THE POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION AND INDIFFERENCE: UNITED STATES AND AFRICA

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The growing importance of Africa in contemporary world affairs and the responsibilities of the U.S. as the major power in the "free world" have contributed to a re-examination of American foregn policy towards Africa. For quite sometime now this policy has been a subject of considerable interest and controversy among scholars, diplomats, African leaders, American policy-makers and Congressmen. It has been hotly debated at conferences and Congressional hearings, as well as a focus of acrimonious exchanges between American academic Africanists and editors of the American press. Since the late 1960s private American organisations such as the African-American Institute and Phelps-Stokes, which are concerned with the development of mutually beneficial relations between Africans and Americans, have been holding in Africa, and also in the United States, a series of dialogues, conferences and stimulating seminars, with a view to improving African-American understanding.[1] For, as recently described by Franklin Williams, president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, African-American relations "are now at the nadir of their fortunes."[2] Consequently, American policy and prestige in Africa are drifting steadily downward. The massive opposition by various groups and organisations in Ghana against Henry Kissinger's April 1976 tour of some selected African coutries, coupled with the last-minute refusal of the Ghana Military Government to receive the Secretary of State is a case in point.[3]

One fact has become evidently clear. Despite stylistic differences, significant thougn they can sometimes be, the most important fact about American policy towards Africa since the early 1940s is not its change but its continuity[4]. It has been a policy of consistent indifference to major African problems and legitimate aspirations, the only exception to this stance being perhaps a portion of the Kennedy era. Precisely the pattern has been of consistent support of the colonialists and the white redoubt. This policy has become noticeable since the Nixon era. For under the Nixon administration Africa enjoyed not just low priority, but perhaps "the blessed" status of non-existence for important policy-makers and leaders. It was a policy of "status quo" and "fait accompli". The advent of Gerald Ford has not meant a perceptible change of direction in this policy. On the contrary, Secretary Kissinger's strategy is more firmly fixed than before since Ford does not pretend to have Nixon's knowledge of foreign affairs.

It is easy to follow the trend towards a hardening of the US policy towards Africa in recent years. It has become evidently clear that official American attitude is one of marginal interest. In the American Senate, there seems to be little more than an overwhelming lack of interest in African affairs. Most observers agree that

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HenryKissinger, perhaps the most dominant Secretary of State in U.S. history, has shown no real interest in Africa. He does not consider relations with Africa as crucial tc U.S. strategic and national interests. And he does not think of African issues in the same way as Detente or the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the whole Kissinger's interest in Africa may be described as one of "benign neglect". President Ford does not even mention Southern African, one of the world's most potential sources of conflict, in his "State of the World" address. Despite the recent changes in Southern Africa, following the April 1974 coup d'etat in Portugal, the major orientation of U.S. policy on this sub-continent has remained unchanged. The U.S. is the only country in the world that has passed legislation which openly violates the U.N. economic sanctions on the illegal Ian Smith fascist regime in Rhodesia. This open violation of a treaty obligation under the Charter and the U.N. Participation Act has provided the illegal regime with much needed foreign exchange and psychological support. The Ford administration's recent efforts to get this legislation the Byrd Amendment of 1971 - repealed have dismally failed. In pursuit of this policy of consistent support of the minority white regimes in Southern Africa, Kissinger quickly replaced U.S. African Assistant Secretary Donald Easum mainly because of his alleged "pro-African" policies and his efforts in dialogue towards change in South Africa. In his place was selected, despite OAU's concerted protests, Nathaniel Davis, a diplomat with no experience in Africa, and who had recently been in the headlines for his role in the destabilization of the Allende government while ambas sador to Chile[6]. Again, indifferent to African opinion, the U.S. intervened in the current Angolan imbroglio, and overtly supported Zaire's efforts to eliminate the MPLA which has over the years been supported by the OAU Liberation Committee. America vastly increased its military aid to FNLA, thus helping to destroy any possibility of even a tenuous Unity Government. All this has been underscored in recent months by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Daniel P. Moynham, who advocated a series of diplomatic incidents to put America on the political offensive, to make it " feared" in the Third World. It seems some American policy-makers still do not understand the nature of Third World nationalism, nor are able to distinguish it from international communism.

In recent years therefore, American-African relations have been charac erised by confrontation, indifference and misunderstanding. For despite involvement in treaties of all sorts with the U.S., numerous African statesmen have deliberately adopted "an anti-American posture" in their search for popular approval. Even the American foreign-aid programme has done little to stifle criticisms. It is against this background that this article attempts a critical review of U.S. policy towards African over the years in the light of recent research. Congressional hearings, policy recommendations by the Congressional Black Caucus and the response of the Ford administration to pressure for a vigorous and comprehensive policy towards Africa. Basically this study would argue that the present U.S. policy is not related to the dynamics of change in Africa nor to the reality of the Third World. On the contrary, it relates most effectively to the static reality of the status quo that as events have demonstrated, is likely to be temporary. There is therefore the need for basic rethin-

king by the United States about a new American policy towards Africa, grounded on rational objectives and conceptions of national interest, governed by some overall framework of priorities, and inspired by some sense of national principle and responsibility

Much of the criticism of U.S. policy towards Africa is centred on its reflection of a duality of approach: the intertwining of idealistic declarations with hard-headed pursuit of national interest as a basic element of U.S. foreign policy. Many explanations have been offered for this contradiction between what Henry Kissinger recently repeated, continued American major concern "that self-determination, racial justice and human rights spread to all Africa" on the one hand,[7] and on the other U.S. consistent and vigorous support for the maintenance of Africa under colonial rule and for the forces attempting to maintain the status quo in Southern Africa. Scholars like Clinton Knox, Walderman Nielsen and Vernon McKay have variously explained this dichotomy in terms of the rather low priority that strategic defence and economic interests in Africa hold in U.S. view of world areas considered important, if not vital, to US policy considerations.[8] These scholars quickly cite in support of their contention what economist Andrew M. Karmack wrote in 1958 and emphasized in 1965 that America "could get along without African commodities and markets with an imperceptible ripple in our standard of living"[9].While accepting the increasing importance of Nigeria as a major supplier of petroleum to the United States, Knox is doubtful as to the possibility of Nigeria ever utilizing its petroleum resources to pressure the U.S. on policies and actions directed to other areas and countries of Africa[10] It is contended, therefore, that U.S. strategic interests in Africa in terms of defence, trade, and investments, as forming the basis of U.S. foreign policy, are not very significant in relation to U.S. interests in other areas. In the opinion of Knox, it is this lack of "interest that contributes in part to the application of policies regarded by African leaders as inimical to the continent."[11] In other words, this lack of interest in Africa has made the United States ally herself with the most reactionary forces on the African continent and resist the aspirations of Africans and their leadership. While for a static view of economic relations this premise of the marginal nature of African-US trade relations, as argued by Knox, is acceptable, it cannot be tenable for a long-term dynamic analysis of international economic relations. As will be demonstrated later in this study, the arguments of Knox would appear to be an oversimplification of the economic and political realities of Africa today.

On the other hand, scholars such as Ofuatey-Kodjoe have critically analysed US policies in Africa against the background of US policies and interests around the world. In a recent study, Ofuatey-Kodjoe has argued that the United States "has defence or strategic interests in Africa that are derived from the overall policy of trying to contain international communism."[12] Africa was considered by the US as a link in the ring of alliances designed to "contain" international communism. It was therefore in the interest of US to keep black Africa under the colonial control of her NATO allies. In the view of Ofuatey-Kodjoe, the underlying factor of US policy has been both anti-African and racist.[13]

In the context of earlier US policies of Communist containment and, later, competition with the Communist powers in an atmosphere of *detente*, this idea has some validity. However, as the period before the Communist threat has not received adequate attention from scholars, it is necessary to provide a continuity by explaining the nature of U.S. policy towards Africa during the war years. Did the Communist threat fundamentally change this policy? Secondly, the introduction of race by Ofuatey-Kodje as a motivation of US foreign policy calls for a critical assessment of the various factors, conflicting interest groups and linkages which characterize US relations with Africa. Within this context it is necessary to establish the importance or overwise of racial linkages as one of the major determinants of US attitudes towards the African continent.

I.

Following the traditional Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination as a basic element of foreign policy, President Roosevelt and such highly placed Americans as Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, Wendell Willkie, Henry Wallace and Reinhold Neibuhr repeatedly expressed their opposition to colonialism during the war years. They made it clear to their European allies that the 'Age of Imperialism' was over and that it would become essential after the war for them to grant self-determination to their colonial territories. Winston Churchills's intransigence on colonial issues and his interpretation of Atlantic Charter drew criticism from many influential Americans.[14] The strong anticolonial stance was vigorously declared by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on July 23, 1942:

> .....We have always believed and we believe today that all peoples, without distinction of race, colour, or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept tne reponsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment..... It has been our purpose in the past will remain our purpose in the future to use the full measure of our influence to support the attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it.[15]

In the context of the time this was a bold statement that must have given encouragement to nascent African nationalist movements. James Coleman and other scholars of African nationalist politics have adequately discussed how such US anti-colonial pronouncements stimulated the interests of the rising forces of nationalism in Africa.[16]

The question immediately arises: How faithful is the U.S. to this Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination in relation to Africa? While this principle seems to explain and justify American action in Yugoslavia, Formosa, Israel and other areas, it does not appear to be reflected in U.S. attitudes towards the African continent generally. In the case of Africa, the commitment to the Wilsonian doctrine has given rise to a series of contradictions. For long before the Communist threat US had compromised its anti-colonial objectives whenever possible, and vigorously pursued a pro-colonial policy towards Africa. For example, as early as November 2, 1942, Ambassador Robert Murphy, then a special diplomatic representative of President Roosevelt, sent a confidential despatch to General Henry Giraud, the

French representative in North Africa, assuring him that the "restoration of France, in all her independence, in all her grandeur and in all the area which she possessed before the War, in Europe as overseas, is one of the aims of the United States."[17] This was indeed "an iron-bound guarantee" to French imperialism. On the other hand, the anti-colonial stance was vigorously reinforced at the San Francisco conference of 1945 which created the United Nations. At this conference, W.E.B. Du Bois, Walter White and Mary Mcleod Bethune of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), who were invited by the American government, urged the United States to take the lead in the campaign for colonial independence. Du Bois submitted a proposal forbidding any nation to use racial criteria to limit participation in government, but it was rejected by the American delegation. The trusteeship system was largely an American product, and one American delegate admitted that it was essentially" a modernization of the mandates system."[18] The three Negro advisers fired off protests to the State Department, and Walter White complained personally to President Harry Truman.[19] In a blistering editorial, *Crisis*, the widely-read organ of the NAACP, declared that by voting against the proposal for colonial freedom, the United States had renounced its own revolutionary heritage.[20] It would appear, then, that the Wilsonian commitment has been "troublesome" to the U.S. policy makers even as far back as the early 1940s.

It is worth emphasizing, therefore, that before the Communist threat and development of the cold war, the US had made her policy of keeping Africa in the hands of the European colonial powers evidently clear, despite official rhetoric to the contrary. The period of the Second World War is, therefore, a useful starting-point in any assessment of US policy towards Africa. The pattern of US policy which was set during that period was consistently followed in the subsequent years. It was a policy which was fundamentally contradictory and irreconciliable in its objectives. The contradiction was based on the US desire to adhere to her commitment to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations on one hand, and on the other, the desire to restore the "grandeur" of the colonial powers. The Communist threat did not fundamentally change this policy: it vigorously reinforced it.

The complete disregard by the United States of her ideological heritage should be perhaps explained in terms of her new role as a world leader. In her isolationist period the practical consequences of vague ideological statements of sympathy with dependent peoples were comparatively innocuous. For a world leader and, moreover, the strongest member of the Western Alliance, to make such statements was a completely different matter. During the period 1945 to 1950, the United States somewhat reluctantly awoke to her leading world role. The awakening was perhaps only fully achieved by the threat to her national interests posed by Soviet imperialism. Many American opinion-makers maintained that because of the revolution in global communications and military strategy, extensions of Soviet power in any part of the world created a threat to American hemispherical security. Thus,. any Soviet penetration of the Western European colonies was of concern to the United States. This consideration came to the fore in the early 1950s with the

upsurge of the Afro-Asian anti-colonial drive and the Soviet Union's decision to give it active support. It is against this background that between 1945 and 1947 the Truman administration supported French efforts to re-establish colonial control over Indochina, remained silent as the British moved back into Southeast Asia, and treated the former Italian colonies in North Africa as pawns in the contest with the Soviet Union[21].

Thus, despite the presence of restless new self-determination forces, the decade following the Second World War witnessed the reinforcement of colonial power in Africa. Black Africa was seen as a "strategic resource and manpower supplier" in the developing Cold War. America therefore opposed African nationalistic objectives, and reinforced the racial-economic dominance by the West. During the Algerian war, for example, the US went so far as to become a substantial arms supplier and financier. Henry Cabot Lodge, the then US representative to the UN, declared in 1955 that Algeria was "administratively an integral part of the French Republic" and that it would be a "grave danger" to the future of the United Nations if the organisation took up questions whose consideration would conflict with the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter.[22] Similarly, the US kept up the consistent practice of voting with the colonial powers to ward off attempts to terminate colonialism through various organs of the UN.[23] Thus it was American power, her economic, military, and intelligence agencies which "gave a transfusion to the dying colonial system that undoubtedly sustained it for a decade or longer against the gathering forces of nationalist liberation.....[24]

It is not without significance to observe that African nationalist movements were not unaware of the objectives of US attitudes towards their continent. They were not at all convinced of the sincerity of what scholars like Herbert Spiro or Clinton Knox have emphasized as the Rooseveltian objectives of economic and political advancement for the colonial area of the world.[25] On the contrary, they were quick to note that American interest was not in Africa itself but as a means for the achievement of US anti-communist objectives. Many articulate nationalists thus came to identify American policy with a kind of pathological anticommunism and an interest in Africa not for itself but only as a counter in the cold war. This trend of African thinking seriously disturbed many US public officials at that time. In a major address on African policy given in mid-1950, George McGhee, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs, frankly admitted that the U.S. Marshall Plan, as applied to the overseas territories of the European powers, was being regarded as "an important" object of suspicion among many educated Africans who considered it "as a device to strengthen or perpetuate the hold of the European powers over the African territories."[26]

The United States' wrestling with the principles of self-determination and racial justice in Africa versus support for the colonial and minority white regimes in the continent came under increased pressure following the intensity of the demands of the African nationalist movements for independence. This situation created an uncomfortable dilemma for the officials of the United States. The heritage of idealism expressed in such documents as the Virginian Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Inde-

pendence, and the United States Constitution, made them sympathetic to Afro-Asian anti-colonialism. However, they were also vitally concerned with combating Soviet ambitions; the Soviet Union being a vociferous supporter of the drive against Western European colonialism (with which she identified the United States). Thus, the United States had to resolve the tension between a dislike of colonialism and an antipathy towards communism. The perplexity was made more acute in that the Western European colonial Powers were her most important allies in the world-wide struggle with the Soviet Union. There was the further consideration that severe colonial set-backs might threaten the fragile political stability of particular metropoles because of possible strengthening of local extremist groups. Concurrent with the need for Western European stability was the consideration that the greater the economic viability acquired from colonial relationships, the more Western Europe could allocate to the Western Alliance's financial and military resources.

An official American view of the dilemma was given by Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen in an address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science in April 1956. His remarks refer specifically to French North Africa, but are an apt summary of the official American view of the problem:

> Because of our origins and traditions, we are basically in sympathy with the desire for independence and nationhood of the emerging states, but we are also friends and allies of the Powers who must help to shape this new status. This places us in a position from which we hope and believe our influence can be exerted to make the transformation of Africa a process of orderly evolution and not one of violent revolution[26].

The government responded to this dilemma by attempting to follow what it considered a middle course, assuring colonial peoples of American sympathy and goodwill while supporting or acquiescing in the continuation of European control[27]. This strategy was alluded to by John Foster Dulles on his appointment as Secretary of State in 1953. In his maiden speech Foster Dulles promised that the United States would never waver from its belief in "orderly transition from colonial to self-government status" but declared that the government would exercise restraint lest precipitate action produce" captivity far worse than present dependence"[28].

By the early 1960s majority of African states had achieved independence. Although the US policy and relationships in Africa did change, U.S. followed the lead of the European powers and never supported nationalism or neutralism against those powers. More significantly, America lent its support to British and French efforts to maintain the closest ties possible with their former dependencies in the continuation of the process of acculturation. In other words, the United States supported what became popularly known as "neocolonialism" in Africa. This was important because, as expressed by Gabriel Almond, "the survival of Western culture is dependent upon its assimilation in significant measure in the modernizing societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America."[29] Thus apart from strategic considerations the other national interest of the US was to assimilate African territories into Western culture. These two aspects of US national interest in Africa were indeed complementary, and not mutually exclusive. For the more the African territories

became assimilated into Western culture the more their orientations would be disposed to rejecting Communist military or ideological inroads. As Ofuatey-Kodjoe has recently argued, while the strategic aspect of US national interest "was concerned with the defense of the republic and the free world,' the cultural aspect 'was concerned with creating the kind of 'free world' that would be compatible with the long-term survival of American culture."[30]

II.

It is when considered against the background of the Southern African situation that the US interests, as indicated above, assume a wider dimension. It is on the Southern African problem, therefore, that current confrontation between the United States and Africa is centred. It is here, too, that the contradictions in, and short-sightedness of, US policy are clearly demonstrated. Evidence seems to indicate that in their efforts to ensure regional stability and the existence of strong anti-communist governments, both vital for the protection of American corporate investments, US policy makers have all along considered the principles of self-determination and majority rule in Southern Africa expendable. A major objective of US policy has been to avoid confrontation with the colonial and white minority governments in power. Hence, in general US policy has been weak and non-in-initiating — reactive rather than active.

In the case of Portugal it was the perceived strategic value of the Azores and the militantly anti-communist posture of the Salazar-Caetano regimes which underlay both the US close relationship with Lisbon and her willingness to accept almost completely uncritically Portugal's claim to the "back-water" colonies of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. In spite of the independene of the former Portuguese African colonies, there is little evidence of any significant re-thinking of US policy towards the new states. Similarly, although the heart of US Southern African policy is the Republic of South Africa, there is hardly any evidence of US redefining its status quo policy towards the Republic following the recent changes in this sub-continent occasioned by the April 1974 coup in Portugal. On the contrary US policy still continues to be much more dynamically keyed to the forces attempting to maintain the status quo than to the forces of change. Hence South Africa remains the last retreat of the cold war strategists, multinational corporate interests, and the Anglo-Saxon congressional racists. For strategic, political and economic reasons United States has become one of South Africa's chief allies. The guiding principles of American policy are: political stability and concurrent containment of Communist influences in Africa's southern cone; continued use of air and naval facilities in South Africa and the former Portuguese colonies in support of United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean and other activities; easy access to South Africa's raw materials, notably uranium; and concern with orderly trading in her gold.

In pursuit of these principles the US has given every indication of its support for the South African minority white regime. The toughest policies against the Republic have in fact been emasculated: support for the termination of South Africa's mandate over Namibia and the discouragement of investment in that country has been weakened by the unwillingness of the US to engage in implementing action through the United Nations and particularly by its refusal to serve on the

UN Council for Namibia. American protection of South Africa's position was expressed on 30 October, 1974, when the US together with Britain and France, vetoed the African initiative to expel South Africa from the UN. And in June 1975, the US vetoed a Security Council resolution, calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter after noting South Africa's failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 366 of December 1974 (supported by the US).

The US investments, her favourable trade balances, and American corporations in particular, have done much to develop both strategic industries and economic self-sufficiency in South Africa.[31] Regardless of the motives of these corporations, their investments have the effect of increasing South Africa's military strength, its chances of withstanding international sanctions, and its technological capability to repress the majority African population. This has been underscored by the sale of enriched uranium and nuclear technology that would be useful in creating nuclear weapons in South Africa. The Republic has recently opened a uranium enrichment plant for which the pilot enriched nuclear material and some of the technology was procured from American firms. In addition to the full range of dangers that attends any proliferation of nuclear capability, there is the unique likelihood that South Africa's principal targets for nuclear weapons would be the black African States.[32] Thus, at the very period when white minority rule faces its ultimate challenge US ties with the South African regime have become more entrenched.

Paradoxically, it is the former colonial powers, Britain, France, and most recently Portugal, that have been the first to reach some economic and political accommodation with Africa in response to the changes in the world power configuration. Through the Lome Agreement of February 1975, signed with the forty-six African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (ACP) the nine members of the European Economic Community have taken a major step to respond to the economic arrangements advocated by the developing countries. By proposing a general agreement on commodities at the 1975 Commonwealth meeting in Jamaica, Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Great Britain reflected a further tilt in this direction.

More significantly, the US principal allies have given every indication of forward movement in the Southern African policy. Britain, for whatever reason, abrogated the Simonstown Agreement with South Africa, and France has announced an important modification of its arms policy with the Pretoria government. However, even after Portugal recognised that independence of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola was inevitable, the U.S. was the only country to veto Guinea-Bissau's admission to the World Health Organization (WHO). When in September 1973 Guinea-Bissau unilaterally declared her independence from Portugal, the State Department bitterly objected to her recognition at the U.N. These events suggest a trend to dismiss the concerns of the black states and to move towards a more open and forthright promotion of U.S. tangible interests in the white-ruled states of Southern Africa. It will be instructive at this stage to analyse briefly the major concerns of the African states.

III.

The interests of African states may be briefly outlined. Since African states attained statehood there appears to be two fundamental problems which tend to dominate African issues, and also, to some extent, African States' relations with the outside world. The two crucial problems and their closely related goals, such as promotion of unity and solidarity in Africa, the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states, have become the major interests of African states. The first problem is the struggle against colonialism and racism. There is perhaps no single issue on which the African states share fundamental agreement more than the issue of the liberation of all remaining colonial territories in Africa.. Since the convening of the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra in April 1958, all the African leaders have shared the belief that collective struggle against colonialism represented an essential ingredient of African unity and their individual national security. They have been justifiably distressed by the fact that Africa is the only continent where the phenomenon of international colonization has survived into the "civilized" world. Even when the African states split into rival Casablanca and Monrovia groups, they remained united in their opposition to colonialism and racism. They have been unequivocally insistent upon recognition of their equality and the elimination of racial discrimination wherever it exists. This issue is closely tied up with respect for the principle of human rights.

Since about 1964, the anti-colonial offensive both in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, as well as at such important conferences as those held in Lusaka in April, 1969[33] and Oslo in April 1973[34] has concentrated on the territories continuing under Portuguese control and the white-minority regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia. For it is in this area that the march of progress and independence has encountered several obstacles which unduly retard, at the cost of much suffering, a fundamental historical development. Africa's independence and unity are threatened by the continuation of the hard core problems of colonialism and racism in the south. More significantly, the continent of Africa cannot be powerful and influential until Southern Africa is free. The issue of decolonization of Southern Africa has therefore been the central feature of African politics today. It has been at the fore-front in the minds of African heads of state and government especially since the creation of Organisation of African Unity in May 1963.[35] The Charter of the OAU itself is vehemently dedicated to the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa.[36] It is essentially a charter of liberation. Through resolution after resolution, declaration after declaration, the OAU has sought to identify the whole of Africa with the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa.[37]

The second major interest of Africa States is centred on the trials of economic development, exacerbated by the problems of the world economy and quite recently by the exorbitant rises in the price of oil. All indicators point to the fact that economic development ranks next to colonialism as the topic of greatest concern in the hierarchy of values of African States. Economic development has indeed become the highest

national goal of the people of Africa as well as a symbol of their drive for a more significant role in world affairs. Although much progress has been made, development hopes in Africa have too often been crushed by the cycles of natural disasters and the shocks of worldwide economic instability. On the whole, acceleration of economic growth by improving access to capital, technology and management skills has been one of Africa's fundamental problems.

In this field, however, there have been fewer instances of conflict of interest between the United States and Africa than in that of politics. One major instance of this conflict that has emerged over the years is centred on the question of ultimate control over the economic destinies of Africa. For in order to complete the goal of their political independence, African states have justifiably initiated policies with a view to enlarging the control over their own economic destinies, particularly in the exploitation of natural resources. These critical areas of natural resources are the very ones in which "U.S. private direct investment is concentrated."[38] Without any real means of assessing and controlling foreign performance, some African states have resorted to nationalization of the assets of foreign companies in petroleum and minerals. Since American corporations are in an unfavourable position to adjust to these moves, this area is considered a source of conflict between Africa and the United States.

Secondly, there is a general belief that the U.S. has not seriously and consistently responded to Africa's economic development problems, and this is viewed as a source of serious concern among African states. While it is recognized that Africa receives a higher share of resource transfers in the from of grants than any other region, closer analysis reveals that "Africa is allocated fewer resources on a per capita basis".[39] Besides, although Africa contains the largest number of least developed and most seriously affected countries of any other region[40], the Ford administrations "FY 1976 Agency for International Development Budget" submitted to Congress requested less for Africa than any other region.[41]

However, as we have indicated above, it is in the field of politics that the conflicting interests between the United States and Africa become more evidently clear. African states have had numerous occasions to observe that, with very few exceptions, the United States policies and actions are consistently opposed to African legitimate political interests. It is this conflict which has done much to erode the prestige and reservoir of goodwill which the United States enjoyed in Africa since the early sixties. This prestige and goodwill had grown out of America's historical position as the first new nation, the presence in the United States of the largest aggregation of persons of African descent outside African borders and, finally, the absence of American colonial past in Africa. However, U.S. intransigence on African colonial and liberation questions has prevented it from capitalizing fully on this positive inclination towards America. Consequently, Africans have been on various occasions very bitter in their criticisms of the West. As the *Nationalist* of Tanzania commented in 1959:

> But while the American imperialists continue to do this (exploit South Africa's wealth), they should refrain from any talk of "friendship" with

> the African people. For, in the final analysis, it is not only insincere on their part but also criminal to continue soliciting for the goodwill and friendship of the African while at the same time they continue to hob-nob with the enemies of Africa.[42]

The central core of the conflicting interests between the United States and Africa is, of course, centred on Southern Africa, that "unfinished business of the emergence of Africa". We have observed that the United States policy towards this region is marked by a contradiction between stated policy and practice. This contradiction arises from the fact that America's perceived military and economic interests in Southern Africa outweigh its moral judgement and its sense of justice and humanity; this has bedevilled American policy, causing it to lag well behind the changed circumstances in Africa. In relation to the issue of Southern Africa, conflict of interests between Africa and the United States is total, intransigent, and completely irreconciliable. For while for strategic and cultural reasons the United States "is committed to the survival of the white supremacist regimes, the African states are committed to the destruction of these regimes," since their continued existence on African soil "is unacceptably incompatible with African dignity".[43] It is true that some African states are more committed than others and are prepared to assist in more open and challenging a manner than others. In the hearts of all Africans, however, there is deep hostility to discrimination and strong, unyielding opposition to colonialism. As Julius Nyerere wrote in 1971. "The issue in Southern Africa is one of principle. It does not allow for compromise, because compromise on a manner human rights is a denial of those rights".[44] This stand on huma rights and human dignity has been a crucial factor in generating the forces in Africa against colonialism. As far back as 1958 President Sekou Toure of Guinea uncompromisingly stood on this principle when, in rejecting France's bid to persuade his country to join the French Community, he proudly observed.

> We have a grave and pressing need - our dignity. But there is no dignity without freedom. For any subjection, any coercion, dishonors the man who submits, deprives him of part of his humanity and arbitrarily turns him into an inferior being. We prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery.[45]

The fundamentally irreconciliable nature of the conflct of political interests between the U.S. and Africa has been evidenced in voting at the United Nations. The U.S. has consistently refused to comply with U.N. Assembly resolutions calling for measures aganist South Africa. Rhodesia and the former Salazar-Caetano regimes in Portugal. In the 1972 General Assembly, for example, of the eight major resolutions on Southern Africa and colonial issues, the U.S. voted negatively on seven and abstained on one. For the most part the United States was joined in these votes by South Africa and Portugal.[46]

The question is: Is this consistent and vigorous support for the maintenance of minority white regimes of Southern Africa a reflection of the internal racial realities of the American society? In other words, how significant is race as a motivation for U.S. policy towards Africa? Despite G. Freyre's stimulating and scholarly analysis of the racial factor in contemporary politics,[47] this is still a subject of controversy

among scholars, particularly in relation to the United States policy towards Africa As we have stated above, scholars like Ofuatey-Kodjoe have argued that it is the "racist nature of American society that accounts for the racial aspect of conception of the U.S. national interest, which in turn leads to the policy of natural alliance with South Africa and support for Southern Rhodesia and Portugal."[48] This view may be substantiated not only by the Kerner Commission of 1968 which made history by stating, for the first time in an official report, that America is a white racist society,[49] but also by James Rosenau's conclusion that the emanation of racist foreign policies from a racist society is entirely to be expected.[50] On the other hand, in measuring the attitudes of the American public towards Africa, Alfred T. Hero, Jr. has recently asserted that "Racial developments in the United States have probably had less effect on attitudes towards Africa than popularly supposed". In his view black Americans have been "more favourably disposed toward Africa than whites on the whole, but racial attitudinal differences have been smaller than some might assume".[51] Clinton Knox's discussion of the cultural aspect of United States foreign policy[52] largely supports this contention.

There is no doubt that United States foreign policy is generally a reflection of both internal realities and a response to the changing realities in the outside world. As G.W. Shepherd has rightly pointed out, "conflicting interest groups and linkages characterize U.S. relations with Africa" and these "become especially apparent in the case of Southern Africa". Shepherd has also noted "corporate financial and ideological interests as well as racial linkages" as major determinants of U.S. relations with Southern Africa[53]. We have already referred to the phenomenal growth of U.S. investments and trade in the Southern African sub-continent. However, U.S. economic or corporate financial interests in this region should be studied alongside the enormous racial ethnic, and ideological affinity between American Anglo-Saxons and the Anglo-Saxons and Afrikaners of South Africa. The case for this becomes stronger when viewed against the background of U.S. internal racial developments over the years. For almost throughout American policies towards people of African heritage outside the United States have been viewed with suspicion. The almost virtual absence of justice and equal opportunity in American domestic affairs as perceived by Afro-Americans, and supported by the Kerner Commision's report, is assumed to be equally absent in the external relations of the U.S. Simply put, it is unlikely that a domestic racial policy which ignores justice and inequality of opportunity could be coupled with a foreign policy based on justice and equal opportunity.[54]

In this context, therefore, the importance of racial and cultural linkages as one of the determinants of U.S. attitudes towards the Southern African problem can not be easily ignored. But this factor has not received as much attention from scholars as other determints. Yet it is an important element in any overall appraisal of determinants of U.S. policy towards Southern Africa. For one must take note of the Anglo-Saxon racial band which links the United States to Europe and directly to settlers in Southern Africa. The Anglo-Saxon racial-ethnic links were best illustrated in 1965 when the United States failed to support the African request at the

United Nations for the use of force against the Rhodesian rebellion. Yet neither Britain nor the United States had hesitated to use force in Aden, Guina, Egypt and the Dominican Republic, or support whites as in Stanleyville. Quaison-Sackey's contention at the United Nations that the basis of Anglo-American action in Rhodesia had been that "the blood of white Rhodesian rebels is too sacred to be shed in the interests of African majority rule,"[55] was most apposite. The Anglo-Saxon and Afrikaner racial-ethnic links are sustained and always kept alive by private South African and Rhodesian pressure groups in the United States – such as the South African Foundation and the Rhodesian Information Office based in Washington, D.C.[56] The combined effect of these organisations on U.S. policy makers is as formidable as that of any lobbying group in Washington.

IV

The Southern African problem apart, it is perhaps important in order to appreciate fully the confrontation between the U.S. and Africa, to review briefly certain other areas of friction which tend to keep the two continents apart. Evidence seems to suggest that a major weakness in the U.S. diplomacy towards Africa is the American's failure to understand and reckon with African nationalism.[57] Consequently, certain developments in independent Africa have not met with universal approval in the United States, mainly because they are outside of the American tradition. Hence African neutralism, for example, is distasteful to many Americans who demand that the nations of that continent choose between the United States and Russian-Chinese axis, while most African statesmen resent the "theory that an either – or choice is necessary."[58] Besides, the socialist tendencies found in several African states today are a source of friction to proponents of American capitalism, even though socialism is not the same thing as Communism. Another point of friction is that African "democracy" tends to be more authoritarian than the American variety, and here, too, many Americans tend to draw parallels between Africa and the Russian-Chinese axis.

It is true that an American sensitive to the politics of the left might see African nationalism as infused with Marxism. It is also true that various African forms of socialism, one-party systems, and economic plans could lead one to believe that Africans in general are leftists. It should be argued, however, that Black Africa is an area where the voices of various political systems serve only to cover up its essentially pragmatic politics. In this connection, General I. K. Acheampong, head of the Military government of Ghana, is perhaps right in pointing out in early 1973, "that foreigners should stop judging indigenous African governments by their foreign yardsticks. We are African first and foremost. After the end of foreign domination, African Governments have been trying to evolve a system of government which suits them best. As the evidence shows, this process has not been easy. But the governments have not given up".[59] The United States should not be surprised that colonialism has not ended easily, and should not be surprised that independence has not made nation-building an easy task.

What many Americans tend to forget is that they too have had a bitter experience in the process of nation-building. America won her independence through a revolution which did not produce a stable government until eleven years had passed. Seventy-one years after the inauguration of her first president the country was torn apart in a bitter civil war. The United States' early growth was largely dependent on capital resources from Europe. Today, after two hundred years, Americans are still struggling with deep and divisive questions about freedom, equality, opportunity and justice. The process of achieving nationhood of establishing a country in which men and women can live with freedom from fear, freedom from suspicion and mistrust, freedom from want and disease, and freedom to grow and achieve their natural potential can be long and painful.

More significantly, contrary to the early anxieties of the United States, African leaders have displayed keen appreciation of their sovereignty and independence, and have been remarkably zealous in resisting the threat of communism in replacing the former colonialism. They have emphasized instead a posture of non-alignment and have sought a healthy diversification in their relations with the world outside Africa. On numerous occasions, Africans have bitten the hands of the Soviets and Chinese Communists when the latter over-extended themselves in certain countries. Furthermore, it has even been demonstrated that the mere act of aid-giving, such as the massive Soviet deliveries of arms to Algeria, or the Chinese Communist assistance for the Tan-Zam Railroad, does not lead to political dependency. The sense of self preservation, as common to nation states as it is to humans, is perhaps the best guarantee that great power conflict will be kept in check on the African continent.

V

There is a strong enough case for a positive redefinition of U.S. policy, and indeed its whole attitudes, towards the African continent. The current status quo and cold war orientation of this policy cannot be maintained for an indefinite period. More significantly, the fast shrinking of the boundaries of the white redoubt certainly suggests a reassessment of American policy south of the Zambesi River, which is based on the thinking outlined in the National Security Council Study Memorandum of 1969. If present U.S. policy continues the United States can hardly expect good relations to be established when independent states emerge in all of Southern Africa. The exclusion of U.S. from the Mozambique independence celebrations of June 1975 is a case in point — indeed an indication of future events. Although the United States could survive without having the best of relations with countries controlled by African majorities in all of Southern Africa, it could not be a simple burden to bear. It will certainly not be costless if the United States continues her present policy towards Africa. For, as the crisis in Southern Africa deepens, especially with the independence of Mozambique and Angola and the uncertainty in Rhodesia, the United States may well be subjected to joint and concerted action by many of the countries of the Third World. A joint action as demonstrated during the recent Middle East crisis and the subsequent embargo on oil to countries aiding Israel is a clear indication of this possibility. It is by no means inconceivable for the African

countries, joined by some of their friends elsewhere in the world, as evidenced in the recent Angolan crisis, to undertake similar action. Such a concerted action may in turn diminish further the influence of the United States and her ability to mobilize votes in the United Nations Assembly and committees. Already, American role in the U.N. system is on the decline.[60] But can the United States basically change its policy towards Africa, particularly towards the liberation struggle of Southern Africa?

George Houser has stated that a change in U.S. policy would be difficult "without some rather fundamental changes" within the country.[61] This change, in the view of Ofuatey-Kodjoe, must be "in the racist character of American society".[62] There can be little doubt about the importance of the racial factor in the formulation of U.S. policy towards Africa. However, there are in recent years cetain other factors which are likely to influence U.S. decision-makers. While it is true that a lot would depend upon the outcome of the 1976 presidential election, one must also take into consideration the steady growth of black political power in the United States and its inclination to influence U.S. policy towards Africa through such organisations as the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa and the Black Congressional Caucus.

Perhaps one hope for changing U.S. policy towards Africa rests in the emergence of the African Constituency to a position of influence in the American Society. The black community is Africa's natural constituency in the United States. The major change in this constituency in the 1970s has been the increased growth of black participation and the emergence of a middle class. This is reflected in the growing political sophistication of their activities, now directed more at Congress, as compared to the United Nations, and in the awareness of the techniques of influencing congressional condidates.[63] The sum total of their input is to support Africans in their economic and liberation efforts. Their weight is against any economic or military measures that support Rhodesia or South Africa, and they favour the use of necessary force by the U.N. The recent sixteen-page-statement of the Congressional Black Caucus to Secretary Henry Kissinger is expressive of the pressure of the black community in the United States on the Ford Administration to change its policy towards Africa.[64] For black Americans see U.S. support of South Africa and shilly-shallying on Rhodesia as a threat to their status in America. For most of them the African liberation struggle and the civil rights movements in America must be considered as integral and interrelated parts of the black man's struggle.[65] The future president of the United States may well have to deal with the growing black political power dedicated to the solution of Southern African racism and colonialism. The racial factor in the Southern African situation indeed can be a double-edged sword. While it links the white Americans with the racist minority regimes, it also acts as an effective catalyst for the black Americans in their identification with the blacks in Africa.

Also, much will no doubt depend on the extent of identification of the African governments, through their representatives in Washington, with this growing black political power in America. Such an identification can create a greater black awareness of Africa or mobilize the black American masses around foreign policy issues. Perhaps an establishment of a branch office of the Organization of African Unity in Washington can be a medium through which black American and African ties can be strengthened. The long-term goal must be to build a base of popular support for freedom in Southern Africa to which elected officials will be forced to respond. African states must therefore develop appropriate and judicious links with the sources of power in the American legislature; initiatives that would bring the influence of African states to bear on American policy in the interests of the primary aspirations of Africa would be a step in the right direction.

Another factor likely to influence U.S. policy towards Africa is the growing significance of American trade and investment in independent black African countries. The arguments of Clinton Knox and Andrew Kamarck about the marginal role of Africa in the U.S. economy can not be sustained in the light of realities of the 1970s. The U.S. investment in South Africa is now roughly $ 1 billion but it "will be $ 2·5 billion in Nigeria by the end of 1976 as the liquefied natural gas project gest under way".[66] In 1972 trade with South Africa "grew 2 per cent to $ 972 million and with Nigeria it grew 28 per cent to $ 384 milion",[67] Nigeria, Zaire, Algeria, Lybia, Zambia, Angola and perhaps soon-to-be independent Rhodesia are going to be far more important to the U.S. economically than South Africa. To say, as has been said ad nauseam, that Africa is unimportant to the United States economically because its total investment in Africa is only 5 per cent of its overall investment abroad, and because African-US trade is relatively small for both parties, is to miss the point altogether.

The conclusion towards which this study tends is that because of the special identification of black Americans with their African heritage, and with the economic interdependence of Africa and America becoming increasingly obvious. Americans owe it to themselves and to Africa to define clearly and to state candidly their policy towards the continent of Africa. There are important areas of policy where African and American interests coincide both economically and politically. A case in point is Nigeria's willingness to sell oil to the United States during the OPEC oil boycott in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War which proved immensely helpful to America. More recently, at the Organisation of African Unity meeting in Kampala, Uganda (July 1975), the African States blocked a resolution advocating Israel's expulsion from the United Nations. Such events point out the critical role African states can play on issues of importance to the United States. They also reinforce the necessity for inter-dependence in the modern world, which is perhaps one of the most important concepts of international relations to emerge in the last several years. Finally, they indicate the urgent need for replacement of the current sterility of confrontation and indifference with the promise inherent in collaboaration. It is worth emphasising, however, that if a viable American policy towards Africa is to be developed for the years ahead, the most obvious necessity is that it be conceived as an integral part of the whole U.S. foreign policy and that it be fitted within that framework.

Footnotes

1. Since 1968 the African-American Institute based in New York has been organising two types of conferences on this subject, namely, the "African-American Dialogues" and "Conferences of African and American Representatives". Similarly, the Phelps-Stokes Fund has been holding seminars on African-American relations. The volume, *U.S. Policy Toward Africa* (N.Y. 1975) edited by F.S. Arkhurst is a collection of papers presented at one of these seminars.
2. See Arkhurst, *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*, p.v.
3. The Ghana Government Press Release cancelling Henry Kissinger's Visit to Ghana on 29 April 1976 is contained in *Ghanaian Times*, April 29, 1976.
4. This view was strongly expressed by Charles Digs, U.S. Congressman, in "Report From the Conference of African and American Representatives", Kinshasa, Zaire, January 21 – 25, 1975, p. 11.
5. President Ford has recently nominated William Schaufele, the Inspector-General of the State Department, to be the new Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, in place of Nathaniel Davis.
6. See Henry Kissinger's "Policy Statement on Africa", September 23, 1975. Also "Africa: U.S. Policy", *Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State*, PA/MS August 1975.
7. Clinton E. Knox's comment in Arkhurst, *on cit.*, pp. 228.
8. Andrew Kamarck, "The African Economy and International Trade", in *The United States and Africa*, ed. Walter Goldschmidt (New York, Praeger, 1965), pp. 157–158.
9. Arkhurst, *cit.*, p. 229
10. *Ibid.*, p. 230
11. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Conflicting Political Interests of Africa and the United States", in Arkhurst, *op. cit.*, p 201.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Colin Cross, *The fall of the British Empire*, 1918–1968 (N.Y. 1968,) p. 233–239; Steward Baston, *The Rise and Fall of Western Imperialism* (N.Y. 1964), pp. 152–160; Russell and Muther, *History of the United Nations Charter*. pp. 75, 83 and 514.
14. Leland Goodrich and Morie J. Carroll, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. 5, July 1942–June 1943. (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1944), p. 6.
15. James Coleman, Nigeria; Background to Nationalism (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1958), pp. 230–235.
16. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (N.Y. 1962) pp. 348–9.
17. Huntington Gilchrist, "Colonial Questions at the San Francisco Conference", American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 5, October 1945, p. 985.
18. *Chicago Defender*, 2 June 1945.
19. *Crisis*, No. 51, June 1945, p. 161. For further details see James L. Roark, "American Black Leaders: The Response to Colonialism and the Cold War, 1943-1953", *African Historical Studies*, Vol. IV No. 2, 1971, pp. 253–270.
20. H.S. Truman, *Memoirs II: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, New Jersey, 1956), pp. 232–3.
21. U. S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents*, 1950–1955 (N.Y. 1971), Vol. 2, p.2301. See also W. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (N.Y. 1969), p. 253.
22. See C. Good, "The United States and the Colonial Debate", in *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 224–70; Thomas Hovet Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge, 1960).
23. See George W. Shepherd's comment in Arkhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–4.

24. Herbert J. Spiro, "U. S. Policy: An Official View", in Arkhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–71.

25. Speech before the Foreign Policy Association, Oklahoma City, 8 May, 1950, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 22, No. 572, 19 June, 1950, pp. 999–1003.

26. Department of State Bulletin, 30th April 1956.

27. Chester Bowles, *Africa's Challenge to America* (Berkeley, 1956), p. 56

28. *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXVIII, Vol. 711, 9 February 1953, pp. 110–112.

29. G. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (N.Y. 1960), p. 30.

30. W. B. Ofuatey–Kodjoe, in Arkhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

31. For details about current U.S. investment, exports to and imports from South Africa, see *Church Investments. Corporations and Southern Africa* (New York, Corporate Information Centre, 1973), pp. 8–9; "Overseas Business Reports (Market Factors in South Africa"), U.S. Department of Commerce, November 1974; *Industrialization, Foreign Capital and Forced Labour in South Africa* (New York, United Nations, 1970); Donald B. Easum, "United States Policy Toward South Africa", *Issue*, Vol. v, no. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 66–72.

32. "Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Africa, U.S. Senate, July 28, 1975" by Willard R. Johnson.

33. See *Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, April* 14–16, 1969 (Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania).

34. For the Resolutions, Papers and Documents of the Oslo Conference, See Olav Stokke and Carl Widstand, ed., *Southern Africa*, Vols. I and II, (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1973).

35. OAU Doc. AHG/Res. 7 (1); AHG(Res. 8 (1), and AHG/Res. 9 (1).

36. See OAU Charter, Article 2, para. 1 (d) and Article 3, para. 6.

37. For details see Leonard T. Kapungu, "The OAU's Support for the Liberation of Southern Africa", in Yassin El. Ayouty, ed. *The* (Praeger Publishers, N.Y. 1975), pp. 135–151.

38. Eleanora West and Robert L. West, "Conflicting Economic Interests of Africa and the United States", in Arkhurst, *op. cit.* pp. 153–184.

39. See "Congressional Black Caucus Statement to Secretary Henry Kissinger", August 19, 1975.

40. Fully 16 of the 25 least developed and 21 of the 33 most seriously affected are in Africa. See Henry Kissinger's Statement on U.S. Relations with Africa, September 23, 1975.

41. "Congressional Black Caucus Statement", *op. cit.*

42. Editorial, *Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), 25 February 1969. Cited in D. Rothchild, "Engagement versus Disengagement in Africa: The Choices for America", in *U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World:* ed. A. Jones, Jr., (David Mckay Co. Inc., 1973), p. 231.

43. Ofuatey–Kodjoe in Arkhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

44. Julius Nyerere, "South Africa: Peace or War", *Pan-African Journal*. Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 1971, p. 54.

45. Cited in Abdulrahim A. Farah, "Southern Africa: A Challenge to the United Nations". *Issue*. Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 1972, p. 14. Cf. the motto of Kwame Nkrumah's revolutionary organ, the

Accra Evening News, "We prefer Self-Government with Danger to Servitude in Tranquility"

46. "Congressional Black Caucus Statement", *op. cit.*

47. G. Freyre, *The Racial Factor in Contemporary Politics*, (University Sussex, merts, 1966).

48. Ofuatey-Kodjoe in Arkhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

49. See *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York, Bantam Books, 1968), p. 203. See also, Elizabeth Burney, Black in A White World (The Economist Brief 5, London 1968), p. 4.

50. James Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area", in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James Rosenau (New York, 1967) p. 36.

51. Alfred T. Hero, Jr., "Africa and the U.S. Public", African-American Institute Paper, cited in E. W Chester, *Clash of Titans: Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 1974), p. 268.

52. C. Knox in Arkhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 230–232.

53. George W. Shepherd in Arkhurst, *Ibid.*, p. 39.

54. For details, see Badi G. Foster, "United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: An Afro–American Perspective", *Issue*. Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 1972, pp. 45–51. See also W. R. Johnson's "Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Africa", *op. cit.*,

55. Statement by Alex Quaison-Sackey, U.N. *Monthly Chronicle*, Vol. 2, No. 2., December 1965 pp. 14–26.

56. For details, see R. J. Janosik and B. E. Lawrence, "Southern African Pressure Politics In the U.S." *Issue* Vol. IV, No. 3, Fall 1974, pp. 76–79.

57. See Boniface I. Obichere, "American Diplomacy in Africa: Problems and Prospects" *Pan-African Journal*, Vol. VII, No. 1, Spring 1974, pp. 67–80.

58. See E. W. Chester, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

59. Acheampong, I. K. "Stop Judging African Governments by Foreign Yardsticks", "Ghana Press Release 17/73, Embassy of Ghana, Information Section, Washington, D.C., January 22, 1973, p. 3. Cited in Obichere, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

60. For details, see Leon Gordenker, "The Declining American Role in the U.N. System", *The World Today*, Vol. 29, No. 4, April 1973, pp. 169–180.

61. George M. Houser, "U.S. Policy and Southern Africa", in Arkhurst, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 129.

62 Ofuatey–Kodjoe in *Ibid.*, p. 221.

63. George Shepherd in *Ibid.*, p. 52.

64. "Congressional Black Caucus Statements to Henry Kissinger", *op. cit.*,

65. See. S. K. B. Asante, "One People, One Destiny: A Century of Black American and African Relations", a paper presented at the Graduate School Seminar on 'Improving International Relations Through Understanding', Texas, Southern University, Houston, Texas, U.S., Nov. 3, 1975.

66. John A. Davis's "Comment" in Arkhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 83. Also Kissinger's "Policy Statement on Africa", *op. cit.*

67. See Bruce Oudes, "In Washington: Nigeria, Humphrey and the Chrome Caper", *Africa Report*, Vol. 18, No. 2, March–April 1973, p. 15. Coted in Davis, *Ibid.*, p. 87.

68. Henry Kissinger's "Policy Statement on Africa" dated September 1975 stresses the magnitude and relative importance of trade and investment relationships between the United States and independent black Africa.