SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE 1984 COUP D'ETAT .INGUINEA George Rubiik Department of Political Socience & Public Administration University of Dar es Salaam Introduction The emergence of the military as a crucial factor in African politics especially durwg and after the 1960s has becom~ an ac- cepted fact today. as military governments have come to consti- tute more than half of Africa's existing regimes. Much has cor- respondingly been theorised at the general plane on the role of the military in African politics in general, with a few studies spe- ci:lc to some states. However, specific studies are yet to be carried out on the role of the military in the politics of and the origins of coups in those countries of "socialist orientation", where, at- tempts have been made towards political and ideological re- orientation and re-moulding ofthe military towards the "socialist" objectives of these states. In the particular case of Guinea. hardly any research has been carried out in this area. The 1984 coup' d' etat against a transition civilian government by the military and its overt right wing and pro-western political and economic orientation against the background of Sekou toure~s declared socialist path to developmen! and politicization of the military, took some people by surprise. This surprise largely emanates from the fact that the military in Guinea had undergone a process of "politicisation" that nurtured it to became one of the agents in transforming the Guinea society into a socialist state. Surprising how~ver. is the {act that the foundation. and social roots for this change was part of the legacy of Sekou Toure's rule. What could explain the fact that in post-ooionial Guinea, despite the politi- cization of the military through th~ agency of the PDG and the im- partation of communocratic ideoldgy amongst the ranI and file of the military, a coup of this nature eQuId Occur? 93. UTAFITI- Vol '9 No 1 1987 The coup is of added interest too because it was the Guinean People who set the pace in the struggle for African Independence right from the onset. Tbey raised the lone rebellious voice against General De-Gaulle's neo-colonial designs in French West Attica by declaring "Non" to the 1958 referendum. Moreover, Guinea went even further by nationalising foreign owned companies and land. then created her own national currency (the Sily) in place of the French Franc. At the level of foreign policy, it was Guinea which provided the most consistent material and moral support to Patrice Lumumba of the Congo against internal and external forces bent on compromising the independence of the people of Congo; it was Guinea which similarly provided material and mo- ral support to the liberation movements in Guinea Bissau and Angola and in 1966 provided homage to Kwame Nkrumah, one of Africa's outstanding Pan-Africanists. How then could a mili- tary, politically and ideologically nurtured for ~nty-six years by the revolutionary Party (PDG) stage a pro-Western coup in 1984 against the PDG without any popular resistance by the people and their "instrument", the Peoples Militia. Much of the existing literature on the military and military coups in Africa have tended to be more concerned with the search for explanations and causes of coups, to the exclusion of any co- ncrete understanding of the social and political circumstances in which coups are executed. This tendency has been attributed to the frequency of military coups in the 1960s and early 1970s. Secondly, the phenomenon of military coups has shifted the de- bate not on whether armies ought to participate in politics but to what extent and by what means.! In the search for an anSwer to this dilemma, indigenous dominant forces in the states in Africa, especially those with declared "socialist aims", have sou- ght to deal with the problem any how. But whether this problem has been resolved by the extension of political participation or not, has very much depended on the very character and nature of the state itself, for political participation by the military in civi- lian controlled regimes pre-supposes that democratic forms of popular participation exist in society. More often than not, this modicum of political participation is but a form of mechanism of political control, rather than participation. This reality has alway~ been turned upside down by the ideological rhetoric of the state and its pronouncements about the existence of democracy. In 94 Ru biik - Coup in Guinea .certain cases, the orientation of the army to production - basica- lly of those crops that deepen the intergration of these societies in the global division of labour at the expense of food production - has been ideologically dressed under the garb of engaging the military in the social and economic transformation of these so- cieties. All this has been done without a critical look at those so- cial and political forces that determine production and the di- stribution of social surpluses in these societies. Existing literature is largely treated from the theoretical plane of modernization theory, and military interventions apart from the conjuctural factors explained to derive from certain chara- cteristics of the military, notably, organisation, centralised com- mand-hierachy, discipline and superior equipment, the military is then viewed as possessing developmentalist qualities, an in- telligentsia in uniform. 2. This theoretical approach is premised on the military being an autonomous sector not integrated into the rest of the society. An analysis of the military in Africa requires an understan- ding not only of internal social and political dynamics of the so- ciety in question, but also the manner in which the internal pro- cesses are closely bound up with, conditioned, and, in certain cases determined by forces external to these societies. The republic of Guinea is a country of 5,014,000 people (75'% of whom are Moselms) with an area of 245,857 (km2), with roughly 80% of the population rural and 20% urban. It is bordered by six countries; in the No~h and North-west, by Senegal and Mali re- spectively, to the East by Ivory Coast and to the South Liberia and Sierra Leone, to the west by the Atlantic Ocean and to the North-west by Guinea Bissau. Guinea's main ethnic groups de- fine the colonial originated administrative units so that the country is administratively divided into four regions corresponding to these ethnic groups. Maritime Guinea, generally inhabited by the Susu and related ethinic groups in the coast and extending to the foot of the Fouta Djallon Mountains, Middle Guinea, covering the Fouta Djallon and neighbouring highlands of the Muslim Peul herders; Upper Guinea, a savanna country inhabited by the Ma- linke who are related to the great clans that formed the empire of Mali, and lastly, the forest zone in the South inhabited by the Kissi, Toma, Guerze, Manon and Kono. The country's mineral, agricultural and animal resources 9S UTAFIT/- Vol 9 No 1 /987 consist of bauxite (the world's largest deposit) irone-ore, diamond, bananas. pineapples, palm kernels. rice, manioc, cereals and stock, raising together with hydroelectric potential. The main ex- port commodity. bauxite. accounts for 97% of total export reve- nue. Guinea became. the first French West African colony to become politically independent. with an economy closely inte- grated into the French metropolitan economy as a source of cheap labour and raw materials for French i~dustries and market for finished products. By the time of independence, wild rubber, which prior to World War I accounted for four-fifth of the value of Guinea's exports ,had lost its importance due to the start in rub- ber production from havea trees in the Far East while Gold in the Boure province had been exhausted. The colonial economy was dependent on revenue from the exploitation of diamond in Beyla and Kerouane. bauxite and iron; and taxes from the migrant and agricultural labourers involved in the production of Bananas, Coffee, Palm Kernels and Colas for export to France. The only extractive industry in existence was the aluminium plant at the bauxite mine in Kassa owned by the Fria Company. Economic and social infrastructure was negligible, so that by 1953 there were only 6,558 primary students and no secondary school. By 1935 there was one hospital built in Conakry. Rail infrastructure was hardly developed and the existing one was closely linked to the economic enclaves. The reprecussions of the colonial economy was the emergence and development of new social classes and strata. In the banana plantations the labor force numbered over 10,000, while a nascent working class evolved in the mines. By 1953 almost half of the urban wage earners in Guinea were emplo- yed in the public sector. It was against this background that the PDG emerged both as the political expression of the peasant masses and the labour mo- vement in particular from which it derived much of its leadership. It was pitied against an alliance of the colonial state and faudal chiefs given birth to by a feudal social formation, especially in . Middle Guinea around the Fouta Djallon. This feudal social for- mation provided the social base for the French policy of "indirect rule" On ~ptember 14,1958, after years of anti-colonial struggle in which labour played a crucial role under the political guidance of Rubiik - Coup i" Cuin"a the PDG, the Guinean people by a vote of 1,134,324 to 56,981 voted "No" in a referundum aimed at retaining the people of the territory within a French Community of Semi-independence. 3 On October 2. the Republic of Gufnea was proclaimed, and the territorial assembly became the national legislature. The Origin bf the PDG and its IdeologicalDevelopment The evolution and influence of socialist thought in Guinea . and the subsequent ideological development of the PDG could be traced to two sources. Firstly, the emergence after World War II of formal political parties, movements and groups in French West Africa, and secondly the emergence of trade union movements, all of which were subordinately affiliated to respective metro- politan political and trade union organisation - 'namely; the French Communist Party and Confederation of Trade Unions (CGT). The PDG as a branch ofthe RDA was therefore exposed to varying degrees to the political ideology of the PCF (French Com- munist Party), which was its "mother" Party from its formation in 1947. Sekou Toure, as labour leader and, in 1953 as an elected territorial assembly man emerged as the key individual in the anti- colonial struggle. in merging both the union's economic and poli- tical demands in the struggle against the colonial regIme. This il11al.!e,as an ardent champion of the Guinean masses through articulating the'demands of both the working class and the pea- santry, occured through his close identification with the Labour movel11ent~ Partly through this, the PpG emerged as the main po- litical force in Guinea, and Sekou Toure, the main articulator and ideologue of the Party'. Nevertheless, despite his exposure to Marxist thought, Sekou Toure's concept of socialism in the 1950s was largely influenced by Afican communal life. As he argued in 1959, just after independence; Africa is essentially communaucratic ... Collective life, social solidarity, give to African habits a basic humanism which many people would envy. It is ... because of these human qualities that no individual in Africa can conceive of the organization of his life outside that of the family, village, or elan groUp ..5 Consequently, from 1958 the Party's ideoltlgy became based on a number of premises: the non-existence of social classes, 97 UTAFlTI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 the consolidation of a commuriaucratic society and strength- thening of the African revolution and the unity of the Party, People and Nation. Not until 1967 did the Party declare "Scienti- fic Socialism" as its objective. The colonial question having been partially resolved in 1958, two main tendencies emerged within the Party. Firstly, the pro- mass line elements who advocated a unitary PDG championing the interests of all the Guinean people, and secondly, PDG mili- tants mainly from the Trade Union and Youth Wing of the PDG ad- vocating the transformation of the PDG from a mass party to a vanguard Marxist-Leninist Organisation with Scientific Socialism as its guiding ideology and a committed position on the East- West. Socialist-Capitalist divide. However, it was the advocaters of the mass line led by Sekou Toure whose line prevailed, "ap- propriating" the Marxist-Lininist conception of organizational structures for party and state - which ideally, gave the petty bourgeoisie in the state, total control over all institutions and every sphere of social life in Guinea. However in 1958, by virtue of the overwhelming victory of the PDG in the referendum as well as in the Assembly elections, Sekou Toure declared the attainment of political independence a permanent "revolution against colonialism in the form of its in- herited structures, and opted for the maintenance of the mass po- pular front character of the PDG arguing that the contradictions amongst indigenous social classes were secondary, apart from that between the people and feudalism. The latter having been used by the colonial regime under the cover of chieftainship which was resolved by the universal suffrage of 1957. The only other con- tradiction was that ofthe intelJectual elite and the mass of the rural people which was a result of the former's priviledged position in the colonial economy. However it was the belief of the party and Toure as its main ideologue, that, this and other c~nflicts between the rural masses and other priviledged groups especially the edu- cated elite was prompted by egoism, opportunism or by profes- sional critics. Thus, through intense political education and con- trol of the major means of production, the party believed that these minor contradictions could be suppressed. The Party went on to -add that in a newly independent country, the contrasts between social classes should not be artificially aggravated. In- deed, such differences would disappear in a revolutionary and de- 98 Ru biik - Coup ill GuillPfl mocratic state through the action taken by a single party - the party of all the people.'!; It was only in 1967, during the 8th Co- ngress, when a new class - the lumpen bourgeoisie was put for- ~ ard by Sekou Toure, a class whifh he characterised as the "idle and shirking petite bourgeoisie, ready to hire out the nation to the imperialist power which is on hand" 7 .Also in this category was the group of corrupt high-ranking 'civil servants. These constituted a class of conter-revolutionaries. Thus, the dominant line in the party's approach to the analysis ofthe Guinean social situation and of classes in particular, remained fundamenally the same - not based on the analysis of the relations of production, but on po- litical ideological conscience and behaviour. Supposedly based on the fundamental harmony of interests of the entire Guinean people, the PDG became a party of all the people, and was to give the nation a regime of 'National Demo- cracy' and to embark the nation's action upon the path of popular revolution. National Democracy was to be the means by which all classes could be associated with the construction of the state to enhance. Economic development. Moreover, according to Toure, the inevitable success of the PDG's economic development lay in the fact that whereas the colonial economy neglected the human factor due to the colonialist's concern for profits and in- creasing efficiency, the PDG's plans would be conceived by the people and realised for the people and the well being of collective humanity. In this context, Sekou Toure found no contradiction in declaring as early as 1958 that; "I say publicly; we shall be the first African government to institute forced labour. We are not ashamed to say that forced labour will be instituted, since this work will not be done for the benefit of Sekou Toure, the govern- ment or whoever it may be. This wilfbe done for th~ benefit of those who are going to work themselves. ,sThis alleged harmony of interests by all Guineans became the ideological basis for autho- ritarianism and suppression rather than resolution of emergent contradictory class interests. ,. Post-independence politics in Guinea can be categorised in three phases - the period between 1958-64; the period between 1964-70 and the post 1970 period. Each of these phases mark im- portant landmarks in the political and ideological developments and in the relationships between the Party, State and the People. The period between 1958-64 was characterised by mass 99 UT.4FlTl- Vol 9 No 1 1987 enthusiasm in production, labelled, "human investment" that is massive voluntary labour in the implementation of the PDG's political and economic programmes. The period 1964-1970 marked the surfacing of contradictory class interests and the factionali- sation of the petty bourgeoisie as a social srata. There is mass op- position to the reorganisation of agricultural production and the I use of force by poli!ically inept and technically unskilled party cadres. Consequently, there is a decline in production both in agriculture and industry. The second feature of this period is the stniggJ'e for hegemony in the state between the commercial fa- ction of the petty bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic petty bourgeo- isie, a struggle in which sections of the army become increasingly involved. The post 1970 period marked an important departure in party. state and people relations, characterised by mass resista- nce taking various forms, increased state regression. the streng- thening of the commercial petty bourgeoisie, liberalisation and the politicisation of a number of factors as new mechanisms in the political survival of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie in the state. Having lost much of its social base, the PDG degenerate into a "family club" alienated and suspicious of its coercive ap- paratuses especially the army in a period in which coercion had become the main form of class rule in Guinea. Having arisen to state power on a popular platform of anti- colonialism and anti-feudalism, the PDG, with a strong labour and peasant backing constituting part of its history, was faced with the translation of pre-independence promises into concrete political and economic programmes capable of re-structuring Guinean society. This it was to do on the basis of its mass based compo- sition and petty bourgeois (former clerks, trade union leaders. petty traders and teachers) leadership. The Party's task was to transform a backward agricultural economy basically an appenda- ge of France, dependent on primary products of bananas, coffee and bauxite with an illiteracy rate of 99% and poor economic and social infrastructure. Moreover, following the departure of both French investment and skilled personnel, Guinea's most educated consisted of primary school Ieavers lacking any technical exper- tise to run a modern el-onomy. This handicap was partially alle- viated with the arrival of "progressive sympathisers", especially blacks who, inspired by Guinea's option for total independence rushed to Guinea to help mobilize the people and build an inde" 100 Hlln;ik-- COU(Jill Guilll'a pendent country. The populist character of the PDG's ideology was reflected in the PDG's objective of 'a self-maintaining growth" and the adoption of a 'non-capitalist way', to development, a line which eventually rendered the national economy static. Between 195~ and 1964, various policies came irito effect; land reform, nationali- sation of trade and industry; the creation of a national currency as a means of controlling trade; the institution of vigorous plan- ning; the organisation of collect'ive farms and rural cooperatives as a means of transforming the economy and the development of .. ocial and economic infrastructure and consumer industries. Lacking the expertise both within the state bureaucracy and the supreme party. these policies and the institution of a centrally planned economy was the work of French economic experts under the Marxist economist Charles Bettleheim on the basis of aid from the Eastern Block countries and China. In the initial stages especially the period just after indepe- ndence. mass enthusj~sm and voluntary labour contributed im- mensely to the implementatton at these programmes. In those areas that did not require highly-skilled labour such sectors as construction of roads, bridges. hospitals, schools, hotels. party offices. and in the production of consumer goods. textiles. shoes, automobiles and motor-cycles. targets were achieved and in cer- tain cases even surpassed. Despite these successes. weighed (/[!aillstthe crisis of1958. a multiplicity of problems emergedfrom within. ran~in~.from political. technical to ideological. However, right from the time of independence. fractures h. began to emerge within the leadership of the mass party eSpecially between the dominant (moderate) forces in the Party and those on the left calling for more radical changes in the ideo- logy and character of the party and in its foreign relations. The forces mainly concentrated within the trade union, (CNTG) teachers and students advocated for the transformation of the Illass p:1rtv into a vanguard 'party. espousing scientific ~ocialism. neutral positiOl. ,'1 the East-West divide. Internationally. they \\ c ff' oPP'lsc'd lu the more moderate line pursued by Toure. Their opposition was "baptised" by Toure as "The Teachers Plot of I l)fl!" and was linked to the Eastern Block countries. especially t he Soviet Union Ambassador in' Conakry. They were accused of heing radical s.yndicalists. Pseudo-Marxists and partisans of an 101 UTAFlTl- Vol 9 No 1 1987 egalitarianism exaggerated beyond al.1bounds)' The so-called "Teachers Plot" of 1961 was significant, notab- ly because teachers had been the main disseminators of the PDG ideology to the masses while the youth constituted the most radi- cal wing of the PDG. Their political alienation by the more refor- mist elements lInder Toure, to some extent, 'undermined the PDG's popular base. The expression of popular support for the PDG in this early period is, however, shown by the manner in which the production in agriculture and other projects prior to and just after 1960 were dependent on voluntary labour albeit at the expense of plan- ning. But precisely because of the absence of ideological clarity by the party, leading to mobilizational problems together with lack of a' clear political and economic program, the party having nationalised large tracts of land began to coerce peasants to work in collective farms and cooperatives. Mass resistanc~ of forced labour was partly rooted in the fact that some of the plans were poorly conceived, thus leading to a waste of resources and labour. Enthusiastic party cadres in the countryside, most of whom lacked technical expertise began to coerce peasants to work in collective farms and cooperatives. Whereas the period immediately after independence ,has been characterised by massive enthusiasm by peasants and voluntary labour, the post 1960 period witnessed a dwindling in the response of the peasants to party calls for gre- ater production. This resistance was reflected in the tonnage de- cline of cooperative exports in bananas and coffee between 1960 and 1965 from 55,000 tons to 37,000 and 14,000 tons down to 7,000 tons respectively.10 Similar declines were recorded in other crops. On the other. hand, the state enterprises on which govern- lent hopes for economic development had been based had made only a meagre contribution of 2% to the national revenues four years later (1964) and were operating at quater of their production cat'acity. Apart from the additional problem of financial handicap for the projects (largely in the hands of the Eastern block countries and the United States), the other source of problems was the burgeoning bureacracy. Thus, whereas in 1958 there had been nearly 6,000 government servants inclu- ding local cadres. out of a total of between 62,000 to 70,000 wage earners, by 1965 civil servants had risen to 25,000, auxilliaries 102 H/lhiik -- Coup in Guinpu numbering 17,000 from 7,000. Those in the higher levels of the Civil Service had risen from %5 in 1%5 to 4,600 in 1968. Hence, as the economy was declining, the bureaucracy was expanding and causing further strain to any efforts at internal accumulation. In order to maintain this breaucracy, therefore, the party resorted to increased taxation ofthe working people. The second measures arising from the above crisis aimed at increasing state revenue was the increased statisation of the economy. Thus. in 1964. whole-sale and retail trade was taken over by the state. The result was that more merchants. who had pro- moted the rise of the PDG with funds and had loaned their trucks to the party in its pre-independence compaigns became the secQnd victim in the state's frantic eft rts to reproduce itself. The 1964 changes were to them a betrayal. and threatened to paralyse pri- vate trade which constituted their domain of interest. Conse- quentlv. the peasants who formed the mass base of the party, faced with a defective economic system, shortages of consumer goods and deteriorating living sta ..uards reacted in a typical pea- sant fashion. Firstly, they recllced production of export crops; became indifferent to the party, left the country in large numbers, especially to Ivory coast, and sold much of their produce to neigh- bouring countries in return for basic consumer goods. It was esti- mated that two-thirds of the 1963 rice and coffee harvest was ex- ported to Liberia and Ivory Coast. J1' It is these developments which gave rise to the 1965 "coup plot", baptised by Toure as "The Traders Plot". This plot was more specifically a response to the 1964 and 1965 political measures against that section of the petty-bourgeoisie. outside and within the state involved in trade. The measures sought to limit the number of traders and maintain state monopoly over trade. More fundamentally, the measures sought to exclude traders from posts of political responsibility which had assured them of necessary links and political protection and patronage. The 1965 plot was thus, a result of the emerging contradictory interests and struggle for state power as an impor- tant asset in pursuit of these interests between the petty bourge- isie in the bureaucracy and its commercial section. More speci- fically. it was a reaction to twv main policies of the 1964 commis- sions:one to regulated and control rents, and the other to che~k on the property acquired by Party leaders since independence and to confiscate those acquired illegally. The first policy had its fo- 103 UTA FlT/- Vol 9 No 1 /987 cus on traders and the separation of business and Party roles. The second, and most important, was the banishment from the Party of those individuals associated with theft, embezzlement or sub- version. The importance of the latter lies in the fact that it marked a turning point in the conception of the nature of PDG, for de facto, these measures amounted to an aknowledgement of the fact that the PDG would not be and was not a Party of all the people whose membership was voluntary. An important aspect of the 1964-1965 measures was the fact that despite the party's attempts to purge itself of those flouting Party policies, the exposure and punishment of these elements did not go beyond the Iieads of para- statals, as action against ministers was left to the Secretary Ge- neral or'the Party who,merely reshuffled those implicated.'12 Against a background of economic stagnation, inflaiion, ge- neral rationing and acute shortages of basic commodities, huge foreign debts, Sekou Toure decided to revive Marxism in the vo- cabularly of the Party and for the first time since independe,nce declared socialism as the goal. But as if this was not enough, 'Sekou tourewent further to put his leftist critics on ~liedefensive by "bringing home a carricature of the Chinese cultural revolu- tion. This political development was significant for Sekou Toure for the first time, and for objective reasons, recognised the reality of class struggle. In his own words in 1967, "the interests of the labouring ~a The inabiliy of the non-coercive apparatus to ensure state control over the masses; and increase production upon which the state bureaucracts owed their material existence led to the mili- tarisation of society. The people's militia (recruited from amongst the urban unemployed) whose initial role was to revive the rural economy and carry out political education amongst the youth, to act as a counter-force to the army and act ~ praetorian guard, shifted their emphasis from the above tasks to that of repression. in the face of popular resistance. This reversion to acts of repres- sion was also precipitated by the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 and the October plot of 1965. In 1968, in response to the decline in agricultural production and peasant resistance against party agricultural policies, the Party declared a "Cultural Revolution" whose aim was to redress the above problems. Revolutionary Education Centres (CERS) were formed to provide basic agricultural education to peasants and to intensify the literacy campaign. IS The State even went further in reviving the campaign by.linking and identifying the ide J ological singificance of the compaigns with the anti-colonial le- gendary of Samori Toure and Alfa Y~ya. 16, As part of the Party's efforts to exercise total control of popular organisations, the wor- kers organisation CGT A was integrated into the Party and a com- pulsory union membership for workers imposed, while party dues had become part of state tax on all adults in Guinea. Further plots in 1969 and 1970 merely led to the intensification of repres- sion and major structural changes in the military due to the in- volvement of same of its members in both upheavals. These attempted coups, especially the latter, which involved merce- nary forces in alliance with internal opponents of the regime was effectively used by Sekou- Toure to crush both real and nn.giaary opponents through fake trials and summary executions in the name of the "fifth column". Inde~d, the state effectively used the mercenary invasion to' keep G\lineans mobiJised. thus de6e- cting attention from the economic crisis. By 1970; nearly one- fifth of the population especially a large proportion of inteDectaals and the skilled population had fled to Senegal, Ivory Coast and France. In the face of economic failures, mass indiffereac:e to PDG policies, corruption and nepotism by the leadership, Setou Toure reached the conclusion in 1970 that Guinea's hope lay with the younger generation who had come to maturity in the twelw'e 105 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 years of Guinea's Independence. He dismissed those in the bure- acracy as having been iredeemably corrupted by colonialist ideo- logy. Greater stress was now laid on the revolutionary role of the youth. It is in this context that the popular militia (Milice popu- laire) composed largely of urban unemployed youths assumed po- lice functi0I!..}Vhile Sekou Toure made his distrust for the army publicly blOwn. He declared that "Every soldier who opposes the militia is an immediate or a potential recruit of Imperialism which seeks to establish neo-colonialism within the armed forces everywhere; also, every soldier who opposes the militia is in fact opposing the democratic revolution." 17 This .."t summary of ci- vilian - military and military - militia relations by Sekou Toure in 1970 was the culmination of the failure of the party structure to effectively subordinate the army to party ideology. More sillnifi- cantIy. it was an eye opener for the army whose role in Guinean politics was being'relegated to the second place compared to that of the militia. At the economic level, by 1970, there was marked decline in industrial and agricultural production,. in the former due to lack of raw materials, machinery and skilled expertise, poor manage- ment and rampant corruption, while agricultural production fur- ther declined as, a result of singificant exodus of the peasant population to neighbouring countries, mobilization for unprodu- ctive tasks, shortage of commodities, low prices and more, si- gnificantly, resort to subsi;tence and food crops farming by pea- sants. Hence betwee.n 1964-69, whereas there was an annu~ po- pulation growth of 2.7%, overall production of paddy declined from 360,000 tons to 200,000. 18 The post 1970 period therefore marked a tuming point in Guinea both politically and economically. Politically, despite Sekou Toure's theory of "permanent comspiracy" which set the whole nation into permanent military mobilization , the regime sought to come out of its isolation - both in West Africa and ' with the western countries including France. This change was ne- cessitated by economic factors and the dictum of the supremacy of pofitics over economics was abandoned and a more pragmatic course adopted. The severity of the economic problems took va- rious forms; acute shortages of medical facilities and drugs in 1972 - dubbed by Sekou Toure as "a plot by the physicians to d'i scredit the revolution", the declaration by the president in 106 Hu hiik - Coul> in Guinea 1973 that crops and cattle lie accepted for tax per capital and for the fares of the Mecca Pilgrimage. It is against this background f;lat relations with neighbouring states was improved, an agree- ment with Zaire to provide for the processing of Guinea's bauxite reached, and in 1974, a trip by Premier Lansine Beavogui to the Middle East and oil rich states helped in the country's financial and fuel problems. The State started a process of liberalization which legalised private trade and the importation of goods by tra- ders. The fail ures of state supervised and imperialist -controlled .production both in the sectors of agriculture, services and industry led to the institution of a process of liberalization which was signi- ficant in that it become a permanent and expanding process which strengthened not only the influence of foreign private capital but more fundamentally, the commercial petty boufgeoisie - which had been struggling for greater local private participation in the economy, thus undermining the material base .of the state bureaucracy. This liberalization occured at a time of declining pro- duction in agricultural crops, and subsequent declining importa- nce in the country's foreign trade and the ascendancy of the mi. nerals industry as the main backbone of the country's exports. Thus, by 1977, bauxite and aluminium alone stilI accounted for 97% of the country's export revenue. 19 At the same time, exter- nal debts continued to rise from US 560m in 1973 to US 955m. in t 976. Indeed in Africa, Guinea stood out as one of the countries most dependent on foreign aid. The liberalization policies 'of the post 19705 were therefore aimed at checking economic stagnation by providing the climate :for increased foreign investment in the mining ind.Atries in the face of increase in oil prices and obtaining the foreign, private and multi-Iaterial financial assistance to rejuvenate the exi~g industries ~perating at below 25% of their operation capacities. The Boke Bauxite project jointly owned by the. state.and Harvey Aluminium Company and by Aluminium Ud of Canaeja (HALCO'O) was a major beneficiary of this liberalization. which enabled it to receive a long negotiated aid from United States AID and the World-Bank whose signing dated back to 1965. The second beneficiary was the Fria mines which constitutes Guinea's ri- chest source of bauxite and in which the state and American capi- tal are jointly involved. Since Guine'll's economy., except for the early 1960s was generally sustained by western aid and tnde 107 UTAF/TI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 especially from the common market, the post-1970 liberalization policies were but a continuation of western capitalist monopoly of Guinea's source of aid/trade and both exports and imports. Indeed, from 1975, followed the resumption of relations with France and despite ruptures following the death of Diallo reIli, former Secretary General of the O.A.U., France has become an important trading partner second only to the USA in exports land top in imports. 20 In the face of economic failures, decline in production, po- litical repression and corruption, the regime was forced to seek for alternative sources of finance. The 1970s and beyond therefore marked a period of Sekou roure's moderation and pragmatism, signalled by his move to the right. Materially dependent on for- reign private capital, which the Party had attempted to control, Guinea's foreign policy became less militant. The regime's increasing alliance with reactionary African and Arab States who were willing to provide financial assistance to a regime threate- ned with economic collapse and surviving on a narrow social base,. was part of this process of de-radicalisation. Though initi- ally not propounded by the party or roure as an important poli- tical factor, Islam became a constant theme in post 1970s, espe- cially with regard to its progressive element. One would well ar- gue that, ideologically, Islam accidentally "appeared in the Gui- nea political. scene at a time when Guineans economic problems were pushing her closer to oil-rich Arab States epecially Saudi Arabia. His mediatory role in the gulf war as the leader of the Islamic Conference Organisation, though not successful, created further sympathy from Arab nations, specially those allied to Iraq. It is these economic necessities in Guinea that explains Sekou roure's close association with King Hassan II of Morocco and his support for Morocco in its predatory and occupationist War in Western Sahara. The Saudi Arabian monarch and King Hassan became the Intermediary between Sekou roure and the Arab Sheikhs. This link enabled the regime to became the main reci- pient of Arab petrol-dollars in Africa. Thus, both at the domestic and international scenes, Sekou roure's revolutionary myth gra- dually eroded.!1 Internally, the liberalisation policies and mas- sive inflow of foreign capital intensified class struggle since the liberalisation policies and strengthening of the commercial petty bourgeoisie and foreign capital went hand in hand with the weak- 108 Ru biik - Coup in Guinea ening of the purchasing power of the labouring masses, their gre- ater exploitation and increased inflation. With increased reliance on foreign capital and the sanctioning of favourable repatriation of profits by foreign private investors, the PDG's role became es- sentially that of disciplining and supervising labour. It is not supri- sing therefore, that in 1983. the congress of PDG dropped the slogan of' 'revolution" in favour of that of "produCltion" .2i' It is against this background that we attempt to analyse the social basis of the April 1984 direct military intervention in Guine- an politics after over two decades of PDG rule. In doing so, we ana- lyse the manner in which the military, as a state institution was an offspring of the political and institutional organisation of the Gu- inea society. Contrary to. the theoretical models which seek to conceptua-. lise the military as an autonomous institution, the nature and roh~ of the military in Guinea has intimately been shaped by the socio- economic structures of the society. To a large extent, the mili- tary role in society has been determined by the attempts of the do- minant class forces in the state (bureacratic petty bourgeoisie) to mediate between foreign capital and the exploited classes in Guinea. Central in this mediatory role has been the Party, the PDG. which formulated'the policies which placed the military, its service in reproducing the relations of exploitation in a statist form. Thus, despite the verbal declarations of the party of trans- forming the military into a revolutionary instrument of social tra- nsformation, the military like other state institutions has reflected the cross societal contradictions which has taken the form of at- tempted coups and covert resistances. Elements within the mili- tary allied to civilian forces opposed to PDG rule, had, since 1965 been part of the many "conspiracies" against the regime. Thus, as sections of the petty bourgeoisie opposed to statisation of the economy, elements within the military severally attempted to po- litically intervene in Guinean politics. Correspondingly, as there have been endemic political crises in Guinea, so have these found expression within the military establishment in attempted coups since the 1960s. further de-mystifying the thesis of the atonomy military. However. precisely because the politics of social control was extended to the military establishment, and as a result of the contradictions created by the ruling class within the armed forces, in which the army was earmarked for greater control, it was not 109 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 suprising that it was this section of the military which evolved as the least reliable. But more significant about the intervention of the army was the fact that no other organised political force could survive in the repessive political climate in Guinea over the two decades. The Guinean military establishment, like other institutions, was inherited from the colonial order and initially consisted of a police force composed of remants of General De Gaulle's African Army, formed during World War II to liberate France from Fas- cism. The inherited force had two distinct elements: Firstly part of it acted as a counter-revolutionary against the Algerian peoples war for independence; and secondly, a section of it was opposed to the popular expression of the Guinean people for full indepen- dence from France, as exhibited by a protest and the burning -of Delaba barracks after the outcome of the referendum in 1958.!~ When Guinea gained independence, African commissioned officers who had served in the French army readily availed them- selves to the n~~ government, only to be demoralised by the go- vernment's non-respect for professionalism and promotion - factors which were inherent elements in the military ideology of French military establishment. In the aftermath of the "Non" response to De Gaulle's call for the Franco-African. Community, and the subsequent rupture of relations, Guinea's urgent mili- tary needs were for political, ideological and financial reasons,met by the Eastern bloc countries. Thus, the military assistance from Eastern bloc countries - both in the form of training and hardware, formed the basis for the formation of the three sectors, of the military in 1965, the army, police and the militia.!' Since then, the Gumean military has been basically equiped and trained in the east (notably soviet) apart from some limited west German assistance. By 1969, Guinea had a regular force of 4,800 officers, and a 30,000 popular militia, one out of 133 Guineans was a militia man and one out of 800 was a soldier. !5 By 1979, the reguiar force had shot up to 8.850; with one armoured battalion, four infantry battalions, one Engineer battalion, 30 T-34/54- medium and 10 pt light Tanks. The Navy was 350, with six Shangai Patrol Boats, an Air Force of 500. with Mig 15s and a paramilitary' force of 8,000 men. The interest of the Guinean ruling class on the military, with 110 RlIbiik-Coup in Guinea regard to internal politics, evolved particularly, with the inter- vention of the military on the Ghanian political scene in 1966, a development which denied Sekou Toure one of his closest ideo- logical colleagues. Prior to this, the role of the military was dire- cted towards the defence of the nation and Guinea's territorial boundaries against French supported destabilization attempts, ~ortuguese colonial forces In Guinea Bi!i!il!.u-as well as in produ~ ction. Though coups had been taking place in Africa, the 1966 Coup was crucial in that the military had ousted a relatively progressive government without any popular resistance. Hence- _forth, Sekou Toure, aware of growing internal opposition to the regime decided to go beyond balancing the regular army with a people's militia. From 1967, the regime began a campaign of po- liticisation of the army, followed by structural changes in 1969 and the eventual disestablishment of the army. Whereas the first steps in 1967 were largely influenced by external developments, the second was closely tied up to both internal and external fa- ctors. Internally, it was preceded by an attempted coup involving, for the first time, sections of the military and civilians. Exter- nally it was both a response to the coup in Mali in 1969, and to the 1970 mercenary invasion by Portuguese recruits in alliance with internal forces within the military establishment and oppo- sition elements in and outside the country. The 1967 measures were part of the general re-structuring of the various party and state institutions, to facilitate the realisa- tion of the newly stated socialist objective of the party. The chan- ges, notably, the reduction in the number of the BPN members (Party Central Committee) was part of the process that vested immense powers in the person of Sekou Toure and strengthe- ned the political powers of the PDG. Due to the challenge posed by the commercial petty-bourgeoisie to the petty bourgeoisie in the state, this period was marked by constant references to the lumpen bourgeoisie which had emerged from within the burea- cracy and the idle and shirking petit bourgeoisie (undefined); both of which sought to ally with f~reign imperialist powefs to re- store capitalism. In 1969, the PDG therefore, decided to carry out a structural reform of the army with two objectives: increaSing the effective control of the party on the army, and seco- ndly, reducing the separation of the military and civilian popu- lations as a means of decentralising the army 2. Henceforth, it 111 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 was argued, the miiitary was to play a greater role in economic life and would be granted the same rights of gu~rantees as civil servants in recruitment, promotion and retirement. Party com- mittees were introduced in each military camp under the most active POG militants irrespective of rank, to ensure close POG political supervision of the military. Thus, the POG found its way in the military establishment as an institution of social control- rather than an instrument of mobilization. At this period, the party had lost much of its mass base which enabled the dominant forces to rule less arbitrarily. The atomisation of the various sections of the miiitary into separate staffs for the army, police, air force, navy and gendermerie with an overall council of defence presided over by the Head of State for coordination between the five staffs, was part of the mechanisms of social control !7~ The army was im- mediately integrated into the statutes of the civil service. Howe- ver, these structural changes did not cushion the top brass ofthe military (part of the bureacratic petty bourgeoisie in the state) from contending for political power. Thus, in 1969, a plot in Habe region involving high ranking politicans and military offiers, ciIiegedly attempting to proclaim independence for 'Moyenne Guinea, in the model of Biafra, was discovered. This prompted a purge in the army against "elements whose presence within the army was considered incompatible with Guinea's wish to radi- c~lise its revolution". Four measures were taken: L Military units previously stationed in the towns' were dispersed to the country's 208 districts to train members of the civil service and to set up production units, not as an initially conceived policy to transform the military into an agent of transformation, but as a reaction and ' response to the military~s political inclinations 2. Solders who wi- shed to leave the army were' promised recruitment in the other sectors ofthe administration 3. The army was to engage in cotton, rice, groundnuts and maize production 4. New wage scales were set corres'pondin~ to t~ose in the civil service and 5. The army.was disestablished. that is, all workers including the military would)n future be regarded as civilians (factor which partly contributed to the partial success of the mercenary invasion in 1970). The Pre- sident and hence the Party, instead attached emphasis on the run- ning of the peoples militi'a as a counter-fOl:ce to the army, in line with his declaration to the army' in 1970 that to oppose the militia is to oppose the democratic revolution and to be a reactionary 112 ally of imperialism. How then could a coup take place in Guinea by an army ideo- logically brought up under the PDG and indoctrinated by it on the ~irtues of obedience to the "party as the supreme organ of the people? On the basis ofthe Guinean political economy, several fac- tors help explain the social basis of the 1984 coup by the Army, a coup one commentator superficially described as the first coup in history against a corpse-because it was in effect a coup against Sekou Toure. 28 In the twenty-six years of Sekou Toure's rule in Guinea, des- pite the relatively greater role played by women in the political life of Guinean society, and of the quantitative improvement in social infrastructure, the Guinean economy was marked by gene- ral economic stagnation, both in agriculture and Industry. Con- currently, the economy remainecl an appedange of the wider global capitalist system, a system sustained by the infusion of western capital, mainly, American and therefore subject to its crises. Underlying this crisis, have been political, economic, tech- nical and ideological factors manifested in the shortages of com- modities, inflation, peasant reversion to subsistance agriculture, exodus to neighbouring countries, and covert and overt political resistance by diverse social classes and groups in the society. Secondly, post independence Guinean politics has been shaped by a political party with a bureacratic petty bourgeois leadership lacking a clear ideological direction. The Ideological foundation upon which the post independence objectives were defined cre- ated the very basis for recourse to repression and dictatorial methods in the name of defending the interests of the whole people, and one general will in a social reality in which the evo- lution of classes and hence class interests had become irreconci- !able. Yet is was a faction of the Guinean petty bourgeoisie using the state to develop a socio-economic base through the PDG in the name of "Communacracy" and later, "Socialism" a process .necessi~ated by the general crisis of capitalist social surPluses through state intervention in the economy in the interests of both capital and the reproduction of the state. It is this ideological' mask and false start" in the name of the people which led to the swift dismissal of those opposing the policies of the PDG to be labelled "Counter-revolutionary agents of international i.rnpe- rialism." It is this same ideological confusion which ledio the 113 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 'identification of classes at the psychological realm rathe.r than in the realm of relations of production. Faced with a break in the all- front alliance and lacking the ideological basis for a theoretical understanding of the on-going proceSses, the party resorted to coercion to maintain an all-class front in the name of social pro- gress and later, socialism. Concurrently, the intervention of the state in the economy in the post-1984 period led to the evolution of a cQlossal bureaucracy. The party, swallowed up by the state, rather than mobilize, was transformed into an institution of coerci- on and of the consolidation of obedience. Driven into an anti-demo- cratic institution, the PDG under Toure, sank into an extraordinary lethargy. The party's mission became one of delivering instructio- ns which issue from the summit and eventually keep the state to hold the people dawn. The authoritarianism of the PDG which had its roots in its inability to transform Guinea's underdeveloped economy was heightened by the struggle over the scarce resou- ces whose access was dependent upon strategic location in the party bureacracy. Mass lethargy which exhausted the energies of anthuastic peasants, was closely related to the ill-conceived eco- nomic programmes in the early 1960s in industry and particularly agriculture. The failures were a consequence of poor management, final'cial handicap, lack of technical expertise and ecological pro- blems, compounded by the ideological basis of the party's obje- ctives and programmes such as the introduction of state farms and cooperatives in which the use of forced labour became one of the most serious sources of peasants resistance. The state, in disor- ganising peasant production units, failed to provide a viable al- ternative thus heralding a decline in production in agriculture. The state response was political repression. Subsequent mass lethargy the erosion of the party's social base intensified in the succeeding period and was epitomised by the women's deII]o- nstration in 1977.,30 At the level of the military establishm,::nt, this repression was highlighted by the militarisation of society from 1965, the recruitment into the popular militia of the urban unemployed. Militia's enjoyment of powers of repression over other state coercive instlll'nents. Thirdly, the dependence on one individual as the single ideologue of the party led to the develop- ment of a personality cult around Sekou Toure. The concentra- tion of decision - making powers in his hands, the constant re- ~huffling of personnel and rampant nepotism led to the i(t'entifi~ 114 Rubiik- Coup in Guinea cation of the party and its failures with Sekou-Toure. Indeed, Sekou Toure became an institution, allegiance to the Party and State became synonymous with allegiance to the secretary General of the Party. The result was the relegation of the other leaders, especially the members of the BPN (central committee of the Party and cabinet) to mere followers of Sekou Toure resulting to the ab- sence of democratic centralism in the party decision-making pro- cess. This situation had an undermining influence on the Guiean political and mass institutions, especially the party. Indeed the rlominance of Sekou Toure in decision-making and the concentra- tion of powers in his hands can be viewed against the overwhel- ming preponderance of decreed laws over those legislated by the Assembly. Thus, the failure and success of the PDG was ipse: factor, the failure and success of Toure. Thus, having been elevat- ed into an infallible figure, Sekou Toure reacted visciosuly to criti- cism over Party policies, and considered such criticism as an as- sault on his personality. Sekou Toure's increasing reliance on the popular militia for repressive purposes and lVs preference of its members for political support, together with a public declaration that they be obeyed by the army was a political bomb. The Secre- tary General was in effect announcing that he would not preclude the use ofthe militia to handle any army discontent, that is, to use one apparatus of state coercion to coerce another apparatus. But precisely because the popular militia acted as a 'personal force' in this form of class rule - in a situation of leadership crisis - itself a creation of Toure' s legacy, a mass, apathetic, demobiltzed and indifferent to PDG politics, a section of the arm~ opposed to statisation was able to move in un resisted at a conveniet7t time when the top brass of the military and Toure's sycophaqc follo- werS,were locked up in a succession crisis. It was this section of the army within the military which had not only consistently proved its pOtential as a contender for political power, but as a well-organised institution that could face Toure's force with force. Thus, twenty-six years of PI>G ideological indoctrination had done little to shape their ideological outlook. Making use of all those factors that give the military greater lee~y to inter- vene in politics, the army ,took over power on AprlI 3rd 1984: denouncing Toure's domestic policies, and stating that, the coup would not have succeeded in Toure's life. time. nus, the myth of the dominance and supremacy of the Party as a. political organ l1S UTAFTTI- Vol 9 No 1 1987 of social control through repression rather than popular will, was rudelv shattered by the coup. The indifference of the Guinean mass~s to the coup was itself proof o(their peripheral role in PDG polities. Lessons and Conslusion Three Jessons can be drawn from the abrupt end brou~ht to Gui- nea's over two decades of communaucratic - cum - socialist experimention. Firstly, the role of the party in relation to the pe- ople. The case of Guinea' demonstrates the necessity for a clear, coherent ideology which corresponds to and articulates the obje- ctive interests of the labouring masses in Afric8.l, where socialism,' is viewed as the objective ideology whieh by virtue of its social con- tent bonds the masses and the party and expresses their aspira- tions. Oosely tied to this is the necessity of popular participation and respect for democracy and dmnocratic participation of the people in public affairs, for there can be no genuine struggle for national liberation nor socialism outside popular democratic par- ticipation. The absence ofthe latter not only leads to apathy but to the adoption and institutionalization of anti-democratic forms of rule. Secondly, one of the causes and consequence of arbitrary rule is the phenomenon of leaderism - the cult of the personality. The guinea" experience demonstrates how the elevation of an indi- vidual into an institution buttresses individualism and hinders the d~velopment of popular initiative and leads to the -subordina- tion of the labouring masses to "apolitical spectators'. The reliance on the leader whose views, generalised into public out- look, is both a cause and effect of a monolithic conception of poli- ties. Its consequence is the stiffiing of opposing views and expres- sions which lead ultimately to the creation of a police-state, where state, orchestrated homogenous thought and expression is but a product of fear. Thirdly, and closely related to the above two, is that the role, and aspirations of the military as an institution and its members as sections of various social classes and groups is not largely determiJled by legal definitions, but by internal class struggles and the class content ofthestate,' the political culture of the so<;iety, and hence the forms of governance. Thus, whether the military is professional 'or geared towards social transforma- tion, the final determiriant of that objective is the form class 116 Ru biik - Coup in Guinea struggle takes and the political climate in which it is moulded. Gui- nea's experience demonstrates, the incompatibility of the mili~ tary as an institution of social transformation and of repression not only of the labouring masses but also of itself. In conclusion therefore, post-independence GUln~ was ca- ught up in a political and economic crisis originating from Gui- nea's continued integration into the world-wide capitalist system; a crisis compounded by an ideological confusion, and revolutionary rhetoric, based on the revolutionary myth of Ahmed Sekou Toure as an institution synonymous with the party. The concentration of decision-making powers in Sekou Toure and his role as the single theoretician and ideologue of the party allied to the identi- fication of the party WIth the personality of Sekou Toure. His revo- lutionary myth dressed under such titles as 'the faithful and su- preme servant of the people', our well-beloved Secretary General, the Helsman of our Revolution, 'the Great son of Africa 'the Stra- tegist. the Liberator of oppressed peoples, the Terror of Inter- n~tional imperialisllLcolonialism and Neo-Colonialism, the Do- ctor of Revolutionary Science .... 50 institutionalised the psycho- phacy that paralysed all other institutions apart from the army. The "popular party", the PDG, for lack of a clear ideological di- rection of its leaders and the political impudency of its leader gra- dually developed into a huge bureaucratic and repressive appa- ratus. From a mobilization oriented party up to early 196Os, the PDG sank into a demobilizing agent, and in the words of Fanon .'into an information service." The social basis of the coup was to' be found in the Guinean political economy, a mono-culture crop and later mineral oriented stagnating economy characterised by repression .. and suspicion of the massive institutions of coercion created by the party. Despite some of the positive advancements in the social infrastructure-education, health, the ~volution of confidence in the Guinea women, the development of national languages, the popular resistance of the Guinean labouring mas- ses and progressive sections of the petty bourgeousie against "revolution" from above, underscore the fact that the amancipa- tion of the working peoples must be the task of the working clas- ses themselves. 117 UTAFITI- Vol 9 No 1987 NOTES 1. W. Gutleridge. "Undoing Military Coups in Mrica," Third World (buJrterly. Jan. 1985. Vol. 7 No.1 2. R. Murray. "The Social Roots and Political Nature of Military Regimes , In P.C.W. Gutkind. & P. Waterman, (eds), African Social Studies: a Radical Reader, Monthly Review press. 1977 p. 858-97. 3. C. Reviere. Guinea: The Mobilization of a People. Cornell University Press, London.1977,p.82. 4. L. Kaba. "Guinean Politics: A Critical Historical Review." The Journal of Modern African Studies, 15, 1, 1977, pp. 25-45 5. L. Adamolekun. "The Socialist Experience in Guinea" Socialism in Sub- Saharan Africa e.G. Rosberg and T.M. Callaghy,(eds) •. Berkeley, 1979. p. 65 6. A_S. Toure The Doctrine and Methods of the Dem()f!ratic Party of Guinea, Vol. 10.. p.)9. 7. E. Schatten. "Revolutionary Unity and National Reservations: The case of Guinea". In Communism in Africa. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1966 pp. 125-45. 8. A.s. TO!.lre.Guinea Revolution and Social Progress, 1%3 pp. 44-45. 9. t:.M~R.eviere. op. cit., p. 111' 10. Ibipp.204.7 11. Ibi.pp.l09 . 12. R.W. Johnson, "Sekou Toure: The Man and his Ideas", in P_C.W ..Gutkind, & P .. Waterman. African Social Studies: A Radical Reader, Hememann. London, 1977.p.558. 13. L. Adamolekun. op_cit.. p. 120. 14. This was triggered off by the expulsion of U.S. Peace Corps in 1967 as a result of the arrest of a Guinean ministerial delegation in Accra during a Pan- American stop over. See Adamolekun Ibid p. 120 15. For further discussion see X. Lound. "Educational Reform and its effect on Rural Development in Guinea," Civilisation Vol. XXII- 1972 - No.2, pp.261.2. 16. R.W. Jonson. op.cit .. p, 340. 17. Quoted in L. Adamolekun. op.cit .. p. 146_ II!. Africa Contermporay Record. 1978 - p. B. 339_ 19. E. Momoh. "Sekou Toure: The Man .. the Policies," West Africa 12th April. 1984. p. 704-5. 20. L. Adamolekun. "Reflection on Guinea". West Africa 7th may 1984. p. B.964.5. 21. Jose Nun .... The middle class military coup", in R.I. Rhodes, (Ed) Imperia- [ism and U'lderdevelopment. p_ 323-4. 22. Ahmed Sekour Toure' "An Mrican Tragedy" The Ajrican Communist No. 100 First Quarter. 1985, p. 61. 23. E.F. Pachter. "Contra-Coup: Civilian control of the military in Guinea, Tanzania and M07ambique in The Journal of Moden Africa Studies, 20. 4 1982. p. 597. C. Riviere. &p. cit. p. 85.. 24. C_Reviere Ibi. p_ 1M 25_ Africa Contemprorary Record 1970-71 p_ B. 365. I978-79p. B 639_ 26. For a discussion on the methods used by civilian government to control' the militarv see H. Bretton, Power Politics in Africa, 1983_ 27. West Africa, 7th May. I:l84p. 959 - .. 28. F ~anon The wretched of the Earth, Peguin, London 1965 p. 157-59. 29. A}'ricaSouth of the Sahara 1982-83 Europe Publications. 1982. 50. F. Fanon. op. cit., p. 172'" Ch_ 5 118