SUDAN AND THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION DEMOCRATIC Norman O'Neill Department of Sociologyand Social Authropology, University of Hull Introduction In most studies of political economy of Sudan (as well as other African nations) two subjects remain conspicuous by their abse- nce: class formation, and the class structure of this postcolonial state . These are not merely ideological ommissions unconsciously desi~ned to i~ore "impenalism" and the "class struggle"; they are also a clear reflection of uneven and combined develop- ment, in which. for example, the apparent "autonomy of the state" and "economic weakness of the indigenous bourgeoisie" are intimately related.~ Similar features apply more generally in the sa-called "Sociology of development". At one extreme, the temptation is to argue that capitalism "underdevelops" Third World countries, while at the other, the argument is precisely the opposite.3 The fact is that capitalism has always developed unevenly in both time and space, especially in the form ~f colo- nialism where economic ,Ianning that is, dependent development was initially undertaken in order to satisfy the needs of the "colo- nizers - whether in terms of the export of capital, the import of raw materials, or military strategy. The legacy of colonialism is therefore a malformed economy in which the primary export 'Sector is often tochnologicaIly advanced, alongside other 5f;ctors which remain economically and technologically backward. This penetration of economically advanced capitalism into baciward and pre-capitalist modes of production inevitably poses a theoreti- cal paradox in any attempt to postulate "stages of economic growth." This is because an obvious distinction needs to be made between tl1.eantecedents of capitalist industrialisation (the fact" "69~ UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 11987 that capitalism developed out of European feudalism) and its sub- sequent development, o~ a global scale, through the agencies of colonialism and imperialism. In fact, the contemporary debate on the different political implications contained in the seemingly con- tradictory assertions, that - crudely expressed - capitalism at once develops and underdevelops its periphery, has a parallel even in the works of Marx. Notwithstanding his analysis in Ca- pital, Marx conceived in "Modernization" the possibility of "7'Jeaping stages" - a theme that was to prove pOliticaily crucial in the theory and practice of Bolshevism in contradistinction to Menshevism4• Oassical Marxism had been exceptionally articulate in delin- neating the course of European economic development - slavery being superseded by feudalism, and fp.udalisrn by capitalism - and had analysed political conflict in terms of class struggle. Thus, political opposition to feudal absolutism was conceived as a class struggle between the rising bourgeoisie and landed ari- stOcracy. The achievement of parliamentary democracy, based on free elections, freedom of speech, of assembly, and so forth, were all attributable to the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a pro- gressive class. Similarly, free trade-unionism and the right to strike, were related to the rise of the industrial proletariat in its class conflict with this same bourgeoisie. This latter struggle - of wage labour against capital - fbrms, of course, the basis of Marx's analysis of capitalism, and the revolutionary struggle for socialism. The bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution are therefore each. conceived in .terms of a speCific Class hegemony, and are theoretically distinct and historically disparate. The Men- sheviks had applied similar reasoning in arguing that further development of capitalism in Russia would promote a progressive bourgeoisie and a prolonged period of parliamentary democracy during which time the pre-conditions for socialism in the form of a maturing labour movement - would materially progress. The Mensheviks thereby awarded, in advance, the leadership of the ensuing revolution to the Russian bourgeoisie. Events proved to be quite different. The success of the October Revolution was based on Lenin's theoretical premise that the uneveness of Rus- sia's economic development rendered the bourgeoisie quite inca- pable of fulfilling the political task which the Mensheviks had ordained. 70 b'Neill- Democratic Revolution - Sudan Whatever the anteceqents of capitalism and its subsequent extension through imperialism, economic penetration into those econoJ!1icallybackward areas of the globe now euphemistically labelled the "Third" or even "Fourth World" (for in some, eco- nomic growth has been decidely faster than in others) has exhi- bited the following general features: the gradual transformation of primitive agriculture; land seizure and consolidation; the crea- tion of a reserve army of migrant and unemployed labour; and, initially, the erosion of, Qr in some cases, systematic discrimina- tion against handicraft industries that were in competition with those of the imperialist countries. This latter feature highlights the aforementioned paradox that is, monopoly capital distorting, and by a process of unequal exchange unevenly developing indigenous capital because for many years it limited - and in many countries continues to limit - the formation'of an industri- 'al bourgeoisie; the class which in Europe had led the struggle for democracy. Recognizing that even in Russia (about which Lenin had writ- ten his book on the development of capitalism) this "national" bourgeoisie was too weak either to compete economically against imperialism - upon whicl'1it therefore necessarily came to reply- or to genuinely lead and sustain a democratic revolution. The Bol- sheviks politically opposed "class-collaboration", collapsed the "bourgeois-democratic phase" into the "dictatorship of the pro- letariat", and, on seizing power, proclaimed the epoch of socialist revolution. Failure of the revolution to spread outwards through Europe and beyond, undoubtedly gave impetus to the notion of "Socia- lism in One Country" , but this thorough revision of Marxism enta- iled not merely a re-evaluation of the role of the peasants - espe- cially after the victory of the Chinese Revolution - but also of the "progressive" role of the "national" bourgeoisie in economi- callyoackward countries. This is ironic because in 1925-7, Chinese Communists had been instructed by the Communist International to join the Kuomingtan under the leadership of Chaign Klli-shek, who subsequently sent thousands of them to their deaths. Despite this unapalatable truth, it has nevertheless become pl:'litically legimitate for many' 'Third WorId" Communists to seek' 'progres- sive" elements within their national bourgeoisie, and to provide theoretical justification for it in terms of "Maxism-Leninism" 71 UTAFIT1- Vol No 9No 1 1987 -whether of the Chinese or Soviet variety. The result has been catastrophic defeat for Communists through the agencies of such' "bourgeois nationalists" as Premier Sukamo in Indonesia, Ge- neral Kassim in Iraq and - as Sudanese Communists need no' reminding - of President Numeiri at home. It is therefore instru- ctive to remind ourselves that a debate engaged in by Russian Marxists over sixty years ago, and in which they anticipated many ofthe essential arguments to be encoutered, "development the- ory", has precisely the same political relevance today, as it had then-is there, or is there not, a progressive bourgeoisie with whom to collaborate'in the struggle for social revolution? In con- temporary Sudan, this question is of more than "academic in- terest" to be confined to political scientists or sociologists; it is a vital theoretical issue, having immediate practical implications in the current struggle for a national democratic revolution. An attempt has already been made by the author to answer it, and the tentative conclusion reached then (in 1978) has since been empirically verified in the extensive empirical work of Dr. Fatima Babiker Mahmoud. After assessing the class interest, andpoliti~1 behaviour of the Sudanese bourgeoisie, she condu-' des: .. This study has suggested that the Sudanese capitalists are in fact a 'comprador' dependent bourgeoisie. Given the repressive role their parties have. played throughout the political history of the modem Sudan, and the personal role that some of those studied have played in opposition to radical change (to the extent of crushing governments in collaboration with foreign capital) these capitalists can in no way be described as a 'national bourgeoisie'.-6 Primitive Accumulation and the Formation of Classes The class forces engaged in the current political struggle assume all the characteristics of uneven and combined develop- ment, typical of neo-colonial regimes. This is evident even in Su- dan's dominant economic sector - cotton. Cotton accounted for approximate 90 per cent of Sudan's G.N.P. even as late as 1950. Other significant sectors of the agri- cultural cash economy were gum-arabic, camel meat and beef, millet and vegetable cultivation. Industrial production, such as it 72 0' Neill ~ Democratic Revolutio7l- Sudan w~s, consisting of a brewery, soap and match factories, and a tex- tile mill, made up 01llY2.5 per cent of the G.N.P. at the time of Britain's formal withdrawil in 1956. As elsewhere on the conti- ~nt. Sudan's indigenous capitalist class was thus very small, and to a larger extent, dependent on foreign capital at the time of political independence. The main source of capital accumulation for other nascent capitalists was in agriculture, and especially in the private pump schemes along the Nile. Three categories of people were in a po- sition to invest their existing wealth in such schemes: the larger merchants, some tribal heads and the religious leaderS. The lat- ter were especially prominent. The Mahdi family of the Ansar sect and the Mirghani family of the Khatmia were able to amass considerable wealth through the dues paid to them by their several million followers. Through a classic policy of divide and rule, Bri- tish ~olo~iallsm was able to encourage collaboration first with one and then with the other of these religious sects by offering various forms of economic inducement. Facilities were pl'Qvided at va- rious times for the Mahdi and Mirghani families to set up, develop and extend their farms, often on the basis of land granted to each ofthem by the colonial administration. To a lesser extent the same applies to tt"ilial leaders who possessed hundreds of camels and often even larger herds of cattle. Merchants, too, were in a favo- urable position, and especially those tied up with increased trade in the colonial cotton scheme in the Gezira. Thus, rich merchants, religious leaders and tribal heads were able to consolidate their economic power prior to independence, and came to express their developing class interests through their different political parties whicp came to dominate the political scene afterwards. These emergent capitalists lived mostly in the riverain areas of the north, centred around the three towns of Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North, the Blue Nile Province and Ge- zira. They claimed Arab descent, and their kinship system of first-cousin marriage, encouraged an attitude of ethnic supe- riority that cut across class differences. But despite the subjective factors that militate against the formation of class consciousness., objective basis is clearly discernible, and must be thooretically and empirically spelt out. 73 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 Class Structure in Sudan Corresponding to the emergence of the aforementioned capitalists in agriculture and industry there were increasing nu- mbers of wage labourers on the farms, in the factories, and in transport - especially on the railways where the Sudan Com- munist Party (SCP) was able to establish a strong trade union base. Increasingly, workers were being drawn into capitalist property relations, either directly as permanent or seasonal la- bourers, or indirectly through the role of peasant farmers sup- plying food for subsistence. The consequent imbalance, or mal- formation, for the pOst colonial Sudanese economy was fu~her aggravated by the introduction of modern technology. Migrant labourers from Darfur, the Nuba mountains and the far south, and the so-called 'Fellata' from the west, flooded into the cotton schemes, mechanized farms and urban areas in search of work. The outcome of this malformation, exacerbated by British coloni- / al policy which encouraged a rigid divide b~tween 'Arab" n~rth , aqd 'negro' south and west, ha.s been t~e formation of separatist movements, now a national liberation movement .. The indigenous industrial bourgeoisie, though small, flouri. shed in partnership with foreign capital. As a class it was, and is, too weak to possess any long-term political significance on its own account. Commercial capitalists on the other hand are growing in number and political importance. Originally, many of them were Greek and Syrian traders who accompanied the British 'colonizers from Egypt, but most of these left Sudan during Nume- iri's 'left turn'. The conversion to 'socialism' of many Sudanese merchants and state bureaucrats is now easily accounted for. Their support for nationalization, and especially the expropria- tion of this 'foreign' petit bourgeoisie, paved the way for their own econo~c ascen~ancy. They are increasing in number in direct proportion to the penetration ~f foreign investment capital. Many of them are the direct agents for western firms, and they manage insurance companies, banks and export-Import busines- ses. The unevennes of their different locations in the economy renders their politics extremely. volatile, although they are largely parasitic to neo-colonialism. Numeiri's shift to the right received their wholehearted support. Family members from this stratum are frequently to be found in the state bureaucracy, entry into 74 0' Npill- Democratic Revolution - Sudan which generally comes through either membership of the armed forces or the universities. They include military and civilian offi- cials, the secret police, higher officers in the army, civil servants and some university personnel. In the lower echelons are the less powerful salaried officials, some professionals like doctors, engi- neers and lawyers, and below these the increasing number of clerical workers who form an expanding salariat. The Sudanese trade unions were once am.ongthe best orga- nized in Africa, and were led in strategic sectors such as transport and textiles by the SCP, which gave the party a substantial prole- - tarian composition. This proletarian composition remains intact. The defection of prominent farmers ( some of them party mem- bers) from the former SCP-Ied Gezira Tenants Union into orga- nizations of the SSU had served to increase the proportion of wor- king class members in the Communist Party, while curtailing 1ts broader political influence, although it continues to influence uni- versity and high school students, and has the support of sections of the intelligentsia. It lacks support among the much more nu- merous lumpen proletariat of shoeshiners, po,rters, beggars and the rest, the urban migrant labourers and the broad mass of the heterogenous peasantry. The Peasantry The overwhelming majority of Sudanese, well over 80 per cent. are farmers. farm workers or nomadic herdsmen. Most are peasa- nts owning small plots of four or five acres, growing a limited va- riety of crops which keep them at subsistence level. The 'middle peasants' , owning a hundred to two hundred acres, who frequently also lease land from the state, are obviously of a different order. Some of them are retired army officers, many are developing com- mercial interests especially through the introduction of machinery , some own shops. Their political propensities vary roughly in accordance with their uneven development, but among the more wealthy, N'umeiri had established a rural base, especially in the riverain Arab communities of the north. It is here and in parts of the east thlJt a few wealthy merchants,have set up their mecha- nized farms. These capitalist farmers have extensive commercial interests that place them alongside the growing indigenous com- mercial bourgeoisie. Their power and political influence are stea- 75 UTAFrrl- Vol 9 No 1 1987 dily increasing. In contrast are the mass of migrant labourers who work in the extensive cotton plantations, especially in the Ge- zira-Managil Scheme and the so-called 'tenant farmers' who ostensibly 'employ' the labourers. - _ Elsehwere, I have described the Gezira Scheme as a quasi- state-capitalist enterprise, run within the general framework of commodity exchange.7 This requires some explanation. There are approximately 550,000 seasonal workers who receive their wages from some 100,000 "tenants". In legal terms, the migrant workers are therefore the tenants' wage labour, and the tenants small employers. In essence, however, the income of both the mi- grant workers and the vast majority of Gezira tenants is. derived from what is more accurately described as wage labour. It isargu- able that only a small percentage of tenants derive the bulk of their income from surplus value8 • Three possibilities present themselves here. Theoreti- cally, the income of the tenants can be derived exclusi- vely from appropriating the labour' of others - as profit; it can be derived exclusively from the sale of his own labour power - as wages; or it can be derived from a combination of these sources; (but) ... essential point is that the Gezira tenant' works not merely for himself, nor does he "employ" the labour of others as a capitalist. He works for the (Gezira Board. In other wor!is,) legally, he is in partnership not with other tenants, but with the ... state, which took over the scheme from the British administration and runs it as a capitalist enterprise.9 In this respect, the tenant is "subordinate to capital, beha- ves as a non-owner in his legal relations with his partner, the, state and in most cases the revenue accruing to tlte state appears to absorb almost all ofthe tenants' surplus labour _~o Tenants are told when, how and where to grow cotton, under a system of inspection that resembles an enormous. factory conveyor belt. In their position of authority, officials now control the packaging and marketing,of the cotton crop, hold the tenants accountabl~ for supervision over migrant labour, and are empow- ered to "inflict all kinds of penalties':-induding the confiscation of 76 0' Ndll- DemocTfltic Revolution - Sudan 3 tenancy, on any who fail to perform adequately this vital organi- sational task." Their class position - "subordinate to capital, bahaying as though propertyless in relation to their legal partner, the state, and their surplus labour being absorbed in the process of production - satisfied alJ the conditions which render these so called "tenants" de facto "wage-workers." II A class analysis of these relations therefore indicates that the underlying conflict of intef!'\sts is not between tentants on the one side and migrant workers on the other, but between "aU these producers of surplus-value and the small class of wealthy tenants and commercial capitalists" who utilize the state to ex- ploit them. This appropriation "forms the class basis upon which authority relations have become structured within the scheme." These relations have their origin in the colonial period, the key in. understanding their development entails an analysis of capita- lists ground rent.(1' What characterises the rate of capitalist ground rent is the demand for and supply of land incorporating any capital invest- ments that increase its productivity. In the case of Sudan, this in- corporation never occurred, not because the capitalist' mode of production was too weak, but because it was too strong. British colonialism fixed the price of land at a level which was to limit se- verely the consolidation of a class of indigenous landowners. Exi- sting title holders were able to stay on their land, but the price they commanded from the colonial administration was fixed at a maximum of two English shillings per feddan (1.038 acres). Any increase in value accruing to irrigation was therefore never re- flected in the amount of rent paid out to these farmers. It has been estimated that the Sudanese government conti- nues to pay approximately 5£50,000 as yearly rent to Gezira "tenants" (all farmers in the scheme are treated as being in the same category irrespective of whether they payor receive rent). This amount may seem impressive, and would be, but for the fact that about 70 per cent of tenants own less than half a plot each, and that the S£5O,OOO is divided among some 30,000 of them. In other words, if the figures are correct, what is at issue is a yearly ave- rage of about 5£1.6 per tenants per year, which, by no stretch of the imagination, puts them among the ranks of wealthy land- owners. There are some, moderately wealthy tenants, but in many cases these derive the bulk of their personal income not di- 77 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No I 1987 rectIy from agriculture, but from trade and commerce. SoD1e of these merchants are title holders who sub-let their tenancies. The income of most other tenants places them at the margin of subsistence, and they are therefore unable to accumulate any si- gnificant capital. All costs of production within the scheme other than the wages paid out to seasonal workers are charged to a common ac- count. official version is that seasonal workers receive their in- come from the profits of independent tenant farmers, but, as we have seen this is sheer mystification'because from the stand- point of the Board. the bulk of the tentants' income is as much a 'cost to be met as any other factor of production. This amount is re- latively constant being a fixed percentage of the total net income. In consequence, there is persiStent pressure to reduce that eleme- nt of it which is variable-the wages paid out to seasonal workers. These, an 110 f~port informs us " ... have increased by only 3 per cent a year on average over the past 20 years. This does not even cover the rise in prices and thus real wages have on the whole declined."I' It is of enormoUS ideological significance that these migrant workers are of a different ethnic origin-coming from the west and south - than their northern ••Arab" tenants. It has always sen-ed to cut across and disguise their uniform class interests - as when Shaikh Amin Mohammed EI Amin, of the Gezira Tenants Union, proposed that all agricultural workers should be eligible to join. His principled stand, based on a class analysis and in opposition to racialism, was apparently rejected by this rural aristocracy of labour. Their practice of first-cousin marriage, and id~ntifica~' tion of arduous agricultural work - such as cotton sowing and pi- cking-with slav~ry, further encourages a strong sense of ethnic identity vis-a-vis the so-called "Fellata" whom these tenants ostensibly employ .;I~ Even the subject of land enclosure and con- solidation has failed to provide the expected focus upon which it was hoped unity could be forged between them and the large nu- mber of migrant workers. The ideology of property rights even given a tenous legal expression, and enduring ties of ethnicity have until now formed an effective barrier to class solidarity. There is another factor too, that promotes rural stratifica- tion, and one which also serves to re-enforce petit bourgeois aspi- rations. 78 O' Neill- Democratic Revolution- Sudan Vegetable plants, originally introduced by the British as food for subsistence, have increasingly become cash crops sold in the open market. The predictable result is that despite increased su- pervision over the growing of cotton, increasing numbers of te- nants concentrate their productive efforts elsewhere. This enabled those tenants who were already involved in trading to become re- latively wealthy. They are few in number, but represent a deve- loping class interest. These capitalist farmers would, "shed the remnance of colonial exploitation ~ in the form of the Gelira Scheme ~ if it were in their economic interests to do so" .15 But at this stage of their class formation it is not because they re- quire the scheme to be more efficient, and are determined to uti- lize rehabilitation funds to finance capital investment, and ~ just as important ~ to discipline the vast majority of tenants and migrant workers whose class interests they oppose. The pattern of capital accumulation typical of these farmers is not unlike that of others in the past, even though, as indicated, the main source appears to have been the private pump schemes along the Nile, and late rainfed mechanised farming. Commerce had offered similar scope too, but on a smaller scale, and so had investment in real-estate. All of these were to develop in importa- nce, and to some extent become interrelated. The pattern for some emerging capitalists, for example, was undoubtedly accumula- tion in small-scale farming, leading to trade in the local markets. In some cases it led to involvement in petty commodity produ- ction, thence to investment in urban real-estate, followed by further investment ~ on a larger scale ~ in mechanised agricul- ture. It is a pattern that applies, in full, to a small number of exce- ptionally wealthy families. Other families concentrated on agri- culture, as in the case of the 30,000 feddan estate on Aba Island, which was built by Said Abdel-Rahman E1-Mahdi, but which was registered as the Mahdi Commercial Company. Numeiri has established a fairly strong rural trade, among the strata of peasants owning a hundred to two hundred acres although they are in competition with the Umma, which remains entrenched. Some of these "middle peasants" have trading in- terests that tie them up with the rapidly developing indigenous commercial bourgeoisie, and some have invested their accumula- ted capital in mechanised farms. 79 UTAFlTI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 Political and Class Struggles in Sudan Inthe struggle for a national democratic revolution, the pe- asantry is far too heterogenous to have a leading role. The ideo- logy of property rights, with its legal expression, backed up by various forms of racialism, forms a political barrier to any uni- form class solidarity being widely expressed among them. As for the salariat and other sections of the state bureaucracy, forming the largest part of the educated elite, they will probably only commit themselves politically when they are certian of being on the winning side, and/or of hoping to maintain their privileged position afterwards - a very precarious hope indeed. There re- mains, of course, the possibility of individuals among them ali- gning themselves with other classes, but this is obviously some- thing quite different. Much the same applies to the petit bourge- oisie in industry and commerce, but the difference here is that, as a class, in supporting a move to the left, they risk facing economic suicide. What therefore remains is the relatively small, but poli- tically significant. class of industrial workers who are far more homogenous in their composition than the peasantry and far bet- ter organized. These, in combination with an alliance of poor te- nants and the great mass of labourers from the south and west, form. it would appear. the only class basis from which a success. full democratic revolution can be achieved, but one which would in the course of the struggle develop far beyond the political limi- tations imposed by neo-colonialism. These neo-colonial ties severely limit the political options open to whatever regime that forms the government. Another factor which is structurally related to neo-colonialism and its at- tendant class structure, is the weakness not merely of the indige- nous capitalist class, but also of the petit bourgeoisie whose frag- mentation results in frequent political vacillation, from religious fanaticism to "national" socialism. Reliance on the military to maintain the political status-quo in the absence of a more fully developed class structure and related political culture, is therefore yet another consequence of the uneven development wrought by the penetration of foreign capital. This process of uneven (and combined) development begun by British colonialism, through which only three regions of Sudan - the Gezira Scheme, Khartoum and the Blue Nile Province _ 80 0>Neill- Democratic Revolution - Sudan underwent any major economic advance, was, under the Numeiri regime, extended and deepened by encouraging the penetration of foreign investment capital. The explanations for this pheno- menon of uneven development is obvious. Both British coloni- alism, and more recent foreign capital, shared one primary obje- ctive: a high return on investment. British textile manufacturers wanted cheap cotton, and the oil rich Arab states were seeking cheap food ("Sudan as the breadbasket