

THE LUSAKA MANIFESTO STRATEGY OF OAU STATES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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The Lusaka Manifesto¹ is an old document now -- 8 years old today (April, 1977) -- compared to the other and more recent OAU declarations on the subject of Southern Africa. But, there are three compelling reasons why we should discuss the strategy adopted 8 years ago in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. This article will re-examine the Lusaka Manifesto strategy in some detail, because: (1) We should assess and evaluate the strategy in the light of the experiences of the last 8 years. We should discuss and evaluate the consequences of the strategy on the current struggle for freedom and independence in Southern Africa. Particular attention will be paid to the Penina Agreement between Portugal and the competing Angolan Liberation Movements in 1974; the Lusaka Accord between Zimbabwe leaders in Lusaka in 1974; and the Turnhalle Conference inside Namibia and related issues. (2) Two publications in recent years have thrown much-needed light on the Lusaka Manifesto. There is the published correspondence between President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Mr. John Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa² in 1968, which now appears to have been a build-up towards the Manifesto. Either individually or on behalf of a group of states, Kaunda was fishing in troubled waters to see where the fish and crocodiles lay. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, and in the same year, Dr. Henry Kissinger, presented several options on Southern Africa to President Richard Nixon in the now famous Tar Baby Memorandum (or Memorandum No. 39 of October, 1969).³ There are points of convergence and divergence between the Manifesto and Memorandum which will be discussed below. (3) Although the OAU has issued several other documents on Southern Africa, notably the Mogadishu (1970) and the Dar es Salaam (1974) Declarations, the overall strategy has remained that of the old Lusaka document. This document was endorsed by both the OAU and the General Assembly of the United Nations, and has remained the rallying point of OAU powers against those

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few states that advocate dialogue with South Africa on the one hand, or those which seek outright commitment to the armed struggle on the other.

Of the positive features of the Manifesto, the one that should be mentioned at the outset was that it drew the attention of the world at an early stage to the crucial issues of race and colour, and an area of growing strategic importance. In recent years, the two major powers, the USA and USSR, have vastly increased their interests in the area. The civil war in Angola lit the fuse in Southern Africa and nearly brought the major powers to blows. Stern warnings were issued from both Washington and Moscow, followed by visits of senior government officials to the area, and increasing militarisation of the Indian Ocean and selected governments on the mainland. The danger of escalating the current guerrilla warfare into a major conflict in which the major powers will be involved looms large in Southern Africa. The situation has all the makings of a Vietnam-type conflict, including an ample supply of the Diems and Theus.

The Liberation Movements have scored major victories against the colonialist forces. In every state in Southern Africa, there is a growing national consciousness among the indigenous people, and a widening of the conflict with the white settler regimes and their colonialist supporters. The greatest victory of all was the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire after the successful coup d'etat in Portugal on April 24, 1974. The establishment of people's governments in former Portuguese colonies fired the imagination of Africans in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa itself. The guerrilla wars in Zimbabwe and Namibia gathered momentum. In mid-1976, the urban population of South Africa exploded in school and race riots that caught the regime unawares. The persistence and scale of these urban disturbances, especially in Soweto in Johannesburg and Guguleto near Cape Town, was unprecedented in the history of the South African freedom struggle. By the end of 1976 the possibility of a major civil war within South Africa was so imminent that the Government enacted legislation to give it powers to deploy heavily-armed troops and the airforce in African residential areas in the event of widespread disturbances.

The general idea of liberating the African continent from colonial rule has kept the OAU united, no matter how bitterly the Heads of States disagree on the best method and strategy to be employed. The liberation of Southern Africa evokes applause and deep

emotions of solidarity among Heads of States at OAU Summit conferences, or bilateral talks between visiting dignitaries. Some OAU meetings in which deep divisions occurred among members over matters of borders or security, however found common ground when they moved to reports of organs concerned with liberation. Although the charter of the OAU had generally committed member states to fighting against colonialism, it was the Manifesto that provided the ideological underpinning and the flexible strategy that all members could support. Furthermore, the document was well-received by the former colonial powers in Western Europe and North America to whom it was addressed. As one of the authors put it, Western Europe listened because Africa "argued, not shouted".

DOMINO THEORY

Another aspect of the overall OAU strategy was the application of what is known as "the domino theory". In a few words, the theory focusses on the general morale of the population, and postulates that if one state falls in a group of inter-related states like in Southern Africa, the others will fall in quick succession like dominoes. Or, to put it in another way, when one faces a powerful enemy, it is better to fight him at his weakest point first, and proceed in stages, rather than provoking the total opposition at one and the same time.

In the context of Southern Africa, the OAU strategy was to give maximum military and financial support to the Liberation Movements of the Portuguese colonies so that they succeed first. Since the liberation of those territories, the emphasis has now shifted to Zimbabwe and Namibia. Eventually, an independent Zimbabwe and Namibia would assist the OAU in confronting the Republic of South Africa itself. But, as we will discuss below, the strategy in fact was never to confront South Africa militarily. The domino theory has been criticised by South African Liberation Movements, the PAC and the ANC. They argue that liberation forces in other states of Southern Africa could only succeed if the South African military forces were pinned down in South Africa itself, and therefore unable to render assistance to their neighbours. This point has been the subject of considerable debate and comment between the South African movements and the OAU Liberation Committee for almost a decade.

In our view the domino theory is applicable to the region of Southern Africa because of the sense of solidarity and common destiny that has developed among the 50 million indigenous peoples of Southern Africa. The absence of major geographical barriers and the extensive movement of ordinary people across national boundaries in search of work and employment, has built a sense of solidarity and common destiny among them. During the ten years of the Central African Federation, the strongest branches of both the Malawi Congress Party and the African National Congress of Zambia were in Rhodesia and South Africa. The liberation of Mozambique was warmly welcomed by Africans in Rhodesia and South Africa, where many Mozambiquans were working. The economy of South Africa depends heavily on migrant labour from neighbouring territories of Southern Africa. The Rhodesian economy also relies heavily on Malawi and Mozambiquan labour. It is estimated that Southern Africa as a whole has about 2 million migrant labourers at any one time, i.e. person working in territories other than their own. Our study elsewhere of the dynamics of the liberation wars has shown the critical role played by these migrant labourers.

A close examination of the social structures of Southern Africa shows two major contours that are politically significant. The first refers to white society. There is a national bourgeoisie that runs the military-industrial complex and the mining industry of Southern Africa -- one of the richest in the world -- and is now increasingly intertwined with international capital. It should be stressed that this national bourgeoisie accumulated capital from a domestic base, and then spread upwards to link-up with international finance capital and downwards to link-up with lucrative sources of colonial labour in the region. This national bourgeoisie lost political power with the defeat of General Smuts' United Party in South Africa in 1948, and the eclipse of Sir Roy Welensky's settler-dominated Central African Federation in Rhodesia in 1963. John Vorster's Nationalist Party which has been in power for the last 29 years represents a coalition of plantation farmers and white trade unionists who insist on maintaining racially discriminatory practices and sources of cheap African labour. Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front represents a similar coalition of plantation farmers and trade unionists in Rhodesia. In particular, the plantation is an institution whose survival depends absolutely on the maintenance of the colonial capitalist system, with all its ramifications, especially the control of labour and land.

by the individual plantation owners. Half of the total land area of Rhodesia, and 87 per cent of South Africa is plantation land, large and small. This class cannot afford the neo-colonial solutions implicit in the Lusaka Manifesto.

On the African side, understandably the most profound changes over the last hundred years has been the proletarianisation of the population, and the declining of the peasantry. Through taxation and land shortage, the economic base of the peasantry has been destroyed, and they have been forced into the labour market as permanent or temporary wage-earners. Consequently, a viable working class has developed in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia, possibly more than in any other country on the continent. It is this class, and especially the migrant section of it, that forms the main component of the liberation movement. The growing contacts with socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia that provide the main training facilities and weapons for the movement, has significantly radicalised the movement. The old nationalist leadership drawn from the truncated petty bourgeoisie is barely retaining its control of the dynamic movement. This movement has set its face against the neo-colonial solutions sought by both the Manifesto and the Kissinger memorandum. Having outlined very briefly the major classes contending for power in Southern Africa, let us now turn to the strategy of the Manifesto itself.

TALKING VERSUS KILLING

The Lusaka Manifesto clearly states that "we would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill", but concludes that "while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. That is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the OAU" (paragraph 12). Peaceful negotiations and the armed struggle were therefore presented as two sides of the same coin. Negotiating peacefully wherever and whenever possible, and resorting to fighting only when all else has failed, has remained the basic strategy of the signatories and the OAU over the last eight years. Let us examine the consequences of this strategy in the case of Zimbabwe.

Soon after the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in 1974, Vorster resumed contact with Kaunda, and stated that he

feared that there would be a war whose consequences were "too ghastly to contemplate". He appeared to have dropped the threat of hitting Kaunda "so hard that you would never forget it" contained in the exchanges of 1968. One point of agreement in the 1968 exchanges was that the illegal situation of Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia was a threat to peace in the area. The point was not pursued. When Vorster disclosed in Parliament in 1970 that exchanges had taken place, and Kaunda had published the letters, any further contact had been discontinued. However, the powerful international financiers with business interests in both South Africa and Zambia, kept verbal contact at least between the two men. In October 1974, at a University of Zambia graduation ceremony attended by Sir Richard Luyt, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town and Sir Harry Oppenheimer, the financial magnate who is head of the largest South African multinational corporation, Anglo-American Corporation, Kaunda praised Vorster publicly for a speech he had made in Cape Town calling for peaceful and painstaking negotiation rather than war. Kaunda described this speech as "the voice of reason that Africa has been waiting for". There was nothing outstandingly new or reasonable in the speech, but it presaged the policy of detente that was already under way. Again, common ground had been struck between the two men over Rhodesia. Events followed whose general thrust was to stop the guerrilla war then raging in north-eastern Rhodesia, and to call for a constitutional conference to be attended by the Smith regime on the one side, and the African nationalist leaders of ZAPU and ZANU on the other. The Zimbabwe leaders were released from eleven years of detention, and rushed from prison cells in Salisbury to the State House in Zambia. Edward Ndhlovu, deputy national secretary of ZAPU, described this event as the surprise of the decade. In a circular to his members he said:

On the 8th of November 1974, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Comrade Jason Moyò, and the Secretary for Publicity and Information, Comrade T.G. Silundika, were called to State House, Lusaka. There they met James Chikerema and George Nyandoro. The four were ushered to a prepared chamber by themselves. There they met the surprise of the decade - our President, Joshua Nkomo, and the Secretary for External Affairs Comrade Joseph Msika, entered the chamber.... He (Nkomo) explained also that his coming to

Lusaka was also his pleasant surprise and had been arranged through diplomatic moves involving Dr. Kaunda, Dr. Julius Nyerere, and Dr. Seretse Khama, with the regimes of South African and Rhodesia.

Ndhlovu did not mention that this was Nkomo's second visit to Lusaka in that month. He mentioned that, in the ZANU delegation, "Ndabaningi Sithole had not come because his colleagues had deposed him in the Que Que Prison". After a long and protracted power struggle the external ZANU confirmed this deposition by electing the Secretary-General, Robert Mugabe, as party leader. On December 7th the leaders of the four nationalist organisations -- the ANC, ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI -- met again in Lusaka and signed a unity accord covering complex and delicate issues on which there was no real meeting of minds, although there may have been an agreement on paper. After considerable disagreement in the presence of the three presidents for two full days, on the third day the delegations of ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and ANC met by themselves and took a fresh look at the question of unity which had been demanded by the frontline presidents. The following 7 points declaration was agreed upon and announced:

1. ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and the ANC hereby agree to unite in the ANC;
2. The parties recognise the ANC as the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe;
3. (a) They agree to consolidate the leadership of the ANC by inclusion into it of the President of the ANC;
(b) ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI shall each appoint three other persons to join the enlarged ANC executive;
4. The enlarged ANC executive shall have the following functions:
 - (a) To prepare for any conference for the transfer of power to the majority that might be called;
 - (b) To prepare for the holding of a Congress within 4 months at which: (i) A revised constitution shall be adopted; (ii) The leadership of the United people of Zimbabwe shall be elected; and (iii) A statement of policy for the new ANC will be considered.
 - (c) To organise the people for such a conference and congress.
5. The leaders of the ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI call upon their supporters and all Zimbabweans to rally behind the ANC under its enlarged executive.

6. ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI, will take steps to merge their respective organs and structures into the ANC before the Congress to be held within 4 months.*
7. The leaders recognise the inevitability of the continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe. (The declaration was signed on December 8, 1974, by the four African leaders: Nkomo (ZAPU), Sithole (ZANU), Muzorewa (ANC) and Chikerema (FROLIZI).

The theme that runs through this declaration was the unity of the people of Zimbabwe in the light of the projected constitutional conference. The frontline presidents had agreed with Vorster and Ian Smith on five points: That Smith will:

- (1) call a constitutional conference within 4 months;
- (2) release all political prisoners, including South Africans imprisoned for their part in the Zimbabwe struggle;
- (3) lift the ban on political parties, ZANU, and ZAPU and allow free political activity;
- (4) Suspend the emergency laws, revoke death sentences, and repeal discriminatory laws; and
- (5) Express willingness to shape the future of Rhodesia in an atmosphere of racial harmony, cooperation and peace.

In return for these concessions, Smith and Vorster wanted only one thing from the frontline presidents and the seemingly united Zimbabwe movement -- ceasefire in the north-east district of Rhodesia. Smith never fulfilled any of the promises in full. He released the leaders and only 100 of the 850 political prisoners; and he finally did call a constitutional conference at the Victoria Falls Bridge which was planned to fail before it started inspite of the personal presence of Vorster and Kaunda. And yet, for their part, the African states imposed a ceasefire by disrupting the only fighting-movement at that time, ZANU. Seizing upon the unfortunate and untimely death of its patriotic chairman, Herbet Chitepo, several measures taken by the Zambian Government virtually stopped the military operations in north-eastern Rhodesia.

Before the meeting at the bridge which was supposed to be a constitutional conference, Smith told the press in Salisbury that it would last only 15 minutes. The verbatim record of that meeting makes interesting reading. Apparently Smith wanted the African delegation led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa to put its signature to the minutes of a prior meeting held in Pretoria. The

frontline states were represented at the Pretoria meeting by Mark Chona, adviser to President Kaunda on foreign affairs, and possibly others. Smith insisted that the business of the bridge meeting was simply to initial the Pretoria agreement, although the agreement was not known to Muzorewa's delegation. Smith refused to budge until Mark Chona himself interjected sharply to state that persons who were not at a meeting cannot be compelled to agree to what was discussed in their absence. Although the meeting did go on for 15 hours, no serious negotiations took place.

Following the farcical encounter at the bridge, and flattering remarks by Smith, Joshua Nkomo broke away from the ANC established by the Lusaka Accord, and continued to hold meetings with Smith's regime in Salisbury. Although Nkomo met one of the main conditions Smith had insisted upon at Pretoria and Victoria Falls meetings -- namely that the talks be held inside Rhodesia -- he too did not get very far. Nkomo's talks foundered on the same rock as previous talks, that Smith's regime was adamant not to transfer power to the majority Africans. At the same time, Smith himself successfully warded off an attack from extremist settler elements in his own Rhodesian Front which accused him of trying to sell out the white settlers to corporation interests and to Zambia. Their weekly newspaper warned: "Unless the electorate wakes up in time, it will find itself very soon the victim of the blackest political deceit ever perpetrated in the country's history. The Prime Minister (Ian Smith) will be primarily responsible, after many months of secret moves with Nkomo".⁴ It accused Harry Oppenheimer and his multinational corporation, Anglo-American Corporation, of trying to shore up the economy of Zambia and South Africa at the expense of Rhodesia and Rhodesians (whites).

When Nkomo's talks collapsed early in 1976 and ZIPA guerrillas resumed operations through independent Mozambique in eastern and north-eastern Rhodesia, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, entered the stage with a visit to the front-line states. His Lusaka speech in April, 1976, and subsequent meeting with Vorster in Germany opened the way for his shuttle diplomacy in September, 1976. The shuttle prepared the ground for the abortive Geneva conference. Long before it adjourned on December 14, it was obvious that there was no basis for an agreement. Smith's delegation took no serious part in the conference insisting on a total acceptance of what they called the Kissinger package. This was negotiated in Pretoria in the

absence of any representatives of Zimbabwe Africans.

Reduced to one sentence, Smith wants to maintain the status quo. His refusal to transfer power to the majority Africans on Tiger and Fearless, rejection of the Pearce Commission proposals, and his stand at Victoria Falls and Geneva, has hardened and deepened. Indeed, the Geneva conference was bedevilled from the very beginning by his insistence on a power-sharing formula, supposed to be part of the Kissinger package, which would leave him in power during the interim period. If that happened, he would be in the singularly fortunate position of being able to choose his successor and the leader of a supposedly independent Zimbabwe.

The course of events in the continuing search for a Rhodesian settlement, brings to light three major weaknesses of the Lusaka Manifesto strategy. The first and most serious is the continuing negotiation over the heads of the leaders of the Zimbabwe movements. No leader of a Liberation Movement was consulted about the contents of the Manifesto until it was published. This pattern has continued in the implementation of it. Excepting Nkomo, no Zimbabwe leaders were consulted seriously before the Victoria Falls and Geneva conferences were set up. Infact, we could even state that in the period between 1974-76, the frontline states in particular and the OAU as a whole had taken most of the initiative from the Zimbabwe leadership into their own hands. We have already cited the 1974 agreement between the frontline states and Smith to ceasefire in north-eastern Rhodesia in return for the five unfulfilled promises. No Zimbabwe leader entered into that agreement with Smith. In particular, the ceasefire aspect set back by several months a war that had struck deep roots in a part of the country whose terrain was favourable to guerrilla warfare. To be fair to the frontline states on this point, they acceded to the formation of the Zimbabwe People's Army soon after the failure of the bridge conference, against the advice and wishes of the leadership of the enlarged ANC. ZIPA re-initiated the armed struggle, and ZANU re-emerged. The one decision set back the revolution, while the other one saved it, but the practice of taking decisions over the heads of the established leadership of recognised movements remains a threat and a danger to the long-term interests of the movements and the struggle.

The readiness to go to conferences with a proven liar like Ian Smith has bought much-needed time and breathing space for

his minority and racist regime. Of the two faces of the OAU strategy -- namely, talking and killing -- the Rhodesian evidence shows that the greater commitment is to talking. Indeed, it can be observed that, for some frontline leaders, the armed struggle is viewed as pressure for bringing Smith yet to another conference table. They all too easily recall the experiences of their struggle for independence in a colonial setting that did not go as far as the armed struggle. In this context, we should point out the great assistance that FRELIMO and its experience has been, both in the armed struggle, and even at the constitutional conferences discussed above.

Perhaps the most pertinent lesson to learn from the Lusaka Accord of 1974 refers to the pre-occupation of the OAU with the question of unity. Admittedly, the unity of a struggling people gives them the strength they need to fight a vicious enemy, but it is imperative that that unity springs from the peoples and movements of the country concerned. Enforced unity like the enlarged ANC failed to work because it did not have enough internal support among groups and individuals within the movement itself. The suggestion of the Daily Mail of Zambia that President Kaunda should lock up Zimbabwe leaders in a room in State House and leave them there to talk until they agree to unite, should be treated with scorn because it is fraught with dangers for the movements concerned. Unity is like a flower which should be given time, space, and material support so that it grows and blossoms.

Furthermore, unity should be based on clearly stated objectives, and perceived advantages in the military field. If unity is to last it must be purposeful. In the case of Liberation Movements fighting, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial war, the only firm basis of unity is a socialist ideology aimed at overthrowing the capitalist system. More importantly, there should be agreement to overthrow the system by armed force. Agreement on those two basic principles is necessary in order to maintain a viable united front. To be meaningful, unity has to be planted in that anti-imperialist and anti-capitalists ideological soil in order to grow and blossom. In this context, the Patriotic Front of ZANU and ZAPU has greater chances of success than the ANC of 1974, had. The Front does rely heavily on progressive elements that have developed in both organisations in the course of fighting, recruiting, and organising. The original FROLIZI headed by Shelton Siwela had similar objectives of uniting ZAPU and ZANU fight-

ers, but failed abysmally because of fairly conservative elements that were entrenched in key position, and finally took over leadership under James Chikerema.

THE ANGOLAN SCUTTLE

However, it was the Angolan civil war that provided the litmus test to the OAU strategy. Like in Rhodesia, the three Liberation Movements were persuaded by the frontline states to sign a declaration of unity only a few days before they met the Portuguese Government for the purpose of negotiating the independence agreement. However, unlike Smith in Rhodesia, the Portuguese had had enough of the guerrilla war and were anxious to shed their government responsibility to the movements. An interim government was formed with an unusually large Cabinet which never functioned. Fighting between the movements broke out before the date of independence, November 11, 1975.

In October South African troops invaded Angola from the south, seized the Cunene dams, and thrust forward through Huambo towards Luanda in support of UNITA forces. Well-trained FNLA forces poured from the north using tanks and armoured cars provided by the Government of Zaire. It soon became clear that MPLA would have a difficult task to withstand attacks from the two fronts. However, under this intense pressure, Augustinho Neto, President of MPLA, went ahead with the process of transferring formal power from Portugal. He announced the independence of Angola and the establishment of the Angolan People's Republic on November 11. He quickly appealed to friendly socialist countries for military assistance. On November 27, a Cuban artillery regiment arrived in Luanda after "encountering provocations of all kinds from American warship and planes" in the Atlantic Ocean.⁵ With Cuban personnel and Russian weaponry MPLA was able to drive off the besieging forces from the north and the south. By February 1976 all foreign troops had left Angolan soil and MPLA was establishing order and an administration throughout the country.

A special OAU meeting called in November to discuss the raging Angolan civil war, failed to muster support from half the members, in order to recognise the MPLA Government. The vote was a dead-hit with 22 states supporting MPLA recognition and 22 against. Even a state like Zambia which had supported the MPLA liberation war for ten years voted against this recognition.

The reasons for the reluctance of so many OAU members to recognise the MPLA Government are not far to seek.

Firstly, the success of MPLA seriously undermined the policy of detente launched in 1974 by the South African Government with the support of Britain and the USA. This policy aimed at harmonising the relationships between South African and Black African states, in order to achieve the following goals of South African foreign policy: (a) To establish a Southern African common market which will be dominated by South African Manufacturing companies; (b) To secure black African markets outside the projected common market for the bulging products of South African manufactured goods; (c) To secure a ring of buffer states that would not harbour or support South African-bound guerrillas; and (d) To secure for South Africa and the West the products of the mineral-rich area of Namibia, Angola, Zaire, and Zambia.

The policy of detente in the context of Southern African was built on the recognition that the basic interests of the national bourgeoisie of South Africa, and those of the ruling petit bourgeoisie in the independent black African states were similar if not identical. Hendrick Verword, the theoretician for the Afrikaanders, created the facade of Bantustans in the 1960's to remove the psychological and racial barrier in the cooperation between South Africa and black Africa. But South African industrialists and manufacturers were pressing for this realisation before the independence of black Africa. It is no surprise that Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation and Tiny Rowland, managing director of LONRHO, were the prime movers behind the policy of detente, and the Rhodesian constitutional conferences discussed above. They were particularly keen that the mineral-rich area (Namibia, Angola, Zaire, and Zambia) in which South African industry already had a big stake should be associated with their bigger interests in South Africa. Obviously, if UNITA or FNLA had seized power in Angola, Chief Kapuo would have been installed in power in a glorified Bantustan in Namibia, and access would have been established to the entire area. This fact partly explains the quick deployment of South African troops in Angola, and the refusal of Zaire and Zambia to support the MPLA Government at the OAU meeting, and for many months after it had won victory. The loss of Angola to MPLA introduced a "revolutionary" element to the detente exercise.

Secondly, most of the OAU members who did not support MPLA, were scared of the seizure of power by a movement with a revolutionary programme. MPLA had long declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist party which would consider the destruction of the capitalist system as its prime duty. Both the South African Government and its Western European and North American supporters, as well as the conservative ruling classes in most African states, are agreed that a real revolution in any African country would not serve their purpose. It would have the wrong kind of demonstration effect. This fact explains the refusal of most of the members of the OAU to harbour guerrillas or provide training facilities. Infact, one of the supreme tests of the degree of neo-colonialism in an African state today, is its willingness to train and equip guerrilla forces against colonialism and imperialism. On this criteria, OAU states divide themselves neatly into three categories: (a) The majority which do not want to have anything to do with guerrillas and freedom-fighters; (b) The few who provide transit facilities only and possibly money; and, (c) the very few (especially Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, and Congo) which have camps and training facilities.

On this point, most African states find common cause with South Africa, and Western Europe, in opposing communism, The fear of communism is a fear of radicalism. Henry Kissinger's intervention in the Rhodesian case was justified on these two points: (a) the de-radicalisation of the Liberation Movement; and (b) the fear of an Angolan-type introduction of Russian weaponry and Cuban forces.

On these two points he had the support of most African States, including some of "the very few" mentioned above as providing camps and training facilities. If the successes of FRELIMO in Mozambique and MPLA in Angola were to be repeated in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, that would set in train a reverse process where the truly liberated Southern Africa would assist in liberating the rest of Africa from neo-colonialism and the clutches of imperialism.

Thirdly, although the entry of South Africa into Angola infuriated many African states, the Lusaka Manifesto had encouraged such behaviour by rendering South African recognition as an independent state, and thereby removing it from the line of their freedom fire. The quarrel with South Africa was reduced to disapproval of its domestic policy of apartheid. The methods to be used all fall short of the one that counts, the

armed struggle. Even in the Dar es Salaam Declaration of 1974, the armed struggle is reserved for Zimbabwe and Namibia. When it comes to South Africa, the Declaration says:

....Africa's responsibility is clear. We must ostracise, and urge the rest of the world to ostracise the South African regime as at present organised. Africa must maintain the economic, political, and cultural boycott of South Africa. The OAU and the U.N. must work in concert for the extension of the boycott. (page 21; in the Manifesto, para 20)

Support for the liberation movements of South Africa is mentioned in passing after the boycott strategy has been elaborated upon, although it is known that these boycotts have never been really effective in dealing with a network of international capitalism and global, multilateral imperialism.

What is needed is not a recognition of the independence of South Africa, but rather a recognition that South Africa is the hub of imperialism and militarism in Southern Africa. Therefore, no meaningful independence could be had in the region with its cooperation and approval. The strongest factor that has militated against adoption of an aggressive policy towards South Africa is the myth of its military might and economic strength. These myths have been spread by imperialist propaganda and the analysis of bourgeois scholars who record military strength in terms of the inventory of weaponry, without taking into account the will of the people. South Africa's economy has had a balance-of-payments crisis since 1966. Her imports from Europe continue to run far ahead of its exports, hence the desire to sell its manufactured goods to under-developed African states. On the military side, the explosion of the resistance of students in Soweto near Johannesburg and Guguleto near Cape Town, and other cities of South Africa, in June 1976, has shown the strength of unarmed masses who have the political will, and the weakness of the well-armed South African defence forces. For several months the South African Police and Army failed to suppress the unarmed students and youths of Soweto.

The success of MPLA in Angola and the successful expulsion of South African troops exploded the myth of invincibility spread so effectively and widely by imperialist propaganda. More importantly, MPLA's success showed the truth and correctness

of the analyses of revolutionary strategists on Southern Africa,⁶ namely the main engine of resistance will and should be the workers and students. The African peasantry had declined sharply, and been rendered impotent by the harsh and rigid systems of control, especially the notorious pass system which prevents or reduces interaction between the village and the city. An organisation with a viable leadership and a strong ideology can tap a lot of strength and support from South African workers and students. The strength of the MPLA was neither in numbers nor weaponry, but the quality and character of its organisation. UNITA had the large numbers of supporters among the largest tribe in Angola, and FNLA had considerable firepower from Zaire and the USA, but MPLA had an organisation deeply rooted among the workers in Luanda, the capital, and along the line of rail. It was these workers organised in cells and units in every factory and residential area who repulsed the attacks of FNLA and UNITA and held the capital for many weeks before Cuban and Russian help arrived. The intensity of mobilisation of the workers, and the clarity of the objectives being sought, were the major factors that contributed to the strength and success of the MPLA. It is men and organisation, not money and weapons, that will decide the fate of Southern Africa, as indeed it decided the fate of Vietnam and Cambodia.

THE NAMIBIAN EMBROGLIO

It is the case of Namibia that shows the belligerent attitude South Africa has adopted towards black African states, and reveals the overall strategy of imperialism in Southern Africa. Vorster travelled secretly to Liberia in 1975, and among other issues assured President Tolbert that South Africa did not want an inch of Namibian soil. He assured his host that he would take steps to call a constitutional conference of Namibians to discuss and decide their own future. But, at the same meeting, he rejected any participation of the legitimate representative organisation of the people of Namibia, SWAPO.

Taking advantage of the impotence of the U.N., and the inability of the U.N. Council on Namibia to perform the task it was appointed to do, the South African Government convened a conference at Turnhalle to be attended by all the eleven ethnic groups in Namibia. They were to meet regularly and interminably for 3 years in order to prepare the ground for the real Namibian Constitutional Conference. It was envisaged that the

Government that would emerge would be a confederation of the 11 Bantustans being established in Namibia. In other words, South Africa was stepping up the implementation of its hated policy of apartheid and Bantustans in Namibia. At the same time it speeded up the drive to pseudo-independence in its own Bantustans, notably the Transkei and Baputotswana. Transkei was given so-called independence in December 1976, and Baputotswana is scheduled to be "independent" in December 1977.

Bantustanisation of Namibia reveals the overall strategy of detente. What South Africa wanted and still wants in Zimbabwe and Namibia is two glorified Bantustans that would replace the white regimes as buffer areas between South Africa and independent black states. This policy has the tacit support of America and Britain whose Governments have both stressed their intention to install moderate African regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia. As our earlier discussion has shown, the OAU states are not opposed to this general aim. While they are opposed to Bantustans, and demonstrated their opposition by refusing to recognise the independence of the Transkei, they would prefer a moderate African government in Namibia and Zimbabwe. It may be a Bantustan in effect, but it should not be called by that name. Therefore the difference between South Africa and the OAU states becomes one of degree rather than of kind.

The current Turnhalle talks in Namibia, and the abortive Geneva talks on Zimbabwe reveal two important developments - the deepening class struggle in Southern Africa, and the nature and character of modern imperialism. Both sets of talks were and are bedevilled by the fear, on the part of the colonialists, of the repetition of the events in Angola and Mozambique. The insistence on a long time-table of transition - 3 years in Namibia and 2 years in Zimbabwe - is intended to give the colonialists time to establish Bantustan-type regimes. Both FRELIMO and MPLA have established vanguard parties based on Marxist-Leninist principles. They have adopted programmes of action intended to benefit the workers and peasants of those countries. The emergence of parties with a clear proletarian ideology in the two former Portuguese colonies has frightened the colonialists and their cohorts. Furthermore, the great general strike of 1972 in Namibia, and the continuing strikes in Durban, South Africa, in 1973, and the uprising of the students in 1976, have shown that the workers inside South Africa are restive. The emergence of a party, ZANU, with an increasingly proletarian ideology in

Zimbabwe, has added fuel to the fires in Southern Africa. What is emerging is class struggle with proletarian movements representing workers, students, and peasants on one side, and imperialist and colonialist forces on the other, supported by the white minority regimes in the area and their agents among the African petit bourgeoisie and traditional authorities.

Related to the growing class struggles in Southern Africa is the response and strategy of modern imperialism. Its strategy is to identify and shore up conservative elements in the African society that would establish moderate regimes. The support given to the white minority regime in Kissinger's memorandum No. 39 of 1969 is apparently being withdrawn, especially from Ian Smith's regime. The fight against Communism and for Capitalism should be undertaken by the Africans themselves. If moderate regimes are to be established in Southern Africa, similar regimes like Kenya and Zaire in black Africa should be made to succeed, even if this means injecting large sums of foreign aid. In this way, the rear-base of the Liberation Movements will be undermined, while the fruits of their struggle in Southern Africa will be given to someone else - an agent of imperialism. The European settlers who are being pressurised to shed political power to the black elites will be compensated by an enormous increase of their economic power. The projected 2 billion-dollar Trust Fund in Rhodesia, an accelerated increase of the 3 billion-dollar U.K. and U.S.A. investment in South Africa and Namibia, will give the white settlers enormous economic power. The skills of the settlers are needed to manage the neo-colonial states that are planned to replace the present colonial-racial oligarchies. While the United Kingdom wanted to use the Trust Fund to buy out the Rhodesian settlers to enable them to emigrate to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain and the USA, the USA wanted to use it to make them stay in an independent Zimbabwe. Consequently, only the white settlers who stayed in an independent Zimbabwe as long as 8 years could draw 80 per cent of their investment. Those who left in the first year would receive only 20 per cent. The sliding scale was intended to persuade them to stay and help manage the neo-colonial state.

In addition to this alliance of conservative forces, the other strategy of American imperialism was to build Southern African military bases. In 1976, Donald Rumsfeld, the American Secretary of Defence, visited Kenya and Zaire and concluded defence agreements with far-reaching consequences for the

armed struggle in Southern Africa. Kenya was to receive modern F-5 combat aircraft and other military equipment to the value of 75 million dollars; while Zaire would receive an assortment of military equipment valued at 52 million dollars. Over the last decade Zaire received from the USA 800 million dollars of aid under the "international security support assistance to Zaire" -- an umbrella programme for aid to Zaire, Holden Roberto's FNLA, and undercover activities in Southern and Central Africa. The stated reason for the Rumsfeld agreements were the presence of a Russian fleet in the Indian Ocean, and Russian military assistance to Somalia and Uganda on the East Coast, and Angola on the West Coast. But the real reason for arming Kenya and Zaire was to hold a dagger at the back of the Liberation Movements fighting in Southern Africa, and pose a threat to states supporting these movements. In 1975 President Gerald Ford had announced the construction of an American military base on Diego Garcia, an island in the middle of the Indian Ocean, capable of handling B-52 and B-1 strategic bombers, as well as nuclear-armed submarines. Thousands of peasants have been deported from that island to Mauritius and Madagascar to make room for the American base. In 1975, the American Congress also approved a resolution permitting NATO navy and air forces to operate south of the Tropic of Cancer - meaning in the Indian and South Atlantic oceans, around the African continent - ostensibly for the purpose of defending sea routes considered vital to the Middle East and Australia. In 1970, the British Government had resumed sale of arms to South Africa. France and Italy vastly increased their arms sales to South Africa in the last decade, and even helped South African armaments industry to get off the ground. Henry Kissinger's visit to South Africa in 1976 accelerated this process when he agreed to supply South Africa with nuclear-armed submarines, and to supply the young South African nuclear research station at Palandaba near Cape Town with enriched uranium. The militarisation of South Africa was completed by the American take over of the British base at Simonstown. In May 1975, the USA Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger, suggested to the NATO Defence and Planning Committee, the building of a NATO Military base in South Africa. British and French Ministers supported the suggestion, but it was opposed by Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch Ministers. Although it was shelved, Britain and France compensated by

constructing their own military bases on the islands in the Indian Ocean. The Kissinger "peace mission" to Southern Africa in 1976 consolidated the military plans by bringing South Africa, Kenya, and Zaire into them.

In conclusion, it should be clear to the reader that the Lusaka strategy of OAU States does not support the proletarian struggle to its logical conclusion, namely the creation of a socialist state following an Angolan-type victory; nor does it confront imperialism. It seeks to argue and persuade imperialism which is arming itself to the teeth and building alliances that will divide the people of Africa, and defuse the real struggle for Liberation.

FOOTNOTES:

¹The Lusaka Manifesto On Southern Africa, 5th Summit of East and Central African States, Lusaka, 14-16 April, 1969.

²Dear Mr. Vorster ... Exchanges between President Kaunda and Mr. Vorster, published by the Zambian Information Services, Lusaka, April 22, 1971.

³See a new book titled: The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa edited by Mohammed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, published by Lawrence Hill and Company, USA, 1976.

⁴Property and Finance, No. 237, November 1976, Salisbury - a page 1 article under a five-column banner headline, titled "Deceit, Danger-Smith, Nkomo, Oppenheimer, Vorster, Kaunda".

⁵An article titled "Angola: The Real Story", appearing in the Kenyan newspaper, The Weekly Review, p. 7, January 24, 1977, announces the publication of a new book by a Columbian writer, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and an 80,000-word article in the Mexican weekly, Proceso.

⁶We are referring in particular to a conference on "Imperialism and Revolution in Southern Africa", held at the University of Dar es Salaam, on December 4-8, 1975, organised by the U.N. Institute of Economic Planning (IDEP) in Dakar, Senegal, and the University of Dar es Salaam.