STRUGGLES FOR THE "SECOND INDEPENDENCE" IN CONGO- KISHANSA E. Eamba-dia-Wamba Department of History University of Dares Salaam Lumumba's Assassination: Implications for the Struggles for National Independence Patrice E. Lumumba, the first head of the government of the independent Congo (now Zaire, since 1971) was assassinated in Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), Katanga (Shaba) on January 17th 1961. Internal and external forces opposed to what Lumumba represented, worked jointly to eliminate the strongest leader of the nationalist forces struggling for a genuine national indepe- ndence. In August 1960, at a meeting of the American National Security Council (NSC), for example, President Eisenhower gave what was understood as a green light for the CIA to go ahead with the contingency planning to eliminate Lumumba as the neces- sary solution for the Free World cause in the Congo.2 Timber- lake, the US ambassador in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), and Lawre- nce Devlin, the CIA station chief in Leopoldville — who described himself as an "adviser to a Congolese effort to 'eliminate' Lumu- mba**3 — had been for some time making suggestions (and pres- sures) to work out something for the ultimate elimination of Lu- mumba. Those suggestions were said to be in line with the senti- ments of the Congolese moderates who included: Kasa-Vubu, Deo, Bomboko, A. Kalondji, C. Adoula, etc*4* The African Divi- sion of the CIA *s clandestine services then headed* by Bronson Tweedy, put up a technical plan for the assassination of Lumumba by virus or poison. Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, whose secret code name was 'Joe from Paris' arrived in Leopoldville on September 26th 1960 with everything necessary for this operation. As Thomas 31 UTAFlTl- Vol 9No 1 1987 ]{anza wote in his The Rise and FaN of Patrice lumumba: "Lu- mumba was a victim of a conspiracy worked out abroad, and put into effect in the Congo with the willing or unwilling help of his own compatriots." 5 Among these were, of course, "personal and political enemies of the Prime Minister" brought "together by representatives of international financial monopolies and We- stern secret services working to combat communist influence in Africa." 6 In this period following the "earlier cold war ofthe late 1940's and early 19SO's7- as a phase of struggles for world hegemony -, given the strategical location of Congo-Zaire within the we- stern zone of influence, the Soviet Union in a relatively wealcer position could not possibly have risked a confrontation with a de- termined and expanding Pax Americana to rescue a Lumumbist type of national independence for the Congo. The other external forces favourable to such a genuine national independc:nce - the Afro-Asiatic nationalist group - were too weak to be in a po- sition to do anything substantive and not even sure of the capacity to defend their own national independence. What then did Lumumba repres~nt? Although, by class back- ground, a member of the evolue (intelligentsia) fraction of the Afri- can colonial petty bourgeoisie - the other fractions being: tra- ders, rich peasants, civil servants - by 1958 - 1959 deeply involved in the anti-colonial mass movement, Lumumba became a radical nationalist. With his participation at the Accra African peoples conference in 1958, his nationalist perspective became broadened. His party programme - presented to the public in 1959 - conceived of the future Congolese society as being poli- tically independent with a Congolese capitalism developed in cooperation with Belgian capitalism. It expressed a perspective typical of an aspiring national bourgeoisie with an eye on foreign s capital. This was the most advanced vision of the leading class (petty bourgeoisie) in the struggle for national independence; a class that was in the main tailing the radicalism of workers and poor peasants. The most reactionary element of the class _ the chiefly rich peasant element tied to the colonial state Or its reproduction of pre-coloniid pre-capitalist forms of e~loitation - was actively opposed to any idea of political independence, and the 'moderate' intellectuals were still agitating for a colonial programme of native preparation for independence. The ABAKO 32 Warnba- .'Second Independence" leadership, due to its being rooted in a mass movement for 'im- mediate independence' dominated by radicalized workers and poor peasants, was, as an exception, forced to agitate for immedi- ate independence by the late 19505. Lumumba was catching up with the radical elements in the ABAKO petty bourgeois leader- ship and going very much beyong them by the end of 1959. Between June and December 1960, Lumumba then majo- rity leader and Prime Minister, had to confront many obstacles put up by imperialists and their local allies to prevent him from reaching his aim of a true national independence. The incident over the historiographical confrontation opposing Lumumba to King Baudouim of Belgium on the day of the independence festivities-June 30th 1969-:-left no doubt that, like the French in Guinea in 1958, Belgians, who favoured only a neo-colonial independence for the Congo were going to do all in their power to maintain and perhaps expand their imperialist exploitation and domination. It was also dear that some Congolese elements were supporting or coniving with Belgian interests. Lumumba, despite regrettable diplomatic consequences, had, against the King, to vigorously set the historical record strai- ght: the national indepetldence was not a gift of the civilizing mis- sion of King Leopold n and his successors, but an outcome of victorious difficult struggles of the Congolese people 10 Lumu- mba and other nationalists intended to lead the Congolese pe- ople's struggles to win and defend a true national independence. Belgian imperialists, supported by their NATO allies, were raising one obstacle after another to bar the nationalist objective of a ge- nuine national independence. Within the first week of independe- nce, a Belgian instigated mutiny of the Force Publique led to a si- tuation of a major crisis, and allowed Belgians to militarily re- occupy the country. This was followed by Belgian settlers' sup- ported secessions of two rich mining provinces. The UN operation that was invited by. the Congolese government to redress the situ- ation by dealing with the Belgian military invasion and the cata- strophic disorders it gave rise to, instead functioned ultimately against the nationalist led government for the protection - if not expansion - of Western interests on the pretext of excluding Cold War in the Congo, that is, to keep the Soviet/Communist influence out of the Congo. All those manoeuvrers were triggered off with an ultimate aim of letting the nationalist government 33 VTAFlTI- Vol9No 1 1987 ~lIapse. It was necessary for Lumumba to vigorously expose those manouvrers; the toll, however, was heavy: the government be- came divided into opposite camps_ Some MNC-L and close go- vernment collaborators were leaving Lumumba to join the band- wagon of puppets, imperialist collaborators or reformists. All those difficult circumstances of struggle for true national inde- pendence forced Lumumba's political and ideological positions to be drastiCally transformed. The massive response in most parts of the country given to Lumumba's call to struggle against Belgian military invasion and secessions was an indication that his new conceptions reflected the-most advanced level reached by the mass movement against the threat of Belgian neocolonialism. By the end of 1960, Lumumba had come to the following con- <;Iusions : Il 1. There cannot be any possible compromise with imperialism; the struggle between authentic nationalism and imperialism is an antagonist one, that is, one to the death. 2. Only the mobilization of popular masses constitutes a force capable of winning against imperialism. 3. imperialist domination, ~ased on the use of arms, can only be won against by armed resistance. 4. The struggle against imperialism cannot be won unless it is linked to a struggle against local imperialist collaborators. As can be seen, Lumumba reached the conclucions which were in line with the radiCalism of workers and poor peasants, especially in the rural areas where imperialist primitive accumu- lation had devastated the most. Workers of private settlers' plan- tations in Kivu, those who were made landless or confined to poor lands through land expropriation (state, concessionary companies, etc.), those reduced to sharecroppers or seasonal workers in the Lever's empire of Bandundu and those made very bitter by the local dictatorship of colonial administrators and their chiefly a,Ilies-through forced labour, taxation, forced crops, etc. _ were indeed, in a position to understand, identify with and unite with Lumumba's call. To summarize, 'From the point of view of the Belgians and especially the cold war crusading Americans, Lumu- mba's radical nationalism was seen as a potential threat to a stable future of the Congo under NATO. Thus, even before independence had been won manoeuvres were ini- tiated in order to keep Lumumba out of power. This having 34 Wamba- "Second Independence" failed, the army mutiny provided the needed opportunity for Katanga to secede thereby cutting the main source of funds for the state, and thus politically destabilising Lu- mumba. For the western powers, this was the main purpose of the Katangese secession (Emmanuel, 1972). Unfortu- nately for the west it took a while for Tshombe and his southern white allies to realise this. 12 Why did Lumumba fail despite the massive people's support? This question was the key to the continuation of the struggle for true national independence. It is too easy to simply say that impe- rialist forces and their local allies were too strong for the nationa- list forces led by L~mumba to win. Fundamentally, the main problem was the insufficient political and theoretical develop- ment ofthe leading core .ofthe mass movement of struggle for true national independence. Lumumba lacked any solid organizational structures capable of dealing with imperialism - let alone syste- matically organizing the large masses of people and isolating lo- cal imperialist allies., No real attempt, for example, was made by Lumumba's party, MNC-L, to make some inroads into the social base of ABAKO to win over some of the most politicized elements of the movement. Lumumba's own government, filled with all kinds of opportunists-since it was organized on the basis of "compromise for the sake of territorial unity' - was but a house of cards unable to resist against any imperialist blow. Some of his own ministers were actively conspiring. to overthrow him. Two of his ministers - Bomboko and Delvaux - actually co-signed president Kasa-Vubu's act of revocation of Lukumba as Prime Minister. Ultimately, Lumumba and his few reliable colla- borators became real hostages inside a colonial state in the process of becoming a neo-colonial one. The nature of the existing 'parties (~deologically confused mass organizations) did not permit them to systematically orga- nize, ideologically equip and effectively lead the masses of people to stage a victorious counter-attack against NATO imperialism and its local allies. The leadership lacked a satisfactory theory of the balance of forces within the world conjuncture in which the struggle was taking place and thus that of the revolutionary and democratic character of the struggle. Unifying forces that could be unified were lacking. Reformists who might not necessarily have been pro-imperialists were driven to' become imperialist 35 UTAFITl- Vol 9 No 1 1987 agents. Carried away by majority vote, the Lumumbist leader- ship tended to break too soon the united front character of the national independence movement, thus failing to effectively co- ntinue isolating reflirmist/compradore elements especially when faced with Belgiaa agression, secessions and UN pro Western powers operation. Being fundamentally radical nationalists, Lu- mumbists failed to realize that nationalism per se is never consi- stently anti-imperialist. As a bourgeois ideology, nationalism is often confusionist. as it hides, specifically, class interests under general interests of 'the people as a whole'. Therefore the neces- sity to uncover the class character of the consistent antagonism against imperialism evaporates. Imperialist interests are also, more often than not, justified by a form ofnationaIism.H The crucial question in the pursuit of struggles for national independence'-especially in the period of struggles for World he- gemony, is the necessity for the leadership of the movement to be politically and ideologically independent from any world ideo- logical centers. The lack ofthe national capacity ofthe ruling class- to-be was demonstrated by the fact that the nationalist govern- ment. faced by the Belgian caused crisis, was relying on the UN- at least at the outset - than on the the masses of the people themselves. Both the pro-secessionist and pro-US imperialsit collaborator fractions of the ruling-class-to-be were relying re- spectively on Belgian settlers and imperialists and other NATO imperialist forces. It was, indeed a mistake for Lumumbists to tendentially let themselves be forced to rely on the Soviet Union. In these conditions, the ruling c1ass-to-be was incapable of even achieving a political unification of the class: its members tending to be pulled from every direction so that the struggle to take con- trol of the state was indeed settled by outsiders. "To readers of C.C.O'Brien's To Katanga and Back , wrote J. Depelchin, "it will not be difficult to recognize the whole period from 1960 to 1964 as unique in the history of Independent Africa, in the se- nse that while sharp struggles, to take control of the statz, were going on UN officers and western powers' ambassadors (parti- cularly that of the USA) were busy not only determining which faction was going to take over but also shaping and moudling the state apparatus to suit their own needs.' '14 'The working class, not having developed any political autonomy, could have provided neither a state capacity nor a national capacity - nor even taken 36 Wam ba- "Second Independence" up organizationally the tasks implied by Lumumba's conclusions. Thos~ tasks included the completion of the seizure of the colonial state power; its transformation into a democratic one, that is, a state based on 'the principle that power comes from the people', organization and arming the masses of people, politically isola- ting imperialist local allies and confronting imperialist, political, economic and military assaults. Disarmed and determined not to retreat, even tactically, Lumumba'had to die. Had he been able to retreat, could he have orgnized successfully, at least the poli- tical autonomy of the working class? It seems, in hindesightvery doubtful. Struggles for the "Second Independence. "" The Independence has been sold to imperialist powers by the murderers of Lumumba. We must struggle for the, second independence. -Pierre Mulele. With the death of Lumumba, nationalists and revolutionary forces lost their most courageous and shrewd leader. A period of confusion and opportunism among Lumumbist nationalists followed. "~'Nationalist parties, like other parties, 15 degenerated shortly after the proclamation of independence. This was due, in part, to the class leadership of those mass parties that conceived these 'as a means ~o have access to colonial state posts after Bel- gian colonialists' departure. Parties for national independence, not necessarily being rooted in the mass movement against colo- nialism. never came together in an organized manner to form a broad large mass-based united front for national liberation. By the force of circumstances they were roughly grouped into three camps: the pro-colonial restoration camp of parties inspired by colonialists and settlers, the pro-US led NATO imperialist neo- colonialist camp-ultimately led by the Binza group, and the na- tionalist camp - ultimately led by MNC-L and PSA-G. Only the last camp could be said to have, at least tendentially, acted as 'a broad mass-based united front for national independence. The radicalization of the nationalist bloc brought about the unification ')f the two other camps. 37 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 Three tendencies 16 were c;ompeting for the leadership of the nationalist bloc: the national bourgeois aspiring elements" ulti- mately led by Christophe Gbenye; the radical petty bourgeois ele- ments represented by Gaston Soumialot and Olenga; and the properly revolutionary - increasingly marxist inspired - ele- ments - ultimately represented by Pierre Mulele, Theodore Benguila, Leonard Mitudidi, Thomas Mukwidi, Laurentin Ngola, Laurent Kabila, etc.J7 Only this last tendency clearly understood the need for the patient political mobilization, anti-tribalist/re- 'gionalist unification and even military preparation of the large masses of the people. Unfortunately, this minority tendency needed more time to actually and completely win over the leader- ship of the entire mass movement of the second independence. The first two tendencies were more interested in replacing tha neocolonial compradore bureaucratic class in the colonial/neo- colonial state apparatuses rather than in fighting for a real national independence capable of transforming the conditions of mass domination, oppression and impoverishment. By early 1961, some members of the Lumumbist bloc succe- eded in regrouping in Stanleyville (Kisangani) and tried to orga- nize a nationalist counter-attack to overthrow the imperialist puppet government of the College of Commissioners - principally composed of university students installed by Mobutu's. coup d'etat of September 14th, 1960. A nationalist government was formed; it was headed by Lumumba's deputy Prime Minister, Antoine Gizenga. The resulting polarization of the class fractions of the ruling-class-to-be organized in three camps, thus led to a form of a geopolitical separation/opposition of zones of influences. The Stanleyville based nationalist government had the control of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. The Leopold- ville based neocolonial government of the College of Commis- sioners controlled the near-Western and Western parts of the country. And the Elizabethville/Bakwanga based pro-settlers' secessionist governments were in charge of parts of Kasai and Katanga (Shaba) provinces. Of course, the more the nationalist camp appeared to gain momentum, the more the two other camps joined forces. The nationalist government had, internally, a strong mass- support especially in areas controlled by nationalist parties; and externally, it was immediately recognized by the 'progressive' 38 Wamba- "Second Independence" African states (the Cassablanca group, etc.) and most of the 'so- cialist' camp. Nevertheless, in the absence of a strong leader- ship and torn apart by regionalist fractionist tendencies and real ideologico-political differences (bourgeois, radical petty bourgeois .and revolutionary), the government was unable to carry out, mer- ciless protracted struggle against imperialist puppets and colla- borators. Nor did it even begin, despite Mulele's advice, the po- litico-military preparation for a protracted armed struggle. Under the pressure of the 'bourgeois tendency', the nationalist govern- ment ended up falling into the imperialist instigated trap of 'na- tional reconciliation'. The bourgeois desire for quick access to state posts made it fail to see that a genuine movement of the na- tional unification/union of the Congolese people cannot possibly and successfully be led by a government of imperialist collabora- tors. The nationalist government had hardly consolidated its social base before A. Gizenga and other Lumumbist ministers accepted to go to Leopoldville and participate in the pro-Am6rican Adoula's government of 'national union'. Gizenga became Adoula's deputy Prime Minister in this imperialist tactic of breaking off the nationa- list momentum. It was a surprise to no one when, a few weeks later, Gizenga was arrested and sent to Mbula Mbemba's jail where he was kept for two years - only to be freed by Prime Minister Moise Tshombe in a new attempt to disorient the nationa- list camp! NATO imperialism, under cover of the UNC operation arid 'through its local allies, took advantage of this period of na- tionalist political weakness to consolidate the emerging neo- colonialist compradore bureaucratic class ally. Through the Col- lege of Commissioners. pro-Western imperialist forces became the real administrator of the newly 'independent state in crisis.' Former colonial administrators. consciously or unconsciously opposed to Congolese political independence, came back as tech- nical advisers for the 'new state.' Belgian 'technicians', who had been governing the secessionist Katanga, moved to Leopoldville to take up the governance of the whole country. Relatively 'neu- tral' UN functionaries (e.g. Dayal) were being e.liminated~ Local neo-colonial forces (e.g. those organized through the CIA inspired Binza group) were put in control of the former Force Publique army and other key state apparatuses while at the same time very 39 UTAF/TI- Vo/9 No 1 ~987 drastically curtailing the remammg democratic institutions won through national independence struggles. The Leopoldville US pro-consul, Ambassador Timberlake, perhaps expressed the general feeling of the Western imperialist opposition to democra- tic institutions threatening the continuation and deepening of imperialist doiniDationin the Congo, when. he said;" I do not believe there is one single Congolese who has more than theoretical idea of even the most elementary principles of democracy. They obviously cannot practice something they do not understand. This does not insult the many well-intentioned Congolese but does discount their ability to produce anything resembling democratic government until they have been taught. 18 It is clear here that in the spirit of "'freedom loving" imperi- alists. the colonial period having failed to "teach Congolese to practice democracy". a neo-colonial period, under American supervision, was needed to acComplish that task, if ever. One al- 'ready saw the remote elements laying the ground for the US "going our way':19 foreign policy towards Zaire. The policy, strongly favoured a pro-American anti-democratic (repressive) centralized Slllte led by a strong defender of US interest. Already in 1963. Adoula's government, seeking to silence the remaining Lumumbist parliamentarian opposition, arrested many persistent Lumumbist nationalists and obtained President Kasa-Vubu' dissolution of the Parliament. Those, among nationalists who still dreamt of pursuing the struggle to occupy state posts by legal means - induding the call for general elections - had to tacti- calIy join hands with proponents of armed struggle. The masses of people largely stirred up by the fast deterio- ration of their socio-economic conditions in the face of the rising group of arrogant nouveaux riches; and being genuinely grieved by Lumumba and his collealgues'2Q assassination, were ready in many parts of the country to take up arms and struggle for the second independence. It was under these conjunctural circum- stances that nationalist forces took up the organization of the poli- tical leadership ofthe mass insurrectional movement. Representatives from four nationalis~ parties - PNCP (parti de la Convention Populaire - Bas Congo), PSA-G (Gizen- ga's Pani Solidaire Africain), CEREA (Bisukiro's CEREA), and MNC-L (Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais) - agreed 40 Wam!x.- "SecoNd /lideperJdmce" to create another political formation regrouping all the remaining Lumumbist forces: the national council for Liberation (ConseR national de Liberation - CNL) was formed in 1963. It was a form of a united front, reproducing again the contradictory tendencies of the nationalist bloc, to serve as the leading core of the Second Independence movement. This was clearly an advance over the ~umumbist conception of relying on state apparatuses to trans- form the colonial state and society. The different tendencies in- side the CNL, however, had different conceptions of what was to be done on the basis of their different lessons drawn from Lornu- mba's failure. The nationalist bourgeois tendency (C. GBenye, Bocheley- Davidson) wanted to use CNL and armed struggle to seize the neo- colonial state power and replace, in the state apparatuses, the im- perialist collahorators, and colonial restorators, but not neces- t sarily to deal with the socio/ question. It thus eould not conceptu- alize correctly the question of the political and organizational form of the class leadership of the anti-colonial and anti-imperi- alist people's camp in the absence of an organized political autono- my of the working class. Its conception of the CNL tended increa- singly to be a kind of a government in exile, it started opposing and censoring tr~ly revolutionary positions. It thus lacked a cor- rect conception of the nature of the on-going struggle for the se- cond independence and did not even hesitate to engage in compro- mising negotiations with colonial restorators such as M. Tshombe and imperialist forces, such as Henri Paul-Spaak and L. Devlin.2)" that is, to beg for political power from imperialists themselves: •give us power, we will protect your interests better than your lo- cal puppets'! The radical petty bourgeois line, represented by Soumialot, Olenga and Marandura, tended to be militaristic. subordinating political mobilization to military recruitment and deployment of children (simbas). Politics was often understood by Lumumbists as the process of occupation of local administrative posts. That is why they often politically fell under the leadership of the bourge- ois line that used them to contain truly revolutionary forces and seize political power in Stanleyville (Kisangani) proclaiming a Co- ngolese People's Republic without consulting the revolutionary forces. Issues of crucial political importance such as fetishism, tribalism, male chauvinism and regionalism (localism), chara- 41 lJTAFlTI- Vo/9No I 1987 cterizing pre-capitalist forms of consciousness, were actually in- tensified instead of being dealt with, resolved or problematized. The fusion of marxism with the mass revolutionary movement became blocked, at least in the Eastern wing. The revolutionary tendency of the CNL whose main leaders - Mulele, Benguila, Mukulubundu, Mukwidi, Mitudidi - stu- died the lessons of the most advanced e~eriences of the oppres- sed people's revolutionary movement22 , had worked out a speci- fic revolutionary strategy to lead the popular mass insurection of 1%3-1964. The document of the CNL programme, written. by Thomas Mukwidi and published ~~'on April 15, .1964,:summarized the co- nclusions reached at Nkata (NkwiJu) by those advanced cadres of the revolutionary tendency. It clearly explained that the ongoing struggle had a national and democratic character. It was a na- tional revolution because imperialist domination controlling' the country's economy, civil administration and army, represented the principal enemy to destroy. As imperialism relied on itsoCo- ngolese agents, "an oligarchy whose reliance on the USA was the only coherent trait", the revolution therefore had also to be de- mocratic: it had to aim at oyerthrowing a ferocious government sold. out foreign interests' i' so as to actualize' the' principle that power comes from the people~ The document also noted that the Congolese people were actually fighting for their security, dignity. freedom, democracy and prosperity. The document specified the objectives ofthe revolution. "The socialist experience based on the conditions of our country", it said, "is the surest road for the development of our popular masses". Specific orientations to follow in order to achieve that objective were said to gradually take shape through the protra- cted struggle itself. "While having opted for socialism", the do- cument went on, "we must guard ourselves not to fall under the dependence of a foreign ideological center." The necessity for self-reliance for a genuine national independence was clearly as- serted. The fundamental means to achieve the objective was said to ~ be the "revolutionary armed struggle". "It is essential, the do- cument emphasized. "to rely on our own forces even when aid from friends - we welcome - may be an important element to accelerate victory." This radical solution requires that revolu- .42 Wam ba- •'Second Independence" tianaries fundamentally depend an the popular masses af the Ca- ngalese peaple as the sale social farce capable af bringing it about. The dacument appealed to. Cangalese patriats, wherever they were, to. arganize themselves in Committees af three to' six people to' taJce up the tasks specified in the programme. The histarical process of the natianal and democratic revalutian was believed to' ultimately cleanse the masses of people af foreign induced alie- natians and other reactionary African traditions. It is clear here that the arganizational questian af the class leadership of the CNL united front was nat clearly dealt with. Were the' conimittee~ to be' formed by patriots supposed to functian as party cells ? Was tbe CN!: seen as the fuifill~ent af a lum umb~' s ca~l for rigoraus ati<;t hamogenaus' party? As a united front, the CNL should have dealt with the question af its class arganizatianal leadership. To. actually be realized as conceived, the programme required a Marxist-Leninist type party to organize and lead the united front. The issue of whether ar not bourgeois and petty bourgeais class leadership of a united frant can acbieve a national and democratic revalutian is, in taday's Africa, nat an abstract questian. Mulele and Mitudidi ultimately took up the study ofthe questian afthe faundatian af a M-L type party. They faced a difficult limitatian: the whale mavement had abaut seven palitically experienced Marxist-Leninist cadres. This grave li- mitation explains the failure by revalutianary farces to. daminate nat anly the CNL unite'd front but also to. pravide the averall'lea- dership afthe whale revalutianary mavement. At any rate, armed with the CNL programmtf.~plltriats were ready to. engage in armed struggle. They had already ruled aut - an the advice af the PNCP - the suggestian that the apening Maquis be arganized in the Mayumbe forest, clase to. Kinshasa, in the area of arigin af president Kasa- Vubu as tbe local populatian was still fundamentaIly supporting Kasa-Vubu and ABAKO. By July 1963, Pierre Mulele began arganizing the maquis in Kwi- lu. 'The idea was that partisans fram all aver the cauntry wauid came there far politico ...military training and go.back to. set up ather Maquis. This proved to' be difficult, if nat impassible, due to. the strictly clandestine character af the operatian and the military and security capacity af the Leapoldville regime. Leapaldville was already in farmed af the whereabouts af Mulele just faur days after his arrival in his viIIage. It is impartant to. nate that baurgeois and 43 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 petty-bourgeois tendencies within the CNL did not support the conception that emphasized the protracted character of the struggle as they wanted to occupy state posts as soon a~ possib!e. The truly revolutionary leadership, although confined to a smaller area, was provided by Pierre Mulele's maquis. Mulele was the first, in the Congo, to have attempted to organize a na- tional and democratic revolution with a marxist-Leninist inspi- ration. He was the first to have organized and led the first great popular insurrection against a neo-colonial regime in indepe- ndent post-colonial Africa. That no victorious case has yet taken place in Africa shows how difficult the operation is. It is thus still important to briefly study Mulele's experience. Pierre Mulele, Former Minister of National Education and Culture in Lumumba's government, has probably been the most dedicated revolutionary the Congo has so far produced. That is perhaps why neo-colonial historiography of Zaire tries so hard to confine him to a moral silence or to treat him as the black sheep of Zairean history., Mulele was basically a self-educated man having been expel- Jed from.the seminary for refusing to believe in the 'Saint Virgin Mary' mystery (immaculate conception). Before his inv'olvement in the organized politics of national independence struggles, he served a couple of years in the colonial Force Publique. He, together with Gizenga and Kama, founded in 1959, 'the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), after studying carefully lill,th~t transpired on the important experiences of anti-colonial struggles (Vietnam, Algeria, Kenya's Mau-Mau, etc). PSA was, with ABAKO, the most organized anti-colonial political party. It was at this time that Mulele became aware that a long and protracted struggle was needed to actually win national liberation. He, in fact, was among the least surprised and shaken up by imperia- lists' treatment of Lumumba and his colleagues. In December 1959, he went to Conakry with the aim offurther studying the most advanced nationalist experiences of Africa. He met Andree Blouint5 • a left-pan-africanist woman and an extremely t~ent!4 organizer. She became Lumumba's head of protocol after partici- pating, on the side of Mulele and Gizenga, in the PSA electoral campaign (April- May 1960) in KwillL She h.elped considerably politicize women in the area; four years later, some of those poli- tized ones played an important role in Mulele's maquis. 44 Wamba- "Second Independence" As minister -l c:: ('D 'ttJ '0 '"in > g ~ ~- .... ~ en '1:l ~ t"' S~> ::a t"' >-l > V; ::a o > l'tl (') Z~l'tl 9 o 0 3: Z 3: > ~ ~ en I:l 0 c:: m > ~.~ ::a trl::a tIl -rri '> 0 3: ttJ '" Z 3: ttJ, ,S" > t"' tIl. l"" ::a i tIl Sft"' > 0 ~ ~ ttJ ~ ttJ o~ ( o~ "Il Z ~l j~ "0 8 > 0 ttJ 3: l"" ~ 0 ;:r:: e "0 > 0 l"" ~I Z ttJ ttJ ::a VI- I 64 Wamba- "Second Independence " Teams sent reports to the GR _ntbIy 00: :political situation .- education/organization of popular masses -:- activity ofthe enemy situation of partisans ~combats ~ performances in battles, deficiencies, casualjties, etc. Relations masses/partisans Eco!)omic situation - agriculture, quantity of food received from villagers, etc. -finance VRLAGE COMMl'lTEES (up to 10 people) great fmmittee chalnnan often traditional chiefs, politi~al Committee Vice-chairman many were patriotic questlo secretary nationalists; when reactionary, the chief kept his title, but' committee chainnan was somebody else elected. military leader of the Committee - mobilization of villagers in combat against ANC soliders. agriculture officer - makes sure people continue to cultivate their sham bas elections of judges organized in each village protocol officers infonnation officer intendence officer intelligence/ security/officer Close relation - PartiS3ll team village committee as long as village existed when villagers forced to go to the forest. no separation. Twice per week: political lessons given t~ villagers., 6S UTAFlTI- Vol 9 No I 1987 DAILy ACI'IVITIES, 6 00 a.m. everybody up 7 00 a.m. flag. salute (red flag) Morning activities manual labour: cut trees, make bivouacs, look for food in the forest and wood for cooking, carry water, wash clothes. - military training -c- missions - attack on ANC soldiers - ambushes, - road blocks. 1200 -14.00 rest 1400 pm fIag salute Afternoon activities - political education open to nearby villa. gers - continuation of morning activities up to 1730 pm. - collective cooking - dinner: 1830 p.m. - leaders, Mulele, Bengila and Kafungu, others eating Oldy after everybody else has eaten sometime 2200 p.m. If not enough. food leaders did not eat. Miliary Zones: up to 7 or 8 starting Feb. - March 1964. 1st: Centre zone, Kalaganda area zone South-West zone, Northern zone, Kandale- Kabemba zone, Kilembe-Ngudi zone, Zone (Commanders and assistants) Commanders nominated according to merits by MuleIe and Bengila. Capacity for military leadership. Partisalls teams. 66 Wamba- "Second Independence " ~ ,,=' -, < 0' o ... ...cr;:3.,~. =' 0 "- -- =' '0 ... "'" '" ~ '< ...., N o =' "'" .~ .0 c;,. <: o t"l r;' ;; ... a"... '< " :r ~ o (j ...., .," ., ~ ,J:J 3 C '0 ,t"l = .,"" "- "ll ;~. ::l. ..." ,,' g ::t '" ~ ~ a:" ,I:; c ~ =' IJQ .... =- i UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1987 o en ......... ..... « ... '" 3 ~ 8"8 }:l '" '"3 ~3 ::to (JQ "'0..... 08en '.n .... < :l en ... , en 3 '" !:i" ='" aa ~ :I