This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of distributive policies in autocracies. Existing scholarship argues that democratic responsiveness affects distributive allocations, because voters are able to hold politicians accountable in elections. However, researchers have not sufficiently paid attention to why dictators spend significant resources on distributive policies in autocracies as well, where accountability for policy performance is relatively low or non-existent. This dissertation argues that distributive policies represent the vehicle that autocrats use to maintain political dominance and to pursue autocratic legitimation. In the first essay, I focus on political budgetary cycles in autocratic redistribution. While political budgetary cycles in democracies have been rigorously studied in past decades, surprisingly little is known about the electorally motivated budgetary cycle in authoritarian regimes. This study analyzes how dictators strategically choose the timing of welfare expansion to cultivate electoral dominance even when election results are predetermined. I argue that dictators spend more on redistributive policy in election periods, and that citizens' evaluations of redistributive policy fluctuate according to the electoral cycle. Using budgetary spending data from 63 autocratic countries between 1972 and 2015 and Afrobarometer survey data in 18 African autocracies between 2008 and 2015, this paper finds cross-national evidence of the existence of an electoral cycle in autocratic redistribution. These findings contribute to the authoritarian politics literature by exploring macro- and micro-level mechanisms about how authoritarian elections contribute to regime durability. The second essay analyzes how autocratic welfare programs affect support for dictators. This essay argues that autocratic welfare programs alleviate the adverse effects of poor economic performance on citizens' support for the dictator. Negative conditions in the national economy can undermine the performance-based legitimacy of autocratic rulers. Welfare benefits can compensate for citizens' loss of income, however, and can thus serve as a means of purchasing citizens' support. Consequently, the provision of welfare benefits contributes to building autocratic legitimation even under conditions of economic recession. Using Afrobarometer Survey data from 22 African autocracies from 1999 to 2015, I explore the micro-foundations of autocratic support with a focus on autocratic welfare programs and citizens' evaluations of the national economy.While existing studies on authoritarian politics focus on the dictator-citizen relationship to examine the motivation of autocratic distribution, little attention has been paid to how dictators allocate government resources to manage relationships with the ruling elites. The last essay argues that dictators have an incentive to staff the legislature with the elites who have a close connection. Dictators deliver more targeted government transfers to localities where these legislators are elected. By doing this, dictators can legitimize their political dominance by improving loyal legislators' policy competence. Utilizing original data about legislators' attributes in South Korean military dictatorship between 1973 and 1987, I measure dictators' connection with legislators based upon legislators' military experience. I find that legislators' military experience significantly increases the distribution of targeted government transfers in their electoral districts. This paper highlights that military dictators strategically use authoritarian legislatures and distribute targeted government transfers to manage and control military forces.
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