IMPERIALISM AND SETTLER-COLONIALISM IN WEST ASIA: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE. JAMIL HILAL" The present conflict between Israel and the Arab peoples (especially the Palestinian people) pre-dates the creation of the state of Israel and arose with the beginning of Zionist colonialisation of Palestine. It was the representatives of British capital who, in the middle of the nineteenth century, first put forward the idea of creating a colonial settler state in Palestine (situated at the corner of the two continents of Asia and Africa) to guard the trade routes of British colonialism to the East, especially with India. However, Zionism as a colonial-settler ideology was to emerge all a later period. in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and in a different location. The disintegration of the feudal order and the rapid development of capitalism in Eastern Europe in the latter part of the nineteenth century, made the situatron of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie untenable. They, as a class, were facing extinction, since they had lost, or were in the process of losing, their economic role. with no prospects of preserving their monopoly position (especially in the trade sector) in the decaying feudal order. or of moving to join the bourgeoisie in the emerging capitalist order. The only prospect facing them was proletarisation. The wave of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe (especially the Russian pogroms of 1882) hastened the articulation of the Zionist ideoIogy (e.g., the publication by Leo Pinsker of Auto-Emancipation in which he called for the "return" to Palestine as the only solution to the Jewish question; the publication by Theodor Herzl of The Jewish State. which remains to this day the Bible of Zionism).~ Zionism did not reject anti-Semitism, it incorporated it and gave it a central ideological ~ignificance; it projected it backwards and forwards in history; it made it innate, ineradicable and eternal. It considered assimila- tion an impossibility. The only solution. therefore. was to gather all the Jews in the Diaspora into a Jewish state. Thus the interests of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie were generalised and universalised, and articulated as the • This paper was presented lilt the TYL/Politica1 Science Department Seminar on "Imperialism and Revolution in Southern Africa" held at the University of Dar es Salaam. and is published here by kind permission of the organisers . .. Jarnil Hilal was a lecturer in the Sociology Department, University of Oar es 51 Salaam during 1974/5. He is now back in 8eiru~ Lebanoq. interests of Jews everywhere. The Jewish bourgeoi~ie, on the other hand, UTAFITI were profoundly assimilated and the Jewish proletariat was also integrated economically and politically. Indeed, Zionism, in its attempts ,to gain the support of various capitalist states offered ilts colonisation as a way to weakening revolutionary movements in Europe which had been joined by many Jewish workers. To the decaying and heavily indebted Ottoman rulers it offered the support of Jewish financial capital. But the West European Jewish bourgeoisie showed limited interest in Zionism as such; its later interest in Israel was motivated by the opportunities for investment the state offered, and not by a sentimental or religious consideration. That is, they became interested in Israel as bourgeoisie and not as Jews, and then only in a limited way (as a part of their general activities as a bourgeois class). Organisationally, the Zionist movement was born during the First Zionist Congress held in Basle in 1897 under the presidency of Herzl. The objective of the movement was stated as the creation in Palestine of "a homeland for the Jewish people". This was to be achieved through the "fostering of colonisation of Palestine by Jewish farm and industry workers", through the "integration of all Jews of the world into appropriate local and international organisations", through "strengthening of national Jewish con- sciousness" and lastly through "development of the methods necessary to obtain from governments concerned Jhe consent necessary to achieve Zionism's aims". Since Zionism has no social base in Pale:st:ine,2 the Zionist movement had ,to ally itself with the imperialist powers.8 It approached and offered to serve the interests of the Ottoman rulers, German, French and British imperialism. It was British imperialism which showed the most active interest in the nionist project:. But British imperialism could not actively interfere (apart from applying pressure on the "sick man of Europe", ie., the Ottoman Empire) before the First World War, since before then, Palestine,like most Arab territory, was under Ottoman domination. The First World War led to the defeat of Turkey (which allied itself with Germany) and the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire dismembered and divided between British and French colonialism (Italy having acquired control over part of Libya). As soon as the First World War ended the British issued the Balfou'r Declaration which promised the Zionist movement the establishment of a "national home" in Palestine. In 1920 Palestine fell under the control of British colonialism. A wave of Zionist immigration into Palestine began. Thus, the number of Jews in the country rose from 56,000 in 1917 to 175,000 in 1931 to 529,000 in 1944 to reach 700,000 (about 33% of the total population owning about 5.6% of the total area of Palestine and about 15% of its cultivated land) in 1948, when the British left the countrY just after the establishment of the state of Israel (May ] 948), having handed mQSt of Itheir arms to Zionist gangs. From 1920 till 1948 'the Pakstioian 52 UTAFITI people were subjected to a dual colonialism: (i) British colonialism which, as in Africa and Asia subjected the indigenous population to exploitation, tied their economy to the metropolitan economy and interrupted the country's own autonomous development; (ii) Settler colonialism. As in Southern Africa, stretches of land were acquired by the Zionist settlers, some presented to them by Bri,tish colonialism, and other stretches were purchased from absentee landlords and their Arab tenants thrown out. What Zionist colonialisation had in common with settler-coloni:aIism in Southern Africa was the dispossession of the indigenous population of their land by Europeans. These similarities were sufficient to motivate HerzI to write to Rhodes for his blessing and support for the Zionist project, and were also sufficient to single out South Africa as the only country in Africa to give support in the United Nations to the establishment of Israel in 1948. These similarities are also manifested in the s.trong links that Israel has maintained with South Africa ever since, (likewise with Portugal for similar reasons). But there are important differences between Zionist colonialism and settler-colonialism in Southern Africa. These differences explain the course and the intensity of the conflict that has raged in the Middle East for the last 50 years. The Zionist project aimed, right from the beginning, at crea~ing a Jewish state- That is, the Zionists confronted the indigenous population (the Palestinian Arabs) not as a source of cheap labour to be exploited for the benefit of the Zionist settler economy (as settlers did in South Africa), but as an obstacle to the realisation of such an economy.4 Herzl wrote in his Diaries, referring to the Palestinian Arabs: 'The poor population was to be worked across the frontier surrepti- tiously, after having rid the country of any existing wild animals such snakes, for Jewish benefit'. So Palestinian labour was useful to Zionist colonialisation in one respect only, i.e., getting rid of wild animals, after which it was to be got rid of altogether ! Zionism was, therefore, pledged to create a fully-fledged class society of Jewish settlers (Le., a Jewish working class). The constitution of the Jewish Agency for Palestine made clear that Arab land bought or acquired was inalienable Jewish land, but more important is the fact that Jewish fllll"Il1Sand enterprises were forbidden to employ Arab labour, despite the fact that it was much cheaper than Jewish labour, and furthermore Zionist settlers were forbidden to buy Arab produce. although it was cheaper than the PrOOuce of settler farms. Thus a closed settler economy was created with very little interaction with the existing economy. Thus Zionists strove not to exploit the indigenous Palestinian population but to displace it. This displacing character of Zionism explains the intensity 53 of the contradiction that it en8end~red with th~ r~~lUl people. This contradiction manifested itself in the armed uprisings that took place against UTAFITI both Zionism and British imperialism between 1919 and 1948: 1919, 1921, 1929, 1936-39 (this latter included a general strike which lasted six months, the longest in history), and 1947-48. The contradiction was total. It engulfed all the major classes; the nascent but thwarted Arab bourgeoisie, the land- lords fearful of Zionist competition and expansion, the peasantry who were becoming increasingly pauperised, the radicalised working class (a strong Arab communist party emerged in Palestine with the emergence of a working class there, mostly employed in the ports and railways of Palestine). They had lower wages and worse conditions of employment than Jewish workers and were deliberately prevented from employment in Zionist firms. There was also a frustrated Palestinian bourgeoisie with no future prospects. However, the movement against Zionism and British colonialism was led by the Palestinian bourgeoisie and landlords who, despite their contra- diction to Zionism, sought to compromise with British imperialism, and by the Arab ruling classes in the surrounding countries who were already allied to British colonialism. Thus, the Palestinian Arab workers and poor peasants were repeatedly let down, especially in 1936-39 and 1947-48. The class nature of the Palestinian anti-Zionist movement and the extremely unfavourable balance of forces against the Palestinian Arab people explain why they failed.5 In 1948, Zionist forces-helped in various ways by British rolanialism- succeeded in "pushing most of the Palestinian people across the frontier" but not surreptitiously. Whole villages-men, women and children-were butchered in a wave of Zionist terrorism to drive the people out. Palestine was now divided into 3 parts: The occupied area (Israel), 78% of the territory. The West Bank (annexed by the Hashemite regime, a British client state at the time), 205% of the territory. The Gaza Strip (came under Egyptian administration), 1.5% of the territory. About three-quarters of a million Palestinians became refugees, scattered in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The Palestinian people, having lost their major means of production (land), their livelihood, and their political organisation, and having become geographically dispersed, found themselves powerless. The radicalised sections joined the various Arab nationalist anti-imperialist movements (Nasserite- type, Ba'ath, etc.), and communist parties. But since most of the Palestinian people were now under the Jordanian Hashemite rule, the struggle was resumed against the Jordanian regime. The emirate of Transjordan was created in the process of Balkanization of Arab territory by British and French colonialism. It was carved out after the First World War in an area bordering Syria and Iraq in the North and Bast, Palestine in the West, and Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea in the South. 54 UTAFITI It was to act as a buffer state separating the anti-colonialist struggle in Palestine from that of Syria and Iraq. To subdue the local population in the area they relied on the conflict existing between the settled peasantry and bedouin tribes, who lived, partly, on the surplus of the peasantry through continued raids. The British first relied on the peasantry (1920-30) for the formation of a military force which they tried to use to subdue the bedouin tribes. This failed, so they switched their tactics. The bedouin from now on formed the core of the military force in Jordan. Thus the integration of these tribes (400/0 of the total population in 1940) into the newly formed state was carried out not by the integration of their economy and transform- ing it into the urban and peasant economies, but through integrating them occupationally, Le., providing them with a source of income within the coercive apparatus of the state. Their pastoral economy was deliberately preserved to prevent their economic and hence political integration. Hence they remained really a mercenary force." Even today the bulk of the fighting force of the Jordanian army (about 80,000 out of a resident population of less than two miUiion) remains bedouin. This explains why-U1l!like in all surrounding Arab countries-no military coup d'etat has taken place in Jordan, despite the widespread and militant opposition to the regime since the formation of the kingdom in 1950 (when two-thirds of its population became Palestinian). Over half the national annual budget in Jordan is consumed by the army. But the army is not-and never has been-dependent for its con. sumption on the surplus produced locally. The source has been foreign aid, firstly British, i.e., up until 1957 when there was a general uprising against the regime in Jordan and against the British presence (the army command via Glubb Pasha remained until then British), which was-as lrlways--put down by the army; and secondly through American aid.7 The ratio of foreign aid to the GNP has never gone below 400/0 and has, on occasions (especially as internal popular opposition intensifies) reached a level of over 600/0' Hence the army in Jordan (as in Israel) has never reflected the development of the forces of production in the country, nor depended on the economic surplus of the people.s This applies, to a large extent, to the whole state apparatus in Jordan. Although the state bureau- cracy did appropriate economic surplus-through taxations of various kinds and through direct investment in economic enterprises-this surplus certainly cannot sustain a fraction of the huge state administrative, ideological, and coercive apparatus. This maintenance of the state by foreign aid and subsidies explains its dependence on imperialism on the one hand, and the large degree of autonomy it bas internally. It explains, too, why the ruling bureaucratic class has been so unresponsive to internal demands throughout the history of its formation. It also explains why this class has never taken any independent stand vis-a-vis imperialist policy in the area, as it has in surround- 55 ing Arab states. It is within such a political set-up that over half the Palestinians found UTAFITI themselves between 1948 and 1967 (when Israel occupied the West Bank of Jordan) under the control of the Hashemite regime. It was partly for this purpose of containing the Palestinian and radical East Jordanian masses that imperialism created and continued to subsidise the Jordanian regime. 9 The regime in Jordan (like the Israeli state) is subsidised for political reasons, i.e., its political role in the area. The repression, unemployment and marginalisation of the masses in Jordan made labour the major export commodity. Every year, tens of thousands migrated to the Arab oil states, forming large communities in the Gulf area. Although they found employment in these states, they did not escape political repression. As "foreign" workers (despite the ideology of Arab brotherhood professed by these regimes) they were subjected to various controls and pressures which paralysed any open political activity. This was an important factor in keeping the Palestinian national question and identi'ty alive. In fact, it was from this area that some of the political leadership of the PLO (especially that of Fateh) emerged. In 1964, because of popular pressure and in an attempt to contain the unrest and mounting general frustration with Arab nationalist regimes,! ° the Palestine Liberation Organization was established. Later that year the Palestine Liberation Army was formed. Both of these were under the spon- sorship of the Arab nationalist regimes, and under bourgeois Palestinian leadership. At the same time a clandestine Palestinian organisation was formed under the leadership of bourgeois.l1 This organisation believed that the Palestinian people could not wait for the Arab regimes to liberate Palestine and that, therefore, the Palestinians should begin to initiate military action against the Israeli state. This they did: their first guerriHa operation inside Israeli-held territory was carried out early in 1965. Subsequent events were to make this a significant date in the history of the Palestinian struggle. For it was through the resistance movement that the Palestinian Arab people were able to regain the organisational unity they lost in 1948, and were enabled to assert their national identity and their right to self-determination. Israeli aggression against the surrounding Arab countries and its sub- sequent occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip (thus bringing the whole of Palestine under occupation), together with the whole of Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights made it clear to the poor masses that classical military confrontation is not the way (or at least not sufficient in itself) to fight the national enemy. The example of Vietnam had great impact. The bookshops of the Arab capitals became full of translations of the writings of General Giap, Mao, Che Guevara, among others. Marxist literature became available-for the first time-in great quantities in all the capitals of surrounding Arab countries. 56 UTAFITI The ruling classes of these countries, demoralised and weakened by the defeat, had nO' alternative but to' make a tactical retreat. The Palestinian resi~ance mQvement grew enQrmQusly as peasants, wQrkers, refugees, teachers, students (both Palestinian and frQm other Arab cQuntries) flocked to' join the movement. Beurgeois natiooalist organisatiQns (such as the Arab NatiOltailist MQvement) fQund that their old theoretical framewQrk (which believed that the Arab "bourgeois" regimes are capable, if they adQpt some radical measures and policies, of building socialism) crumbled. FrQm these movements emerged various organisatiens adQpting a Marxist-Leninist ideology. A fairly large number Qf small organisatioos emerged committed to' armed struggle (some opportunistic, some directly patrooised and financed by the variQus Arab regimes). Most of these had little impact and some dissQlved themselves and merged intO' the larger organisations. Of these Qrganisatioos Fateh had the largest support, basically fQr twO' reasons: firstly because it was the first on the scene. It began befQre the June War of 1967, and the results of the War seemed to' confirm the correct- ness of its strategy and tactics. Secondly, and this is of equal if nQt mere importance, its political programme was wide enough to' appeal to' a very wide sector af the Palestinian populatioo, both amQng the pauperised masses Qf the refugee camps and the "bourgeoisie" ,12 and even among certain sectQrs ef the bourgeoisie. Because of this, Fateh was able to' attract a heterogeneous membership, ranging from the fairly conservative to' those committed to' a Marxist-Leninist line. On the other hand, the more radical organisations (such as the PDFLP and PFLP) have a mQre restricted membership (mostly from the poorer classes and the more radicalised bourgeoisie). Within a shert period, the Palestine resistance movement became strQng enough to' make itself felt in the whQle region; inside Israeli-held territory through increasing armed struggle, inside the Arab countries through in- creasing mass support. It was soon to' take ever the organisation of the PLO and to' eust its Qld bourgeois leadership. It became strong enQugh to' create a situatiQn of dual authority within East Jordan. The people were armed, Qrganised and deeply cQmmitted to QverthrQwing the regime. In the many camps in Amman and outside, the resistance mQvement had complete control, and various experiments in popular participation and decision-making, and even in productiQn, were started. The ruling class in Jordan was retreating and offering one concession after another. But these were tactical, fQr during the whQle period between the beginning of 1969 till September 1970 the JQrdanian regime was pre- paring itself militarily, politically and organisatiQnally, with open support from American imperialism and encouragement from Israel, to' smash the Resistance movement and re-establish full authority. On the other hand, the major section of the Resistance movement did 57 not orient itself or prepare itself fQr the seizure of power. Left-wing organi- satians did, in 1970, raise such slogans as "All power to the Resistance and UTAFITJ the people", but these were not taken seriausly by the body of the Resistance which considered the main conflict to be with Israel, and with Israel alone, and attempted ta limit its relatians with the regime towards the obtaining of concessians. The infantile leftism af some of the practices, and the neglect by other Resistance organisations of the poorer Transjordanian masses, Were used by the regime to mabilise sectors of the Transjordanian population against the Resistance. Similarly, not enough emphasis was given ta the social aspects of the struggle (i.e., the transformation of social relations, which was left to the spontaneous action of the people). The emphasis was centred on the political-military side (i.e., on resistance rather than revolution). I emphasise this because the above lesson that emerged from the bloody civil war in Jordan in September 1970 has been a costly one. It left many thousands killed and more injured, and it ended the open existence of the Resistance in Jordan. In July 1971 the Resistance was driven out of Jordan. This experience emphasises yet again the absolute necessity of com- bining theory with practice. No liberation movement can be successful without combining theory with practice; no revolutionary strategy can be achieved without the necessary revolutionary tactics. These are determined by the specific revolutionary situation. While the Hashemite state was exporting Palestinian labour through economic and political pressures, the Israeli state was on the other hand importing Jewish labour through economic incentives and political pr~res. Thus, between 1948 and 1967 the population of Israd tripled from 758,000 to 2.430,000. Most of these immigrants came from the Arab countrieslS and East Europe. In the former, Jewish emigration was the product of a number of factors: Zionism considered all Jews everywhere as potential citizens of the State af Israel.14 That is, it deliberately equated Zionism. (a political settler colonill!list ideology) with Judaism (a rel'igious ideology). ThIS fact made the task of the ruling Arab classes easier in encouraging Jewish citizens ta migrate ta Israel. Since the Jewish minorities in most of the Arab countries concentrated their economic activities in trade, com- merce and the professions, it meant that the control over these economic activities would fall into the hands of the Arab bourgeoisie. In some cases, the ISraeli state paid cash to the Arab ruling class for every Arab Jew wha migrated to Israel (this was certainly the case with the compradar class that ruled Iraq until 1958). In other Arab states Israeli secret agents began a wave of terrarist attacks on Jewish property and religious places ta "encourage" their emigration. Zionism had na attraction for the Arab Jewish populatian. Belore the establishment of the &1ate, no single Arab Jew went to Palestine as a Zionist settler. Certainly a Jew from the Yemen or Morocco had DO cultural links with a Jew from Poland or France. These cultural, linguistic differences corTeSpooded to differences in physical features. Ta Arab Jews. European 58 UTAFITI Jews looked, behaved and talked like Europeans. To European Jews, Arab Jews looked, talked and behaved like Arabs. Thus they had to be "assimilated", as far as possible, into European culture. At the cultural level, Israeli society has come to be organised into three basic compartments. In this it resembles the colonial settler societies of Southern Africa. These compartments are: the European Jews, the Arab Jews, and those Palestinian Arabs who remained in Palestine after the establishment of the state of Israel. The ruling classes in Israel are exclusively drawn from the European Jews; ministers, army officers, managers, state administrators, etc. They control the state apparatus, the labour organi- sation (the Histradut), the education system and the economy. The Arab or Asian Jews form the bulk of the unskilled and semi-skilled labour, petty traders, and the bulk of the rank and file of the Israeli army. The Palestinian Arabs (who formed in 1967 over 12% of the population) are confined to agricul- tural "reserves" (labour-intensive agriculture) and have remained subjected to various military, administrative and social restrictions. This segmentation of Israeli society, depending on waves of Jewish immigration, faced the ruling classes with the task of providing an integra- tion mechanism lest the conflicts between the various sectors tear the country apart. At the cultural level, the ideological apparatus of the state (the radio, press, schools, television, etc.), turned Zionism into the political religion of the state. Anti-Semitism anywhere was taken as evidence of the truth of Zionism, and where anti-Semitism did not exist it had to be created. Thus any attacks on Zionism were labelled as anti.Semitism. The demands by the Palestinian and Arab masses for the de-Zionisation of the state of Israel and the establishment of a secular Palestinian state were presented to the Irish population as unadulterated anti-Semitism. Thus, the Israeli population was led to believe that one is either a Zionist (and, therefore, a defender of the Israeli State) or alse one is anti-Semitic (and, therefore, wants to throw all the Jews into the sea). Those Jews who stood against Zionism were considered traitors to the Jewish state. Just as Zionism asserted the existence of a Jewish nation entitled to its own state,13 it denied, and continues to deny, the existence of a Patestinian Arab people.16 Israd was depicted internally and externally as the embodi- ment of Western values and democracy, surrounded by backward and savage people bent on its da<;truction. The presentation of an ever-present external threat to the "Jewish state" was and remains essential to Zionism. It is also essentially a justification and sanctification of its militarism and expansion. In Jordan, a modern state apparatus was imposed on an already existing population with pre-capitalist modes of production. The colonial state began-through various .Idministrative and economic measures-to transform those pre-capitalist modes of production into a colonial mode 59 (e.g., the commercialisation of agriculture, the development of certain primary products for export). However. the extraction of economic surplus is a UTAFm subsidiary function of the colonial state. Its role remained primarily political- strategic (i.e.• related to settler-colonialisation in Palestine and to the colonial exploitation in the neighbouring Arab States).!7 The Israeli state apparatus (and its precursor in the form of the Zionist Organisation) on the other hand. was not imposed on an already existing population organised in production. One of its main tasks was to assemble such a population (from various parts of the world) in Palestine and organise its production. Even today, more than a quarter of a century after the establishment of the Israeli state. one of its major functions remains to organise immigration into the country and agitate for such immigration (the gathering of Jews from the Diaspora). The fact that the Israeli state played and still plays a crucial role in the organisation of production has lead some petty bourgeois idealists and various brands of "left-wingers" in the West 'to view Israel as a progressive and even socialist state. struggling for survival in a hostile environment. The petty bourgeois origins of the Zionist movement and of the state, together with the tasks it had to. perform (gather. integrate and organise a diverse population over one geographic area) explain the specificity of the Israeli state. This petty bourgeoisie did not seize state power from a comprador-landlord ruling class. as happened in countries such as Syria. Egypt. and Iraq; nor did it lead a struggle of decolonisation. as happened in many of the African countries. It created the state. This explains its reactionary character and its open and articulated alliance with imperialist interests. not only in the Arab and Mediterranean area but also in Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America.18 Furthermore, in the process of formation and creation, the Israeli state had to displace the Palestinian people. which explains its overt militarism and racialism. Israel is completely integrated in the world capitalist system (e.g., the bulk: of imports and exports are with the capitalist countries) and its relations of production are capitalist relations. The relationship between labour power and the means of production is a wage relationship. The Kibbutz system- which contains less than 3% of the population-is integrated, both economic- ally (produces for the capitalist market) and militarily (Kibbutz members are trained. armed and supervised by the Israeli army) into the state. The ruling class in Israel is the Bureaucratic (state) class, represented most clearly by 1he Israeli labour party, the Histadrut and the army. The Israeli army plays a role as an extremely important organisational apparatus for integration. Conscription ensures that every adult male and female goes through the military machine (with its emphasis on discipJiine, chauvinism. and constant external threat) and that they remain part of that army when they leave to their various civilian occupations (that is, retain a rank and are allocated to a military unit). They are liable to recall at any time. Thus. the Israeli state can raise an army of about a third of a million within 60 UTAFITI 72 hours-this out of a tatal populatian af three miHion inhabitants. As in Jardan, the army consumes the major part af the budget and is externally dependent an foreign aid from the imperialist cauntries. '" American imperialism has ensured that the Israeli army is constantly equipped with the latest and most sophisticated military equipment.2° Thus an understanding af the rale af the army in Israel is extremely important, far without its weakening (and hence the weakening of the state and the cohesiveness of the rwing class and its hald an the Israeli population), internal cantradictians (including class contradictions) are likely to. remain muted. This means that armed struggle is basic to. any revalutianary actian against the Israeli state. The limited military blaw that the Israeli army received during the Octaber war21 had a clear and manifest effect on the cahesion af the rwing class, and also braught a certain amount af open hastility to. the ruling class from some sectars af the populatian. The canflicts were sufficient to. farce the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to. change some af its politica:l representa- tives (e.g., the removal of Dayan and GaIda Meir, amang athers). The military losses have been more than compensated for by American military and financial aid. Israel received the equivalent af three billian dallars in military and other aid during 1974. Since the Octaber War, the Israeli ruling class has been preparing itself for anather military attack on neigh- bouring Arab countries (the most likely target being Syria). This is in order to re-esta61ish its prestige and demonstrate its value to imperialism on the ane hand (especially after European imperialism began to. shaw signs of daubt as to. the value af Israel as a sub-imperialist base in the area) and to. mute and cantain the internal discontent that emerged after, and as a direct result of the Octaber war, and because of the deteriorating economic situation with increasing unemployment and rising cost of living.2' Major Israeli military aggressian against the Arab people has always been initiated when specific conditions are present. Internally they have come during periods of worsening economic conditions and increasing poli- tical unrest, and the beginning of emigration fram Israel, especially from among the Eurapean petty bourgeois. 28 Externally, such a period has been characterised by slackening of fareign aid and investments in Israel, together with an American interest in increasing its cantrol in the area. This is true of 1956 with the Israeli-British-French aggression against Egypt, and of June 1967. In June 1967 Israel came to. occupy the whale of Palestine. the whole af Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights. Israeli leadership was faced with the task of deciding upon a policy in the populated occupied areas, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli leadership was faced with a dilemma. Expansionism has always been a basic tenet of Zianism. However, unlike the situatian in 1948, when the majority of the Arab Palestinian popwation 61 were driven out, in 1967, having learnt the lessons of 1948, the majority of the Araib Palestinian population in the West Bank and Oaza Strip refused to UTAFITI budge. They remained put in spite of the various attempts to drive them out. Hence, the expansionist tendency (territorial annexation) came into conflict with the tenets of the exclusiveness of the Jewish state and its "racial purity" (be£ause of the absorption of over one million new Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip). The commercial, agricultural and industrial Israeli bourgeoisie saw in the West Bank and Gaza Strip a reservoir of cheap labour and a new market for their commodities. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, tended to view the occupied Palestinian population in political terms, i.e., as representing a threat to the "purity and exclusiveness" of the Zionist state, an explosive element that could tear Israeli society apart. Gradually a compromise was reached between the two factions. The occupied territories are to be integrated economically but to remain isolated politically and under strict military control. Thus a process of moulding the economies of -the West Bank and Gaza Strip to meet the needs of the Israeli economy was begun in early 1968. That is, a process of rapid colonia- lisation began in the occupied area. By 1973 the economies of the West Bank and Gaza became dependencies of the Israeli economy. Thus, after 1970 the occupied areas became the second major importers of Israeli goods after the U.S.A. with only a fractional difference between the two. According to official Israeli statistics, the balance of trade between Israel and the occupied area showed a surplus of 1.6 billion Israeli pounds during the period between July 1967 and October 1973. Import of Arab labour remained restricted, but each year the quota of Palestinian labourers allowed to work in Israel was raised. The number of Arab workers from the occupied territories increased from about 10,000 in 1968 to nearly 80,000 before the October War (representing nearly 40% of the tatal labour force). Now the Israeli bourgeoisie found in them a source of cheap labour (mostly unskilled or semi-skilled hard physical labour employed in building industries, manufacturing and agriculture). The state bureaucracy found in them a source of revenue. Since Israeli labour laws applied to these workers, something like 40% of their gross wages had to go to the state. The Israeli workers who pay these taxes get various benefits in return for these deductions (sickness benefits, pensions, paid holi- days, etc.). However, the Arab workers received none of these benefits, while having 4010 of pay deducted. The Israeli state was exacting tribute from the Arab workers of the occupied territories. Israeli ~which are likely to underestimate the amount-reported that the Israeli state was collecting, through these deductions, about half a million Israeli pounds every day from Arab workers. Thus Arab labour was subject to a double exploitation: an exploitation by the bourgeoisie which took the form of profit, and exploitation by the state, which took the form of tribute. The Israeli bourgeoisie did not depend solely on migrant Arab labour 62 UTAFITJ which travdled daily to' wQrk inside Israel. They went in search of cheap labour in the occupied territQries themselves. Cottage-type industries were soon started where women's labDur was exploited in sewing, embrQidery, weaving, etc., fDr Israeli businessmen. SDme Israeli industries were started. Small peasants became prDletarised as they fQund they eQuId nO'longer subsist Dn their farms with the rapid rise in the cost O'f living. Large landowners turned to' the production Qf agricultural crops that could be marketed in Israel and to' partially mechanised agriculture because of the labour shortage created by the opening up of the Israeli labour market to' Arab labour. The Israeli military OCcupatiDn authDrity adopted a CO'nscious policy Df "nDn-interference" in local affairs and daily administratiDn. Municipal administratiO'n remained in local hands. supervised by the O'xupatiO'n fDrces-a typical colonial practice. At variDus points the Israeli leadership attempted to' create a quisling Arab leadership in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It WQuid probably have succeeded had it nDt been for the existence Df the Resistance mDvement which came to' be viewed by mDst of the poorer classes as their sDle representative. The major Resistance grQups established underground cells in the occupied territories. These engaged in military QperatiQns against Israeli targets and against. collaOOrl!,tQrs. The Israeli authO'rities also adopted a policy of "open ,bridges" (keep- ing the bridges across the Jordan River that link the West Bank with the East Bank O'pen.to' the mDvement of goods and people). This had a double pUl"}JO>c. PO'litically it kept the West Bank linked to' Arab ma:rkets, especi- ally to' that O'f the East Bank. Indeed, Israel initiated a policy of encouraging exports frO'm the West Bank to' Arab markets'" This was dO'ne fO'r twO' reasons: firstly, Israeli cQmmodities can be infiltrated intO' Arab markets thrO'ugh the JQrdan Bridge, and secO'ndly, the exports O'f local agricultural and manufactured products in the East Bank created a wider market in the West Bank and Gaza Strip fO'r Israeli products. Thus the wages that the Arab wO'rkers received in Israel were spent Dn buying Israeli imported commodities. The value of these imports increased annually to' reach nearly half a billiO'n Israeli pounds in 1972. Moreover, the "open-bridge" policy ensures the mQvement Df money intO' the West Bank and Gaza from family-supporters. working in the oil states and East Bank. On the pDlitical-ideological level it is meant to' induce a feeling of nDrmality and stability to' people both inside and O'utside the occupied territO'ries. People outside can come and visit their relatives (after obtaining the necessary permit from the Israeli authorities through their relatives in the occupied areas) and similarly people in the occupied terri- tories can leave the West Bank and Gaza fDr travel and study. Zionism. hO'wever, is a settler-colQnial mQvement. It could not remain satisfied with economic colonisation of the occupied area. After the annexa- tion O'f Jerusalem and its envirQns it initiated a programme of CO'lonial 63 settlement. Between July 1967 and September ]973, 46 Zionist settle- ments were created in the occupied territories. Large stretches of land UTAFm were seized and settlements were built on them. Plans were devised for