

STRUGGLES FOR THE "SECOND INDEPENDENCE" IN CONGO-KISHANSA

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Lumumba's Assassination: Implications for the Struggles for National Independence

Patrice E. Lumumba, the first head of the government of the independent Congo (now Zaire, since 1971) was assassinated in Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), Katanga (Shaba) on January 17th 1961. Internal and external forces opposed to what Lumumba represented, worked jointly to eliminate the strongest leader of the nationalist forces struggling for a genuine national independence. In August 1960, at a meeting of the American National Security Council (NSC), for example, President Eisenhower gave what was understood as a green light for the CIA to go ahead with the contingency planning to eliminate Lumumba as the necessary solution for the Free World cause in the Congo.¹ Timberlake, the US ambassador in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), and Lawrence Devlin, the CIA station chief in Leopoldville — who described himself as an "adviser to a Congolese effort to 'eliminate' Lumumba"² — had been for some time making suggestions (and pressures) to work out something for the ultimate elimination of Lumumba. Those suggestions were said to be in line with the sentiments of the Congolese moderates who included: Kasa-Vubu, Ileo, Bomboko, A. Kalondji, C. Adoula, etc.³ The African Division of the CIA's clandestine services then headed by Bronson Tweedy, put up a technical plan for the assassination of Lumumba by virus or poison. Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, whose secret code name was 'Joe from Paris' arrived in Leopoldville on September 26th 1960 with everything necessary for this operation. As Thomas

Kanza wrote in his *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba*: "Lumumba was a victim of a conspiracy worked out abroad, and put into effect in the Congo with the willing or unwilling help of his own compatriots."⁵ Among these were, of course, "personal and political enemies of the Prime Minister" brought "together by representatives of international financial monopolies and Western secret services working to combat communist influence in Africa."⁶

In this period following the "earlier cold war of the late 1940's and early 1950's"⁷ — as a phase of struggles for world hegemony —, given the strategical location of Congo-Zaire within the western zone of influence, the Soviet Union in a relatively *weaker* position could not possibly have risked a confrontation with a determined and expanding Pax Americana to rescue a Lumumbist type of national independence for the Congo. The other external forces favourable to such a genuine national independence — the Afro-Asiatic nationalist group — were too weak to be in a position to do anything substantive and not even sure of the capacity to defend their own national independence.

What then did Lumumba represent? Although, by class background, a member of the *evolue* (intelligentsia) fraction of the African colonial petty bourgeoisie — the other fractions being: traders, rich peasants, civil servants — by 1958 — 1959 deeply involved in the anti-colonial mass movement, Lumumba became a *radical nationalist*. With his participation at the Accra African peoples conference in 1958, his nationalist perspective became broadened. His party programme — presented to the public in 1959 — conceived of the future Congolese society as being *politically independent* with a *Congolese* capitalism developed in cooperation with Belgian capitalism. It expressed a perspective typical of an aspiring national bourgeoisie with an eye on foreign capital.⁸ This was the most advanced vision of the leading class (petty bourgeoisie) in the struggle for national independence; a class that was in the main tailing the radicalism of workers and poor peasants. The most reactionary element of the class — the chiefly rich peasant element tied to the colonial state or its reproduction of pre-colonial pre-capitalist forms of exploitation — was actively *opposed* to any idea of political independence, and the 'moderate' intellectuals were still agitating for a colonial programme of native preparation for independence. The ABAKO

leadership, due to its being rooted in a mass movement for 'immediate independence' dominated by radicalized workers and poor peasants, was, as an exception, forced to agitate for immediate independence by the late 1950s. Lumumba was catching up with the radical elements in the ABAKO petty bourgeois leadership and going very much beyond them by the end of 1959.

Between June and December 1960, Lumumba then majority leader and Prime Minister, had to confront many obstacles put up by imperialists and their local allies to prevent him from reaching his aim of a true national independence. The incident over the historiographical confrontation opposing Lumumba to King Baudouin of Belgium on the day of the independence festivities—June 30th 1969—left no doubt that, like the French in Guinea in 1958, Belgians, who favoured only a neo-colonial independence for the Congo were going to do all in their power to maintain and perhaps expand their imperialist exploitation and domination. It was also clear that some Congolese elements were supporting or coniving with Belgian interests.

Lumumba, despite regrettable diplomatic consequences, had, against the King, to vigorously set the historical record straight: the national independence was not a gift of the civilizing mission of King Leopold II and his successors, but an outcome of victorious difficult struggles of the Congolese people.¹⁰ Lumumba and other nationalists intended to lead the Congolese people's struggles to win and defend a true national independence. Belgian imperialists, supported by their NATO allies, were raising one obstacle after another to bar the nationalist objective of a genuine national independence. Within the first week of independence, a Belgian instigated mutiny of the Force Publique led to a situation of a major crisis, and allowed Belgians to militarily re-occupy the country. This was followed by Belgian settlers' supported secessions of two rich mining provinces. The UN operation that was invited by the Congolese government to redress the situation by dealing with the Belgian military invasion and the catastrophic disorders it gave rise to, instead functioned ultimately against the nationalist led government for the protection — if not expansion — of Western interests on the pretext of excluding Cold War in the Congo, that is, to keep the Soviet/Communist influence out of the Congo. All those manoeuvrers were triggered off with an ultimate aim of letting the nationalist government

collapse.

It was necessary for Lumumba to vigorously expose those manouvrrers; the toll, however, was heavy: the government became divided into opposite camps. Some MNC-L and close government collaborators were leaving Lumumba to join the bandwagon of puppets, imperialist collaborators or reformists. All those difficult circumstances of struggle for true national independence forced Lumumba's political and ideological positions to be drastically transformed. The massive response in most parts of the country given to Lumumba's call to struggle against Belgian military invasion and secessions was an indication that his new conceptions reflected the most advanced level reached by the mass movement against the threat of Belgian neocolonialism.

By the end of 1960, Lumumba had come to the following conclusions :¹¹

1. There cannot be any possible compromise with imperialism; the struggle between authentic nationalism and imperialism is an antagonist one, that is, one to the death. 2. Only the mobilization of popular masses constitutes a force capable of winning against imperialism. 3. Imperialist domination, based on the use of arms, can only be won against by armed resistance. 4. The struggle against imperialism cannot be won unless it is linked to a struggle against local imperialist collaborators.

As can be seen, Lumumba reached the conclusions which were in line with the radicalism of workers and poor peasants, especially in the rural areas where imperialist primitive accumulation had devastated the most. Workers of private settlers' plantations in Kivu, those who were made landless or confined to poor lands through land expropriation (state, concessionary companies, etc.), those reduced to sharecroppers or seasonal workers in the Lever's empire of Bandundu and those made very bitter by the local dictatorship of colonial administrators and their chiefly allies—through forced labour, taxation, forced crops, etc. — were indeed, in a position to understand, identify with and unite with Lumumba's call.

To summarize, From the point of view of the Belgians and especially the cold war crusading Americans, Lumumba's radical nationalism was seen as a potential threat to a stable future of the Congo under NATO. Thus, even before independence had been won manoeuvres were initiated in order to keep Lumumba out of power. This having

failed, the army mutiny provided the needed opportunity for Katanga to secede thereby cutting the main source of funds for the state, and thus politically destabilising Lumumba. For the western powers, this was the main purpose of the Katangese secession (Emmanuel, 1972). Unfortunately for the west it took a while for Tshombe and his southern white allies to realise this.¹²

Why did Lumumba fail despite the massive people's support? This question was the key to the continuation of the struggle for true national independence. It is too easy to simply say that imperialist forces and their local allies were too strong for the nationalist forces led by Lumumba to win. Fundamentally, the main problem was the insufficient political and theoretical development of the leading core of the mass movement of struggle for true national independence. Lumumba lacked any solid organizational structures capable of dealing with imperialism — let alone systematically organizing the large masses of people and isolating local imperialist allies. No real attempt, for example, was made by Lumumba's party, MNC-L, to make some inroads into the social base of ABAKO to win over some of the most politicized elements of the movement. Lumumba's own government, filled with all kinds of opportunists—since it was organized on the basis of "compromise for the sake of territorial unity" — was but a house of cards unable to resist against any imperialist blow. Some of his own ministers were actively conspiring to overthrow him. Two of his ministers — Bomboko and Delvaux — actually co-signed president Kasa-Vubu's act of revocation of Lumumba as Prime Minister. Ultimately, Lumumba and his few reliable collaborators became real hostages inside a colonial state in the process of becoming a neo-colonial one.

The nature of the existing parties (ideologically confused mass organizations) did not permit them to systematically organize, ideologically equip and effectively lead the masses of people to stage a victorious counter-attack against NATO imperialism and its local allies. The leadership lacked a satisfactory theory of the balance of forces within the world conjuncture in which the struggle was taking place and thus that of the revolutionary and *democratic* character of the struggle. *Unifying* forces that could be unified were lacking. Reformists who might not necessarily have been pro-imperialists were driven to become imperialist

agents. Carried away by majority vote, the Lumumbist leadership tended to *break* too soon the united front character of the national independence movement, thus failing to effectively continue isolating reformist/compradore elements especially when faced with Belgian aggression, secessions and UN pro Western powers operation. Being fundamentally *radical nationalists*, Lumumbists failed to realize that nationalism per se is never consistently anti-imperialist. As a bourgeois ideology, nationalism is often confusionist, as it hides, specifically, class interests under general interests of 'the people as a whole'. Therefore the necessity to uncover the class character of the consistent antagonism against imperialism evaporates. Imperialist interests are also, more often than not, justified by a form of nationalism.¹³

The crucial question in the pursuit of struggles for national independence, especially in the period of struggles for World hegemony, is the necessity for the leadership of the movement to be *politically and ideologically independent* from any world ideological centers. The lack of the national capacity of the ruling class-to-be was demonstrated by the fact that the nationalist government, faced by the Belgian caused crisis, was relying on the UN—at least at the outset — than on the the masses of the people themselves. Both the pro-secessionist and pro-US imperialist collaborator fractions of the ruling-class-to-be were relying respectively on Belgian settlers and imperialists and other NATO imperialist forces. It was, indeed a mistake for Lumumbists to tendentially let themselves be forced to rely on the Soviet Union. In these conditions, the ruling class-to-be was incapable of even achieving a political unification of the class: its members tending to be pulled from every direction so that the struggle to take control of the state was indeed settled by outsiders. "To readers of C.C.O'Brien's *To Katanga and Back* , wrote J. Depelchin, "it will not be difficult to recognize the whole period from 1960 to 1964 as unique in the history of Independent Africa, in the sense that while sharp struggles, to take control of the state, were going on UN officers and western powers' ambassadors (particularly that of the USA) were busy not only determining which faction was going to take over but also shaping and moulding the state apparatus to suit their own needs."¹⁴ The working class, not having developed any political autonomy, could have provided neither a state capacity nor a national capacity — nor even taken

up organizationally the tasks implied by Lumumba's conclusions. Those tasks included the completion of the seizure of the colonial state power; its transformation into a democratic one, that is, a state based on 'the principle that power comes from the people', organization and arming the masses of people, politically isolating imperialist local allies and confronting imperialist, political, economic and military assaults. Disarmed and determined not to retreat, even tactically, Lumumba had to die. Had he been able to retreat, could he have organized successfully, at least the political autonomy of the working class? It seems, in hindsight very doubtful.

Struggles for the "Second Independence."

The Independence has been sold to imperialist powers by the murderers of Lumumba. We must struggle for the second independence.

—Pierre Mulele.

With the death of Lumumba, nationalists and revolutionary forces lost their most courageous and shrewd leader. A period of confusion and opportunism among Lumumbist nationalists followed.

Nationalist parties, like other parties,¹⁵ degenerated shortly after the proclamation of independence. This was due, in part, to the class leadership of those mass parties that conceived these as a means to have access to colonial state posts after Belgian colonialists' departure. Parties for national independence, not necessarily being rooted in the mass movement against colonialism, never came together in an organized manner to form a broad large mass-based united front for national liberation. By the force of circumstances they were roughly grouped into three camps: the pro-colonial restoration camp of parties inspired by colonialists and settlers, the pro-US led NATO imperialist neo-colonialist camp—ultimately led by the Binza group, and the nationalist camp — ultimately led by MNC-L and PSA-G. Only the last camp could be said to have, at least *tendentally*, acted as a broad mass-based united front for national independence. The radicalization of the nationalist bloc brought about the unification of the two other camps.

Three tendencies¹⁶ were competing for the leadership of the nationalist bloc: the national bourgeois aspiring elements, ultimately led by Christophe Gbenye; the radical petty bourgeois elements represented by Gaston Soumialot and Olenga; and the properly revolutionary — increasingly marxist inspired — elements — ultimately represented by Pierre Mulele, Theodore Benguila, Leonard Mitudidi, Thomas Mukwidi, Laurentin Ngola, Laurent Kabila, etc.¹⁷ Only this last tendency clearly understood the need for the patient political mobilization, anti-tribalist/regionalist unification and even military preparation of the large masses of the people. Unfortunately, this minority tendency needed more time to actually and completely win over the leadership of the entire mass movement of the second independence. The first two tendencies were more interested in replacing the neocolonial compradore bureaucratic class in the colonial/neocolonial state apparatuses rather than in fighting for a real national independence capable of transforming the conditions of mass domination, oppression and impoverishment.

By early 1961, some members of the Lumumbist bloc succeeded in regrouping in Stanleyville (Kisangani) and tried to organize a nationalist counter-attack to overthrow the imperialist puppet government of the College of Commissioners — principally composed of university students installed by Mobutu's coup d'etat of September 14th, 1960. A nationalist government was formed; it was headed by Lumumba's deputy Prime Minister, Antoine Gizenga. The resulting polarization of the class fractions of the ruling-class-to-be organized in three camps, thus led to a form of a geopolitical separation/opposition of zones of influences. The Stanleyville based nationalist government had the control of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country. The Leopoldville based neocolonial government of the College of Commissioners controlled the near-Western and Western parts of the country. And the Elizabethville/Bakwanga based pro-settlers' secessionist governments were in charge of parts of Kasai and Katanga (Shaba) provinces. Of course, the more the nationalist camp appeared to gain momentum, the more the two other camps joined forces.

The nationalist government had, internally, a strong mass-support especially in areas controlled by nationalist parties; and externally, it was immediately recognized by the 'progressive'

African states (the Cassablanca group, etc.) and most of the 'socialist' camp. Nevertheless, in the absence of a strong leadership and torn apart by regionalist fractionist tendencies and real ideologico-political differences (bourgeois, radical petty bourgeois and revolutionary), the government was unable to carry out a merciless protracted struggle against imperialist puppets and collaborators. Nor did it even begin, despite Mulele's advice, the politico-military preparation for a protracted armed struggle. Under the pressure of the 'bourgeois tendency', the nationalist government ended up falling into the imperialist instigated trap of 'national reconciliation'. The bourgeois desire for quick access to state posts made it fail to see that a genuine movement of the national unification/union of the Congolese people cannot possibly and successfully be led by a government of imperialist collaborators.

The nationalist government had hardly consolidated its social base before A. Gizenga and other Lumumbist ministers accepted to go to Leopoldville and participate in the pro-American Adoula's government of 'national union'. Gizenga became Adoula's deputy Prime Minister in this imperialist tactic of breaking off the nationalist momentum. It was a surprise to no one when, a few weeks later, Gizenga was arrested and sent to Mbula Mbemba's jail where he was kept for two years — only to be freed by Prime Minister Moise Tshombe in a new attempt to disorient the nationalist camp!

NATO imperialism, under cover of the UNC operation and through its local allies, took advantage of this period of nationalist political weakness to consolidate the emerging neo-colonialist compradore bureaucratic class ally. Through the College of Commissioners, pro-Western imperialist forces became the real administrator of the newly 'independent state in crisis.' Former colonial administrators, consciously or unconsciously opposed to Congolese political independence, came back as technical advisers for the 'new state.' Belgian 'technicians', who had been governing the secessionist Katanga, moved to Leopoldville to take up the governance of the whole country. Relatively 'neutral' UN functionaries (e.g. Dayal) were being eliminated. Local neo-colonial forces (e.g. those organized through the CIA inspired Binza group) were put in control of the former Force Publique army and other key state apparatuses while at the same time very

drastically curtailing the remaining democratic institutions won through national independence struggles. The Leopoldville US pro-consul, Ambassador Timberlake, perhaps expressed the general feeling of the Western imperialist opposition to democratic institutions threatening the continuation and deepening of imperialist domination in the Congo, when he said;

I do not believe there is one single Congolese who has more than theoretical idea of even the most elementary principles of democracy. They obviously cannot practice something they do not understand. This does not insult the many well-intentioned Congolese but does discount their ability to produce anything resembling democratic government until they have been taught.¹⁸

It is clear here that in the spirit of "freedom loving" imperialists, the colonial period having failed to "teach Congolese to practice democracy", a neo-colonial period, under American supervision, was needed to accomplish that task, if ever. One already saw the remote elements laying the ground for the US "going our way"¹⁹ foreign policy towards Zaire. The policy, strongly favoured a pro-American anti-democratic (repressive) centralized state led by a strong defender of US interest. Already in 1963, Adoula's government, seeking to silence the remaining Lumumbist parliamentary opposition, arrested many persistent Lumumbist nationalists and obtained President Kasa-Vubu's dissolution of the Parliament. Those, among nationalists who still dreamt of pursuing the struggle to occupy state posts by legal means — including the call for general elections — had to tactically join hands with proponents of armed struggle.

The masses of people largely stirred up by the fast deterioration of their socio-economic conditions in the face of the rising group of arrogant *nouveaux riches*; and being genuinely grieved by Lumumba and his colleagues'²⁰ assassination, were ready in many parts of the country to take up arms and struggle for the second independence. It was under these conjunctural circumstances that nationalist forces took up the organization of the political leadership of the mass insurrectional movement.

Representatives from four nationalist parties — PNCP (*Parti de la Convention Populaire - Bas Congo*), PSA-G (Gizenga's *Parti Solidaire Africain*), CERECA (Bisukiro's CERECA), and MNC-L (Lumumba's *Mouvement National Congolais*) — agreed

to create another political formation regrouping all the remaining Lumumbist forces: the national council for Liberation (*Conseil national de Liberation* — CNL) was formed in 1963. It was a form of a united front, reproducing again the contradictory tendencies of the nationalist bloc, to serve as the leading core of the Second Independence movement. This was clearly an advance over the Lumumbist conception of relying on state apparatuses to transform the colonial state and society. The different tendencies inside the CNL, however, had different conceptions of what was to be done on the basis of their different lessons drawn from Lumumba's failure.

The nationalist bourgeois tendency (C. GBenye, Bocheley-Davidson) wanted to use CNL and armed struggle to seize the neo-colonial state power and replace, in the state apparatuses, the imperialist collaborators, and colonial restorators, but not necessarily to deal with the *social question*. It thus could not conceptualize correctly the question of the political and organizational form of the *class leadership* of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist people's camp in the absence of an organized political autonomy of the working class. Its conception of the CNL tended increasingly to be a kind of a government in exile, it started opposing and censoring truly revolutionary positions. It thus lacked a correct conception of the nature of the on-going struggle for the second independence and did not even hesitate to engage in compromising negotiations with colonial restorators such as M. Tshombe and imperialist forces, such as Henri Paul-Spaak and L. Devlin.²¹ that is, to beg for political power from imperialists themselves: 'give us power, we will protect your interests better than your local puppets'!

The radical petty bourgeois line, represented by Soumialot, Olenga and Marandura, tended to be *militaristic*, subordinating political mobilization to military recruitment and deployment of children (simbas). Politics was often understood by Lumumbists as the process of occupation of local administrative posts. That is why they often politically fell under the leadership of the bourgeois line that used them to contain truly revolutionary forces and seize political power in Stanleyville (Kisangani) proclaiming a Congolese People's Republic without consulting the revolutionary forces. Issues of crucial political importance such as fetishism, tribalism, male chauvinism and regionalism (localism), chara-

cterizing pre-capitalist forms of consciousness, were actually intensified instead of being dealt with, resolved or problematized. The fusion of marxism with the mass revolutionary movement became blocked, at least in the Eastern wing.

The revolutionary tendency of the CNL whose main leaders — Mulele, Benguila, Mukulubundu, Mukwidi, Mitudidi — studied the lessons of the most advanced experiences of the oppressed people's revolutionary movement²², had worked out a specific revolutionary strategy to lead the popular mass insurrection of 1963—1964.

The document of the CNL programme, written by Thomas Mukwidi and published²³ on April 15, 1964, summarized the conclusions reached at Nkata (Nkwilu) by those advanced cadres of the revolutionary tendency. It clearly explained that the ongoing struggle had a *national* and *democratic* character. It was a national revolution because imperialist domination controlling the country's economy, civil administration and army, represented the principal enemy to destroy. As imperialism relied on its Congolese agents, "an oligarchy whose reliance on the USA was the only coherent trait", the revolution therefore had also to be *democratic*: it had to aim at overthrowing a ferocious government sold out foreign interests so as to actualize the principle that power comes from the people. The document also noted that the Congolese people were actually fighting for their security, dignity, freedom, democracy and prosperity.

The document specified the objectives of the revolution. "The socialist experience based on the conditions of our country", it said, "is the surest road for the development of our popular masses". Specific orientations to follow in order to achieve that objective were said to gradually take shape through the protracted struggle itself. "While having opted for socialism", the document went on, "we must guard ourselves not to fall under the dependence of a foreign ideological center." The necessity for self-reliance for a genuine national independence was clearly asserted.

The fundamental means to achieve the objective was said to be the "revolutionary armed struggle". "It is essential, the document emphasized, "to rely on our own forces even when aid from friends — we welcome — may be an important element to accelerate victory." This radical solution requires that revolu-

tionaries fundamentally depend on the popular masses of the Congolese people as the sole social force capable of bringing it about. The document appealed to Congolese patriots, wherever they were, to organize themselves in committees of three to six people to take up the tasks specified in the programme. The historical process of the national and democratic revolution was believed to ultimately cleanse the masses of people of foreign induced alienations and other reactionary African traditions.

It is clear here that the organizational question of the class leadership of the CNL united front was not clearly dealt with. Were the committees to be formed by patriots supposed to function as party cells? Was the CNL seen as the fulfillment of Lumumba's call for a rigorous and homogenous party? As a united front, the CNL should have dealt with the question of its class organizational leadership. To actually be realized as conceived, the programme required a Marxist-Leninist type party to organize and lead the united front. The issue of whether or not bourgeois and petty bourgeois class leadership of a united front can achieve a national and democratic revolution is, in today's Africa, not an abstract question. Mulele and Mitudidi ultimately took up the study of the question of the foundation of a M-L type party. They faced a difficult limitation: the whole movement had about seven politically experienced Marxist-Leninist cadres. This grave limitation explains the failure by revolutionary forces to dominate not only the CNL united front but also to provide the overall leadership of the whole revolutionary movement.

At any rate, armed with the CNL programme,²⁴ patriots were ready to engage in armed struggle. They had already ruled out — on the advice of the PNCP — the suggestion that the opening Maquis be organized in the Mayumbe forest, close to Kinshasa, in the area of origin of president Kasa-Vubu as the local population was still fundamentally supporting Kasa-Vubu and ABAKO. By July 1963, Pierre Mulele began organizing the maquis in Kwilu. The idea was that partisans from all over the country would come there for politico-military training and go back to set up other Maquis. This proved to be difficult, if not impossible, due to the strictly clandestine character of the operation and the military and security capacity of the Leopoldville regime. Leopoldville was already informed of the whereabouts of Mulele just four days after his arrival in his village. It is important to note that bourgeois and

petty-bourgeois tendencies within the CNL did not support the conception that emphasized the *protracted* character of the struggle as they wanted to occupy state posts as soon as possible.

The truly revolutionary leadership, although confined to a smaller area, was provided by Pierre Mulele's *maquis*. Mulele was the first, in the Congo, to have attempted to organize a national and democratic revolution with a marxist-Leninist inspiration. He was the first to have organized and led the first great popular insurrection against a neo-colonial regime in independent post-colonial Africa. That no victorious case has yet taken place in Africa shows how difficult the operation is. It is thus still important to briefly study Mulele's experience.

Pierre Mulele, Former Minister of National Education and Culture in Lumumba's government, has probably been the most dedicated revolutionary the Congo has so far produced. That is perhaps why neo-colonial historiography of Zaire tries so hard to confine him to a *moral silence* or to treat him as the black sheep of Zairean history.

Mulele was basically a self-educated man having been expelled from the seminary for refusing to believe in the 'Saint Virgin Mary' mystery (immaculate conception). Before his involvement in the organized politics of national independence struggles, he served a couple of years in the colonial Force Publique.

He, together with Gizenga and Kama, founded in 1959, the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), after studying carefully all that transpired on the important experiences of anti-colonial struggles (Vietnam, Algeria, Kenya's Mau-Mau, etc). PSA was, with ABAKO, the most organized anti-colonial political party. It was at this time that Mulele became aware that a long and protracted struggle was needed to actually win national liberation. He, in fact, was among the least surprised and shaken up by imperialists' treatment of Lumumba and his colleagues. In December 1959, he went to Conakry with the aim of further studying the most advanced nationalist experiences of Africa. He met Andree Blouin²⁵, a left-pan-africanist woman and an extremely talented organizer. She became Lumumba's head of protocol after participating, on the side of Mulele and Gizenga, in the PSA electoral campaign (April — May 1960) in Kwilu. She helped considerably politicize women in the area; four years later, some of those politicized ones played an important role in Mulele's *maquis*.

As minister of Education and Culture, Mulele, already well known for his opposition to imperialism and its religious aspect, created panic in the Church establishment which had the monopoly over the schooling system by advocating the complete nationalization of the entire educational system.

Mulele was with Lumumba on his way towards Stanleyville, after Lumumba had escaped from his Leopoldville house arrest and when, after crossing over the Sankuru river, he decided to go back to the other side to rescue his wife and child and was thus ultimately arrested by Mobutu's soldiers. It is said that Mulele told Lumumba as he said goodbye to him, that he preferred his family to the people's continuation of struggle against imperialist domination. In other words, it seemed clear to Mulele that Lumumba confused the interests of the whole with those of the part. Mulele arrived safely in Stanleyville. After having tried his best to advise A. Gizenga, he told president K. Nkrumah that in his view, Gizenga was "incapable to resist against the assaults of the neo-colonial forces."²⁶ He spent sometime in Cairo where it is said that he became quite close to Nasser. In March 1962, he went to the People's Republic of China where he stayed for more than a year studying the Chinese revolutionary experience with emphasis on elementary military and civil technology.

Sometime in 1963, Mulele returned clandestinely to his home area in Kwilu. He found that the local situation had become almost catastrophic. In relation to 1960, the standard of living had gone down by about 50%. Though people had still to pay taxes, peasants had almost nothing to sell. Police and military officers were descending on villages, grabbing any available property (goats, chicken, pigs, etc.), imposing arbitrarily one kind or another of taxes, and detaining or imprisoning people on futile charges. A few days after Mulele's arrival, his presence became one major reason to mobilize and justify military violence. The regional government put aside 1,000,000 C.F. as a prize for the head of Mulele. By September 1963, the national army organized military operations in the area to look for Mulele. Villages were terrorized and devastated. Tarra, a priest, who witnessed these events described how these military operations were taking place in these words:

This is how the military officers proceed. They arrive in

the village early in the morning. They summon the village head right away and ask him to assemble the whole village by clans. The head of the clan is required to check on the families of his clan. If a child, girl or boy is missing, the head of the clan is responsible and must bear the consequences for such an absence. He is thus tortured and so are the parents and it does happen that the heads of all the clans are beaten up due to absences in every one of the clans. They are required to pay heavy tributes; clothes of the parents and heads of the clans and their other property of basic necessity are confiscated. These are very horrible scenes to watch. All the villagers are lined up: women on one side and men on the other. Men are asked to lay down on their stomach. Police and military officers must walk on the men's backs. They are thoroughly whipped as if they were dogs. And blood is shed. Goats, chickens, etc., sometimes filling a whole truck, are collected for the officers.²⁷

This went on for months before Mulelist partisans started defending themselves and the people through armed struggle.

To start organizing for armed struggle, Mulele had first to gain the confidence of traditional chiefs who also felt victimized by the new bureaucratic rulers and who had control over the village masses. He assured them that military terrorism was going to be dealt with and the well-being of the villages guaranteed. For Mulele, popular masses were like the river and the partisans were like fish. Wherever there are masses there must be the partisans. With the permission of the Chiefs, Mulele built his camps in the forests, recruited his partisans from children of the peasants. The partisans received, for some months, political and military training.

Due to constant military raking operations in the area, the camps had to be continuously moved. In four to five months, Mulele recruited and trained a considerable number of partisans, estimated at 100,000 by mid 1964, in an area of about 500,000 people.²⁸ The partisans, of course, included both women and men and received the same basic political and military training. They were organized by teams (equipes) that had each from nine to a hundred sixty five members. The average age of members was about twenty years with an average education of about four and a half years of schooling. For the cadres (political commissars, military commissars, secretaries, councillors, trea-

surers, etc.), the average age was about twenty eight years with an average education of about seven years of schooling. Most of the ordinary partisans were recruited from the unemployed or student elements; while cadres were people who have had some profession or were students.

By December 1963, the military terrorism in the area forced the population to take Mulele's side. This created a lot of problems for Mulele's plans. How, for example, in the absence of a vanguard party, were they to take up all the urgent tasks required by the new situation: 1. the political and military training of the partisans; 2. military activities of self-defence and the defence of the masses of people fleeing military assaults in the villages to join Mulele's camps; 3. the political mobilization of the broad masses of people; 4. the organization of production of resistance to satisfy the socio-economic needs of both partisans and the population at large; etc. Definitely there must have been a shift in Mulele's original plan. By the end of 1964, the mere size of the liberated zone posed many problems for its defence and administration. The revolution was ultimately defeated, not militarily — as the case of the Eastern front — but, by the absence of an economy of resistance. How were they to organize a guerrilla economy not open to the enemy's military destruction, when the entire population in an area became partisans, that is, they went to hide in the forest in the absence of enough cadres to deal with the situation? Pierre Mulele himself gives a pertinent analysis of the political reasons for the defeat (see annex).

A truly revolutionary party must emerge from a mass revolutionary movement itself; but the latter, to develop further to victory, requires a well organized and powerful revolutionary party to lead it. Most of the intellectuals were on the side of the bureaucratic rulers; the minority, with some reading knowledge of marxism — especially inside the UGEC (General Union of Congolese Students) — were hostile to (or cut from) the mass movement and its emerging leadership.

Before concluding this introductory study of the struggles for the Second Independence, let me touch on some features of Mulele's ideas. He, like most of the great political leaders, conformed to his political conceptions of truth which give priority of the oral over the written, directives over analyses. Nevertheless, Mulele's ideas²⁹ can be seen in the political lessons he gave, the dire-

ctives given to his partisans and the very important document (see Annex), written by him or under his supervision, summing-up the first three years of armed struggle. Most of his political lessons were centered around the idea that Independence was sold to imperialist powers by the murderers of Lumumba, and that it was necessary to struggle for a second independence. The enemy was clearly identified as imperialism and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Mulele classified the social forces into three categories: strangers or imperialists who steal our country's resources; people in the bad government who help strangers or imperialists to steal the country's wealth and who are thus reactionaries. These were said to live on the basis of aid from imperialists and did not care about the rest of their brothers and sisters who starved and lived in misery. The rest of the whole population who live in misery: the poor people, peasants and workers. These were like hunting dogs that catch the kill but eat only bones. In relation to the struggle, the Congolese population was divided into four categories: the reactionaries, the backward people (*arrieres*), the intermediaries and the partisans. The reactionaries were the internal social forces serving imperialists and as such were the principal enemy of the people. No amount of political education could transform them into forces of the revolution. The people who faced daily imperialist pillage and violence and who thus lived in misery, the peasants and the workers, formed the group of the partisans.

Between the reactionaries and the partisans were the backward people and the intermediaries. The backward ones were the marginal people characterized politically by their complete lack of political consciousness. They are not an enemy of the revolution as such, but they must be educated. The intermediaries or intellectuals are characterized by their opportunism, that is, they have one foot inside and another foot outside. Because of that attitude, they are dangerous. They are capable of the best as well as the worst action — from the point of view of the revolution, they therefore; must be led by the partisans. Those are some of the ideas expressing Mulele's understanding of the Congolese neo-colonial society. Although Mulele's experience failed, it is clear that it provided important lessons for any struggles against neo-colonialism in Africa, then and in the future. It is sad that it took about seventeen years after his death for some of his ideas and conclusions to start coming out.

NOTES

1. Madeleine G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables*, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1982. pp. 53-55, 63-66, 101-103, 128-133.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.* p. 101
4. *Ibid.*
5. Thomas Kanza, *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba*, Schenkman Publishing, Co., Cambridge, Mass, 1977, p. 342.
6. *Ibid.* p. 347.
7. Fred Halliday, *Threat from the East?* Penguin Books, New York, 1982, p. 14
8. Ludo Martens, "Lumumba, cet inconnu", *Solidaire* No. 42 (427), 7 Nov. 1984, pp. 9-12.
9. An attempt to analyze this confrontation has been made by Jacques Depelchin, *Lumumba and history of Zaire* 1980. (unpublished).
10. See June 30th 1960 Lumumba's speech in *Speeches and Writings of Patrice Lumumba*, Little Brown, New York, 1972, pp.
11. Ludo Martens. "L'Ideologie du mouvement revolutionnaire au Congo-Kinshasa 1963-1968: Forces et faiblesses" *Solidaire* No. 2 (437), 16th Jan. 1985, pp. 12-13.
12. Jacques Depelchin, "The Transformations of the Petty Bourgeoisie and the state in Post-Colonial Zaire" *Review of African Political Economy* No. 22, 1981. pp. 27.
13. Fredy Perlman, *The Continuing Appeal of Nationalism* unpublished MS 1984.
14. Jacques Depelchin, *op. cit.* pp. 26
15. I analyzed the main tendencies in these parties in my: "Some Background to Congo-Zaire", *IKWEZI*, No. 8, March 1978, pp. 65-74.
16. This is mainly based on Ludo Martens' analysis of the ideologies of the revolutionary movement in Congo — Kinshasa 1963-1968. See his: "L'ideologie du mouvement revolutionnaire au Congo — Kinshasa 1963-1968: Forces et faiblesses". *op. cit.* pp. 12—13.
17. Idem. Although one should say that L. Kabila was then only tending towards Marxism.
18. Madeleine G. Kalb, *op. cit.* pp. 146.
19. Glenn Adler, Judith Byfield and Marcia Wright, "Going our way: US Policy in Zaire 1963-1965: Documents and Domination", Paper presented at the Paris Conference on Zaire, 1963-1964, December 13-15, 1984.
20. Among them were: Maurice Mpolo, Joseph Okito, Joseph Mbuyi, Emmanuel Nzuzi, Christophe Muzungu, Barthelemy Mujanayi, Jean-Pierre Finant, Pierre Leopold Elengeza.
21. According to C.N'Dom. *op.cit.* pp. 38. This was one on Mulele's initiative; he delegated Mukwidi, G. Yumbu, Mitudidi and Masena to negotiate with other nationalist parties in view of the creation of a Nationalist Front.
22. "Before going to the liberated areas of the East", wrote Ludo Martens, "Gbenye clandestinely passed through Brussels where he had two meetings with Spaak who found him incompetent but manipulatable and well disposed towards Belgian interests. Gbenye also met the CIA official, Mr. Deylin". "L'Ideologie du mouvement revolutionnaire....." *Solidaire* No. 1 (436), Jan. 9, 1985, pp. 14. See also: C. N'Dom, *P. Mulele Assassine la Revolution Congolaise Etranglée*, Hamme-Mille: Ed. resp. Y. Houbankx, 1984, pp. 67-68 and pp. 95-102.

23. Mulele, Benguila, Mukulubundu studied for sometime in the People's Republic of China: Mukwidi and Mitudidi visited Cuba and China.
24. This programme is briefly discussed by Ludo Martens in his "L'Ideologie du mouvement revolutionnaire....." *op. cit.* pp.12-13.
25. See Andree Bluin, *My Country Africa*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1983
26. Ludo Martens, *L'insurrection Populaire au Congo-Kinshasa 1964-1968*, PTB, 1984, pp. 3.
27. *ibid.*, p. 4 See also B. Verhaegen, *Rebellions au Congo*, Vol. 1, Les Etudes du C.R.I.S.P., Bruzelles, 1969, p. 167.
28. These data are analyzed by Herbert Weiss and Renny Fulco in "Les Partisans au Kwilu: Analyse des origines sociales des membres et cadres des Equipes de Base." Paper presented at the Paris Conference on Zaire, 1963-1964, December, 13-15, 1984.
29. Forthcoming book, *Pierre Mulele ou la Seconde vie de Patrice Lumumba*.

ANNEX 1

IIIrd Year of the Congolese Revolution: Analysis of experiences and perspectives of the Congolese Revolution 3 October 1966.

**By the Political Commissariat of the Western
Front**

(Document written by

Thomas Mukwidi,

one of the Colleagues of P. Mulele)

It is now three years since the Congolese people, oppressed, exploited and humiliated by North-American imperialism, three years since the Congolese people faced with fascism, corruption, treason, brutality and violence of the reactionary regime subordinated to yankee imperialism, it is finally three years today since the Congolese people, having used and exhausted all peaceful and legal methods of struggle to restore its national sovereignty and actualize its profound aspirations of freedom and peace; took before the whole world and history the firm resolution to launch an armed struggle as the sole means for the accomplishment of those aspirations.

It was in fact, on the 3rd October 1963, after the puppet Kasa-Vubu had consummated his treason of September 29th by illegally closing the Parliament, that our people, through the voice of its vanguard organizations, namely, the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) and the Movement National Congolais (MNC); and by a general statement to the public opinion, re-affirmed with audacity and determination its resolute will to raise high the flag of freedom and decolonization by the creation of the Conseil National de Liberation (CNL).

The CNL launched, right away, an appeal to all active forces of the nation for the creation of a broad popular front and constituted itself into a conscious vanguard for our revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the corrupted and American enslaved regime.

The Heroic Struggle of the Congolese people

Following the CNL's historical appeal, the broad popular masses of our country, resolute and united as one from the East to the West, from the South to the North, under the schrewd and dynamic leadership of comrade Mulele, rose up with arms in their hands to definitively break down the chains of oppression, exploitation and humiliation imposed on them for 80 years by imperialism, colonialism and their Congolese puppets. Armed with the burning desire for freedom and peace, our People under the war cry "Mayi Mulele" inflicted heavy blows on imperialism and its agents. This heroic and revolutionary struggle, in a short period of time, had had a great development and momentum. More than 2/3 of the national territory fell under the authority of the popular forces, thus shaking in a serious manner, the very foundation of the puppet power and its submission to the USA. Profound internal contradictions undermined the anti-popular and pro-imperialist regime of our country, and we thus saw a vertiginous succession of puppets in power in so far as they proved, one by one, unable to provide any guarantee to their masters' interests.

At the international plane, our struggle benefitted from an active and fraternal solidarity of all peace and freedom loving people and all revolutionary organizations of the world. The CNL was recognized as the legitimate representative and the vanguard of the movement of liberation of the Congo. Conscious of the danger for their interests, constituted by the victory of a people's revolution in the Congo, imperialists formed a solid coalition and intervened scandalously and openly in the internal affairs of our country by the barbarous aggression in Stanleyville on the 24th of September 1964, which brought forth a general indignation from the peoples of the whole world. Such an aggression, in which about 20,000 of our compatriots died, is a material proof of the ferocious and criminal nature of imperialism. It proves that imperialism does not retreat before any force to defend its dirty interests. It was a strong blow that our people will never forget and a debt of blood which will be paid at a high price.

But despite that heavy tribute of blood, despite all the ups and downs of our revolutionary struggle, our people, following

the example of the valiant people of Vietnam, have proven that despite the numerical superiority and the military equipment of imperialists and their Congolese puppets, the latter can be defeated.

On this occasion of the third anniversary of the launching of our struggle, it is for us a duty to make a self-critical analysis of our experiences.

Experience and Lessons to Draw

Imperialist oppression and exploitation, on the one hand, sharp contradictions undermining our country, on the other, have produced objective and subjective conditions leading to the determination of the broad popular masses of the country to firmly persist in the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle. Since 1959, our people have always responded to the appeal launched by its leaders. But, at each stage, our people, responding to those appeals, have known difficulties and faced serious setbacks. They have made heavy sacrifices, suffered great privations and paid dearly with the blood of thousands of their sons their tribute for freedom from imperialism. In many regions of our country, several villages have been completely destroyed by bombs launched by racist mercenaries. Hundreds of thousands of our patriots and compatriots have been mutilated, ripped open, shot, burned alive; hundreds of thousands of others have been arrested, tortured, deported or reduced to a slow death in Congolese jails (Luzumu, Makala). Many more have seen their houses burned, their mothers, their wives and their daughters raped in their presence or kicked out of their homes, deprived of their property, forced to enrol in Mobutu's army or recruited for diverse forced labour. So many families have been reduced to misery, and many other households broken by the neocolonialist politics of force and corruption.

Mobilization and Organization of the people

The first fundamental cause of the successive setbacks that we have known lies in the fact that we have not sufficiently mobilized and organized the people. The enemy is better organized than us and benefiting from a considerable support of imperial-

ists on all planes, only our power of organization and mobilization of the people will allow us to transform the relations of forces between us and the enemy. We must consider the mobilization and organization of popular forces as the sole guarantee we have for our victory. The problem of the mobilization and organization of the masses is thus of extreme strategic and ideological importance for the victory of our revolution.

Nevertheless, many compatriots, strongly influenced by a bourgeois ideology — due to lack of sufficient political preparation and being victims of subjectivism — obstinately refuse to pay a slight attention to that problem.

Experiences of other people's revolutionary struggles have proven that a people, no matter how small, when politically and ideologically trained, mobilized and led by a conscious, shrewd and just leadership, can struggle, confront and win against an all powerful enemy, despite difficulties and horrors of war.

To accomplish the difficult task of mobilization and organization of the masses, it is crucial to use correct methods. We had believed that to do a work of mass mobilization, it was enough to launch political slogans (*mots d'ordre politiques*) and to formulate a programme containing anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist phrases — including the slogan "Scientific Socialism" — to attract the broad popular masses. Practical experience has convinced us that this method is meaningless and lacks any mobilizing power for the masses. Does this mean that we must no longer formulate programme and launch political slogans? That is not the issue. The issue concerns, on the contrary, our methods of work.

We think therefore, that before we write a programme and formulate, a political slogan, we must go to the masses, live with them and struggle on their side to know their problems, their difficulties, their demands and proceed to a serious investigation of their life. It is only after that work is done that we can formulate a programme and launch political slogans which reflect the objective realities of our country and the profound aspirations of our people.

In the present phase of our revolution, the content of such a programme must be essentially rooted in the realization of the national and democratic revolution. In its formulation, we must start from the understanding of the broad popular masses of peasants, workers and intellectuals. We must use a language that is

understandable to the people. It is only on this basis that we will be able to mobilize, organize and unify our whole people to participate in the revolution.

Necessity of a Leading Core and of a Vanguard Party

The second fundamental cause of our setbacks is the lack of a united and homogenous organization and a leading core; a real vanguard of our liberation struggle characterized by a complete attachment to the cause of the revolution and interests of the people. It is high time to think of the foundation of that party and that core.

The conditions of that party and that core must be:

- Complete political unity and identity on the liberation struggle of the Congolese people by means of armed struggle as principal form of that struggle. That core must not use an anti-imperialist language to enrich and satisfy insatiable egoistic personal ambitions, the permanent origin of our quarrels and intensive struggles.
- rigorous and strict discipline. The core must be essentially revolutionary and composed of serious and competent; capable of linking revolutionary theory to practice and words to actions. By discipline is meant the radical transformation and complete loyalty to the revolutionary cause.
- the core must have, as task, the foundation of a vanguard party of a strict discipline and authentically revolutionary vocation.

The foundation of such a party must not be the product of individual imagination, but the result of objective work. That is to say, that Party must be erected on a basis, that is, inside the country and in the process of the revolutionary practice. It is neither in the process of revolutionary tourism nor in exile, thousands of kilometres away from one's country, outside of every objective reality, that a vanguard party is founded.

The Congolese People's Struggle is a Protracted Struggle

We have shown, on many occasions, that the strategic position of the Congo — in the very heart of Africa — is a question of life and death for imperialists. Immense natural resources and economic potentiality of the Congo in general have not just attracted the interests of one imperialist power, but of a whole coalition

USA, Belgium, France, Great Britain, West Germany, etc. Imperialists are highly conscious that the victory of the Congolese revolution is an assault to their sordid interests in the Congo and would certainly undermine the last bastion of colonialism and racism in Africa.

Those reasons thus form our conviction that it is not possible for us to win an easy and quick victory, it is important that we have a clear point of view on that problem, otherwise we may fall into strategical and tactical errors of great consequences. We can not just light a simple flash in the pan. Imperialists and reactionaries have to be compared to great mountains which cannot be displaced in one day.

We must thus resolutely oppose every tendency towards impatience, blind and complacent opportunism that is manifested in some of our comrades, who, power-thirsty or moved by motives which are incompatible with the interests of the revolution, dream of an easy and quick victory. Hence, the adventurism and putschist tendency that have caused irreparable losses to the revolution and demobilized the revolutionary consciousness of many combatants.

Problem of Cadres

The problem of cadres, posed in a sharp manner, constitutes the third fundamental cause of our provisional failure. This imposes on us the duty to consider the problem of cadres as one of the important conditions of the development and success of the revolution. We refuse to understand that the victory of the revolution does not depend on pious resolutions adopted in international conferences nor on declarations and we persist on making revolutionary tourism by visiting all capitals of the world. The victory of the revolution depends entirely on practical work of cadres inside the country in mobilising and organizing the people.

Our urgent preoccupation must therefore be focused on that problem — to train cadres completely committed to the revolution.

Political Struggle in Cities

Given the need to generate the unity of the broad popular masses for the revolution, it is important to give importance to

the mobilization and the organization of the masses in the cities because the enemy is politically and militarily powerful. To be able to develop a great mass movement and create a system of political organization in cities and in areas occupied by the enemy, we must pay a very serious attention to workers' and students' organizations which constitute the vanguard of mass struggles in cities. Mass struggles in cities and in regions controlled by the enemy must essentially start from economic and social bases which are important sections of mass mobilization.

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That problem, must be viewed as the fourth fundamental cause of our setbacks, for historical and revolutionary experiences of other peoples have proven in a very convincing way, that an armed struggle which is not supported and combined with the political struggle in cities and regions occupied by the enemy is bound to fail.

Our Attitude Toward external Aid

We still meet in our ranks many comrades who still have a blind faith in external aid and even consider it as an imperative condition of the victory of our revolution.. That is precisely the fifth fundamental cause of our errors. Despite the true fact that socialist countries have an internationalist duty to help every people struggling for its liberation, we must, however, know that revolution and liberation of a country have always been the work of the people of that country and not of a foreign people. Revolution is neither to be imported nor exported.

To liberate our country, we must essentially count on our people. It is our people alone who are the guarantee and the sure

aid and who will persists to the end to assure the freedom of our nation.

Our attitude towards foreign aid is that we express our gratitude towards every friendly country which offers it, but it should be viewed as a secondary and limited contribution. And, while receiving that aid, we must firmly exercise great vigilance and safeguard our independence.

Our New Preoccupations

The critical examination of everything that has been done since October 3, 1963 allows us to recognize our errors. Only those who do nothing are immune to mistakes. But, far from being ashamed and therefore erase by one blow everything made on the blood of thousands of compatriots, as certain opportunist and arrivists seem to do, we must on the contrary learn through those mistakes, be able to draw lessons and teachings from them. Those errors were due, as far as we are concerned, to our lack of experience in the organization of the insurrectional movement and we do have a firm conviction that despite those errors and present vicissitudes — that in fact constitute the normal process of our action the last word belongs to our people. Perhaps it won't be tomorrow or in ten years, but the last word belongs essentially to our people and the wheel of history is irreversible.

The most important and essential thing for us is our resolute will and our intangible determination to succeed.

The correct understanding of fundamental causes of our errors is the sole sure path towards new strategy and tactics, to stimulate new and victorious momentum to the Congolese revolution.

Consequently, three urgent and interlinked tasks summon us: the creation of a vanguard leading core; the foundation of an authentically revolutionary party; the winning of the masses and the intensification of the armed struggle.

(a) Formation of a Vanguard Leading Core

If a revolution and an armed struggle are not led by a conscious, just, shrewd leadership composed of elements with complete commitment to the revolution and the people's cause, then it is impossible to lead that revolution and that armed struggle to vi-

ctory: That is why, taking into account our experience and past errors, it becomes urgent to safeguard the revolution, to create a real vanguard leading core.

The conditions for such a core, as we have already said, are:

- unity and complete political identity on the liberation of the Congolese people by means of armed struggle as the principal form of that struggle;
- that core must be composed of honest, serious elements capable of linking revolutionary theory to practice and words to actions, and who accept difficulties and sacrifices, who renounce their egotistical and personal interests, and finally who may give their life for our people.
- that core must not use an anti-imperialist language for self-enrichment and to satisfy personal ambitions, the permanent cause of our quarrels and our divisions;
- that core must have, for a fundamental task of the foundation of a vanguard party, strict discipline and an authentically revolutionary vocation. There must be as well, the training inside the country, of numerous cadres of the revolution. To avoid the infiltration in our ranks of bad elements and agents of imperialism, a series of criteria will be imposed on the selection of cadres. Cadres will come from elements that are determined to firmly persist in the revolution and view it as a question of life and death, and know very well that only the victory of the revolution can bring about salvation and happiness to their parents, brothers and sisters.

(b) Foundation of a Revolutionary Party

Since old political parties and organizations of united fronts became inoperative, a new appeal for unity, without exception and sectarianism, of all democratic and patriotic forces must be launched to create a real Revolutionary Party and a Revolutionary United Front. The second task we must take up is the foundation of a Vanguard Revolutionary Party, that is, a Party that will reflect the profound aspirations of our people, correctly express their needs and defend their interests.

To accomplish such a historical mission, such a Party must be

born from within the masses. That is, it must be founded inside the country and in the process of the struggle itself. This important requirement will allow us to reduce the ambitions and craving desires of those who confuse the revolution with their own interests and conceive of it as a means for their self-enrichment. In addition, such a Party will fix a clear demarcation between true, and pseudo-revolutionaries and will put in the direction of the Party leaders and officers who have graduated from the ordeals of the struggle and who have the esteem, the confidence and resolute support of our people.

In that Party, we must fight against personal ambitions and impose vigorous criteria for the admission of its members. No Party a la "Bantoue". The best members must also come out of the revolutionary practice.

(c) The Conquest of the Masses and the Intensification of the Armed Struggle.

The third urgent task for the glorious development of the revolution of our people is the winning over of the masses and the intensification of the armed struggle under the absolute leadership of the leading core and the vanguard party. In fact, the mobilization and organization of the masses and the armed struggle under the shrewd and centralized leadership of the vanguard party with an iron discipline, are the two principal weapons for the revolutionary people to achieve victory over its enemies.

That is why it is indispensable that the vanguard party, the promoter, the organizer, the initiator and the leader of those two arms come out from the burning fire of the struggle.

Those, in our view, are the three essential tasks for the process of development of our revolution in our present circumstances. Those three, tasks, we repeat, although distinct, are in fact indissolubly linked.

Formation of a Broad United Popular Front

The third arm of the revolutionary people is the United Front. That is why, while struggling to realize the three first preceding tasks, we must simultaneously deploy our efforts for the conjunctural creation of a broad popular united front, regrouping all

patriotic and democratic social strata, all progressive organizations and political parties which are opposed to imperialism. We must, as a basic principle, isolate the enemy to the maximum.

The problem of the united front constitutes one of the strategic and fundamental problems of the Congolese revolution and we must give it the importance it deserves.

On this day of October 3, 1966, we must bow to the memory of all our martyrs who, heroically fell for the cause of the liberation of our people, and make an appeal to the unity of all democratic and popular forces of our country. Let us forget what divides us up to now, and what has considerably undermined our unity and retarded our victory. Let us realize a solid and authentic revolutionary unity.

Let us never betray our martyrs and let us remain committed to the Historical Testament that our National Hero Lumumba had bequeathed our people and the world when, a few days before his death, he wrote:

I know, and I feel in my heart, that sooner or later my people will shake off all their enemies, inside and outside our land, and that they will rise as one man to say 'no' to the shame and degradation of colonialism, and to assume once again their dignity under clear skies.

We are not alone. Africa, Asia and the free and freed peoples all over the world will always stand beside those millions of Congolese who will not give up the struggle until the day when no colonizers and no mercenaries are left on our soil. I would like my children, whom I am leaving and may perhaps never see again, to be told that the Congo has a great future, and that it is up to them, as to every other Congolese, to carry out the sacred task of rebuilding our independence and our sovereignty; for where there is no dignity there is no freedom, and where there is no justice there is no dignity, and where there is no independence there is no free men.

No brutality, no agony, no torture has ever driven me to beg for mercy, for I would rather die with my head high, my faith unshaken, and a profound trust in the destiny of our country, than live in subjection, seeing principles that are sacred to me laughed to scorn. History will have its say one day — not the history they teach in Brussels, Paris, Washington or the United Nations, but the history taught in the countries set free from colonialism and its

puppet rulers. Africa will write her own history, and both north and south of the Sahara it will be a history of glory and dignity....

The road of honor, dignity and glory for our people has not been better incarnated by another but Patrice Lumumba.

ANNEX 2

On may 11th 1968, Pierre Mulele described to Ndabala who came to the maquis from Brazzaville, the problems they were facing in the maquis in the following way:

1. The Lumumbists are abroad since 1963, I think of those in Brazzaville especially. They have never taken the trouble to be in contact with us in the maquis.
2. The Lumumbists outside the country have had the privilege to send people abroad for training. They have never felt the need to send those trained cadres inside the country where we lack them in a very dramatic manner.
3. The arms we have, have been taken from the enemy in combats. They are not enough. You have, outside, the possibility of obtaining arms but we have never received arms through Brazzaville.
4. Before a man can fight, reflect, act, he must be in good health. How can you keep a whole people in the forest for years, without any medicine to treat the sick and wounded?
5. The massive departure of combattants has been caused by the lack of medical services, malnutrition and the barbaric oppression by the enemy.
6. Most of the intellectuals who have never had any political education are carried away by opportunism; they cannot be taken as authentic cadres of the revolution:

Despite the fact that we count on you who are outside we never forget that the revolution must take place on our own soil. In this struggle, our strength, without which nothing is possible, is constituted by the popular masses of people. Without them, we cannot speak of revolution. I can categorically state that our revolution has the confidence of the masses who remain strongly attached to it. Traditional chiefs have given us, for five years, their moral and material support.

Our enemy is powerfully armed. To destroy him, we need unity in our struggle. We must realize genuine and sincere unity of all outside Lumumbist around one sole leadership. We must stop every struggle among ourselves which just reinforces the enemy and weakens our ranks. All prejudices against comrades in struggle must be put aside as well as the habit of putting the blame on others. We all know the present position of Gizenga, but we are against anybody trying to undermine his prestige.

After the regrouping of all Lumumbists without exception, all must return inside the country to pursue the struggle. By staying away from the masses too long, you risk creating a big gap between you and the people.

The creation of those numerous parties is the work of enemies who are using Congolese to divide our forces. A vanguard party cannot be created unless all leaders have been contacted.

I insist that you send here right away cadres trained in China and Cuba who are in Brazzaville. Even if the material we are asking arrives late, the cadres must come: people above all."


—Ludo Martens, *Pierre Mulele ou la Seconde vie de Patrice Lumumba* (Anvers: Editions EPO asbl, 1975), pp. 302 — 303.

ANNEX 3

Levels

A

ORGANIZATION



Around Commandant in Chief, Pierre Mulele, responsible for the overall leadership (political and military) of the whole movement.

Oct. 1963-March 1964: decentralization: 3 general headquarters. (Nov. 64-March 65)

Structure: Central Camp — Zones (up to 7), Leading Cadres: Mulele and Bengila (Fundamental questions) military and political supervision.

Kafungu, Chief of military staff (beg. May 64) Laurentin Ngolo and Pascal Munde lengole, principal assistants to Mulele and Bengila for political matters.

Martine Madina, Thetime Ntsolo, Pierre Ngwentsungu and Commanders of zones, office heads.

REGIONAL H.

REGIONAL H.

Teams sent reports to the GH monthly on:

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| political situation | — education/organization of popular masses
— activity of the enemy |
| situation of partisans | — combats
— performances in battles, deficiencies, casualties, etc. |
| Relations masses/partisans | |
| Economic situation | — agriculture, quantity of food received from villagers, etc.
— finance |

VILLAGE COMMITTEES (up to 10 people)

- | | | | |
|-----------|---|-------------------------|---|
| great | { | Committee chairman | often traditional chiefs, |
| political | | Committee Vice-chairman | many were patriotic |
| question | | A secretary | nationalists; when reactionary, the chief kept his title, but committee chairman was somebody else elected. |

military leader of the Committee

- mobilization of villagers in combat against ANC soliders.

agriculture officer

- makes sure people continue to cultivate their shambas

elections of judges organized in each village

protocol officers

information officer

intendence officer

intelligence/security/officer

Close relation — Partisan team — village committee as long as village existed

when villagers forced to go to the forest, no separation.

Twice per week: political lessons given to villagers.

DAILY ACTIVITIES:

6 00 a.m. everybody up

7 00 a.m. flag salute (red flag)

Morning activities — manual labour:
cut trees, make bivouacs, look for food in the
forest and wood for cooking, carry water,
wash clothes.

- military training
- missions — attack on ANC soldiers
- ambushes, — road blocks.

12.00 — 14.00 rest

1400 pm flag salute

Afternoon activities

- political education open to nearby villa-
gers
- continuation of morning activities up to
1730 pm.
- collective cooking — dinner: 1830 p.m.
- leaders, Mulele, Bengila and Kafungu,
others eating only after everybody else
has eaten sometime 2200 p.m. If not enough
food leaders did not eat.

Military Zones: up to 7 or 8

starting Feb. — March 1964.

1st: Centre zone, Kalaganda area zone
South-West zone, Northern zone, Kandale-
Kahemba zone, Kilembe-Ngudi zone, Zone
(Commanders and assistants)

Commanders nominated according to merits
by Mulele and Bengila.

Capacity for military leadership.

Partisans teams.

Military

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Central Camp/Pierre Mulele

- Offices
- Secretariat
- Communications
- Company Commanders

Military headquarters (Kafungu)

H. personnel, women Battalion commander elite troops.

military zones

military zones

Political

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Pierre Mulele and Th. Bengila

Protocol office
(relations with masses)

Collective cooking
serving 2000 people,
week shift

Health Office

Dr. Ankawu
(Jerome Mutumbulu)

Daniel Wafula

Leonie Abo

- women/children
- pharmacy

Studies and Documentation
Office — **L. Ngolo**

Elaboration of the political and ideological line. Production of texts serving as a basis for political education, high theoretical competency required. *Ngolo, Bengila.*

information/press office "Voice of the Revolution"

security service

Central Depot every material taken from the enemy etc.

accounting office

Technical office

Production of weapons explosives

Internal politics

office. (**P. Munde-lengole**) in charge of the formation of cadres of the whole movement.

Martine Madinga

— training of cadres to become political commissars. heads of teams workshops

Justice and "Contentienx"

PARTISAN TEAMS

