

Colonial and Neocolonial Urban Planning: Three Generations of Master Plans for Dar es Salaam Tanzania

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Introduction

Tanzania's urban history has been brief, effectively dating back little more than a century during which period, Dar es Salaam initially asserted and has subsequently, maintained its position as the country's leading urban centre. One consequence of this short lifespan has been that, compared with the much lengthier and unregulated urbanisation undergone in many other (including Third World) nations, Dar es Salaam's growth has occurred parallel to, and been strongly influenced by, the wider development of urban planning as a modern practising discipline.

Although not a planned town in the modern sense, Dar es Salaam has received the benefit of planning in some form from its establishment, beginning with the first planning scheme drawn up in 1891 by the German colonial authorities, who were transferring the capital down the coast from Bagamoyo. More recent master plans published in 1949, 1968 and 1979, respectively, have attempted subsequently to guide the city's rapid post war growth.

The publication of each of these master plans has coincided with important, transitional or watershed phases in Tanzania's broader post war development; 1949 at the beginning of the final colonial period on a different constitutional basis and in which the first territory wide development programme was launched; 1968 - immediately following the major ambitious policy shift of the Arusha Declaration and on the eve of its detailed application in the Second Five Year Plan; and 1979 in the post villagisation and administrative decentralisation phase and in the midst of steadily growing economic crisis and the damaging war with Uganda. In addition, throughout this 37 year period, urban-related national policy, with its explicit and implicit impacts for Dar es Salaam, was undergoing continuous evolution while conditions in the city itself, particularly population increase, showed dramatic changes from the publication of one plan to the next.

Against a rapidly transforming political, economic and social background therefore, these plans provide a continuous thread of urban management from the city's inception and, with the three more recent master plans in particular, a link between early post-war colonial times and recent faltering post-independence efforts. Indeed, with the exception of a Master Plan for the intended groundnut port of Mtwara produced in 1948, the first two Dar Master Plans long remained the only strategic and comprehensive urban planning exercise undertaken in Tanzania, until the 1970's ushered in a programme of foreign aided and executed master planning for many regional towns. The 'series' which these three master plans now constitute, therefore, provides a unique insight into

not only changing conditions in the city and official responses to these, but also the wider ideas and approaches prevailing on how rapid urban growth should be managed. The additional disproportionate significance of these plans stems from Dar es Salaam's primacy within Tanzania's urban hierarchy; now eight times larger than the second city and comprising 34% of the country's total urban population.

A distinguishing feature of all three plans has been the degree of influence exerted by external institutions and ideas in shaping Tanzania's leading city. The master plans have not only been externally funded (by British, Canadian and Swedish governments respectively) but also prepared by Foreign planning consultants (from Britain, Canada and Sweden respectively), contracted for the task. However, it is in the content of approach and the plans rather than simply their manner of formulation, which external influence has been most strongly felt. In reviewing the three master plans, it is clear that, despite the continuing transformation or even revolution in local conditions and wider national policy to which each plan had to address itself, nevertheless, the strongest impact on each plan has been Western planning values and concepts in general and, the planning fashions prevailing at the time of each plan's preparation in particular.¹

This article attempts to trace the nature and extent to which Western planning ideas have been imprinted on this Third World city, a process elsewhere described as cultural colonialism.² This task is conceptually assisted by the fact that each plan coincides with, and bears many of the distinguishing features of, three successive phases in the evolution of post-war planning thought. In addition to highlighting the major themes identifiable in each, it is possible to show how many of these specific ideas and the whole process of technology transfer and cultural colonialism which they represent, have proved quite inappropriate to Dar es Salaam's situation and unresponsive and insensitive towards the real needs of its urban residents.

The 1949 Plan

The master plan produced in 1949 by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners of London formed one of a generation of post war plans drawn up for other major towns in British East Africa including Nairobi, Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja and Lusaka.³ Framed within the context of the optimistic Colonial Development and Welfare scheme 1947-57, of which the ill-fated Groundnut Scheme formed a key plank, the first Dar es Salaam Master Plan outlined a rational pattern for the city's growth to enable it meet its expanded functions as the major administrative, commercial and transportation hub in this new phase in the development of Tanganyika Territory.

Unlike the narrow, single-purpose remit of later planning consultants, preparation of the Plan itself was only one among a wide range of tasks entrusted to Dar es Salaam's first outside town planning experts. These included drawing up a new Town Planning Ordinance, setting up a Town Planning Division, advising the Government on planning as well as producing a Master Plan for Mtwara and preliminary planning proposals for other settlements. The final result of their efforts, after two years of 'slow progress' 'was a humble and cheaply produced hand typed document of 160 pages including maps and pasted in photographs, lacking the depth of detailed information and technical jargon of its successors and even carrying the

authors admissions of its various short comings (Table 1). Although only a comprehensive planning scheme rather than a full blown master plan, it sought the limited aim of "keeping development on the right lines until a more detailed examination could be made,"⁴ and represented a distinct advance on the descriptive land-use maps labelled, General Planning Schemes which had operated hitherto. Basically, the plan envisaged a town of 200,000 inhabitants on the west side of the harbour, with a large expanded area to the south west. (Figure 1)

The influence of Western planning ideas can be traced in three recurring themes of the 1949 Master Plan. Firstly, its approach fell within the contemporary town planning tradition which saw planning as naive voluntarism, the planner as an independent and objective technician. The city was considered an artefact to be designed and controlled by planners in the same way as architects shape buildings.⁵ The underlying virtually environmental determinist philosophy was translated into a characteristically physical planning approach, exemplified by its application of somewhat mechanistic Garden City principles, an overriding concern with layout and visual appearance, and its devotion to the arithmetic of prescribed standards and densities. A second related theme is the Plan's tendency to be preoccupied with the same concerns which dominated British planning of the period—primarily health and aesthetics, but also with open space provision, urban sprawl and conservation. A third recurring feature is the Plan's bias in the allocation of urban opportunities and in catering for those aspects of the urban environment which directly affected the small expatriate elite which formed the colonial administrative and business community.

These features, sometimes all interacting, can be traced in both specific proposals and general approaches which the plan incorporates. The concern for public health or what has been termed 'the sanitation syndrome' predominates, partly reflecting the primacy of light, health and air in early British town planning thinking, in response, to the insufferable conditions in its industrial cities, and partly a rational and self interested response of the elite colonial community to the real threat of various tropical diseases.⁶ Indeed, it has been suggested that the moves to institute and systematise town planning in Tanganyika, were not primarily motivated by a desire to house the growing African population, but rather fear of the possible consequences of an outbreak of contagious disease in severely overcrowded and inadequately serviced slum Settlements.⁷ For this reason, throughout East Africa "the government medical service was given almost a stranglehold over urban planning."⁸ The surfacing of the health factor can be traced in the 1948 Plan in not only for example, the weight it accorded the advice of the Government malariologist in formulating proposals, its inclusion of a malaria control map but also its proposals for "the dilution of population from the presently congested (African) areas" the attention devoted to improving road safety, and its efforts to maintain strict residential segregation between racial groups and contain 'racial infiltration', aided by open space buffers.⁹ Finally, the desire to improve the air in the city was one major reason for creating 'breeze lanes.'

The amelioration of future urban problems including health was sought primarily through physical solutions mentioned above, and in particular, the Plan's attempt to reinforce the pattern of functional or land-use segregation, residential areas being further subdivided into three racial zones, a mould first


introduced by German authorities in 1912. The comprehensive physical segregation of different 'social groups' (in effect, thinly disguised racial division) was the simple, but strict planning formula advocated; large plots of 1 acre and above designed for Europeans occupying the well-serviced low density zones in salubrious seaside localities; plots of 1/6 to 1/2 acre set aside for Asians in the adjoining medium density zones, while the high density zones reserved strictly for Africans were allocated limited infrastructure and few services of local standard (Table 2). Overall, urban planning seems to have been considered as a design problem to be dealt with in simple physical terms, the solutions offered satisfying basic functional and cost criteria. Moreover, the systems approach being undeveloped as yet, the urban 'system' was seen as a series of isolated problem areas so that, for example, improvements in the transport network were not closely connected to land use charges, but rather, as isolated improved road alignments, new roundabouts or parking controls; while general standards were presented simply as an extension of these individual solutions.

To preserve the integrity of functional and residential segregation, demarcations between different zones were to be created or maintained. The meadows and creeks which interpenetrate Dar es Salaam's site were embraced as welcome natural no man's lands, but, where these did not extend, deliberately planned cordons sanitaire labelled 'breeze lanes', were proposed to perform a similar function. This latter innovation, was also described as 'ventilation funnels' — continuous open space corridors from the coast, penetrating the built up area and aligned in the direction of the prevailing wind—was also intended as a means to 'aerate the town' and epitomises the linked health concern and architectural engineering approach adopted by the consultants. However, one inevitable but undesirable consequence of residential and functional segregation and lavish open space provision, was an uneconomic spreading of the town: a feature of British colonial cities, in marked contrast with the compact and high density character of otherwise similar Iberian colonial cities such as Maputo.¹¹

The aesthetic as well as health concern of the influential Garden city movement also runs strongly through the 1948 Plan. For example the grid iron-sheet layouts established by the Germans, clearly offend the consultants' sensibilities as being both unimaginative and impractical for traffic. The chess board layout of densely populated Kariakoo area for example, receives heavy criticism on account of "its dull monotony, its regimented pattern, lack of open space and resultant lack of vegetation and its dangerous traffic" and more enlightened layouts are encouraged, the consultants seeing "no reason why up to date principles should not be applied."¹² Throughout, considerable space is devoted to arguing against the general application of rigid geometric forms and alternative proposing layouts such as staggered rows of housing and extended crescent streets, most fully developed for the discrete garden suburbs laid out for the European low density zones. In similar cosmetic vein, the zoned use of Offensive Industry is reclassified as Special Industry because of the former's 'unpleasant sound.'

The introduction of the neighbourhood unit, a relatively fresh planning

Figure 1



concept developed in the 1930's for structuring the rapid sub-urbanisation of North American cities, is however indicative of a more organic and community oriented approach beginning to be espoused by Western planning alongside its established architectural bias. Neighbourhood units were proposed as partially self-contained communities, within larger residential zones and aimed at fostering social cohesion and identity. The ideal unit of 5000 people was to be served by its own centrally located services envisaged as 2 schools, 2 churches, a club, cinema or hall and 2 shopping centres (Table 3)

In the application of these modern planning notions, albeit directly imported from, and reflecting the prevailing concerns of British and North American experience, the consultants could perhaps lay claim to their neutrality and beneficent objectivity, in securing the best living conditions for all in the course of the city's expansion. Yet it soon becomes apparent that the consultants were primarily concerned, consciously or otherwise, with improving conditions as they affect the more affluent, mainly European residents to which these professionals no doubt felt closest affinity. Although Europeans comprised only 2.5% of the total city population and their representation was forecast to rise to a maximum of only 6.1%, the Plan devotes a disproportionate attention to the planning of their low density residential zones; thus the neighbourhood unit is outlined in detail for only one district—the exclusive and a typical European suburb of Oyster Bay with no indication of how it might be adapted for other zones and 'different racial needs'. The planners concern for the comfort and convenience of the white urban elite also emerges in their proposals to reserve the most salubrious localities such as Observation Hill for future low density housing development. Within these zones, detailed consideration is given to creating a golf course (rejected due to unsuitable soil conditions) while the main reason put forward for restricting plot sizes to only one acre is the expressed fear that the cost of maintaining the gardens in larger plots might prove beyond the means of residents. This clear class and racial bias extends beyond residential provision and is reflected in many of the plan's proposals for the city's modernisation. In furtherance of this aim, the improvement of traffic flows and upgrading of the central business district and prestigious individual projects such as a new government centre, a new civic centre, a new airport and new hotels are outlined in some detail. Standards for the control of private development adopt a similar rationale; building owners are advised to leave "10 gaps between houses to make provision for car parking", a consideration relevant at that time to only a tiny minority.¹⁴ These are the logical corollary of their proposals to create attractive low density garden surplus and confirm the impression that colonial urban planning was carried out primarily to meet the needs of the privileged car-owning, office-working and shop-using group which comprised the minority expatriate elite.

The contrast between these lavish proposals and the perfunctory attention accorded to, and extremely limited provisions for the needs of the vast and constantly increasing African population (73% of the total) is stark. Thus the city's second largest district—Ilala with 14,000 residents (20% of the total) is dismissed in a single sentence on the grounds that 'insufficient information' was available.¹⁵ Similarly, the need to improvise a more pleasing street layout in Kariakoo appears to take precedence over proposals for ameliorating poor housing conditions. In general, proposals for the African zones were largely confined to reducing densities, to ensuring that housing

Table 1

DAR ES SALAAM MASTER PLANS: GENERAL DETAILS

Year of Publication	Title and Content	Consultants	Funding	Some Major Planning Concepts
1949	A Plan for Dar es Salaam: Report—One Volume of 158 pp + 12 pp appendix	Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, London 1947-1949	Britain	Zoning of functions Zoning of residential areas according to density and races Neighbourhood units Breeze lanes, open space provision Non-geometric street layouts Density and building standards
1968	National Capital Master Plan: Dar es Salaam Main Plan Report (157 pp) + 7 Technical Appendices including Capital Works Programme (57 pp).	Project Planning Associates Ltd, Toronto January 1967—February 1968	Canada	Plan 2000 (long range concept) Systems Approach. Ecosystem of growth/hierarchical modular urban structure including neighbourhood units satellite sub cities city-region planning Green belt, parkways, landscape corridors open space provision Sector strategies Five Year Capital Works programme.
1979	The Dar es Salaam Master Plan:— Summary, Main Report (104 pp) Five Year Development Programme (60 pp) Technical Supplements.	Marshall, Macklin, Monaghan Ltd, Toronto November 1977—April 1979.	Sweden	Flexibility—population attained rather than target years Hierarchical urban structure based on planning module. Subclassification of residential areas/recognition of squatter areas Participation of implementing agencies Detailed implementation programme including 47 priority projects.

Table 2

DAR ES SALAAM MASTER PLAN: SUMMARY OF CONTENT

Plan period	Population (existing and Projected)	Planning Area	Irregular Housing (% of total)	Housing			Industry and Employment	
				Existing	Density (ppgh)	Proposed	Formal employ- ment	Industrial and Commercial Space (Existing and Proposed)
1949	69,227	84 km ²	n/a	Low	13	20—30		Industrial 202 ha Commercial n/a
1969	200,000		—	Medium	52	50		
1968	272,515	404 km ²	—	High	120—220	100		
				Average	N/A			
				Total				
			9,728 (27.4%)	Low	21	78	75,000	Industrial 1795 ha. Commercial 320513 m ²
				Medium	42	76	(27.5%)	
				High	187	170		
1989	1,000,000*	—	—	Average	72	92	Industrial	6600 ha
(2000)	(2,000,000)			New Development			Commercial	1,120,188 m ²
				Planned:				
1979	849,000	448 km ²	43,501 (60.2%)	Large	39	30-70	129,100	Industrial 2056 ha Commercial 406,523 m ²
				Small	149 84	145	(15.2%)	
				Sites and Services:				
				New		145		
				Upgraded	104	183		
				Unplanned	319	207		
1999	2,268,000	—	—	Average	41	94	418,300 (17.7%)	Industrial 4951 ha Commercial 1,755,800 m ²
				New Development		145		

Table 3

Proposed Urban Structure

Plan	Components	Size	Population	Services
1949	1. Plot	546—4047 m ²		
	2. Neighbourhood Unit	n/a	5,000	Two schools, two religious centres, shopping centre, community centre
	3. Residential District	n/a	2,000—19,480	n/a
1968	1. Plot	810m ²	n/a	Neighbourhood centre, primary and
	2. Neighbourhood Unit	35 ha	5,000—10,000	four nursery schools, local market, TANU office, open space, workshop
	3. Community	261 ha	25,000 — 40,000	Community centre, secondary school, central market, shopping centre, bus station, clinic, open space, police and fire station, industry.
	4. Sub-City	n/a	150,000 — 200,000	Community college, hospital, commerce and industry.
	5. Sub-Metropolis	n/a	500,000	Facilities found in main city but at smaller scale.
1979	1. Plot	400—1600m ²	6—12	small open space
	2. Ten cell Unit	0.4—1.6 ha	60—120	Nursery, two play areas/tot lots.
	3. Housing Cluster	4—16 ha	600—1200	Primary school, shopping area recreation area clinic/dispensary per
	4. Neighbour hood	37—133 ha	4,800	two neighbourhoods planning concept only
	5. Planning Module	145—180 ha	20,000	Two religious centres, community hall, market, shopping centre, two cemeteries, post office, central park.
	6. Community	261—1345 ha	40,000	Facilities found in main city but at smaller scale.
	7. Planning District	n/a	200,000 — 300,000	

8. Residential Buffer Area Minimum plot size 0.5 ha. Unless presently available, services such as water, sewage, electricity and telephone must be privately arranged by residents. No community facilities to be provided.

construction respected road lines and to providing communal water standpipes—all, essential health and security control measures. Apart from these, one or two exceptional gestures aimed at Africans smack of condescending paternalism, such as restricting development of the foreshore “for all those not fortunate to have a frontage to their own property” and provision of allotments, also seeing “no reason why a system of native shambas should not be arranged, a move which paralleled the provision of allotments for the industrial working classes in British cities in the 1920’s and 30’s.”¹⁵

In fact, the importation of fashionable contemporary western planning ideas, served to further enforce this elite bias. For example, no modification was proposed to the rigorous building code in operation which, by insisting on relatively high standards of space, materials and service provision, continued actively to discourage the extension of African owner-occupation. Similarly proposals adhering to the conventional planning wisdom of designating separate zones for industrial use implicitly favoured the embryo modern capital-intensive sector requiring a range of services and good access but also discriminated against the typical indigenous, labour-intensive craft or cottage industry practised mainly by Africans which tended to thrive amid mixed uses.¹⁷ Even the laudable principle of trying to locate residence within reach of employment took shape in the proposed creation of ‘boys towns’ - residential villages for African domestic workers on the periphery of low density zones. While this ingenious solution may certainly have reduced the journey-to-work time of some African workers, its main purpose was transparently to create the necessary labour reserves of domestic staff demanded by European residents while, at the same time, maintaining these at arms length and preserving the principle of racial segregation.

Characteristically, the Plan’s emphasis on design, relegated the question of implementation to a minor role, receiving only a few pages in a short concluding chapter which provides no proposals for necessary capital works. Since Government land is “the only land over which effective control can be exercised,” attention is focussed on expounding certain principles or guidelines to which private development should conform including permitted site coverage, height and spacing of buildings before planning consent should be granted. In contrast with its successors, the 1949 plan, while it “falls far short of any grandiose town planning conception, is at least a practicable suggestion” and reflecting a rather avaricious, self financing policy of the colonial authorities, “introduced only those modifications capable of being carried out with the minimum expenditure”¹⁸ This admission reflects the highly conservative and gradualist approach underlying the whole plan in which its unwillingness to disturb the status quo takes precedence over the planners desire to indulge in bolder and far-reaching physical planning solutions.

Overall, the 1949 Master Plan now appears as a rather out dated period piece, a product of the contemporary colonial situation and of an earlier planning generation, still at an early stage is its evolution but incorporating many of the advances in concept and method developed in Western metropolitan nations, in the first half of the century. While the plan’s ultimate direct impact was quite limited, it nevertheless served to consolidate the emergent urban structure, with all its contradictions and inequalities, which had developed in rather piecemeal fashion previously and established the basis

for Dar es Salaam's subsequent growth which was maintained until the rapid development of irregular housing occurred over the last 20 years. Despite its limitations, the 1949 Plan was also influential in another way, since several planning concepts first proposed here subsequently reappear, admittedly modified and in a more elaborate form, in later master plans.

The 1968 Plan

The 1948 Master Plan and a subsequent brief review in 1958 in the form of an Outline Planning Scheme ostensibly guided the growth of Dar es Salaam for the following 20 years.

By the mid 1960's, however, the city's circumstances had altered out of proportion to the situation prevailing even a decade earlier. As the capital of a recently independent Tanzania, the significant expansion of Dar es Salaam's economic base by rapid population growth meant that its population of 275,000 far exceeded (by 35%) that earlier forecast, of which 97,500 were squatters, a 70% increase since 1963.¹⁹

The policy content had also been transformed, and the 1968 Plan appeared following the important Arusha Declaration and prior to the commencement of the Second Five Year Plan. In addition, a Plan for the development of the Dar es Salaam sub-region produced in 1966 contributed to a much fuller policy framework than has existed previously, while among other significant measures, the freehold land system perceived by the 1949 Plan as the main constraint on rational urban development, had been abolished.

The provision of a Canadian soft loan of 3 million Tanzanian shillings, financed through the principle of tied aid, the private Toronto-based consultancy of Project Planning Associates to prepare the 1968 National Capital Master Plan which, unlike that of their predecessors, formed their sole brief.²⁰ Even the plan's outward appearance—a voluminous and impressively packaged main report and seven technical appendices, the product of 1½ years of work by a sizeable team of experts, epitomises the advance of the planning profession since the slim, modest and relatively amateurish effort of 20 years (Table 1) earlier.

In time and in character, the 1968 Plan can be located towards the end of planning's "era of methodological optimism and the rational scientific approach."²¹ Considerable expertise was committed to produce, guided by a specially prepared project manual and critical path work programme, an appreciable volume of detailed pre-plan survey and forecasting, matched by fairly sophisticated modelling techniques. Dar es Salaam's 1968 Plan represents the high-water mark of the comprehensive prescriptive planning approach emphasising the long range, end-state grand design, relegating the details and routine implementation decisions to politicians and administrators.²² The ambitious optimism of the developing Tanzanian state clearly struck a sympathetic chord with a confident and assertive planning profession at the height of its powers and reputation.

The major distinguishing characteristics of the 1968 Plan, and the major departures from the planning practice of its predecessor include the following:

Firstly, in its temporal, spatial and population coverage, the 1968 Plan is drawn on a broader canvas and grander scale than hitherto. In addition to the customary 20 years time horizon of master plans, the 1968 Plan also provides a long range scenario—Plan 2000, a vision of the intended future urban form of the city at the end of the century in which an estimated eight fold increase of population had to be accommodated in a city of 2 million inhabitants (Figure


2). In addition, this considerable expansion is envisaged largely beyond the existing city boundaries and thus, for the first time, plans for Dar es Salaam's role in its wider city region context, as only one of several expanding growth foci in the overall development of the existing poorly articulated sub-region settlement hierarchy. While Dar es Salaam would continue to function as the major market outlet and service centre, encouraging the expansion of district centres such as Kibaha and Kisarawe was advocated not only as a means of facilitating the sub-region's development but also, by acting as counter magnets, their growth would help discourage urban sprawl and reduce population pressures on Dar es Salaam itself.

Secondly, many new physical planning concepts appear for the first time in the 1968 plan, considerably enlarging the limited conceptual basis and meagre technical vocabulary of its predecessor. Dar es Salaam's outward expansion was to be structured according to an open ended and modular 'ecosystem of growth', in which a tightly controlled green belt was to resist sprawl while a series of almost self contained satellite subcities was progressively developed beyond.²³

The 1968 Plan also incorporates the notion of the urban system, recognising the interconnectivity of the separate elements in the urban structure and trying to develop the city's future pattern on the basis of a rational and integrated land use transportation system. Considerable debate on the preferred pattern was resolved by the decision that the city's extension would be primarily linear, extending from Wazo Hill 15 miles to the north and south across Mzinga creek, following construction of a causeway and linked by parallel, 6-lane freeways. Within this strategic framework, the city is conceived as a multiple of basic cells and the systemic modular principle is extended down to the single house unit presenting a nested hierarchy within which sub-urban residential expansion would be organised (Table 3). Thus the satellite sub-city itself would comprise 4-5 residential districts or neighbourhood units, a concept modified from its 1948 interpretation to describe larger communities of around 40,000 inhabitants, containing secondary school, large central market and small scale industry. At the lower end of the scale, the Plan made a worthy effort to incorporate the prevailing political and social preferences of Tanzania society; neighbourhood units were to consist of 4 village units of between 5,000 - 10,000, possessing limited services and themselves made up of housing clusters (where traditional features such as the corner 'duka' (shop) were found in turn based on the 10 cell unit—the basic household component of Tanzania's participatory socialism. Sector plans, for residential, industrial and central zones respectively were preferred, showing how the planners envisaged layout and development could be best attained in each case.

Thirdly, two important and related elements of the 1948 Plan—prestige and aesthetics - received an invigorated affirmation 20 years later. Great stress is laid on the pride and prestige of Dar es Salaam's capital city function which crystallizes in, for example, the proposal to create the symbolic showpiece of a new government complex on the western escarpment at the city's edge, linked to the city centre by a parkway set in an open space corridor.²⁴ Like neighbourhood units, the concept of breeze lanes re-emerges, but in the elevated and more aesthetic guise of landscape corridors' flowing from the hills to the sea while, at the local scale, these became 'open space fingers' following the existing creeks or, in the new suburbs, as green or open space 'edges' forming undeveloped buffers or mini green belts between different use zones.

Figure 2



Fourthly, reflecting the quite altered social and political circumstances in the country, a major and inevitable departure was the 1968 Plan's aim of "breaking down the exclusive racial and income barriers of the past."²⁵ Thus, while the already developed areas offered the consultants less scope for bold physical designs, an attempt was made to create a variety of plots and types of housing for a range of income groups in every residential zone in order "to depart from the character of earlier residential development emanating from a different social system."²⁶ This was to be achieved primarily by the favoured practice (advocated in all three master plans) of reducing residential densities in certain crowded, mainly African zones and by correspondingly increasing densities, by infilling, in former low density zones. The results of these adjustments sought to reduce the gross inequalities in average densities between highest (Kariakoo) and lowest density (Oysterbay) zones from the prevailing 45:1 ratio to a more acceptable 3.3:1 within twenty years. Further liberalisation is proposed in the plan's willingness to relax the rigid and discriminatory high building standards which prevailed and thus increase the housing stock by harnessing "the individual incentives of prospective home builders through provision of planned plots on which initially traditional type housing units could be constructed."²⁷

Finally, the Plan devotes far greater attention to the question of implementation of its proposals. One sizeable technical appendix (capital works programme) specifies the practical measures, the staged programme for public works investment and planning control, necessary for the first five years to translate the plan into reality. Awareness of the importance of instituting ongoing planning and monitoring beyond the plan preparation stage is also recognised in the arrangements for setting up a Dar es Salaam master plan section in the town planning division.

In spite of the innovative and sometimes progressive planning concepts incorporated for the first time in the 1968 Plan, two influential themes embodied in the document give an indication of its underlying conservative bias.

The first of these is that the principle of allocating different land uses to their own segregated zones remains a continuing and undisputed article of planning faith. Despite the fact that segregated land use discriminated in favour of the modern sector, encouraged a rather uneconomic spreading of the city and placed undue pressure on the inadequate public transport system, the consultants recognised some of its failings but were unwilling to significantly modify them to the extent they proposed for the segregated residential zones. Certainly, they did now permit selected light industry to develop in carefully spaced locations believing "employment centres should be as close to population centres as possible to reduce journey to work time."²⁸ But generally, the principle is extended by distinguishing four different classes of industrial zones and introducing sub-classifications for other major land-using functions.

However, it was the Plan's approach to the problem of irregular (squatter) housing, considered the major issue on which its overall success would hinge, which emerges as insensitive and authoritarian. The Plan typifies an early view of squatters' hostile teeming masses acting as malignant tumour on the healthy development of the city. In its advocacy of prevention and eradication measures, it epitomises the 'hostile hard nosed attitude' embraced by many other city authorities at the time, manifest in attempts to solve the housing problem through the use of police and bulldozers.²⁹ The 1968 Plan

sought the eradication of all squatter areas by 1990, through the implementation of five proposals: removal of existing settlements in embryo; removing areas that conflicted with the master plan; opening up new residential districts; employing a staff of enforcement officers; and no further compensation for resettlement or disturbance costs. With the exception of the third, all are negative and coercive adhering to Le Corbusier's doctrine of urban surgery in which "planners must begin by levelling large tracts in the city to create a clean canvas for their rational designs and architectural master-pieces."³⁰

Additional shortcomings of the 1968 Plan also reveal its disregard of objective conditions. For instance, its choice of a 6% projected population growth rate for the city, far below even the 9% growth already occurring, is perhaps indicative of the consultants' inadequate understanding of wider demographic pressures and their over-estimation of the government's ability to control them. Similarly, continuing urban influx soon led to squatters becoming a majority of city residents thereby rendering both administratively impracticable and politically infeasible, the wholesale stringent coercive measures proposed against them. Moreover, the consultants apparently ignored the effects of major changes in Government policy after 1967 in which, by refocussing development efforts towards the rural areas, funding and priorities for urban development were henceforth considerably downgraded.

The final and major criticism of the 1968 Plan is that its wider concept and specific proposals were over ambitious in terms of the funding, manpower and administrative capacities available to implement them. The capital works programme of 364 million Tanzanian shillings was criticised at the time as being "not very practical because of the limited financial resources and economic objectives of the country" yet it seems that in the six year period, 1970-1976, 600 million shillings was spent on infrastructural implementation of Dar es Salaam's Master Plan, though this was not always well coordinated or directed at the most pressing priorities or most widely beneficial schemes.³¹ The planning machinery itself received no major expansion to enable it to meet existing, let alone, increased pressures on it. The Plan's recommendation of a crash programme to house no fewer than 200,000 families (49,000 plots) as soon as possible reflects its quite unrealistic grasp of operating constraints.

Overall, therefore, despite or perhaps because of its detailed and professional presentation, its array of impressive new planning concepts and its ambitious technical design, all incorporating the latest planning approach, the 1968 Master Plan had a relatively insignificant impact in shaping Dar es Salaam. Less than ten years later, there was "no clearly defined or structured growth pattern in evidence", unplanned housing continued to proliferate unabated and "the initial image of Dar es Salaam (was) one of increasing residential sprawl."³² The plan is a testimony to the advancement of planning as a discipline, and to the ascendancy of (increasingly sophisticated) technique over pragmatism. Despite "its undoubtedly good quality according to advanced North American standards" and its lipservice to local constraints and preferences, its insensitivity and impracticality to conditions on the ground and thus irrelevance to their improvement is now clearly apparent.³ In this respect, it bears all the hallmarks and failings of the second generation of master planning of Third World cities, criticised as being "excessively rigid and antiseptic concept... largely static land use exercises, influenced by an undue degree by... British planning practice."³³

The 1979 Plan

Unlike the optimistic political-economic climate prevailing at the time of Dar es Salaam's two earlier master plans, the state of the nation at the time of its third, was problematic in the extreme. Steadily declining agricultural production, apparently negative effects of earlier widespread villagisation and gathering economic crisis was compounded by the damaging impact of war with Uganda. By the late 1970's therefore, Tanzania's prospects appeared increasingly bleak, prompting the eventual suspension of its Fourth Five Year Plan and its replacement by a National Economic Survival Programme, while Dar es Salaam experienced unabated population influx, the proliferation of unplanned housing and stagnation in employment. Failure to fulfil necessary programme of public works had led to deterioration of the city's infrastructure compounded by intermittent food and water shortages and a serious cholera outbreak.³⁴

The policy framework of the 1979 Plan was also transformed from that of a decade earlier. Dar es Salaam was directly affected by a series of policy decisions; in 1973 to transfer the capital to Dodoma; administrative decentralisation to regional capitals after 1972, a drastic revision of housing policy in 1972 to accept the existence of squatters; a change of emphasis by the National Housing Corporation from slum clearance and housing construction, to the provision of only basic sites and services; and, finally, the reorganisation of local government by transferring local urban responsibilities from city councils to new regional authorities (subsequently reversed).³⁵ At regional level, the 1979 Master Plan also had to take cognizance of not only the Third Five Year Plan, but also Regional Integrated Development Plans produced in 1975 for Dar es Salaam and Coast Regions and the Uhuru Corridor Zonal Plan completed in 1978.

Swedish aid financed the Toronto consultants, Marshall Macklin Monaghan Ltd,³⁶ a firm associated with the 1968 consultants, to produce the Dar es Salaam Master Plan Review. Despite the almost two years spent on its preparation and the incorporation of several more sophisticated planning actions, the 1978 Plan is a more down-to-earth document, compared with its ambitious predecessor, lacking many of that plan's grand planning concepts, and intended as a professional working document, determinedly pragmatic and flexible, concentrating on the more pressing and detailed concerns of urban management (Table 1). This reorientation probably owed less to adverse local circumstances than to the crisis of confidence in planning as a whole ushered in the late 1960's and 1970's. The Plan is primarily a product of the third post war planning generation, (which merely coincided with, rather than reflected Tanzania's and Dar es Salaam's straitened circumstances), in which "rationality had given way to the politics of group conflict, technology to discussion, long-term planning to short-term management, promising immediate solutions to pressing problems."³⁷ Following wider re-evaluation of the shortcomings of earlier planning theory applied to Third World cities, the 1979 Plan reflects the general move in the direction of increasingly fashionable trend planning, foregoing exhaustive survey and analysis and shunning rigid and-state scenarios in favour of managing change, laying down practical programmes and emphasizing control and implementation.³⁸ The 1979 Plan's more limited scope and circumspect approach is also attributable both to its review function and to a defensive reaction on the part of its authors, to

criticism heaped on earlier master plans.

Several themes running through the 1979 Plan provide an indication of its overall character and represent marked departures from the approach of its predecessors.

Firstly, flexibility is incorporated to a far greater extent than previously. For the first time, no rigid schedule of forecast population growth and of capital works to accommodate it is stipulated, schedules which had proved quite inaccurate underestimates in earlier plans. The 1979 Plan identified instead three stages of development, not tied to actual years but to approximate population targets—these stages outline areas of the city to be developed and programmes to be implemented to accommodate population growth to 1.2, 1.5 and 2.4 millions respectively. (Figure 3).


Flexibility is also emphasised in the choice of six alternative schemes, incorporating two major locational options presented by the consultants at the draft stage, with the preferred strategy developed only after widespread consultation and following approval by the Ministry of Lands and the city's Urban Planning Committee. Even within the preferred scheme, some alternatives are suggested; for example, areas which could be developed in the event of the failure to construct the Kigamboni causeway. In addition, a notable omission from the 1979 Plan is all reference to its predecessor's grand planning concepts such as sub-cities, green belts and planning modules. This omission and the Plan's stress on monitoring and management suggests the plan is no longer promulgated as a sacrosanct blueprint but rather a document which "functions as a dynamic guide... for monitoring the growth of the city" which is "predicated on the ability to adjust to different and changing circumstances"³⁹ which reflects the consultants redefinition of a master plan as "planning under uncertainty with variables increasing as the time horizon expands."

Finally, flexibility was not apparently sought at the expense of detail or accuracy. In many aspects, such as its subclassification of residential areas, its explicit detailing of the size of plots and other urban components, and, of course, its more detailed costing of capital programmes, the 1979 Plan focuses on a larger and more detailed scale than its predecessors. In this respect, it continues the trend towards greater methodological rigour introduced with each successive plan. (Table 3).

A new theme of pragmatism runs strongly through the 1979 Plan. The Plan marks a further move away from rigidly segregated functional zoning for different uses, recognising the earlier pressures which this practice placed on the transport system and the encouragement it gave to the establishment of squatter settlements alongside industrial zones. The 1979 Plan states that "industry will now be encouraged to locate throughout the urban area to achieve a better balance between job opportunities and the labour force while reducing travel time and distance".⁴⁰

Pragmatism is also apparent in the Plan's accommodationist approach to the squatter problem. Partly because Western planning practice had by this time shunned slum clearance and demolition in favour of conservation and gradual improvement, and partly because squatters now formed a majority of urban residents with rights now sanctioned by government, relaxation of the draconian approach of the 1968 Plan was inevitable. While still seeking to

Figure 3



ensure that most new development occurred on allocated and surveyed plots, "the construction of self-build houses of local materials" was to be facilitated.⁴¹ Residential areas were subdivided into various categories: various planned areas, areas subject to sites and services schemes and unplanned areas, the latter now being formally recognised with even some infilling planned for certain lower density districts. Moreover, arrangements are also made for monitoring, but not interfering in, new squatter development. Indeed future unplanned development is admitted in the concept of 'residential buffer zones', which represents an interesting new concept for the absorption of additional housing in areas where population pressure becomes severe.⁴² These are "areas adjacent to short and mid-term development areas but not on land designated for future development" but where no facilities will be provided and where the installation of utilities will become solely the owner's responsibility, making them, effectively, officially recognised future squatter areas and institutionalising the dualist concept of two classes of urban resident.⁴³

A third characteristic of the plan is its effort to incorporate 'participation' an element enthusiastically advocated by Western planning in the 1970's. Public participation, per se, was not attempted but politicians, administrators and representatives of the relevant national and city agencies were deliberately and closely involved in formulating initial proposals and recommendations, and later, agreeing on the plan's overall form and content and ensuring the implementability of its proposals. Thus the consultants were eager to stress that the plan was the outcome of "a series of informal and feedback meetings held to ensure that the appropriate officials and politicians understood and agreed with the decisions culminating in the final plan".⁴⁴ While representing a genuine attempt to overcome difficulties of poor co-ordination and implementation which had beset earlier planning efforts, this new emphasis on participation can also be interpreted as an attempt by the consultants to anticipate and deflect possible criticism of their role and work by publicising the plan as a joint effort in which their contribution was simply one of many; hence, perhaps, the proviso that "the plan itself is only a guide to politicians, civil servants and citizens of the most advantageous growth patterns. However, without effective leadership action and control the aims of the plan are not likely to be realised."⁴⁵

However, while significant departures from previous approaches characterise this latest plan, a number of important features reappear, often only slightly modified from earlier versions. An urban structure was proposed which was essentially that of the 1968 plan, but based on the planning module. (see Table 3). The question of residential densities was again a major consideration while the provision of open space, now allocated according to an even more detailed hierarchical system, continued to receive disproportionate attention. All three elements have recurred in each of the three Master Plans examined here, reflecting an underlying uniformity of basic approach throughout; essentially, a strongly physical planning approach, heavily criticised elsewhere for "its peculiar obsession with moving people about, getting them out of some localities and into others, reducing urban densities and with stopping immigration."⁴⁶ (see Table 2).

The question of implementation, incorporating the themes of flexibility, pragmatism and participation discussed, received much fuller attention than in previous plans. Indeed the priority now accorded implementation, to which

more than half the Master Plan report was devoted, is the clearest indication of the managerialist character of the latest planning generation.

The implementation process in the 1979 Plan was divided into three development stages, roughly corresponding to two successive five year phases followed by a ten year phase (although the emphasis is on population attained rather than target years). Major emphasis and priority was laid on the first stage of Development Plan, in which programmes to be implemented and areas to be developed to accommodate population up to 1.3 million were outlined. A separate major volume of the plan presents in some detail, 47 separate priority projects in seven different sectors, each shown on a detailed map, carrying cost estimates and identifying the agency responsible for the implementation of an approach which the consultants claim to have pioneered. The components of the second stage Interim Plan and third stage Master Plan are elaborated in less specific detail, but, nevertheless, these indicate areas to be developed, major programmes required in each sector and estimated expenditure to accommodate population growth to 1.6 million and 2.5 million. Nor does the 1979 plan restrict itself to a narrow project 'shopping list' approach, since detailed guidelines and objectives are specified advising procedures for control and monitoring. Policies and standards for servicing each of the major functional uses and urban structure in general are also laid down. Among the many recommendations is the proposal to form a Utilities Coordinating Committee to improve coordination of programmes of various agencies involved. The rationale presented as underlying the implementation programme reflects both the new realism of planning and its sensitivity to criticism of earlier practice. The Plan claimed to have been formulated "within the context of national policies and economic realities" and to avoid "the transposition of western standard into an environment where national policies are at variance with those standards."⁴⁷

Unfortunately, the 1979 Plan appears not to have lived up to its more realistic intentions and indeed is cited by Kulaba as a typical example of "an unpractical and myopic plan."⁴⁸ Its five year development programme specified an investment of 982 million Tanzanian shillings, almost five times the amount spent by the City Council on all development projects within the previous five year period. Furthermore, more limited funding still was possible in the first two years of the plan, the Treasury allocating the city only 19% and 16% respectively, of the amount required to implement those projects specified in the Master Plan. In other respects, the pattern of development on the ground increasingly diverges from that shown in the Plan, partly due to continuing population pressure, limited development expenditure and the continuing incapacity and inadequacy of the city planning machine.

The 1979 Master Plan incorporates the flexibility and pragmatism inherent in the third town planning generation and reflects the fashion for "planning development in accordance with observed trends" and by specifying detailed implementation programmes and procedures.⁴⁹ Since urban pressures are so strong, however, it seems likely to suffer the similar ignominious fate of its predecessors because plan proposals are far in excess of actual resource availability and the capacity of implementation machinery. The flexible trend planning of the 1979 Master Plan already appears to have been superseded by a form of 'action planning', which is essentially a short term, almost ongoing crisis management, involving little need for master plans.⁵⁰

Conclusion

In the mid 1980's, Dar es Salaam exhibits all the symptoms of 'urban crisis' commonly and increasingly encountered throughout the Third World. Its continuing rapid growth of an estimated 9—10% (or over 100,000 new citizens) annually, has far outstripped not only housing provision, but also planned plot allocation to the extent that two out of every three houses now being constructed are irregular (unplanned). The balance between people and work has been severely upset and, with virtual stagnation in the level of formal employment, recent surveys reveal only one in eight of Dar es Salaam's population hold a regular job. The city is also increasingly beset by problems of inadequate public transport, unreliable water supply and deteriorating infrastructure and services, threatened by intermittent health hazards, food shortages and rising crime rates.

This deterioration in conditions has occurred in spite of, on the one hand, various policy measures directed towards controlling immigration and restricting investment and settlement, while encouraging decentralisation from Dar es Salaam and, on the other, the guiding influence over the past almost forty years of the three master plans considered here. While other factors have contributed, it seems clear that these Master Plans have raised expectations but achieved few, if any results, towards the attainment of a modern, efficient city. A significant part of the explanation for this can be traced to the inappropriateness in format, methodology and content of the technology transfer and cultural colonialism which those foreign funded and executed plans represent. Their irrelevance to changing city conditions and their management mainly because of their application of fashionable western urban planning ideas, helps to explain why all three were soon ignored and relegated to an ignominious fate of collecting dust in the city and ministry planning departments. Meanwhile, Dar es Salaam city authorities find themselves "unprepared to control effectively the present tempo of rapid change" as the first consultants noted thirty seven years ago.

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Defined Purpose of Plan

- 1949 The Master Plan in a "comprehensive planning scheme comprising report and drawings... are far short of the fully detailed Development Plan' intended but should" at least form a useful scheme to prevent further sprawl and alleviate congested conditions now existing. Lack of "local factual information and vital statistics, has been a serious handicap" "No bad planning of the Paris form" has been possible and while the Plan "falls far short of any grandiose town planning conception, it is at least a practical suggestion.
- 1968 The Master Plan is "based on conclusions emerging from analysis of the wide range of surveys carried out." The Plan's purpose is to present "a physical framework with policy guidelines for the future development of Dar es Salaam "describing the manner, location and relative priority in which all future urban development should take place in Dar es Salaam by means of policy statements, maps, programmes of works, cost estimates and technical explanations."
- 1979 A Master Plan "plans for uncertainty and the variables increase as the time horizons expand. This Plan through careful monitoring and built-in flexibility, attempts to reduce this uncertainty as much as possible." A primary objective is to provide a development programme and "to promote coordination of all agencies involved in planning infrastructure development. The Plan "represents a pragmatic approach in that, planning is done within the context of national priorities and economic realities." The Plan is "only a guide to the politicians, civil servants and citizens."

Plan Implementation

- 1949 A brief chapter on implementation includes guidelines or relevant development and building standards. No programme of capital works suggested and no estimates of implementation costs.
- 1968 Capital works programme, stage I of Master Plan implementation presented for the first five years, divided into five phases. Recommends development strategies necessary, identifies priority projects and areas to be developed, with general costings. Further study programme outlined. No proposals for implementations beyond first five years. Cost estimates: Stage TShs. 380 million.
- 1979 Master Plan implementation divided into three development stages—Development, Interim and Master Plan. First Five Year Capital Works Programme identifies 47 priority projects, with costings. Detailed implementation controls, monitoring procedures and development policies and standards laid down. Cost estimates: Stage I = 983 Tshs. million; Stage II = 2040 Tshs. million; Stage III = 3242 Tshs. million; total = 6265 Tshs. million.