plans has been the degree of influence exerted by external institutions and ideas in shaping Tanzania's leading city. Th6. master plans have not only been externally funded (by British, CanadiaJ;1 and-Swedish governments respectively) but also prepared by Foreign planning consultants (from Britain, Canada and Sweden respectively), contracted for the task. However, it is in the content of approach and the plans rather than sim- ply their manner of formulation, which external influence has been most strongly felt. In.reviewing the three master plans, it is clear that, despite the continuing transformation or even revolution in local conditions and wider national poli- cy to which each plan had to address itself, nevertheless, the strongest impact on each plan has been Western planning values and concepts in general and, the planning fashions prevailing at the time of each plan's preparation in par- ticular.l This article attempts to trace the nature and extent to which Western plan- ning ideas have been imprinted on this Third WorId city, a process elsewhere described as cultural colonialism.2 This task is conceptually assisted by the fact that each plan coincides with, and bears many of the distinguishing features of, three successive phases in the evolution of post-war planning thought. In addition to highlighting the major themes identifiablving Toad safety, and its <:fforts to maivtain strict residential segrega- tion b<:tween racial groups and contain 'racial infiltration', aJded by open space buffers.9 Fmally, the desire to improv~ the ai.r'in the city was one major rea .. SOIl for creating 'breeze lanes.' Toe ameiioration of future urban oiobicms includin~ health was sought .prin1arily through physical solutions menhollca above. and in particular, the Plan's anemp( to reinfOl'ce the pattern of funCTional 'Jr land.use segregation, tesident~al areas hi'i .... further ~\lbdi\lide(: into three r~daJ ;:,)"e~'.a ffi0ulj first Introduced by German authorities in 1912. The comprehensive physical segre- gation of different 'social ~ups' (in effect, thinly disguised racial division) was the simple, but strict planning formula advocated; large plots of 1acre and above designed for Euro~s occupying the well-services low density zones in salubri- ous seaside localities; plots of 1/6 to ~ acre set aside for Asians in the adjoin- ing medium density zones, while the high density zones reserved strictly' for Africans were allocated limited infrastructure and few services of 10'.-- standard (Thble 2): Overall, urban planning seems to have been considered as a design problem to be dealt with in simple physiCal terms, the solutions offered satisfy- ing basic functional and cost criteria. Moreover, the systems approach being un- developed as yet, the urban 'system' was seen as a series of isolated problem areas so that, for example, improvements in the transport network were not closely connected to land use charges, but rather, as isolated improved road alignments, new round abouts or parking controls; while general standards were presented simply as an extention of these individual solutions. 10 preserve the integrity of functional and residential segregation, demar- cations between different zones were to be created or maintained. The meadows and creeks which interpenetrate Oar es Salaam's site were embraced as welcome natural no man's lands, but, where these did not extend, deliberately planned cordons sanitaire labelled 'breeze lanes', were proposed to perform ft similar fun- tion. This latter innovation, was.also described as 'ventilation funnels' - con- tinuous open space c')rridors from the coast, penetrating the built up area and aligned in the direction of the prevailing wind-was also intended as a means to 'aerate the town' and epitomises the linked health concern and architectural engineering approach adopted by the consultants. However, one inevitable but undesirable consequence"of residential and functional segregation and lavish open space provision, was an uneconomic spreading of the town: a feature of British colonial cities, in marked contrast with the compact and high density character of otherwise similar Iberian colonial cities such as Maputo.ll The ~1hetic as well as health concern of ihe influential Garden cijy move- ment also runs strongly through the 1948 PIan. For example the grid iro~-:S~~ layouts established by the Germans, clearly offend the consultants' seDSlbilities as being both unimaginative and impractical for traff!.c. The chess.~ layout of densely populated Kariakoo area for example, receIVes heavy cntlC1sm on ac- count of "its dull monotony, its regimented pattern, lack of open space and resultant lack of vegetation and its dangerous traffic" and more enlightened lay- outs are encouraged, the consultants seeing "no reason why up to date princi- ples should not be applied."12 Throughout, considerable space is devoted to arguing against the general application of rigid geometric forms and alternative proposing layouts such as staggered rows of housing and extended crescent streets, most fully developed for the discrete garden suburbs laid out for the European low deusity zones. In similar cosmetic vein, the zoned use of Offensive Industry is reclassified as Special Industry because of the former's 'unpleasant sound.' The introduction of the neighbourhood unit, a relatively fresh planning 46 ------ I~DA~ ES SALAAM . 1949 Plan J IV D I A N I ("" I ).<) ~. -.1 I ,.. J I !/' .. --~) '" ',- \.- ./- ..., i ! L AND ZONING I r'-:] Res.denti"l ilrCilS Low O"ns.,y ~ _ Adminjstr~tlve- Industry o I I t 2 • 41ar es Salaam sub-region produced in 1966 contributed to a much fuller policy .framework tharI has existed previously, while among other 'significant measures, the freehold larId system perceived by the 1949 Plan as the main constraint on rational urban development, had been abolished. The provision of a Canadian soft loan of 3 million Tanzanian shillings, financed through the principle of tied aid, the private Toronto-based consultancy of Project Planning Associates to prepare the 1968 National Capital Master Plan which, unlike tha~ of their predeces$Ors, formed their sole. brief.20 Even the plan's outward appearance-a voluminous ~d impressively packaged main report !Uld 'seven technical appendicies, the product of 1~ years of work by a sizeable team of experts, epitomises the advance of the 'planning profession since the slhn,modest and relatively amateurish effort of 20 years (Table 1) earlier. In tiine and in character, the 1968 PlarI can be located towards the end of planning's "era of methodological optimism and the rational scientific approach."21 Considerable expertise was committed to produce, guided by a specially prepared project manual and critical path work programme, an , appreciable volume of detailed pre-plan survey and forecasting, matched by ,fairly sophisticated modelling techniques.Dar es Salaam's 1968 Plan represents the high-water mark of the comprehensive prescriptive planning approach emphasising the long range, end-state grand design, relegating the details and routine implementation decisions to politicians and administrators.22 The ambitious optimism of, the developing Tanzanian' state clearly struck a sympathetic chord with a confident and assertive planning profession at the 'height of its powers and reputation. The major distinguishing characteristics of the 1968 Plan, arid the major departures from the planning practice of its predecessor include the following: Firstly, in its temporal, spatial and,population coverage, the 1968 Plan is drawn on a broader CarIvas arid grander scale than hitherto. In addition to the customary 20 years time horizon of master plans, the 1968 Plan also provides a long range scenario-Plan 2000, a vision of the int~nded future urbarI form of the city at the end of the century in which anestlmated eight fold increase of population had to be accommodated in a city of 2 million inhabitants (Figure 53 2). In addition, this considerable expansion is. envisaged largely beyond the' existing city boundaries and thus, for the first tIme, plans for Oar es Salaam's role in its wider city region context, as only one of several expandiIig groWth foci in the overall development of the existing poorly articulated sub-region settlement hierarchy. While Oar es Salaam would" continue to funcl10n as the major market outlet and service centre, encouraging the expansion of district centres such as Kibaha and Kisarawe was advocated not only as a means of facilitating the sub-region's 4evelopment but also, by acting as counter magnets, their growth would help Cale,these became 'open space fingers' following the existing creeks or, in the ne"Nsuburbs, as green or open space 'edges' forming .un'developed buffers or mini green belts betw~n different use z.:>nes. 54 DAR ES SALAAM - year 12000 concept 1968Plan' Key to roads _ Freeway Arterial roads ______ Park way National capital Planning area -> -' -. - boundary f' ',/ \ -'-', \ (' 'iJ\ \ I \ I ~i I I ! / /1- ( "><' I <:l ,\, \ ,- " L \ ( o \ \ rl?,,~ /" \ ... LAND ZONING \\'," .. .\\ ,' / Residential District ~,~ Central Area _ Major !!'ld District Centres ,.~..... '-""" , Industry and Warehousing l -v ,_ .. , Special Uses 5 J. f,'_,._o_pe_n_s_p_accs O_l '_1_1'JIl_' _. 55 Fourthly, reflecting the quite altered social and political circumstances in the country a major and inevitabk departure was the 1968 Plan's aim of "breaking down the exclusive racial and income barriers of the past.H2S Thus, while the already developed art!as otlered the consultants less scope for bold physical designs, an attempt was made to ~reate a variety of plots and types of housing for a range of income groups in every residential zone in order "to depart from the character of e~rlier residential, develo~men! emanatmg from a different social system~>26 ThiS was to be achieved pnmanly by the favoured practice (advocated in.all three master plans) of reducing residential densities in certain crowded, mainly African zones and by correspondingly increasing densities, by infilling, in former low den~ity zo~:s. ~he results of these adjustments sought !o reduce the gross m.equalItIes III average densities between highest (Kanakoo) and lowest denSity (Oysterbay) zones from the prevailing 45:1 ratio to a more acceptable 3.3:1 within twenty years. Further liberalisation is proposed in the plan's willingness to relax the rigid and discr4minatory high building standards which prevailed and thus increase the housing stock by harnessing "the individual incentives of prospective home builders through provision of planned olots on which initially traditional type housing units could be constructed.H27 Finally, the Plan devotes far greater attention to the question of implementation of its proposals. One sizeable technical appendix (capital works programme) specifies the practical measures, the staged programme for public works investment and planning control, necessary for the first five years to translate the plan into reality. Awareness of the importance of instituting ongoing planning and monitoring beyo~d the plan preparation stage is also recognised in the arrangements for settmg up a Dar es Srtlaam master plan section in the town planning division. In spite of the innovath:e an? sometimes progressive 'plannin~ concepts incorporated for the first tIme m the 1968 Plan, two mfluentIal themes embodied in the document give an indication of its underlying conservative bias. The first of these is that the principle of allocating different land uses to their own segregated zones remains a continuing and undisputed article of planning faith. Despite the fact that segregated land use discriminated in favour of the modern sector, encouraged a rather uneconomic spreading of the city arid placed undue pressure on the madequate public transport system the consultants recognised some of its failings but were unwilling to signifi~tly modify them to the extent they !)roposed for the segregated residential zones. Certainly, they did now permit selected light industry to develop in carefully spaced locations believing "employment centres should be as close to population centres as possible to reduce journey to work time, H d But generally, the principle is extended by distinguishing four different classes of" industrial zones and introducing sub-classifications for other major land-using functions. However, it was the Plan's approach to the problem of irregular (squatter) nousing, considered the major issue on which its overall success would hinge, which emerges as insensitive and authoritarian. The Plan typifies an early view of squatters hostile teeming masses acting as malignant tumour on the healthy qevelopment of the citv. In its advocacy of prevention and eradication measures, it epitomises the 'hostile harrl Hosed attitude' embraced by many other city authorities at the time. manifest in attempts to solve the housing problem through the use of police and bulldozerl>.'9 The 1968 Plan 56 ~ought the. eradic~tion of all squatter areas by 1990, through the Imple~entauon of fIve prop?sals: r~moval of existing settlements in embryo; rel1!0vI~g a~ea~ that conf,hcted w~th the master plan; opening up new resIdentIal dlstncts; employmg a statf of enforcement officers' and' no further co.mpensation for Tl;settlement or .disturba~ce costs. With the ~xcePtion of the thIrd, all are negatIve and coerCIve adhenng to Le Corbusier's doctrine of urban surgery in which "planners must begin by levelling large tracts in the city to create a clean canvas for their rational designs and architectural master-pieces. 30 Additional shortcomings of the 1968 Plan also reveal its disregard of objective conditions. For instance, its choice of a 6070 projected population growth rate for the city, far below even the 9% growth already occurring, is perhaps indicative of the consultants' inadequate understanding of wider demographic pressures and their over-estimation of the government's ability to control them. Similarly, continuing urban influx soon led to squatt~rs becoming a majority of city residents thereby rendering both administratively impracticable and politically infeasible, the wholesale stringent coercive measures proposed against thein. Moreover, the consultants apparently ignored the effects of major changes in Government policy aft~r 1967 in which, by refocussing development efforts towards the rural areas, funding and priorities for urban development were henceforth considerably downgraded. , The final and major criticism of the 1968 Plan is that its wider concept and specific proposals were over ambitious in terms of the funding, manpower and administrative capacities available to implement them. The capital works programme of 364 million Tanzanian shillings was criticised at the time as being "not very practical because of the limited financial resources and economic objectives of the country" yet it seeins that in the six year period, 1970-1976, 600 mjllion shillings was spent on infrastructural implementation of Dar es Salaam's Master Plan, though this was not always well coordinated or directed at the most pressing priorities or most widely beneficial. schemes';, The planning machinery itself received no major expansion to enable it to meet existing, let alone, increased pressures on it. The Plan's ~c:comf\lendation of a crash programme to house no fewer than 200,000 fanuhes (49,000 plots) as soon as possible reflects its quite unrealistic grasp of operating constraints. Overall, therefore, despite or perhaps because of its detailed and professional presentation, its array of impressive new planning concepts and its ambitious technical design, all incorporating the latest planning approach, the 1968 Master Plan had a relatively insignificant impact in shaping Dar es Salaam. Less than ten years later, there was "no clearly defined or structured growth pattern in evidence", unplanned housing continued to proliferate unabated and "the initial image of Dar es Salaam (was) are of increasing residential sprawl."~2 The plan is a testimony to the advancement of planning as a discipline, and to the ascendacy of (increasingly sophisticated) technique over pragmatism. Despite "its undoubtedly good qualIty accordmg to advanced' North American standards" and its lipservice to local constraints and preferences, its insensitivity and impracticality to conditions on. the ground and thus irrelevance to their improve1!l.ent is now clearly apparen~. - In this respect, it bears all the hallmarks and faIlmgs of the second generatIon of master planning of Third World cities, criticised as being "excessively rigid and antiseptic concept ... largely static land use exercises, influenced by an undue degree by ... British planning practice.'3 57 The 1979Plan Unlike the optimistic politica1~onomic climate prevailing at the time of Dar es S~aam's two earJier master plans, the state of the natioI1 at the'lime of its third, waS problematic in the extreme. Steadily declining agricultural production, apparently negative effects of earlier widespread villagisation and gathering economic crisis.w#s compounded by the damaging impact.of war with 'Uganda. By the late 1970's therefore, Thnzania's prospects appeared increasingly bleak, prompting the eventual suspension oJ its Fourth Five Year Plan and its replacement by a National Economic Survival Programme, while Dar es Salaam experienced unabated population influx, the proliferation df unplanned housing and stagnation in "employment. Failure to fulm necessary programme df public works had led to deterioration of the city's infrastructure compounded by intermittent food and water shortages and a serious cholera 'outbreak.34 The policyframework of the 1979Plan was also transformed from that of a decade earlier. Dar es Salaam was direct!y affected by a series of policy decisions; in 1973 to transfer. the capItal to Dodoma; ad~nistrative decentralislUionto regional capitals aftet: 1972, a dr~tic revision of housing policy in 1972to accept the existenceof squatters; a change of emphasis by the Natfonal Housing Corporation from shrm clearance and housing construction, to the provision of only basic sites and services; and, finally, the reorganisation of local govemment by transferring local urban responsibilities from city councils to new regional authorities (subsequently reversed).3SAt regional lev- el, the 1979Master Plan also had to take cognizance of not only the Third Five Year Plan, but _also Regional. Integrated Development Plans produced in 1975ibr Dar es Salaam and toast Regions and the Uhuru Corridor ZonafPlan . completed in 1978. Swedish aid financed the Toronto consultants, Marshall Macklin Monaghan Ltd.36 a firm associated with the 1968 consultants, to produce the Dar es Salaam Master Plan Review. Despite the almost two years spentdn its preparation and the incorporation of several more sophisticated planning actions, the 1978 Plan is a more down-to-earth document, compared with its ambitious predecessor, lacking many of that plan's grand planning concepts and intended as a professional working document, determinedly pragmati~ and flexible, concentrating on the more pressing and detailed concerns of urban management (Table 1). This reorientation probably owed less to adverse local circumstances than to the crisis of confidence in planning as a whole ushered in the late 1960's and 1970's. The Plan is primarily a product of the third post war planning generation, (which.merely coincided with, rather than freflected T.anzania's and Oar es Salaam's litraitened circumstances), in which "rationality had given way to the politicS of group conflict, technology to ~siQn, lo~-term planning to short-term mllA8-8ement, promising immediate solutions to pressing problems."J? Following wider re-evaluation of the shortcomings of earlier planning theory applied to Third World cities, the 1979.Plan refl~ the generalll10ve in the dir~~>D of increasingly fashionable trend planning, foregoing exhaustive survey and analysis and shunning rigid and-state scenarios in favour of managing charige, laying down practical programmes and emphasizin, cOntrol and.implemeDtat!-on.38The .1979Plan's more limited scope and circumspect approach is also attributable both to its review function and to a defensive reaction on the part of its authors, to 58 criticism heaped on earlier master plans. Several themes running through the 1979Plan provide an indication of its overall character and represent marked departures from the approach of its predecessors. Firstly, fl~xibility is.i~corporated to a far greater extent than prevIOusly. For the first time, no ngld schedule of forecast population growth and of capital works to accommodate it is stipulated, schedules which had proved quite inaccurate underestimates in earlier plans. The 1979 Plan identified instead three stages of development, not tied to actual years but to approximate population targets-these stages outline areas of the city to be developed and programmes to be implemented to accommodate p<>pulation growth to 1.2, 1.5 and 2.4 millions respectively. (Figure 3). Flexibility is also emphasised in the choice of six alternative schemes, incorporating two major locational options presented by the consultants at the draft stage, with the preferred strategy develoPed only after widespread consultaticn and following approv.al by the Ministry of Lands and the city's Urban Planning Committee. Even within the' oreferred scheme, some alternatives are suggested; for example, areas which could be developed in • .the event .of the failure to construct the Kigamboni causeway. In addition, a notable omission from the 1979 Plan is all reference to its predecessor's grand planning concepts such as sub-cities, kreen belts and planning modules. This ,omission and the Plan's stress on monitoring and management suggests the. plan is no longer promulgated as a sacrosanct blueprint but rather a document. which "functions as a dynamic guide ... for monitoring the growth ofthe city" which is "pred4cated on the ability to adjust to different and changing circumstances" 39, which reflects the consultants redefinition of a master plan as "planning under uncertainty with variables increasing as the time horizon expands." Finally, flexibility was not apparentIysought at the expense of detail or accuracy. In many aspects, such as its subclassification of residential areas, its explicit detailing of the size of plots and other urban components, and, of course, its more detailed costin&of capital programmes, the 1979 Plan focuses on a larger and more detailed scale than its predecessors. In this respect, it continues the trend towards greater methodological riiour introduced with each successive plan. (Table 3). A new theme of pragmatism runs strongly through the 1979 Plan. The Plan marks a further move away from rigidly segregated functional zoning for different uses, recognising the earlier pressures which this practice placed on the transport sy~tem and the encouragement it gave to the establishment of squatter settlements alongside industrial zones. The 1979 Plan states that "industry will now be encouraged to locate throughout the urban area to achieve a better balance between job opportunities and the labour force while reducing travel time and distance" ;1o~ Pragma+;sm is also apparent in the Plan's accommodationist approach to the squatter prot,>lem.Partly because Western planning practice had by this tim~ shunned slum clearance and demolition in favour of conservation and gradual improvement, .and partly beca.usesquatters now formed a ~ajority of urban residents with nghts now sanctIOned by government, r4ilaxatlonof the draconian approach of the 1968 Plan was inevitable. While still seekin~ te 59 Figure 3 • o fa LAND ZONING D Residential • Industrial ~ Institutional • Central areas .ZJ Agriculture o 5 f I 60 ensure tilat mos~ new develop~ent occurred on allocated and surveyea plots, "the constructlon of self-buIld houses of local materials" was to be facilitated. 41 Residential areas were subdivided into various categories: various planned areas, areas subject to sites and services schemes and unplanned areas, the latter now being formally recognised with even some infilling planned for certai~ lo~er density districts. Moreover, arrangements are also made for morutonng, but not interfering in, new sqnatter development. Indeed future unplanned development is admitted in the concept of 'residenti~l buffer z~ri~s', which !epr~Sents an interesting new concept for the absorptlon of addItional housmg m areas where population pressure becomes severe. 4t These_are "areas adjacent to short and mid-term development areas but not on land designated for future development" but where no facilities will be provided and where the installation of utilities will become solely the owner's responsibility, making them, effectively, officially recognised future squatter areas and institutionalising the dualist concept of two classes of urban resident.43' A third cbaracteri$tic of the plani&itseffort to incorporate 'participation' an element enthusiastically advocated by Western planning in the 1970's. Public participation, per se, was Hut aW:111ptedbut politicians, administnltors ana representatives of the relevant national and city agencies were deliberately and closely involved in formulating initial-proposals and recorpmendations, and iater, agteemg on the plan's overall form and content and ensuring the implementability of its proposals. Thus the consultants were eager to stress that the plan was the outcome of "a series of informal and feedback meetings held to ensure that the appropriate officials and politicians. understood and agreed with the decisions culminating in the final plan".44 While representing a genUIne attempt to overcome difficulties of poor co-ordination and implementation which had beset earlier planning efforts, this new emphasis on participation can also be interpreted as an attempt by the consultants to anticipate and defle~tpossible criticism of their role and work by publicising the plan as a joint effort in whkh their contribution was simply one of many; hence, perhaps, the proviso that "the plan itself is only a guide to politicians, civilscrvants and citizens of the most advantageous growth patterns. However, wIthout effective leadership action and control the aims of the'plan are not likely to be realised."45 However, while significant departures from previous approaches characterise this latest plan, a number of important features reappear, often onlyslightly modified from earlier yersions. An urban strvcture was proposed which was essentially that of the 1965 plan, but based on the planning module. (see Table 3). The question of residential densities was again a major consideration while the provision of open space, now allocated according to an even more detailed hierarchical system, continued to receive disproportionate attention. AIl three elements have recurred in each of the three Master Plans examined here, reflecting an underlying uniformity of basic approach .throughout; essentially, a strongly physical pla~ng approach, heavily ~riticised elsewhere for "its peculiar obsession with movmg people aboUl, gettmg them out of some localities and into others, reducing urban densities and with stop- ping immigration."46 (see Thble 2) ..... The question of implementation, incorporatmg the themes of. fleXlblht!', pragmatism and participation ?is~ussed, recei'ved m~ch fuller att~ntlon tha~ m previous plans. Indeed the pnonty now accorded ImplementatIon, to whIch 61 more than half the Master Plan report was devoted, is the clearest indication of the managerialist character of the latest planning generation. The implementation process in the 1979 Plan was divided into three de- velopment stages, roughly corre1>ponding to two successive five year phases fol- lowed by a ten year phase (although the emphasis is on population attained rather than target years). Major emphasis and priority was laid on the first stage of Development Plan, in which programmes to be implemented and areas to be developed to accommodate population up to 1.3 miJlion were outlined. A separate major volume of the plan presents in some detail, 47 separate priority projects in seven different sectors, each shown on a detailed map, carrying cost estimates and identifying the agency responsible for the implementation of an approach which the consultants claim to have pioneered. The components of the second stage Interim Plan and third stage Master Plan are elaborated in less specific detail, but, nevertheless, these indicate areas to be developed, major progmmmes required in each sector and estimated expenditure to accommodate population growth to 1.6 million and 2.5 million. Nor does the 1979 plan restrict itself to a narrow project 'shopping list' approach, since detailed guidelines and objec- tives are specified 'advising procedures for control and monitoring. Policies and standards for servicing each of the major fU'1ctional uses and urban structure in general ate also laid down. Among the many recommendations is the proposal to form a Utilities Coordinating Committee to improve coordination of programmes of various agencies involved. The mtionale presented as underly- ing the implementation programme reflects both the new realism of planning and its sensitivity to criticism of earlier practice. The Plan claimed to have been formulated' 'within the context of national policies and economic realities" and to avoid "the transposition of western standard into an environment where na,. tiona I policies are at variance with those standards."47 Unfortunately, the 1979 Plan appears not to have lived up to its more realistic intentions and indeed is cited by Kulaba as a typical exar.1ple of "an unpractical and myopic plan."48 Its five year development programme specified an invest- ment of 982 million Tanzanian shillings, almost five times the amount spent by ~he City Council on all ?~elopme~t pr~jects withi~ th~ previous five year penod. Furthermore, more lImIted funding still was poSSIble III the first two years of the plan, the Treasury allocating the city only 19070 and 168,10 respectively of the amount required to implement those projects specified in the Master"Plan: In other respects, the pattern of development on the ground increasingly diverges from that shown in the Plan, partly due to continuing population pressure, limited development expenditure and the continuing incapacity and inadequacy of the city planning machine. The 1979 Master Plan incorporates the flexibility and pragmatism inherent in the third town planning g.;neration and renects the fashion for "plalu1.ing development in accordance with observed trends" and by specifying detailed implementation programmes and procedures.49 Since urban pressures are so strong, however, it seems likely to suffer the similar ignominious fate of its predecessors because plan proposals are far in excess of actual resource availa- bility and the capacity of implementation machinery. The flexihle trend plan- ning of the 1979 Master Plan already appears to have been superseded by a form of 'action planning', which is essentially a short tern, almost ongoing crisis management, involving little need for master plans. 'I' 62 Conclusion In the mid 1980's, Dar es Salaam exhibits all the symptoms of 'urban cri- sis' commonly and increasingly encountered throughout the Third World. Its contining rapid growth of an estimated 9-10% (or over 100,000 new citizens) annually, has far outstripped not only housing provision, but also planned plot allocation to the extent that two out of every three houses now being contructed are irregular (unplanned). The balance between people and work has been se- verely upset and, with virtual stagnation in the level of formal employment, re- cent surveys reveal only one in eight of Dar es Salaam's population hold a regular job. The city is also increasingly beset by problems of inadequate public trans- port, unreliable water supply and deteriorating infrastructure and services, threa- tened by intermittent health hazards, food shortages and rising crime rates. This deterioration in conditioIlS' has occurred inspite of, on the one hand, various policy measures directed towards controlling immigration and restrict- :ng investment and settlement, while encouraging decentralisation from Dar es Salaam and, on the other, the ~uiding influence over the past almost forty years of the three master plans considered here. WhiIe other factors have contribut- ed it seems clear that these Master Plans have raised expectations but achieved f~ if any results, towards the attainment of a modern, efficient city. A signifi- -::ant part of the explanation for this can be traced to the inappropriat~ness in format methodology and content of the technology transfer and cultural colonUdism which those foreign funded and executed plans represent. Their ir- relevance to changing city conditions and their management mainly because of their application of fashionable western urban planning ideas, helps to explain why all three were soon igno~~ and relag~ted to an ignominious fate. of collect- ing dust in the city and nurustry planrung departments. Mcanwhi1~ Dar es Salaam city authorities find themselves "unprepared to control. effectIvely the present tempo of rapid change" as the first consultants noted thirty seven years ago. References 1. According to Cherry, G. "Planning is not an e:mct science but an art, a periodic Cltpression of values" in which notions of environmental design "during the present century chanaed with bewildering rapidity" in The Evolution of British JOWl! Planning'~ Lelghto~ Buzard 1974 pp. 276 .. 2. Kina. {l Colonittl Urban Developmem, London, Routeled&e and Kegan Paul 1976. The ftr1t . urban m.aster plan, wOooiy produced by 1lu1zanian planners appeared only in 1980 - Irings Master F!an 1980 - 200 Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Oar es s.Jaam. 3. Gibb, Sir AICWlder and Partners. A Plan ff>r Dar es Salaam: ~port London 1949. 4. Ibid, p. 20. S. de 'Jeran, F. quoted in Leonard J. Report on ll!ternational Congress on P\annina for Major Cities. Jounusl of Royal 'lOwn Planning Institute Vol. 68 No.2, p. 196, also ill Cherry, G. op. cit. p. 248. 6. A1eKaIlder. L. European Plrouting Iileo10gy in Thnzania, Habitat International Vol. 7 No. 1121983 p. 2S'a!80 King, Exporting Planning: the Colonial and Noe-ColoDiaJ Experience in Cherry, G. (cd) Shaping an Urbtm WorM, London, Mansell 1980 p. 210. '1. Doherty, J. Ideology lOud Tovm Planning: Journal of Geographical Association of 1Iz1lQJnUz No. 14 1976 p. 84. 8. Southall, A. The Growth of Urban Society in Diamond S. and Burke, F. (cds) The transfor- mation of East Africa. New rork Basic Books p. 486. 9. Gibb, op. dt. p. 53. 63 10. \Wlanfer, K. KoIonial and Nach-Kolomiale Stadplanning Frankfurter Wirtschafts and So- ciolgHlgraphische Scluiften vol. 8 Goethe University. Frankfurt 1970. Il. Kay, G. Maputo, Capital of Mozambique. GeographicoJ Associotion of Zimbabwe. Proceedin&1 No. 14 (September) 1983 pp. 1-17. 12. Gibb, op. at p. 156; the pre war plan for Lusaka, Zambia also strove to avoid rectilinear layouts in its enthusiastic advocacy of Garden City principl~, Collins, J. Urban Plannin& in a British Colony in Cbcuy, G. (eel) Slraping an Urban World London Mansell pp. 217-24~ 13. Houghton Evans, W. Pimming Cities: Legacy and Portent London UlWllmce and W"lSJuut. 14. Gibb, op. cit. P. 156- 15. Gibb, ibi4 p. 58; in most coloniol cities, ulUltive areas were invariBbly out with the inter!St mtd QdMty spac:u of colonialists, ofjiciai knowledge about their development corifmed to Iteantq and (mcwement) problems passed largely unrecognised" Banjo, G. and Dimitriou, H. Urban ThDfsport Problems of Third JfixldCities Habitat IntemationalVol. 7 No. 3/41983. pp. 99-IlO. The role of planning in legitimating and extending inequalities in general is dis- cu.ssed in Harloe, M. Captive Cities, London, John Wiley 1977 pp. 76-80. 16. Gibb, Ibid p. 62; Cherry, G. 197. op. cit. p. 246. 17. Muench, C. Planning for Informal Sector Enterprises in the Informal Sector in Kenya, In- . !titute of Development Studies, Nairobi 1978, pp. 181. . 18•. Gibb, op. at p. 154 since 90.,. of city dwellers occupy the lowest income stratum, the city itself was able to raise by taxation only an insignificant fraction of the funds required for Il{ban maintenance and deYclopment. Syivestel" White, F. 'Jbwn Planning in 'Ilmganyika, Jour- nal of tlte 1bwn Planning Institu~ Vol. 44, 1958 pp. 173-5. 19. Mascarcnhas, A. The Impact of Nationhood on Oar es Salaam, East African Geograp/rictI/ Review 'obI. 5, 1967 pp. 39-64; concern regarding the steady growth of squatting is c:xpressed in the 1bwn Planning Division Annual Reports 1962-1968 Ministry of Lands, Settlement and water Devdopment. 20. Project Planning Associates Ud. National Capital Master Plan. Oar es Salaam, Thronto 1968. 21. de 'Thrall, op. cit. p. 196.. 22. Rondinelli d. Urban Planning as Policy Analysis, JourniIl of American Institute of Planners 1976 39 No. 1 pp. 70-86. 23. Houghton Evans, W. op.cit.p. 172. 24. ArmstrVD& A. The Creation of New African Capitals, Jounuzl of Geographical As:rociation qf 1lmzanio, 1984 No. 23 pp. 1-25. 25. Project Planning op.cit. 26. Ibid . 27. Ibid, p. 72 . 28. Ibid, p.73. 29. Lawuian /.. Review and Evaluation of urban Accommodationist Policies in UN PoPfllation Studies No.- 75 New \brk 1981pp.lOl-112 LindbeIg O. Attitudes Towards Squatting: A Review BRAWP Research Report No. 9 University of Oar es Salaam 1974. 30. FIShman, ~ The Anti Planners in Cherry, G. 1980 op. cit. pp.243-257 see also Grohs, G. Slum QClI11Ulce in Oar ell Salaam in Hutton, J. (cd) Urban Challenge in East Africa. East African Publishing HOUBe,Nairobi 1970 pp. 157-76. 31. Mbma, J. Urban Development Policies and P!anning Experience in llmzania in M. Safier (cd) urban and Regional Planning for National Development Kampala, Obote Foundation 1970 pp. 196-208; also Hullman. 32. Marshall Macklin Monaghan Ud., Dor t!S Sak1am Master Plan Thronto 1979. 33. Hillman, S. the Necessity for the Review of the 1968 Oar es Salaam Master Ftan Unit Minis- try of Lands,. Housing and Urban Development Oar es Salaam 1977: p. 3: for criticism of lipservice disguising conventional practice see pjcnefeld M.A. Long Thnn Housin3 Policy to 'llmzania Economic Research Bureau Paper 70.9 1970 University of Oar es Salaam. 34. Perhaps one of the last ewnples of the seoond genezation of \\btem planners of the 1950's and 1960's who believed that the concepts, methods and techniques that has been devdoped in the Vkst were the social equivalents of natural laws and, as such, uniwrsally applicable in 1brner, A. (cd) Cities of tlte Poor London, Croom Helm 1980 p. 13, quotation from Dwyer D. People and Housing in Third World Cities, Longman London 1975 pp. 94-95. 35. ~ W. R.ccent changes in Urban R£sidential Land Use Policies, ./otImQl qfGtogrrrplriaJJ Association of'11numrio. No. 16, 1978 pp. 38-li6; Sam, R. Under--deYdopmaJt, Urban Squat- ting and the State BureallCl'llCY=the case of'Illnzania, Canadian, JQIO"1U11 of African Studies Vol. 16 No.1 pp. 67-91. 36. Marshall Macklin Man.aghan Ud. op. cit. 37. de Teran op. dt ... 01 ' "- .. A!ollSO, W.-Ford D. and J. nend Planmng: An Indonesum case Study .• _" .. ng \.INt.oo... 38. Vol. 21 No.1 5-10. 39. Marshall Macklin op. cit.p.7 64 40. Ibid; p. 47 see also Agger, S. urban Self Management New York M,E. Sharpe Inc. 1980. 41. Holliday, J. Design for Environment, London 1977, see also; Lacquiani op. cit. 42. Marshall MacKlin op. cit. Technical Supplement p. 55. 43. Ibid, p. 65 also Sarin M. Urban Planning in the Third World: the Chandigarh Experience. London Mansell 1982 p.7 44. Ibid, Summary p. 2 45. Ibid p. 55 46. Harris, N. Metropolitan Planning in the Developing Countries Habitat International 1983 Vol. 7 No. 3/4 pp. 5-17 47. Ibid p. 55. 48. Kulaba, S. housing, Socialism and National Development in Thnzania, Centre for Housing Studies, Occasional Paper No. I Ardhi Institute Dar es Salaam, 1981. 49. Marshall Macklin op. cit.p. 107. 50. See Honeybone A. Action Planning and the Systems Approach in Developing Countries, Planning Out/ook Vol. 21 No. I 1978 pp. 2-5; Master plans. 51. Seibods, P. and Steinberg, F. Thnzania: Site and Services Habitat International 1982 t pp. 109-120. 52. Hayuna, A. he Management and Implementation of Physical Infrastructure in Dar es Salaam City, Journal of Environmental Management, London 1983 pp. 324-6. 53. Gibb op. cit p. 18; of Strenhas observed master plans exert little influence since they are not related to urban development while actual day-to-day planning is at best piecemeal or par- tial, guided primarily by the short term financial plan of the city's annual budget, which effectively means "projects are begun only when a shortage or bottleneck is felt... chosen on a largely ad hoc basis and not as part of a comprehensive scheme." Sten. R. Urbal' Policy in Africa, African Studies Review Vol. 15 1972 p. 565. 65 Table 1 continued. Defined Purpose of Plan 1949 jkg ^fester plan in « "comprehensive planning scheme comprising report and drawings... are far short of the fully detailed Development Pfan* intended but should" at least form a useful scheme to prevent further sprawl and alleviate congested conditions now existing. Lack of "local factual information and vital statistics, has been a serious handicap" "No bad planning of the Paris form" has been possible and while the Plan "falls far short of any grandiose town planning conception, it is at least a practical suggestion. 1968 The Master Plan is "based on conclusions emerging from analysis of the wide range of sur- veys carried out." The Plan's purpose is to present "aphysical framework with policy guide- lines for the future development of Dar es Salaam "describing the manner; location and relative priority in which all future urban development should take place in Dar es Salaam by means of policy statements, maps, programmes of works, cost estimates and technical explanations." 1979 A Master Plan "plans for uncertainty and the variables increase as the tirte horizons expand. This Plan through careful riionitoring and built-in flexibility, attempts to reduce this uncertainty as riiuch as possible, A priiftary objective is to provide a development prpgrsbiriie and "to prcmhote coordination of all agencies involved in planning infrastructure development. The Plan "represents a pragmatic approach in that, planning is done within the context of national priorities and econotftic realities.'1 The Plan is "only a guide to the politicians, civil servants and citizens." Plan Implementation 1949 A brief chapter on implementation includes guidelines or relevant development and build- ing standards. No programme of capital works suggested and no estimates of implementa- tion costs. 1968 Capital works programme, stage 1 of Master Plan implementation presented for the first five years, divided into five phases. Recommends development strategies necessjry, identi- fies priority projects and areas to be developed, with general costings. Further study programme outlined. No proposals for implementations beyond first five years. Cost esti- mates: Stage TShs. 380 million. 1979 Master Plan implementation divided into three development stages—Development Ir^erim and Master Plan. First Five Year Capital Works Programme identifies 47 priority projects, with costings. Detailed implementation controls, monitoring procedures arid development policies and standards laid down. Cost estimates: Stage 1 * 983 Tshs. million; State II * 2040 Tshs. million; Stage III « 3242 Tshs. million; total = 6265 Tshs miUton