The use of repression by governments around the world serves as a key strategy for regimes to maintain their power. When faced with a threat, states often choose to repress their citizens as a means of quelling dissent. Recently, the literature has shown that states will also use repression preemptively when facing a potential future threat. This dissertation provides insights into this use of preemptive repression and analyzes instances where states will likely use this strategy. Specifically, chapters two and three look at the economic conditions of the country as a way to explain state use of preemptive repression. Chapter two determines that the effect youth bulges have on increased repression can be moderated by the economic condition of the state in question. Specifically, economically better off states will fail to use preemptive repression in the presence of a large youth cohort. Chapter three similarly looks at the economic condition of the state and finds that countries experiencing negative economic shocks will increase their preemptive repression as a means to insulate themselves from the unrest these shocks often bring. Beyond the idea of preemptive repression, states also desire to avoid the negative consequences often attached to their abuse of human rights like economic sanctions and a possible withdrawal of foreign aid. Thus, the final empirical chapter of the dissertation explores how foreign states can use public relations (PR) firms based in Washington D.C. to avoid the negative consequences of their use of repression without having to modify their behavior. Taken together, this dissertation provides valuable insights into state behavior and the use of preemptive repression. In addition, this project explores an, as yet, underdeveloped way in which foreign states can escape being punished for their human rights abuses.
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